As has become customary in the Spring issue of the newsletter, we list the section’s panels for APSA 2009. Rudy Sil (rudysil@sas.upenn.edu) has done a great job in managing and organizing the panels. We have about 25 panels this year. As usual there is considerable diversity in the panels, which reflects the diversity of the section membership. Panels may change between now and APSA so you should check the APSA website for the final program. This is also the occasion for me to correct a mistake in the last issue and thank Craig Thomas for his work in organizing the panels for APSA 2008.

I also encourage members to attend the business meeting and reception at APSA. The business meeting is usually on Thursday evening. It is a good chance to hear about the section; it is an even better occasion to have some interesting chats during the reception. Check the section website (http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/cqrm/section.html) for information about the business meeting, receptions, workshops, and other events.

One of the goals of the newsletter is to provide useful information and readings for the teaching of qualitative and mixed methods. The symposium on “Teaching Interpretive Methods” provides some ideas and reflections on how one can include interpretive methods in a qualitative methods class. Some discussion of interpretive methods has become standard practice in qualitative methods classes so this symposium should be of use to many instructors.

Mona Krook reviews about 50 syllabi for gender and politics classes, with particular attention to the methodology used in the readings for such classes. The diversity of the methodologies represented in these courses may surprise some readers.

As someone centrally interested in concepts and measurement, when I saw the 2008 APSA panel on “New Approaches to the Measurement of Ethnicity: Identities, Institutions, and Power,” I naturally thought this would make a good symposium. I attended the panel and got some useful ideas for my own seminars and workshops on concepts and measurement. There has been a tremendous amount of work lately on both the data on ethnic groups and the measurement of ethnic group or identity variables. Ethnic identity variables are cru-
cial to quite a few research agendas, from economic growth to civil war. At the same time, many feel that the ELF index and the data used to construct it are very flawed. The Lieberman and Singh, and Chandra articles show that one needs to include political factors such as political parties and the political institutionalization of ethnic identities in the the conception of ethnic identity and then in the collection of the data (as opposed to completely apolitical and individual-level ELF measure). The Herrera et al. piece surveys some of the core issues involved in measuring identity.

As reported in the last issue, the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research will be held in early June at Syracuse University (http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/movynihan/programs/cqrm/institute.html). Along with a new venue comes a new structure. The Institute is now being organized into two-day modules to allow for more in-depth teaching of various topics. Due to the increasing amount of material in the area of qualitative and mixed methods, there will be two concurrent modules that students can choose from, along with some common sessions for everyone. I am excited about the new location and the new structure for the Institute and I think it represents a new stage in the evolution of the teaching of qualitative and mixed methods within political science.

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**Symposium: Teaching Interpretive Methods**

**Introduction**

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Even if one does not teach interpretive methods in particular, all those who teach methods can learn something from these four symposium contributions as the essays provide grist for reflection on pedagogical strategies and goals.¹

For those readers specifically considering how to include interpretive methods in their departmental curricula, these essays recount the challenges faced by professors currently teaching such methods in the discipline. Chief among these challenges is finding space in the curricula; each of these instructors includes interpretive methods as part of a broader course, either research design (Adcock, Kubik, Schwartz-Shea) or an advanced graduate seminar or an undergraduate Scope and Methods course (Hauptmann).² On the positive side, this strategy means the opportunity to teach students who might not otherwise take a stand-alone course (especially effective if the course is in some way required).³ On the negative side, the exposure will perforce be quite limited, which raises the stakes in the choice of topics and readings (as Adcock’s analysis makes clear). Yet the fact that these inroads are occurring is concrete evidence of the impact of the last wave of disciplinary debates over methodological pluralism.

In this context, Emily Hauptmann’s contribution, “Undoing the Opposition Between Theory and Methods,” provides a fitting history lesson on the origins of disciplinary assumptions about “methods” and “methods teaching:” (a) that methods training necessarily entails an uncritical perspective on political life; (b) that political theorists have no methods; and (c) that theorists should not be involved in methods teaching. When political theorists contribute to their departmental methods curricula at either the graduate or undergraduate level, these assumptions can be surfaced and revisited—a healthy development, even if, as Hauptman puts it, she realizes “how differently many of my colleagues think about [methods]” compared with her own perspective.

Recognizing interpretive research and the methods in interpretive research is also a theme common to the other essays. Both Kubik and Schwartz-Shea remark on the taken-for-granted status of interpretive methodologies in other disciplines; their discussion and citations also demonstrate that such methods are already part of political science if attention is turned to particular parts of the discipline (e.g., legal studies, feminism) or to substantive topics in the subfields (e.g., political legitimacy, foreign policy, culture, identity, bureaucratic experience). Graduate students’ critical abilities are sharpened when they are better able to identify and assess the methods used in the interpretive research they encounter during their coursework and, subsequently, throughout their careers.

How students react to interpretive readings and ideas is carefully parsed in Robert Adcock’s essay, “Making Room for Interpretivism: A Pragmatic Approach.” He reports that students’ most positive responses are to those readings that demonstrate interpretive contributions to explanation and field research—whereas interpretivism’s ontological and epistemological stance and encouragement of reflexivity sometimes led to “rejection, rather than recognition, of the claim of [interpretive] views to be potential philosophical foundations for empirical research in the political science.” In her essay, “Teaching Interpretive Methods in Political Science: The Challenges of Recognition and Legitimacy,” Peregrine Schwartz-Shea shares a similar concern with student reaction to the possibility of interpretive research. Using an assignment that has students design quantitative-behavioral, comparative case study, and interpretive approaches to the same research topic produces, she argues, student recognition and appreciation for their “methodological others”—those who may chose to approach topics in ways different from their own inclinations and specialties.

In a manner that echoes Adcock’s approach, Jan Kubik’s essay, “Introducing Rigor to Teaching Interpretive Methods,” succinctly connects the strengths of interpretive methods and methodologies to the concerns not only of Weber, but also of rational choice sociologist James Coleman, survey researcher Laura Stoker, and game-theoretic modeler Barry O’Neill. In this way, students who most relate to these latter approaches can find initial entrée to interpretive perspectives.
In sum, the challenges of teaching interpretive methods have been met by these professors with a mixture of pragmatism, reflexivity, and innovation. And it can be argued that their efforts enrich our departments. Just as theorists of deliberative democracy argue that citizens can learn the most by listening intently to those with whom they disagree, so, too, inclusion of interpretive methods in graduate methods curricula can contribute to the vitality of a department’s research life—engendering debate in its graduate seminars and departmental colloquia. At a minimum students can learn that there is no need to fear their “methodological others.”

Notes

1 Thanks to the QMMR section for originally sponsoring this roundtable at the 2008 APSA conference in Boston and to newsletter editor Gary Goertz for encouraging the contributors to formalize their remarks for this symposium. Contributors’ syllabi are available by emailing the authors or at the CQRM website hosted at the Maxwell School: http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/cqrm/syllabi.html.

2 Although Kubik reports working on a new stand-alone course on interpretivism, it is likely that such courses are still relatively rare in the discipline. For an exception, see Lisa Weeden’s quarter-length course, Interpretive Methods in the Social Sciences, at the University of Chicago. As described in the course catalog, “This course is designed to provide students with an introduction to interpretive methods in the social sciences. Students will learn to ‘read’ texts and images while also becoming familiar with contemporary thinking about interpretation, narrative, ethnography, and social construction. Among the methods we shall explore are: semiotics, hermeneutics, ordinary language theory, and discourse analysis.” Often, stand-alone courses first become available under special topics numbers; see, e.g., a 2009 offering by Ido Oren at the University of Florida, Interpretive Approaches to Political Science. Oren’s syllabus is available through the CQRM website address in note 1.

3 For example, as Robert Adcock explains, graduate students at his institution must take either an advanced statistics course or the research design course he describes in his essay.

Making Room for Interpretivism?
A Pragmatic Approach

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Interpretivist scholars have carefully documented the minimal, at best, presence that interpretive philosophical perspectives and empirical methods have had in political science methods texts and curricula (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2002; Schwartz-Shea 2003). What are we to make of this absence? Is there a problem to be rectified here? Or an allocation decision justifiable in light of limited pedagogical time and resources? Given the profusion of philosophical perspectives and methods for accessing, generating, and analyzing data found in the social sciences as a whole, some absences are unavoidable in any single discipline. Thus, the fact of the relative absence of interpretivism in the methods training of political science graduates students cannot alone support arguments for (or against) giving it more room.¹

I expect readers of this newsletter differ, perhaps even strongly, regarding the imperative (or lack thereof) to expand exposure to interpretivism. Moreover, these differences are, I suspect, tied up with alternative assumptions about how graduate students would respond if interpretivism were given more room in methods training. One potential assumption is that greater exposure would lead more students to use interpretive perspectives or methods in their research. Alternatively, increased exposure might be expected to produce more confusion than conversions. The “conversion” assumption is probably more common among advocates of greater attention to interpretivism, and the “confusion” assumption among skeptics.² A third possibility would be a “recognition” assumption that increasing exposure may make graduate students more likely to see interpretive research as falling within the disciplinary parameters of political science, without necessarily making them more likely to undertake it themselves. The latter assumption initially motivated me to experiment with giving interpretivism some room in my methods teaching. But, as I explore below, my experiences have subsequently led me to rethink that initial assumption.

My goal in this piece is to promote treating these kinds of assumptions not as the sacred hopes (or fears) of sects fighting for the souls of students, but as tentative hypotheses. Evaluating them requires introducing some students to interpretive perspectives and methods, and reflecting upon the results. Methods instructors comfortable enough with interpretivism to give it room in their teaching are, however, usually favorably predisposed toward it. To counteract confirmation bias, those of us who make room for interpretivism must be especially attentive to the possibility of minimal or even negative outcomes. A self-critical frankness is essential if our reflections on our experiences are to be received by disciplinary colleagues as imbued not with methodological partisanship, but with pedagogical pragmatism. A pragmatic approach toward making room for interpretivism must reflectively seek out, and critically adapt in light of, the practical lessons of pedagogical experiments, whether those experiments turn out as initially hoped or not.

What Kind of Methods Course do I Teach to Whom?

There is no single recipe for giving interpretivism more room in methods training. Efforts could involve anything from adding an interpretive reading or two to an existing syllabus, to designing a full course, or even a multi-course curriculum, exploring interpretivism in its rich variety. My own effort has been limited. I have added interpretive readings to an existing graduate methods course while taking key parameters of the course as fixed. This newsletter’s sophisticated readers will be better judges than I of which aspects of my effort, and the practical lessons I draw from it, might transfer to their own pedagogical contexts. But for readers to make such judgments it is necessary that I spell out some details regarding the kind of course I have been teaching, in what broader curricular setting, and to whom.
I teach a semester-long graduate course entitled “Systematic Inquiry and Research Design” (PSc 209) to students who are nearly all pursuing a political science PhD. PSc 209 combines a short philosophy of science component with more extended readings on research design, and culminates with students writing and critiquing draft research proposals. It is part of my department’s methods sequence, which begins with a course introducing statistical thinking and tools. All PhD students take that course (or have taken its equivalent elsewhere), and they then complete their methods requirement either with an additional semester of statistical training, or by taking PSc 209.

The curricular setting of PSc 209 has two consequences for the abilities and interests of students. First, they have (or are acquiring) some familiarity with basic descriptive and inferential statistics. This has notable payoffs. For example, it helps students to engage with nuanced arguments about the conceptions of causation statistical techniques draw upon (on this topic I assign Abbott 1998 and Goldthorpe 2001). Second, students often take PSc 209 in lieu of a further statistical course if they plan to pursue primarily qualitative dissertation research. Many students thus come to the class looking quite specifically for guidance in qualitative methods. Some students are, however, designing quantitative research, and many are interested in multi-method approaches. In terms of subfield distribution, international relations is the major field of the largest number of students, followed by comparative politics, and finally American politics.

**What Aspects of Interpretivism to Include?**

My effort to make room for interpretivism is only one, and not the most important, pedagogical goal shaping the content of my PSc 209 syllabus. I thus have, at most, a few weeks of readings to play with, and can introduce only a taste of the philosophical perspectives and empirical methods of accessing, generating, and analyzing data that might be labeled interpretive. One response to these limits would be to focus the readings and explore in some depth a specific way of framing interpretivism (for example, the framing in Adcock 2003). But I opted instead to experiment with a more diverse set of readings.

The starting point for my pragmatic approach was to scatter readings reflecting various ways of approaching interpretivism throughout the semester. I did not use any kind of sampling frame in selecting readings, but in retrospect they may be summed up as offering at least two readings for each of four entry points to interpretivism:

1. Interpretivism as a general epistemological and/or ontological stance;
2. Interpretivism as a stance specifically centered on questions of explanation in social science;
3. Interpretivism as research emphasizing “reflexivity”;
4. Interpretivism as field research methods that seek understanding of others through intensive interaction in day-to-day settings.

I approached my readings as a series of practical experiments—something akin to canaries in a goldmine—to explore student reactions to varied aspects of interpretivism. I sought to gauge reactions both during seminar discussions, and via end-of-semester ratings of readings. My interpretation of these reactions then informed syllabus revisions for my next iteration teaching PSc 209: I trimmed two of the four entry points listed above (1 and 3), while expanding attention to the other two (2 and 4).

In the four sections below, I discuss, for each entry point in turn, the readings I assigned, student reactions, and my subsequent syllabus revisions. It would be disingenuous to present this process as if I were a dispassionate experimenter coolly observing reactions. I went into the course with rather well-developed priors regarding the strengths or weaknesses of alternative formulations of interpretivism (Adcock 2003). I also had assumptions regarding how students would respond to various aspects of interpretive philosophy and methods. If my subsequent syllabus revisions are one register of the results of my pedagogical experimentation, another is the updating of my own beliefs. I include below some commentary on this more personal intellectual dimension because pragmatism involves more than practical experimenting and adaptation; it also involves being reflexive about the role that the subjectivity of the scientist/scholar plays in these processes.

**Entry Point #1: Epistemology and Ontology**

Contemporary interpretivists claim the status of an autonomous third position within a tripartite division of the terrain of methodology and methods that includes also quantitative and qualitative positions (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006: xv–xiv). The claim relies, first and foremost, on the argument that interpretivists share a distinctive epistemological and ontological stance which sets them apart from a diffuse “positivism,” seen as the philosophical common ground of quantitative, and also most qualitative, political scientists. This argument was (and remains) my least favorite entry point to interpretivism (see Adcock 2009). Yet philosophical abstinence did not appear plausible either, because leading currents in recent methodological conversations—such as wide embrace of the ideal of “shared standards” (Adcock and Collier 2001; Brady and Collier 2004) among quantitative and qualitative scholars—do rely on epistemological premises questioned by many interpretivists.

My initial syllabus included two readings chosen to spotlight these issues. I selected the sixth edition of Neuman’s *Social Research Methods* (2006) as a text largely because of its material on epistemology and ontology. Neuman identifies three major longstanding philosophical traditions in social science—positivist, interpretive, and critical—and surveys their positions across a range of epistemological and ontological issues. He also introduces feminism and postmodernism as more recently developed stances that may inform empirical social science. Neuman’s discussion is a textbook example of the pros and cons of textbooks. It is accessible and concisely summed up in a helpful table (2006: 105). But to pull this off nuances are eliminated. As a more advanced reading a little later in the class, I assigned “What would an adequate philoso-
phy of social science look like?” by Fay and Moon (1977). They contrast traditions of “naturalism” and “humanism,” and then argue that a social science capable of “critique” must transcend this dichotomy. Fay and Moon here use slightly different terminology to engage the same three traditions as Neuman, but they advance a philosophical argument between traditions, rather than a textbook survey.

I assumed that some of my students would be attracted to one or another of these anti-positivist philosophical traditions, and some confused by them. I hoped, in turn, that the attracted students would spark a class discussion which, by differentiating alternative anti-positivist stances and debating them, would help clarify philosophical issues for them and their classmates. But I was entirely mistaken. In the class sessions for which the Neumann and Fay and Moon readings were assigned, students did not raise the alternatives to positivism themselves, and when I pushed this material into one discussion, they reacted by identifying with positivism. Indeed, the main effect of my interjection was to spur students to argue that alternative positions fail to meet key norms of political science, such as objectivity. In sum, rather than loosening positivist tendencies in my students’ developing sense of disciplinary identity, presenting epistemological and ontological challenges only provided an “other” which reinforced those tendencies. Exposure led to rejection, rather than to recognition, of the claim of other views to be potential philosophical foundations for empirical research in political science.

In light of this experience, I dropped this first entry point to interpretivism from the next iteration of PSc 209. My decision was made easier by the discovery that other readings were effective at getting students to debate shared standards. The reading that worked best here was Mahoney and Goertz’s “A Tale of Two Cultures” (2006), which highlights differences in how quantitative and qualitative scholars tend to conceive of explanation and causation, and then traces the ramifications of these differences through a wide array of research norms and practices. Mahoney and Goertz synthesized specific contrasts that were tangibly familiar to students from readings in their substantive classes. The pedagogical take-home for me was that exploring how any one standard—such as “causal inference”—is actually pursued in familiar political science examples is a more effective spur to discussion of whether we have (or should have) “shared standards” than staging a philosophical “battle royale” at the level of epistemology and ontology.

Entry Point #2: What Makes for a Good Explanation?

My second entry point to interpretivism, while still philosophical in character, was pitched at the level of a specific question: what makes for a good explanation in social science? I incorporated interpretive views on this question within a several-week unit on explanation and causality. I devoted most of one session to the classic debate regarding the relation between understanding and explanation, assigning Charles Taylor’s “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” (1971), alongside readings selected to engage subfield interests in American politics (Soss 2006), comparative politics (Schwartz 1984; Kurzman 2004), and international relations (Wendt 1998).

This second entry point to interpretivism was the most successful in raising sympathetic student engagement. In broad outline, our class discussion tracked a path that I expected. Students were receptive to the argument that gaining understanding is a core task of social science, so long as understanding was framed in Weberian fashion as an aid, rather than alternative, to explanation. I was, however, surprised by students’ reactions to two readings. First, put bluntly, they hated Taylor’s famous essay. They found it too abstract, perhaps in part because they lacked familiarity with its examples from political science debates of the 1960s. Second, the students were excited by Wendt’s argument that there is more than one kind of explanation. These reactions inverted my own priors, which ranked Taylor as the best reading, and underrated Wendt’s concept of “constitutive explanation” as a mode of explanation distinguished from “causal explanation.”

In light of these reactions, I subsequently revised my syllabus in three ways. First, I cut Taylor’s article since it just does not speak effectively to my graduate students. Second, I reevaluated my view of Wendt’s distinction between causal and constitutive explanations. I decided that, rather than a confusing novelty, it links up nicely with the distinction between causal and unification theories of explanation presented in the philosophy of science text I assign (Godfrey-Smith 2003: Chap. 13). It is, moreover, useful for unpacking the “interpretivist” approach of Schwartz (1984) as being explanatory in a specifically constitutive sense. Third, I added readings to explore varieties of explanation far more fully. In particular, I chose readings which, like Wendt, distinguish kinds of explanations, but that draw distinctions along different lines: Roth (2004) on “structural” vs. “situational” vs. “intentional” explanations, and Abbott (2004) on “semantic” vs. “syntactic” vs. “pragmatic” explanatory programs. Finally, to balance the splitting tendency of these readings, I added material from Elster’s new Explaining Social Behavior arguing that all good social science explanations share common features based on the hypothetico-deductive method (2007: 15–20).

These syllabus shifts supplemented the classic issue I began with—the relation of understanding to explanation in social science—with questions about whether there are multiple varieties of explanation, and if so, whether there are integrating standards relevant across them all. Raising these additional questions remarks the old debate about understanding as an aid or an alternative to explanation. The debate becomes whether understanding is necessary to all species of social science explanation (and thus offers a shared standard in light of which all explanations that do not incorporate understanding fall short), or whether it is, instead, necessary only for some kinds of explanation (and thus a distinguishing feature of those kinds). My beliefs on these questions are unsettled. But I hope teaching my methods class will continue to push along my thinking in the years ahead!

Entry Point #3: Reflexivity

It is common for interpretivists to emphasize the need for, and benefits of, greater “reflexivity” in social science. Reflex-
Entry Point #4: Intensive Interaction in Day-to-Day Settings

My fourth entry point to interpretivism focused on gathering data through intensive in-person interaction with subjects in their day-to-day settings. While such interaction is a core part of ethnography, I wanted to emphasize that it is a broader data-gathering method. So in selecting readings I paired the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s classic “Thick Description” essay (1973) with readings from former APSA president Richard Fenno (1977, 1990) about his participant observation of members of Congress in their home districts. A second goal was to highlight the endeavor to grasp the perspective of subjects who interpret and act in the world using concepts different from those of the academics studying them. To this end I assigned Schaffer (2006) on interviewing ordinary citizens of other societies in a way designed to elicit details and nuances of what a concept like “democracy” means in their language and political context. I also assigned a further essay by Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View” (1979), which reflects on the task of grasping the “experience-near” concepts of subjects, but also contends that the ultimate goal is to relate those concepts to the “experience-distant” concepts of generalizing social science theory.

During class discussion of this day of readings, the dynamic of students identifying in contrast to an “other,” which had surprised me with regard to my first entry point, was again noticeable. The principal “other” here was Geertz and “ethnography” more generally, which my students saw as something anthropologists, as opposed to political scientists, do. Some of this dynamic also developed in response to Fenno. While recognizing his work as a classic in the American politics subfield, my students identified his method of participant observation as marginal to more recent developments in that subfield. They then debated whether it could be a viable method today for young scholars of American politics anxious to be seen as contributing to the cutting edge of the contemporary subfield. Hence, while I had chosen my Geertz and Fenno readings as accessible pieces that might provide interesting models, students referred to them in our discussion first and foremost as examples of what they believe they should not (or cannot) do in their own research.

An illuminating contrast was, however, provided by the very positive reaction of my students to Schaffer (2006). With regard to endeavors to grasp the perspective of others, I expected students to prefer Geertz’s “From the Native’s Point of View” since it suggests that understanding local perspectives is not an end in itself, and that the social scientific goal in such work is to connect local perspectives to generalizing theory. But two points about the Schaffer piece won student appreciation. First, Schaffer presents his method as a mode of interviewing. While in-depth field interviewing is a central part of both ethnography and participant observation, about half of my students singled out interviewing as something they plan to do and want guidance in, even as they distanced themselves from labels such as “ethnography” or “participant observation.” Second, Schaffer’s piece presents a lengthy excerpt of an actual interview to illustrate his differentiation of...
types of questions and their role at different points in an interview. It thus offered students a concrete sense of what in-depth interviewing can involve, which turned out to be much closer to what they were looking for than the more meta-reflections of Geertz’s essay.

In revisiting my syllabus in light of these reactions, I dropped Geertz’s “Native’s Point of View” and turned interviewing into a central topic. I added a PS symposium (Leech et al. 2002) on elite interviewing with both overseas and domestic examples. I also added a chapter (Walsh 2009) from the forthcoming volume Political Ethnography edited by Edward Schatz. Like Schaffer’s, Walsh’s piece offers students a tangible connection to the in-person field research experience, in her case by excerpting conversations of ordinary citizens of Michigan. Finally I added selections from scholarly interviews with Robert Bates and James Scott (Munck and Snyder 2007) in which each talks about his field research overseas. My goal here was both to show leading political scientists of very different methodological persuasions arguing that field research is essential, and to give more concrete examples of the back-and-forth dynamics of good interviewing.

Conclusion: Two Take-Home Lessons

Early in this contribution I suggested that instructors seeking to pragmatically make room for interpretivism be self-critical about where they themselves are coming from, in order to be as open as possible to learning from student reactions, even, and indeed especially, reactions that cut against prior beliefs. My first concluding lesson is that it is no less important to reflect on where our students are coming from. Looking back over the reactions reported above, I am constantly reminded that the bulk of my students were third-years, in the middle of taking comprehensive exams, and anxious about for- mulating a dissertation project that could engage faculty advisors and, hopefully, in the longer term, political scientists elsewhere. Having invested much time and effort in prior classes and exam studying, students at this stage in a PhD program are especially receptive to methods readings that connect to works and debates they are already familiar with. This both makes a reading more accessible and reassures students that the method or perspective being presented is within the bounds of the “political science” they are being socialized into. For any scholar, faculty or student, our sense of what “political science” is has been shaped by what we have read (or at least read about), and third-year students have already read a lot! Students at this stage are, moreover, also understandingly eager consumers of readings that give a concrete sense of, and advice about, the practical realities of doing research.

My second concluding lesson concerns the results of exposing students to novel perspectives or methods. Partisans of interpretivism should be aware that increasing student exposure is no sure route to greater disciplinary recognition, even, and indeed especially, reactions that cut against prior beliefs. My first concluding lesson is that it is no less important to reflect on where our students are coming from. Looking back over the reactions reported above, I am constantly reminded that the bulk of my students were third-years, in the middle of taking comprehensive exams, and anxious about formulating a dissertation project that could engage faculty advisors and, hopefully, in the longer term, political scientists elsewhere. Having invested much time and effort in prior classes and exam studying, students at this stage in a PhD program are especially receptive to methods readings that connect to works and debates they are already familiar with. This both makes a reading more accessible and reassures students that the method or perspective being presented is within the bounds of the “political science” they are being socialized into. For any scholar, faculty or student, our sense of what “political science” is has been shaped by what we have read (or at least read about), and third-year students have already read a lot! Students at this stage are, moreover, also understandingly eager consumers of readings that give a concrete sense of, and advice about, the practical realities of doing research.

My second concluding lesson concerns the results of exposing students to novel perspectives or methods. Partisans of interpretivism should be aware that increasing student exposure is no sure route to greater disciplinary recognition, let alone use, of interpretive perspectives and methods. Students are busy people who allocate attention selectively. They may skim the surface and not really engage interpretive readings (especially if they are assigned plenty of other readings). Alternatively, they may engage interpretivism, but do so via criticism and identifying against it. My take-home point is certainly not that making room for interpretivism will always be futile or outright counterproductive. But I want to advocate the relative payoff of selectively focusing on interpretive readings that address activities our students already expect to pursue. They all plan to construct explanations, and many to conduct interviews of one sort or another. Interpretivists have distinct viewpoints to offer regarding the standards for good explanation in social sciences, and practical guidance to give about methods—such as in-depth interviewing—that help meet those standards. Interpretivism is, I would suggest, most likely to win a receptive hearing among political science graduate students, and the discipline more broadly, when it engages matters of common and practical concern.

Notes

1 The political theory subfield is predominantly interpretive. Hence, more precisely, the point in question is whether interpretivism should be given more room in the methods training of graduate students outside of political theory.

2 The flow from assumptions to arguments here is not automatic. Advocates of greater exposure subscribing to a conversion assumption also believe (or hope) that the consequences of conversion will be positive for individual converts and, over the longer term, for the discipline more broadly. Different assessment of consequences could, however, reframe “conversion” as a “corruption,” either of individual careers or the discipline.

3 At the end of the semester I gave students fresh copies of the syllabus and had them put a + (or multiple ++’s for stronger reactions) next to readings they would recommend for the next iteration of Psce 209, and a – next to those they would not. I did not single out interpretive readings for special attention in this process, but rather encouraged students to rate any readings that stood out to them.

4 Student reactions informed changes to various aspects of my syllabus, not just my interpretivism readings. Thus, for example, I also dropped a unit on lab experiments in political science.

5 The tensions between “humanist” (aka “interpretive”) and “critical” philosophies deserve, I believe, just as much attention as the disputes either of them has with “positivism.” Eliding these tensions helps construct the appearance of a united “anti-positivist” position, but that appearance is purchased at the price of philosophical confusion.

References


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The division of curricular labor in most departments usually leaves teaching methods courses to only a small portion of the faculty. And in most departments, there is little overlap between those who teach methods and those who teach political theory. When I began teaching almost twenty years ago, I would have ranked “methods” towards the bottom of courses I expected or wanted to teach. But a few years ago, that began to change. Since 2006, I have team-taught a graduate course in Qualitative and Interpretive Methods and an undergraduate course in Scope and Methods of Political Science. This spring, I will offer The Logic of Political Inquiry, a graduate course on the history of the discipline and the philosophy of the social sciences. Several circumstances (which I touch on below) made it possible for me to teach this array of courses.

I do not expect most theorists have either the inclination or the opportunity to explore teaching any methods courses. But I believe that this state of affairs is a product of the overdrawn opposition between theory and methods that many of us implicitly accept. In what follows, I discuss the conflicting ways in which I learned about methods and what I now believe are the best reasons for theorists to consider contributing to their department’s methods offerings.

**Learning “Theory versus Methods”**

I learned a particular view of the discipline as a political theory student at Berkeley in the 1980s. At the time, Berkeley’s graduate curriculum included no general methods requirements; like many other students in political theory, I finished my graduate education without any course work in either research methods or statistics. What I learned instead was to see what political theorists did and knew in opposition to any approach that stressed methods—what Sheldon Wolin famously called...
“methodism.” In his 1969 polemic against behavioralist political science, Wolin argued that methods-driven political science was inherently incapable of a critical perspective on political life. The “methodist,” Wolin contended, necessarily privileged regularity and order, her/his claims to objectivity notwithstanding (1064). For a beginning theorist, this was an easy argument to accept: it bolstered my sense of the grandeur of the work I wanted to do to imagine it in opposition to the willfully blinkered existence of Wolin’s methodist.

Some twenty years later, I now see several things about Wolin’s essay that I missed when I first encountered it. For one, as I have argued elsewhere, I now read the essay as a more specific defense of Wolin’s view of political theory against what the partisans of the behavioral revolution took theory to be (Hauptmann 2005). That debate about the nature and status of theory in political science continues—although, as I suggest below, I believe political theorists could take part in it in a fuller way than many choose to do.

Further, though Wolin pitches his attack against methodism in general, I now read his critique as best directed against the positivist practices that came to dominate political science in the 50s and 60s. Those practices, Wolin compellingly argues, allowed many in the discipline to present their work as ideologically neutral, rigorous, and systematic—but at the cost of offering a critical perspective on political life. It seems illegitimate, however, to find all work that relies on “methods” guilty of this shortcoming. Indeed, far from assuming a world governed by “regularities” (as Wolin charges methodist political scientists do [1064]), some of the methods we now employ are particularly well attuned both to identifying and making sense of irregularities (e.g., Oren 2003; Schaffer 1998, Yanow 2003). Indeed, many who employ methods like category and ordinary language analysis or reflexive historical analysis would argue that these fuel rather than sap the critical power of their work.

Still, some elements of Wolin’s critique remain valid. In particular, Wolin noticed how the methods portion of curricula demanded huge investments of time on the part of both students and faculty—and warned that this would have consequences for everything else a department did (1064, 1072–73). This shift was just beginning when Wolin noticed it; most of us now see curricula that place a heavy emphasis on methods as the norm. Of course, not all programs require all students to take a methods sequence. But the vast majority do (Schwartz-Shea 2005: 389). And to the extent political theorists do not participate in designing and teaching these courses, they end up ceding an important part of the work of defining the discipline to their colleagues in other sub-fields. This isn’t always the most immediately rewarding work; nor will every group of faculty primarily responsible for methods be happy to allow others to join in. But for the reasons I discuss in more detail below, I think it’s time for those of us who teach political theory to think about how we might chip away at the opposition between theory and methods by making a few forays into teaching methods ourselves.

At the same time I was learning that theorists were not methodists, I learned methods all the same—ordinary language analysis and conceptual analysis. (That neither I nor my teachers would have called them “methods” at the time shows how much disciplinary standards have changed.) Needless to say, there was no course in the curriculum called “Methods for Theorists”; nor did any particular class I took focus primarily on either ordinary language or conceptual analysis. Instead, I began to learn about these methods principally through a few readings for Hanna Pitkin’s graduate seminars and by studying her own work on representation and justice. I became more deeply immersed in ordinary language and conceptual analysis while working on my dissertation on rational choice theory (which Pitkin directed). Ultimately, I decided to devote a chapter of my dissertation to an ordinary language analysis of “choice,” though I did so knowing I had a lot to learn before I could do this kind of analysis well. My learning happened slowly, through trial and error; I would try my hand at a bit of analysis to which Pitkin would respond and correct. I’d revise, she’d respond, and I’d revise again. The way I’ve summarized my learning experience above reveals one pedagogical challenge all of us who teach qualitative-interpretive methods have to face. If we want to try teaching these methods in a class rather than one-on-one, how do we do so well—without forcing them into a rigid sequence of “how to” steps? (Yanow 2006: 70–72).

**Theorists Who Teach Methods? Finding the Right Space in the Curriculum**

Methods matter to me now not only as a researcher but also as a teacher, advisor, and member of a department. That is, I now think about how methods should figure in my department’s undergraduate and graduate curricula and what methods would best suit the projects my graduate students pursue. Thinking about methods in these contexts inevitably means confronting how differently many of my colleagues think about them. Although, for the reasons I touched on above, it was easy to scorn thinking about methods while I was a graduate student, as a faculty member I came to see that doing so barred me from pursuing the important pedagogical path along which departments teach their students how to think about politics. I do not mean to suggest that graduate seminars in political theory do not do this kind of teaching; many do. But if methods courses are required of all students and none of them are taught by political theorists, departments end up reproducing what I now see as the false opposition between theory and methods.

So what is a theorist to do? In what follows, I want to point to some spaces in undergraduate and graduate curriculum that are in principal open to theorists who wish to contribute to how their departments teach students how to think about politics and do research. Of course, not all of these spaces will be open to every theorist at every institution. But at least a few should be.

There are several types of undergraduate courses that
offer theorists some of the pedagogical space I have been describing. One such course is commonly called either “Scope and Methods of Political Science” or “Political Science as a Discipline.” To the extent that such courses are not understood primarily as “how to” courses in methods, those who take them on might focus on the history of the discipline or on ontological and epistemological issues raised by philosophers of social science. Many theorists are especially well versed in the latter approach.

Additionally, a significant number of departments also require their graduate students to take at least one course in the philosophy of science (Schwartz-Shea 2005: 388–389). Such courses are not too far afield from methods courses and can therefore speak to how to pose research questions as well as the merits of various methods. Though all political theorists do not have a strong grounding in the philosophy of science, many find the kinds of epistemological questions raised by philosophers of science both familiar and engaging. What’s more, it’s not a huge step to go from showing what follows from a particular theoretical world view to analyzing the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of several different methodologies.

Finally, many departments offer courses in Research Methods both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Theorists might be able to teach a portion of a team-taught general research methods course or qualitative-interpretive methods course or build their own course under the latter title. Many people with whom I’ve spoken at recent Methods Cafés who teach general research methods courses have specifically asked me for suggestions on how to include qualitative-interpretive methods into their courses. In some cases, therefore, even general research methods courses offer theorists an opportunity to contribute to how their department teaches methods.

A Theorist Teaches Methods—My First Attempts

Although I just began teaching methods over the last few years, I have now done so at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. By the end of this academic year, I will have taught three courses that are at least in part devoted to methods. I hope that by summarizing my approach to several of these I can add some specificity to the general point that theorists can potentially contribute to how their departments teach methods.

I first taught methods at the graduate level in a course designed by myself and two of my colleagues (Susan Hoffmann, who studies American public policy, and Sybil Rhodes, a Latin Americanist) two years ago. We called the course “Qualitative Methods,” but taught it under a special topics number in our department’s graduate methods sequence. (For those who teach in programs that do not yet have an established qualitative methods course, teaching one under a special topics number is a good way to start.) We divided the course into three principal sections:

1. Debates about research design, inference and interpretation;
2. Issues surrounding conceptualization; and
3. Approaches to data collection and analysis.

Since our backgrounds and current research differed substantially, it was fairly obvious who ought to teach what. I led several sessions on ordinary language and symbolic analysis and presented my own work in a week devoted to working with archival collections. Working with several colleagues in this way to put a new course together was the only way we could have begun, since none of us felt prepared to offer the entire course on our own.

This semester I began teaching Scope and Methods of Political Science at the undergraduate level. My coming to teach this course and its place in my department’s curriculum both require some explanation. The course became my responsibility following the retirement of my colleague, Alan Isaak, who joined the department in the mid-1960s. Hired primarily to teach courses in the history of political thought, Alan was also asked by the department to develop a Scope and Methods course. He first taught the course in the late 1960s and soon after published the first edition of Scope and Methods of Political Science, a widely used textbook now in its fourth edition. Alan studied both empirical political theory and the philosophy of science as a graduate student at Indiana; both subjects were central to the Scope and Methods course he taught for nearly 40 years.

My taking on this course after Alan’s retirement made sense, given its history in my department. Teaching it, however, has put me into a position I have never been in before: for the first time, I am teaching a course specifically required of all political science majors. (Although my department requires its majors to take one course in the history of political thought, none of the four such courses we offer is specifically required.) Reflecting on this unprecedented pedagogical opportunity has led me to see both how central methods courses can be to defining students’ sense of what political science is and how peripheral many political theory courses are to doing so. I want to be clear: I am not saying political theory courses cannot speak to these issues, but rather that their place in most undergraduate curricula does not make this one of their primary purposes. Speaking to students’ sense of what political science is, however, is what Scope and Methods is all about.

As with any course one is teaching for the first time, I doubt I have hit upon the best way of teaching Scope and Methods on my first try. I have tried to build the course around issues I think are important for all majors to encounter without making it into too sweeping a survey. To that end, I constructed the course around several focal points: U.S. political science in history; sciences of politics; and, for the election season, disagreements about how to study voting and elections. I am closing the course by devoting three weeks to research presentations, one by myself and two by my colleagues. After students have read portions of our recent research, each of us will discuss the methods we have used in it.

The most challenging aspect of teaching this course has been finding the best way to encourage students to think theoretically. I believe it’s not so much the case that they would find thinking this way difficult in all contexts; rather, they are puzzled by being asked to think this way in a politi-
cal science class. I wish I could say that students who have already taken a political theory course seem better prepared for the class; but that does not seem to be the case. In my experience, many students regard courses in the history of political thought as curious addenda to the political science curriculum that lead few to think about the discipline differently. By contrast, I’ve had an easier time convincing my students in Scope and Methods that what they are learning is connected to what they have learned in other courses. But taking the next step—trying to provide my students with a conceptual vocabulary to use to think about how they have learned political science—has proven the most difficult. For instance, although students can readily grasp “positivism” as a general conception of science, it’s considerably more difficult for most to explain why a particular piece is or is not positivist—or to say what sorts of things someone working within a positivist tradition is likely to overlook or dismiss. Though I cannot say I have hit upon a good way to do this yet, I see teaching this class as the best opportunity I have yet had to weave theoretical thinking into how students understand political science.

This coming spring, I will be teaching the Logic of Political Inquiry, a graduate-level course developed and taught for many years by my colleague, Alan Isaak. Because I believe that current standards for legitimate political inquiry are the result of recent disciplinary history, I plan on structuring the course around a number of intradisciplinary debates over what counts as sound political science. I intend to tie our discussions of the philosophy of the social sciences explicitly to that structure as well.

Teaching such an array of methods courses is unusual for a political theorist. I have tried to speak from my experiences not only to undo the opposition between theory and methods but also to show how its reproduction excludes political theorists from participating in part of what political science faculties do to teach their students to think about politics.

References


Introducing Rigor to the Teaching of Interpretive Methods

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I offer several remarks on the way I introduce interpretive methods within a course on research design and intend to approach a new course devoted to a more systematic exposition of interpretivism and its methods. Due to space limitations, I signal the key issues that must be addressed and offer two examples of specific analyses, as the devil tends to be in details.

Interpretation, an intellectual operation whose essence has been variously rendered as translation, clarification, or placing in context, can be usefully introduced to students with the question, “What needs to be interpreted during the course of a social scientific inquiry?” In part, the answer to this question involves recognizing when we are interpreting. How are the concepts in our studies operationalized? Are their meanings transparent and universal or do they vary across cultural contexts? What accounts for the processes evidenced in formal modeling? To some degree all social science analysis, whether aimed at classifying a phenomenon, imputing a cause, or articulating a process involves interpretation. But in another important sense interpretation is a specific method of understanding the communicative process through which discursive objects are created, contested, employed, and interpreted (by actors) as part of the machinery of power.

Why Interpret?

While the utility of interpretivist approaches is taken for granted in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, or feminism, it is far from obvious to many practitioners of political science. The reasons for this may be complex, but they seem to be rooted in the predominantly naturalistic tenor of the discipline (for an alternative perspective see Chabal and Daloz 2006; Smith 2004). But if we agree with an (anti-naturalist) assumption that the signifying process through which people build models of the world, particularly of the social and political world, has political relevance, then the study of how such models are constructed, transmitted, maintained, and received becomes of interest to us. The study of such issues is inconceivable without interpretation. Among the phenomena routinely studied with the help of interpretive approaches are, for example: (1) legitimacy (as its standards vary from society to society and depend on contextualized, culture-specific crite-
Interpretive approaches also provide fresh and valuable insights into a number of problem areas usually studied through naturalistic modes of inquiry. Ample evidence of the fruitfulness of interpretation can be found in the study of non-Western political systems in comparative politics (Chabal and Daloz 2006, Ashforth 2005), constructivist work in international relations (Kratochvil and Ruggie 1986, Klotz and Lynch 2007), “culturalist” analyses in political economy (Blyth 2002), and even economics (Rao and Walton, eds. 2004).

The first task in introducing interpretation to students, then, is to get them to recognize that interpretation underlies the entire enterprise of social science. Whether we are conceptualizing a particular problematic, operationalizing concepts, or organizing observations for analysis, there is a dimension of interpretation. I try to demonstrate the reliance of fundamental concepts of political science analysis on a process of signification that is not necessarily transportable from one social context to another. Cognitive, symbolic, linguistic, and communicative dimensions of political processes vary and are clearly influenced by the historical experiences of the particular society. Recognizing that one is always interpreting is a critical aspect of acquiring methodological self-awareness. The question then is twofold: how interpretation supports or relates to other methods and how it is employed in a rigorous and systematic manner that meets the standards of scientific analysis we presume are achieved through these other methods.

**Location of Interpretivism among Other Approaches**

Interpretivists are beginning to systematize their approach and engage in an explicit exposition of its assumptions, methods, and techniques (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, eds. 2006). Situating interpretivism vis-à-vis the predominant qualitative and quantitative methodologies illuminates the basic ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin the different approaches to knowledge production. Table 1 is a simple tool I use to discuss the ontological split between naturalists and anti-naturalists with my students. I begin by introducing the *Geisteswissenschaften* versus *Naturwissenschaften* distinction of Droysen and Dilthey and then ask them to reflect on the proposition that anti-naturalism is associated with a specific ontology of the social and therefore calls for at least partial reliance on a specific method: interpretation or understanding. The debate on the “proper” match between methods and problems (Bevir and Kedar 2008) is a fruitful point of departure for considering both the information necessary to answer certain questions and the potentially complementary relationship between different modes of inquiry. For example, interpretivism can enhance survey work (Stoker 2003: 13–16) or game theory (O’Neil 1999, Bates et al. 1998, Johnson 2002).

**Interpretation of What?**

**Three Basic Varieties of the Operation**

There are at least three dimensions of political science research that engage interpretive skills, whether consciously or not. The first is in recognizing and classifying observations (or “data”). For example, is a group of people gathered in a market square a religious procession, a political rally, or a crowd getting ready for an open-air concert? Does the uniform of a person whose actions we are studying signify a soldier or a miner? Interpretive skills enable basic coding and classification. Without them, much comparative work is inconceivable. Weber calls this type of interpretive work direct observational understanding. I refer to it as **classificatory interpretation**.

The second interpretive moment comes when we try to specify what drives human agency: “Why does/did she do this?” When researchers ascribe motives (psychological approaches) or reasons (rational choice approaches) to human behavior, they engage in what Weber refers to as explanatory understanding. I call it **motivational interpretation**. The third is in reconstructing the meaning of actions, statements, displays, performances, etc. Discerning “What does she mean by this?” or “What is the meaning of this action?” involves **semiotic/communicative interpretation**.

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Combining Motivational and Semiotic Interpretation and Causal Explanation

Systematic methodological reflection about the relationship between causal explanation and interpretation (understanding) began with Weber. My course thus takes Weber’s methodology, including his own writings and several critical commentaries on his seminal studies, as the point of departure. In addition, I present a sequence of slides designed to elucidate the difference between motivational and semiotic modes of interpretation, and to locate the latter within the explanatory sequence. I rely on an example offered by Martin (2000).

Simple Causal Relationship

\[ \text{If } A, \text{ then } B. \]

A – “Being the inhabitant of a city that is devastated by bombs”
B – “The lack of resistance to aggression”

Source: Martin (2000)

We begin with a simple model of a causal relationship. The first step in analysis is to formulate a proposition that captures the nature of the relationship between two social-level phenomena. Such a proposition can be expressed thus: “If a city is bombed, its inhabitants will not resist further aggression.” Explanation generally involves more than a simple statement of cause and effect, however. The link between them must be articulated by demonstrating why or how a presumed cause produces a presumed effect. In an influential admonition to specify the underlying mechanisms in causal explanations—effectively linking “macro” to “micro” explanations—Coleman (1990) proposed what has come to be known as the “Coleman boat” (Coleman-Lindberg diagram). This model, illustrated below, inserts between two “macro” phenomena and at least one “micro” mechanism.

From Macro to Micro: Coleman’s “Boat”

\[ \text{A} \rightarrow \text{B} \]

A – macro causes
B – macro causes
A\(_1\) – micro causes
B\(_1\) – micro causes

Empathy generates a bridging proposition that states, for example: “If an individual feels terror and dread, as a result (s)he also develops a feeling of helplessness.” Then, a testable set of propositions can take us from the “experience of being bombed” to the “feeling of terror and dread” connected through empathy to the “feeling of helplessness” experienced individually, and finally to the “lack of resistance” by the whole/majority of a part of the population. The bridge between A\(_1\) and B\(_1\) can be built in many ways, without empathy, but with the use of psychological theories about motivation. I do not develop this here for lack of space.

We can also model the argument in game theoretic terms. For example, statements about “feelings” can be replaced with statements about “strategic calculations,” including a reconstruction of an individual preference ordering and assessing the viability of various courses of action (given the assumed or observed actions of others).

A well-known benefit of game theoretic analysis is that it helps to analyze the collective action dilemma and investigate under what conditions rationally calculating individuals engage or do not engage in (collective) action given what they know about the actions of others. A researcher may identify “tipping points,” “cascading effects,” etc. Interpretation is nonetheless a critical component of linking individual agency to observed collective behavior by attributing “reasons” (rather than “motivations”) to individuals. In this task we may rely on “empathy,” but usually we employ a deductively constructed model of a “calculating, rational individual.” One way or another, however, we begin our analysis by interpreting the motives or reasons “causing” individual (in)action.
Reconstruction of strategic decision making

A₁ – Evaluating various preferences for courses of action (represented by a utility function)

B₁ – Responding strategically (rationally) to actions of others

Now, let’s imagine a modified situation. After a bombing that most likely contributes to the lowering of the “fighting spirit” of the population, a popular leader goes public (in all/some available media) with a story that recounts the city’s heroic past. She or he reminds people that once before their ancestors successfully mobilized after an initial defeat, asks them to overcome their fears and despondency, and appeals to them for a common action against the enemy. In short, the leader offers a narrative of empowerment. People listen; some of them redefine their situation and begin to see it in a more positive light. They convince themselves that success is possible or that they want to defend their city even if the chances of success are miniscule. Mobilization for defense can be quite effective among this section of the population.

Interpretive Turn

A₁ – “Feeling of terror and dread” ~B₁ – Feeling of power
N – Narrative of empowerment ~B – Resistance to aggression

Once a narrative of empowerment begins to circulate among the members of the group, it influences their conceptualizations of the situation and as a result it may change their motivations (or calculations). The story is a crucial element of the analyzed situation. Many researchers will conclude that an account of what happened that does not include an interpretation of the narrative of empowerment and an analysis of its effectiveness is incomplete. They will want to know the details of the story, its origins, and how it fits within the broader context of the group’s culture. Often they will want to know more: who told the story, through what channel(s) of communication (and if there were several, which was most effective and why?), from what position (was this person powerful?), to whom, and with what effect (were there groups in the population who responded more readily to the appeal than others and why?)? As the next image suggests, interpretively oriented researchers want to study the semiotic practices that shape individual motivation and rational calculation rather than the message alone (Wedeen 2004).

Interpretation “In Context” (of Power and Institutions)

A₁ → ~B

Analysis of semiotic practices

The insertion of analyses of semiotic practices into studies of international conflicts, electoral campaigns, or strategies of political resistance is increasingly common; it is particularly intriguing in the work of developmental economists (Rao and Walton, eds. 2004).

Interpretation and the Study of Semiotic Practices

The study of semiotic practices can be designed in many ways. For example, it can be fashioned as a reconstruction of an event in terms of a Turnerian social drama (Wagner-Pacifici 1986), an ethnographic case study (Geertz 1973), ethnographically grounded sociology (Wedeen 1999), policy analysis (Yanow 1997), or game theoretic modeling (O’Neill 1999). It can be grounded in the vocabulary and models proposed by political economists or “pure” institutionalists. All of these approaches, however, involve an interpretive component.

There are many ways to begin studying semiotic/communicative interpretation and its components. Umberto Eco breaks down the process into three tasks. First, we may want to identify the intended meaning of the message (text, discourse, poster, painting, speech, performance, etc.). Intentio auctoris—as Eco calls it—is not always available and usually difficult to reconstruct. Nonetheless, a skillful interviewer or diligent biographer may shed a light on this component of cultural creation. Second, we need to analyze the meaning(s) of the message, intentio operis. This is the proper subject of semiotic analysis and structural work. Methods of reconstructing syntagmatic chains (how to build “sentences” of culture?), paradigmatic sets (what are building blocks of cultural forms appropriate for a specific task?), and pragmatic strategies (what is more likely to “work” in a given population?) are described in countless manuals, including works on content and discourse analysis (for a useful introduction of some key issues,
see Herrera and Braumoeller 2004). Third, the study of reception, the interpretation of the message by the (intended or unintended) audience, is a critical aspect of understanding public communication. Reception can vary substantially within a given group and in many cases reflects an active process of resistance through deliberate re-characterization of the message. *Intentio lectoris* can be studied through in-depth interviewing, participant observation, and surveys. This last tool is routinely used in the approach called political culture. It is important to remember that the study of attitudes, orientations, and perceptions contributes to the reconstruction of only one dimension of the cultural process. A complete analysis of this process must include two other elements: the reconstruction of the authors’ intentions (particularly intended meanings) and the study of the message itself.

If we agree that the study of politics should encompass the analysis of the communicative (cultural) process through which some actors propose certain world-views, encode them in symbolic vehicles, and try to disseminate them, while others encode and interpret these messages and accept, reject, or simply register their “meaning,” then the study of the “symbolic content” of the messages is unavoidable. Only if we understand the message and its place in a broader cultural context can we deduce its political significance. Each cultural product is formed by its author, who selects from a rich albeit not infinite repertoire of available cultural materials. If we want to understand the strategy (politics) behind such choices we need to be able to contrast choices that are actually made with the options that are (deliberately or not) forgone. That is why interpretation needs to go beyond merely determining if a cultural message does or does not have a causal effect (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 36–41). In most cases, we want to know how a semiotic practice works and why it is (in)effective.

One of the untapped (by political scientists) reservoirs of high-quality interpretive work is the Russian (and Soviet) school of semiotics. Its authors have long recognized that cultural mechanisms—together constituting a huge coordinating system—need to be carefully studied in order to improve our understanding of politics and, in particular, the machinery of power. A study of how Peter the Great built legitimacy for his power, by Boris Uspienskij, is exemplary of carefully crafted interpretive work. In the following passage drawn from Uspienskij’s analysis, italicized and boldfaced words or phrases signal critical stages in the interpretive process, which are briefly discussed below:

In 1721, Peter assumed a new title: he began to be officially called “Emperor,” “the Great,” and in addition, “father of the fatherland.”… This expression is nothing other than a *translation* of the Latin *pater patriae*, an honorary title of the Roman emperors. However, it had a different ring in a *Russian cultural context*. Since paternity in general can be either blood or spiritual kinship, and Peter obviously could not be the people’s father in the sense of blood kinship, this name was understood to be a pretension to spiritual kinship. But only a member of the church hierarchy could be a spiritual father, and in turn, the title “father of the fatherland” could only be applied to an archpastor-bishop and primarily to the patriarch… therefore the designation in question *could be interpreted* as meaning that Peter was head of the church and proclaimed himself a patriarch. And that is precisely how it *was interpreted*. (Uspenskij 1977:109)

First, by using the word “assumed,” Uspienskij signals that he practices a post-structuralist style of analysis. It calls for the identification of agency and its actions and is founded on an assumption that cultural change is not a matter of apersonal transformations, as it was usually modeled in structural analyses, but, rather, is caused by deliberate actions of specific actors. Second, the word “translation” identifies a specific semiotic operation. Uspienskij identifies the source of the “translated” cultural idea: the classical Rome. Third, the context (“Russian”) into which the translated element is inserted is identified and its transformative capacity is emphasized. Fourth, the mechanism of (potential) semiotic transformation is actually (albeit briefly) described. The analyst, in this case an “expert” on the Russian culture, identifies the field of potential meanings of the new element and points to the meaning that is privileged by the *logic of culture*. I believe that the interpretive (or semiotic) analysis is seriously flawed if such logic is not reconstructed *independently* from the reconstruction of actors’ actual (interpretive or otherwise) choices and actions. Fifth, Uspienskij informs the reader how the new cultural idea (Peter as *pater patriae*) actually began to function: the popular interpretation followed the path privileged by the cultural logic predominant at that time in Russia. He does not tell us how he knows this (his historical studies?), but we can easily imagine the utility of modern survey instruments in arriving at such a conclusion.

**Misconceptions and Myths: Interpretation Clarified**

The perception of interpretive methods in political science is fraught with misconceptions. Some are based on the lack of knowledge or erroneous understanding of what “interpreters” do. Some have deeper philosophical roots and are related to misplaced specifications of differences among various epistemological positions (see Bevir and Kedar 2008 for some important comments on this issue). For lack of space, I will only signal several problems belonging to the first group.

First, it is sometimes asserted that interpretive methods are non-empirical (Ragin 1987: 3, 35). The validity of this argument rests, of course, on the definition of empiricism. Without entering a complex philosophical debate, it may be advisable to offer students some readings from art history and discuss with them the meaning of “empiricism” in concrete interpretive studies. I often recommend studying Ervin Panofsky’s method of iconological analysis (1972) and it application in a short work on Gothic architecture and scholasticism (1951).

Second, interpretation is sometimes presented as an intellectual operation based only on empathy or introspection. It is not difficult to show that this is simply not true. Dilthey, one of the founding figures in the history of hermeneutics, moved ahead from “psychological” introspection to intersubjectively...
verifiable reconstruction of cultural meanings. My favorite method of dispelling this misconception is to have students re-read Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. I ask them to find examples of “empathy.” None is to be found. Weber works like a semiotician employing a form of content analysis (admittedly rudimentary by today’s standards). He reconstructs and interprets the meanings of, say, Franklin’s sayings. His interpretations are contestable and falsifiable.

Third, critics claim that interpretation is imprecise, impressionistic, undisciplined, and arbitrary. It is, however, easy to demonstrate that in specific areas of interpretive scholarship there exist specifiable rules, accumulation of knowledge, methods of achieving (and challenging) consensus, and inter-subjective checks and balances. A useful way of introducing these issues is to study the debate initiated by Geertz’s celebrated interpretive essay on the Balinese cockfight, not merely the essay itself (Jones 1998, Martin 1993, Segal 1999). Eco (1992) offers another useful primer. In his exchange with Rorty on the limits of interpretation, he warns against overinterpretation, shows how we may try to avoid it, introduces a useful distinction between interpretation and use, and demonstrates that the former is not completely arbitrary.

Fourth, semiotic interpretation is often seen as an inductive mode of inquiry. Here, three arguments are worth fielding. First, students may be asked to examine semiotic or hermeneutic studies that focus on the way standardized and prescribed methods of meaning encoding are realized in practice. An example may be the study of the way various artists employ prescriptions codified in manuals of allegorical and symbolic representations (see Ripa 1971). Similar “manuals,” though usually rather less explicit and precise, exist in other areas, for example in the field of political advertising. The method employed in the examination of the “fit” between a manual’s instructions and specific realizations is at least partially deductive. Second, much interpretive work is founded on the falsificationist logic of conjectures and refutations a la Popper rather than induction. Third, it can be argued that the logic of interpretation is neither deductive nor inductive. It is abductive in the Piercean sense. In turn, reflection on the logic of abduction, understudied by comparison with deduction and induction, helps to grasp the benefits and pitfalls of the critical Popperian distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and inject some rigor into thinking about the former.6

Fifth, given the difficulty of separating the context of justification from the context of discovery in interpretation (its abductive character), another criticism, that interpretation is good only for hypothesis generation and not for verification or falsification, is misdirected.

Sixth, it is sometimes argued that interpretivists see interpretation as the only goal of social science. Geertz’s famous words that the analysis of culture is “not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (1973: 5) are often quoted in support of this view. Geertz’s views evolved and grew more complex in his several decades of work following that statement (see, for example, 1983; 2003: 27). But more importantly, many interpretivists do pursue causal explanations and see interpretation as one research procedure among many.

Seventh, interpretation is said to be unscientific. However, interpretation is arguably no less “scientific” than causal inference. The relative status of either task depends on the definition of science. For King, Keohane and Verba (1994), “good research, that is, scientific research” (7) has four characteristics:

1. The goal is inference. There are two types of inference: descriptive and causal. Descriptive inference involves “using observations from the world to learn about unobserved facts.” Causal inference involves “learning about causal effects from the data observed” (8)
2. The procedures are public
3. The conclusions are uncertain
4. The content is method

Interpretation meets all four criteria: (1) it relies on inference to connect observed phenomena (signifying elements) with the (unobserved) meanings (signified elements); (2) its procedures are (or at least are supposed to be) public and repeatable; (3) its result are provisional (uncertain) and always subject to verification and updating; and (4) its content can be construed as method.

The task, whose realization has already begun, is to systematically demonstrate the validity of these points as well as specify and examine the method’s:

1. Ontological affiliations (How are society and politics understood and defined?)
2. Epistemological commitments (How are societies and politics defined in a specific manner knowable?)
3. Rules and procedures;
4. Disciplinary varieties (semiotics, hermeneutics); and
5. Specific techniques (for example, content analysis, [critical] discourse analysis, ethnographic accounts of meaning-formation through rituals, etc.).

Notes
1. These remarks are mostly based on and related to the field of comparative politics, my area of academic specialization. Amy Linch’s assistance in sharpening my argument was invaluable. I also thank my colleagues and students at Rutgers, who provided many critical remarks while listening to my early efforts to develop this essay.
2. There are, of course, many ways to finesse this proposition, express it in probabilistic terms, offer clearer conceptualizations of the key concepts, etc.
3. It is easy to trivialize the role of empathy in Dilthey’s or Weber’s methodologies. Martin (2000) provides a very useful discussion of how empathy relates to other components of the understanding (Verstehen) method.
6. For a useful, brief introduction to these issues, see Uve Wirth (http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth/inferenc.htm), who observes: “The Peircean account of abductive inference denies the possibil-
ity to draw a sharp borderline between ‘context of discovery’ and ‘context of justification.’”

References


Teaching Interpretive Methods in Political Science: The Challenges of Recognition and Legitimacy

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Recognition – n.
1. The perception that somebody or something has been seen before or an identification based on such perception;
2. Appreciation or fame earned by an achievement;
3. Acknowledgement of validity.

—Encarta World English Dictionary

Tell a disciplinary colleague that you are teaching quantitive or comparative case study methods and you will likely get an understanding nod of the head. Likewise, graduate students are reading quantitative research in their seminars and the term case study will be familiar to all of them no matter their subfield. But tell that same colleague or student that you include interpretive methods in your syllabus and you are likely to be met with a puzzled look or an outright question: “What’s that?” Students, too, may be uncertain of the meaning of “interpretive methods,” asking themselves, “Is that the same as qualitative methods?” and “Have I read anything like that in my seminars?”

This lack of both name and content recognition is one legacy of the behavioral revolution’s impact on political science. With the rise of survey research and the emergence of computing capacity, quantitative methods became the methods widely required of all doctoral students while qualitative methods were offered as optional courses for those specializing in comparative politics (Schwartz-Shea 2003, Bennett et al. 2003). There was a concomitant narrowing in the usage of the term “empirical,” such that many equated it only with “quantitative” research and, similarly, “methodologist” came to mean someone specializing in statistical techniques (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002). In this context, the possibility of interpretive methodologies for empirical research was effectively foreclosed. In the aftermath of the 2000 Perestroika movement (Monroe 2005) and with the formation of Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods and the QMMR organized section of APSA, qualitative methods have emerged into the disciplinary sunlight and, now too, as indicated by this symposium, interpretive methods and methodologies are beginning to gain a foothold in graduate curricula.

There is now widespread recognition that the lack of pluralism in methods training has been problematic for the discipline as a whole. Not only is it clear that no one method is appropriate for all research questions but, also, that a lack of pluralism in methods training can result in what might be called “trained incapacity” (Burke 1965), the inability to ask questions in different ways. Just as learning qualitative methods can help students to frame questions in ways that are distinctive from those that can be answered using quantitative methods, so, too, learning interpretive methods can enlarge students’ capacities for imagining ways to approach research problems. Methodological pluralism and theoretical pluralism together contribute to what Dryzek (1986) has termed “lateral progress”—the proliferation of distinct research traditions from which societal actors can draw as they encounter historically new problems.

Yet as the opening scenario attests, those teaching interpretive methodologies to graduate students still face two significant, intertwined challenges—what, for the purposes of this essay, I call the problem of recognition and the problem of legitimacy. In what follows, I describe how I tackle these twin problems in a required, semester-long research design seminar. The primary purpose of the course is to introduce students to elements of research design and to have them prepare a design on a topic of their choosing. After discussing how I use the course to deal with these two problems, I present an assignment that concretely illustrates the disciplinary value of methodological pluralism. The assignment demonstrates in action not only the utility of interpretive methods, but also its validity as science, the third aspect of recognition noted by the dictionary definition above.

The Problem of Recognition

All graduate students, and especially those pursuing doctorates, likely have encountered research that fits into the category “interpretive,” although such encounters vary greatly by disciplinary subfield and often the research studies do not appear under that specific label. International relations and comparative politics students may have read “constructivist” research (although not all such research is straightforwardly interpretive); American politics students may have encountered Fenno’s (1978) study of Congress or at least his classic phrase, “soaking and poking”; students of bureaucracy and policy implementation (e.g., in public administration and public policy concentrations) may have encountered the classic studies of Peter Blau (1963), Herbert Kaufman (1960), Michel Crozier (1964), Graham Allison (1973), or Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973)—each taking an observational and/or documentary approach characteristic of participant-observation or political ethnography, both of which are common in interpretive research; political theory students are likely to have engaged, at a minimum, the idea of a “close reading” of texts, a concept that also falls under this label. International relations and comparative politics students may have read “constructivist” research (although not all such research is straightforwardly interpretive); American politics students may have encountered Fenno’s (1978) study of Congress or at least his classic phrase, “soaking and poking”; students of bureaucracy and policy implementation (e.g., in public administration and public policy concentrations) may have encountered the classic studies of Peter Blau (1963), Herbert Kaufman (1960), Michel Crozier (1964), Graham Allison (1973), or Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973)—each taking an observational and/or documentary approach characteristic of participant-observation or political ethnography, both of which are common in interpretive research; political theory students are likely to have engaged, at a minimum, the idea of a “close reading” of texts, a concept that also falls under this label. And any student who has taken a broad-ranging philosophy of social science course will have heard of the “interpretive turn” (Taylor 1977, Rabinow and Sullivan 1979, 1985, Hiley et al., 1991). (Needless to say, these subfield generalities need to be contextualized by departmental variation of the sort documented in Schwartz-Shea 2005.)

A first task, then, for one teaching a course that incorporates interpretive methodologies and/or methods is explanation of the label “interpretive”—something that is not as straightforward as it might first appear. After all, quantitative scholars interpret their findings, and theorists interpret texts! Methods texts do not, on the whole, lend clarity to the situa-
tion. As of 2000, the texts marketed to political scientists failed to include interpretive methods as a possibility for social scientific research (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002). Texts that do include interpretive methods such as Neuman (2006, 6th edition) or Creswell (1994) use the term “qualitative.” However, inspection of their representations and tables (e.g., pages 15 and 5 respectively) show that what these authors mean by “qualitative” is quite different from the qualitative tradition that has recently been developed in certain areas of sociology and political science (the latter being strongly associated with the comparative politics scholars who founded the QMMR Organized Section). This means that it is imperative to clarify for students that they may have encountered interpretive research under the rubric of “qualitative” research in the literature they are reading outside the discipline, e.g., in interpretive sociology, social geography, communications studies, cultural anthropology, etc., or in the European tradition of social theory (e.g., Foucault 1970, Schütz 1967, etc.), where it means what in political science, social movement scholarship (e.g., Benford 1997), and other disciplines is being called “interpretive.”

The task of recognition is further complicated by the vast array of analytic techniques used by interpretive researchers (from hermeneutics and metaphor analysis to discourse analysis, framing, and narrative and story-telling approaches) and by the fact that similar terms may be used within interpretive and qualitative political science—but in very different ways! For example, interviewing may be conducted for the purposes of extracting “facts” from interviewees or for understanding how they make sense of their worlds (although these need not be contradictory). Similarly, ethnography can be conducted based on either realist or interpretive ontological and epistemological presuppositions. As this last example intimates, explaining what makes an interpretive approach distinct from quantitative and qualitative ones requires delving into the realm of philosophy of social science. Because some students may not have (yet) had such a course, I use the grid displayed in Table 1 as an additional way to explain this distinctiveness using basic ideas—i.e., theory, data—they are like to have encountered in their previous seminars.

Column one of Table 1 lists seven components that constitute common ways of talking about research (from purposes to standards). These provide a set of methods concepts for comparing two approaches to research, “variables-oriented” (column two) and “interpretive” (column three). In the second and third column headings I use the word “gestalt” to emphasize that a research approach is more than the sum of its parts. That is, each approach has a holistic, even intuitive “feel”—a way in which the researcher “approaches” every research task, from the framing of research questions to assessment of what constitutes “good” research. In the second column heading, I collapse quantitative and qualitative approaches into a category I call variables-oriented research, which, through the strength of the contrast, makes clear that interpretive researchers do not think about their research in terms of variables—a point that some students find rather startling. (It also highlights that the distinction has nothing to do with numbers.) This point comes at the expense of eliding debates between qualitative and quantitative researchers over the value of “large n” and “small n” studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) and the relative value of variables-oriented and case-oriented research (Ragin 1997). While the evolution of these debates is discussed in the seminar, this elision as portrayed in the table seems less worrisome in 2009 than it might have been earlier because considerable consensus seems to have emerged, at least as judged from the texts by Brady and Collier (2004) and Gerring (2007), concerning the similarities between quantitative and qualitative methods (as understood in contemporary political science). Brady and Collier emphasize shared standards for assessing quantitative and qualitative studies; Gerring calls quantitative research “cross-case study” research in order to analyze commonalities as well as tradeoffs in the choice between cross-case (quantitative) and case study (qualitative) research designs. Finally, the third column heading, interpretive research, similarly ignores disagreements among interpretive researchers themselves, such as (1) whether “causality” should be rejected or re-conceptualized (cf. Hansen 2006, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006); and (2) epistemological and ontological differences between realist and interpretive IR constructivists (cf. Wendt 1999, Hansen 2006).

Once these caveats have been explained and emphasized, Table 1 provides a succinct overview that builds on what students have been learning in their other seminars (or in quantitative methods courses) in a way that highlights the interpretive possibility. Although each row could be discussed in some depth, I will briefly summarize the interpretive column, as that is less likely to be familiar to readers of the QMMR Newsletter: (1) Interpretive researchers make human meaning making central to their analyses and they also conceive of research purposes as including more than causal reasoning and generalizable causal laws. (2) Interpretive researchers theorize in a different fashion—most notably, preferring concept formation that is grounded in the experience and language of those studied (although what Clifford Geertz, 1973, calls the “experience-distant” concepts of scholars are also important). (3) Interpretive research design emphasizes the need for flexibility as researchers investigate and learn about their chosen topics, and this, in turn, requires a new language of design. For example, variables-oriented researchers (both quantitative and qualitative) concerned with “sampling” worry about the extent to which a selected case represents a broader population. Interpretive researchers, in contrast, emphasize “exposure” to facets of the evidence and setting as a means of ferreting out commonalities, differences, and ambiguities in meaning making. (4) Interpretive researchers respect the “genre” of the data and do not necessarily prefer to transform evidence into indicators that can be measured. (5) The specific analytic techniques chosen by interpretive researchers depend on the genre of the data—from the vast array of possibilities for word data to methodological innovations applied to visual, sound, and spatial data (Bauer and Gaskell 2002, Harper 2003, Yanow 2006). (6) Interpretive researchers reject the notion of “causal laws” as inappropriate to a social science that emphasizes the historically constitutive nature of...
human meaning making—preferring, instead, conceptualizations of causality that are grounded in particular cases or events (as in Sherlock Holmes’ piecing together of concrete clues), framed as “constitutive” of human understanding and conduct; or tied closely to context (“configurational”). (7) Because of all of these differences, interpretive researchers have developed standards of assessment that are appropriate to the epistemological and ontological presuppositions and the purposes of that research gestalt (for an overview of these, see Schwartz-Shea 2006).

Although Table 1 glosses over many complications (which I do discuss in class), it provides a “quick and dirty” summary that can aid students to recognize research studies that are neither quantitative nor qualitative but are, instead, better understood under the label of interpretive science.

**Table 1: Research Components Compared Across Two Research Approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Gestalt I Variables-Oriented Research</th>
<th>Gestalt II Interpretive Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Purpose</td>
<td>Build universal (ahistorical and acultural) theory or mid-level theorizing; prediction and control</td>
<td>Focus on meaning making, but also emancipatory/critical and explanatory purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory and Concept Formation</td>
<td>A priori, deductive theorizing and concept formation</td>
<td>Grounded theorizing; concept formation in terms of participants’ worldviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Hypothesis and model specification; selection and measurement of indicators</td>
<td>Flexibility expected as scholar learns; a new language of design; e.g., exposure, not sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Quantitative preferred as “the best”</td>
<td>Respects the genre of the data: numbers, words, images, space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Statistical preferred, assuming assumptions are met, e.g. unit homogeneity</td>
<td>Depends on the genre of the data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>Understood as universal laws; causal mechanisms</td>
<td>Sherlock Holmes, constitutive, contingent, configurational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards</td>
<td>Validity and reliability; internal and external validity; objectivity</td>
<td>Trustworthiness, thick description, triangulation, reflexivity, member checks, audit, negative case analysis; reflexivity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The substantive value of an interpretive approach is inevitably bound up with these sorts of questions. I address them frankly because students deserve to understand the contemporary “lay of the land.” There is a reason the recognition problem exists, and it is bound up with journal publishing practices, hiring practices, and departmental methods curricula (Schwartz-Shea 2003). But I also share with them my sense of how much has changed in the last ten years or so—that an interpretive community has coalesced within political science; that I know, personally, young scholars who did interpretive dissertations and got jobs, in some cases at top research universities; that some journals are already open to interpretive approaches and more are opening up, and that good interpretive research is being published; and that interpretive scholars can find support within various sections of APSA (including QMMR), WPSA, and, increasingly, MPSA (e.g., its sections on political sociology and political anthropology), as well as at ISA and elsewhere.

I emphasize two additional themes during the course of the semester that help to further assuage these fears. First is the prominence of the debate around problem-driven research (Shapiro 2002; Norton 2004) that subordinates method selection to research question. The second is the widespread discussion of the value of methodological pluralism.

As an ideal, problem-driven research promotes a vision of scholars passionately engaged in research about a topic...
such that *any* method and *any* theory will be utilized if it might shed light on the substantive issues under investigation. Rather than scholars entrenched in a particular theory or method (as a mark of their *identity*), investigators choose their “tools” flexibly, moving comfortably among statistical, comparative case study, and interpretive approaches. The strength of this vision is its emphasis on substance; it is not that methodological and theoretical debates are unimportant (for these are the coin of the realm in academic research) but that such debates should be *about something that matters*, a message that graduate students sometimes need to be reminded of in the midst of socialization to disciplinary norms.

Although there is much to admire in this ideal of methodological pluralism, it is not completely accurate as a description of scientific practices. As the critics of the problem-driven research contend, “in the world of real research, social scientists do not dream up 'problems' to investigate out of thin air, divorced from concerns of theory and methodology, and only then search for precisely the right method” (Atkinson et al. 2003: 99). Instead, problem formation is intricately intertwined with both theoretical and methods training. Here, precisely, is the value of methodological pluralism enacted in a design course. Students may be drawn by background or aptitude to a particular approach (and specialization is likely necessary to gain depth and expertise) but exposure to more than one approach helps to develop an appreciation for what I call their “methodological others”—those persons or projects that use approaches that they themselves do not use. (And those of us teaching methods courses need to be careful in handling multiple methodologies that we don’t in some way, explicit, subtle or unconscious, christen one particular method as more “scientific” than others.) This course in research design occurs at a point in students’ careers when they may be able to develop such an appreciation. The “approaches” assignment, discussed next, serves as a concrete lesson in pluralism that students may remember as they go forward in their research and teaching careers.

**The “Approaches” Assignment**

Because the research design course is required of all students no matter their primary field, it is imperative that I take into account the methodological traditions that have historically been associated with the various subfields. Therefore, I cover three methodological approaches characterized as “quantitative behavioral,” “comparative case study,” and “interpretive.”

The first part of the course (The Three Approaches—Getting Started) introduces these three approaches using published exemplars, along with introductory readings from the assigned texts. This primes students for thinking about the approaches in relation to their first assignment—providing an initial two pages on a possible topic for their research design, which is due at the end of the semester. For the following four class sessions (Part II: The Three Approaches—Digging Deeper), the three approaches are systematically compared in terms of their perspectives on concept formation, evidence generation, analysis and explanation, and design. The approaches assignment which I discuss here is due at the end of these class sessions, which falls at the midpoint of the semester. (A second draft of the first research design assignment is also completed during these weeks).

The inspiration for what I call the “approaches” assignment came from an online, three-page, 43-question survey that faculty were asked by university administrators to complete on the quality of the campus library. See Table 2 for a partial representation of the survey. For 27 of the questions, I was asked to report, using a nine-point Likert scale (“1 is lowest, 9 is highest”), the “minimum level of service that you would find acceptable,” the “level of service that you personally want,” and the “level of service that you believe our library currently provides” (original emphasis). I found the survey’s design extremely irritating, even alienating. It was so convoluted, and its questions were so unrelated to my experiences with the library that I thought the data produced by it would be worthless (and I sent an email to that effect to library administrators). But I also thought that the survey instrument might be useful as a teaching moment in the research design course and crafted an assignment around it.

In the assignment, the students’ task is to design research to assess “library quality.” The advantage of this research topic is that it is far removed from typical disciplinary questions, thus promoting the bracketing of theoretical perspectives and disagreements. Additionally, they need not spend time on a literature review (because that time is better spent on their individual project designs).

Depending on the number of students in the class, students may work as individuals or as teams. Individuals and/or teams might be assigned to particular approaches or allowed their own choice—so long as all three approaches are represented in the oral presentations. Here, I report the result of a class in which, fortuitously, I had only twelve students. In that instance, I divided the twelve into two teams of six and each team further divided itself into three pairs across the three approaches, thus creating two teams per approach and also allowing students some leeway to select both partners and approaches. Students were given the following instructions:

> It is up to each pair to decide what particular methods to use—being sure to mimic the “spirit” of the approach. For example, the quantitative behavioral approach could employ a survey, direct observation, or budget figures but the emphasis is on precise answers to the question of quality. A comparative case study approach could employ observation, interviews, or documentary evidence but, here, the emphasis is on what can be gained from comparison among libraries. The interpretive approach could use participant-observation, interviews, or analysis of documentary evidence but this approach emphasizes the meaning making of library users.

It is in the students’ oral presentations that the class as a whole has the chance to compare how the design of research varies by approach. On this particular presentation day, everyone in the class was able to compare within each approach...
they expanded the research question. So instead of asking researcher reflexivity. In doing so, they ended up shifting the ended nature, sensitivity to context and political power, and other team’s design discussed at length some of the elements badly by library personnel and to obtain, in the “patron’s own library users’ concrete experiences of being treated well or approaches. One used a “story telling” methodology to elicit surveys to those patrons who had recently used those ser-

sentativeness via various forms of sampling. One team de-

ecided to use unobtrusive measures to first assess library us-

sentation about the significant differences among the three ap-

(1) Employers who instill confidence in users 

Low High 

Low High 

Low High N/A 

(2) Making electronic resources accessible from my home or office 

Low High 

Low High 

Low High N/A 

(3) Library space that inspires study and learning 

Low High 

Low High 

Low High N/A 

(1) Employers who instill confidence in users 

Low High 

Low High 

Low High N/A 

As might be expected, students studying comparative politics gravitated to the comparative case study approach and the teams they formed took advantage of their country backgrounds—Japan, China, Germany, and the US. They formulated their designs to ask about how libraries are organized in these different national contexts in order to assess how cultural, historical, and linguistic differences affect judgments of quality. Given their previous substantive coursework, as well as readings from the research design course, teams spent a lot of time in their proposals on case justification, issues of unit heterogeneity, and possible causal mechanisms. Given the class discussion of the problems of the library survey, the quantitative-behavioral teams spent a lot of time in their proposals and presentations talking about the kinds of surveys that would generate believable evidence. As befits the spirit of that approach, they addressed questions of achieving representativeness via various forms of sampling. One team decided to use unobtrusive measures to first assess library usage. Then, on the basis of this evidence, they targeted their surveys to those patrons who had recently used those services, in this way matching questions of quality to patrons’ specific library experiences.

The two interpretive teams used quite different approaches. One used a “story telling” methodology to elicit library users’ concrete experiences of being treated well or badly by library personnel and to obtain, in the “patron’s own words,” what mattered most to them about the library. The other team’s design discussed at length some of the elements that are distinctive to the interpretive approach—its open-ended nature, sensitivity to context and political power, and researcher reflexivity. In doing so, they ended up shifting the research question in a subtle way or, perhaps more accurately, they expanded the research question. So instead of asking the rather abstract question, “What makes a quality library?”, they asked, “Who gets to define the meaning(s) of a quality library experience?” When the question is framed in that way, the political underpinnings of research become much more apparent. The team included in their design not only users but also librarians: managers at or near the top of the library institutional structure but also librarians lower in the hierarchy. The potential results from such a research design would be quite different. Instead of identifying specific factors that top administrators can use to “improve poor performance” in the standard bureaucratic way, the study identifies areas of agreement but also points of conflict and disagreement specific to the context. Instead of “one best way,” coming down from those at the top, the research findings could invite more engagement with the results across institutional hierarchies and specialties, fostering understanding between librarians who may serve different sorts of patrons in a variety of ways. Thus, both the research process and the use of the results imply a different politics than is typical in other approaches.

At the end of the presentations, there was a lively discussion about the significant differences among the three approaches. The take-away message was the inevitable, complex intertwining of our understanding of what research is about (purpose) with how we frame our question about the topic, which, in turn, affects the research design and findings. It is one thing to tell students that these elements interact. It is much more powerful to have them experience this interaction by comparing what they have done to what their peers have done. Each presentation revealed the specific insights afforded by each approach—helping the students to understand why someone might use that approach (even if it was not the one that they preferred).

**Toward Methodological Pluralism: Recognition and Legitimacy of Interpretive Science**

By the end of the semester students should be able to recognize interpretive research when they encounter it and explain how it differs in general terms from qualitative and
quantitative research. Students should also be able to compare the three approaches in terms of what each approach seeks to accomplish and should appreciate the particular insights each approach can generate. By means of the syllabus design and the approaches assignment, an interpretive approach becomes legitimized as a possibility within the realm of political science research. And, finally, some students do choose to frame their research question and formulate its design using an interpretive approach.

Notes
1 Thanks to Shaun Bowler, David Pion-Berlin, and the faculty at the University of California-Riverside for the opportunity for dialogue about the nature of interpretive research. Thanks, also, to Dvora Yanow for her references and every-ready editing pen!
2 At the University of Utah, a philosophy of social science course is required of all doctoral students, although they may not have taken it prior to the design course. Masters students are required to take design but not philosophy of social science.

References
Feminist research in political science is marked by two major contributions: (1) introducing the concept of “gender” and (2) expanding the definition of “politics.” Given its origins in feminist theory and activism, it is guided by scholarly and political aims to transform the study and the practice of politics (cf. Hawkesworth 2006). These commitments enable feminist scholars to identify new research questions, as well as to approach traditional topics in novel ways, using a variety of research tools. However, rethinking the content and methods of political analysis has important implications for how to teach political science by raising questions about what political scientists study and how and why they study these particular topics. It also poses certain challenges, or presents new opportunities, for political science pedagogy by compelling professors to devise innovative techniques for communicating material and fostering self-reflection among students, who may resist or embrace central tenets of feminism. To explore how feminist scholars have met these challenges, this article examines 45 syllabi for courses on women, gender, and politics taught at various universities in the United States and Western Europe between 2002 and 2008. The analysis begins with a short introduction to trends in gender and politics research and interdisciplinary debates on feminist research methods. It then takes a closer look at the syllabi to illuminate some shared features of course content, as well as to make note of course readings, formats, and assignments that reflect feminist commitments to learning and personal transformation. The goal is to raise awareness of feminist tools and teaching techniques as a means for assessing their potential contributions for other areas of political science.

Research on Women, Gender, and Politics

Feminism is often defined as the belief in the social, economic, and political equality of women and men. However, there are in fact a variety of feminist approaches, which differ in terms of how they conceptualize and seek to alter the status quo. Liberal feminists focus mainly on equality, seeking to gain rights for women that are already guaranteed to men. They argue that achieving concrete gains requires engaging with formal politics. They contend that although this sphere has traditionally been dominated by men, there is nothing inherent about this domination. For this reason, they anticipate that as more women enter the public realm, the gendered nature of politics and public policy can be overcome to create equality for all. Radical feminists, in contrast, emphasize difference, aiming to focus on and value women as women, rather than as individuals who aspire to a male standard. As such, they are more skeptical about the value of participating in “politics as usual,” which they argue is inherently patriarchal and thus could never be employed to pursue feminist ends. They prefer political strategies that revalue the feminine, foster solidarity among women, and raise awareness of women’s experiences through collective consciousness-raising. Postmodern feminists are also interested in difference, but focus more on how categories like “women” and “men” are represented through discourse. Theorizing the fluid and relational aspects of identity and experience, they stress contradictions and multiplicities in definitions of “women” and “women’s issues.” While this approach avoids the charges of essentialism that have been directed towards liberal and radical feminism, it also has the effect of undermining the prospects for mobilizing by women as women for social, economic, and political change.

Feminism thus poses varied challenges to existing modes of political analysis. All the same, the research that falls under this rubric shares roughly similar goals to incorporate gender, expand politics, and promote change. The concept of “gender” is often considered the key contribution of feminism as an intellectual and political project. Although often elided with “women” in popular and scholarly discourse, feminists are careful to distinguish between “sex,” biological differences between women and men, and “gender,” the social meanings given to these distinctions. A shift to gender has two broad implications for political research: (1) it moves the analytical focus away from biological sex, which treats men and women as binary opposites, to constructed gender identities, which view masculinity and femininity as features that exist along a continuum, often in combination with other identities, and (2) it replaces exclusive concern with women in politics and public policy with attention to the impact of masculinities and femininities, as well as relations between men and women, on political inputs and outcomes (Krook and Childs 2009). Given women’s ongoing exclusion, focusing on “women” remains crucial for mapping patterns of political access, behaviors, and effects. However, theories of gender offer a chance to delve more deeply into these dynamics by bringing men into the analysis as well, thereby making the subject of investigation the role of masculinities and femininities, and the relative status of men and women, in the conduct of political life.

A second concern of feminists is to broaden existing definitions of what is meant by “politics.” Political scientists tend to use this term to refer to formal processes and institutions of government and elections. Women’s movement activism in recent decades, however, has inspired feminists to theorize at least two additional meanings. One group expands its range to encompass informal politics and the dynamics of everyday life. Some scholars insist, for example, that social movements are a form of political participation on par with engagement inside the state (Beckwith 2005). At the same time, others draw attention to the power dynamics that permeate all levels of social life, including relations within the private sphere of home and family. Echoing the slogan of second wave feminism, they argue that “the personal is political” (Okin 1979). A second group, together with postmodern theorists, has adopted a notion of “politics” as any instance or manifestation of power relations (Butler 1990). As a result, they are
interested not only in the politics of the state and the politics of social movements, but also the politics of language, the politics of exchange, and the politics of representation, which they have analyzed using a wide variety of research tools.

Both of these feminist innovations have come under challenge in recent years. On the one hand, there has been increased recognition of the ways in which multiple facets of identity may interact to shape not only personal interactions but also large-scale political outcomes. In these debates, scholars have offered various schemes for analyzing how the dynamics of gender shape and are shaped by other patterns of inequality based on race, class, sexuality, ability, and other features (Hancock 2007; Weldon 2006). On the other hand, increased globalization, combined with decentralization, has posed major challenges to traditional configurations of political organization. As a consequence, “politics” is now an even more diffuse entity, with new and developing arrangements that are not yet well understood (Krook and Childs 2009). Understanding both sets of trends is crucially important for the third main element of feminist research: a commitment to political change. Although feminists of various types espouse diverse goals, they converge on the opinion that research should contribute to some type of positive transformation, whether this entails the broad empowerment of women as a group or the deconstruction of gendered categories in politics and public policy.

Perspectives on Feminist Research Methods

The political goals of feminism, while central to the ethos of this line of research, have been used on occasion as an argument against feminist scholarship on the grounds that it fails to be “objective,” as such motives interfere with the discovery of “truth” (Hammersley and Gomm 1997). In response to such critiques, feminist epistemologists argue for recognizing the situated and partial nature of all knowledge claims. Yet, there are ongoing debates as to whether there are specifically feminist research methods, ranging from broad acceptance of existing tools, a position known as “feminist empiricism” (Harding 1986), to various attempts to explore and devise new methods of analysis (Hesse-Biber et al. 2007). Although qualitative methods are often associated more closely with feminist research, some insist that feminist work can and should utilize both quantitative and qualitative techniques (Jayaratne and Stewart 1991; Oakley 1998). This has led scholars to suggest that there are no feminist methods, but that there is one feminist methodology (Reinharz 1992). Said in another way, feminists may employ many different research techniques in their quest for evidence, but share an approach to collecting and evaluating this evidence. This methodology is said to be “distinctive to the extent that it is shaped by feminist theory, politics, and ethics and is grounded in women’s experience” (Ramazanoglu with Holland 2002: 16). A survey of feminist methods texts indicates that it comprises four main elements: paying attention to “gender,” challenging norms of objectivity and incorporating subjectivity into research, trying to avoid exploiting women as subjects and objects of knowledge, and empowering women in various ways through research (Acker, Barry, and Esseveld 1996; Fonow and Cook 2005; Harding 1987).

As these goals are sufficiently broad, many different research techniques may be employed in a manner consistent with feminist values. At the same time, some of these concerns overlap with other approaches to social investigation, especially those that seek to question existing “truths.” What make feminist studies distinctive are their efforts to adapt many of the same methods as other researchers in ways that make them more consistent with feminist concerns. In the use of interview techniques, for example, feminists have often been careful to involve research subjects in the construction of data about their own lives. In the process, they have become conscious of particular challenges inherent in generating feminist insights—or simply remaining consistent with feminist goals—when interviewing across age, race, class, gender, and political differences. Feminists have also discussed ways in which other techniques may be employed to feminist ends: archival research—or even starting a group’s own archive—can help promote knowledge of many different kinds of women; internet research can reach women who are geographically dispersed but “virtually” connected in order to study how they share knowledge or mobilize collectively; content analysis can provide insights into discursive and visual representations of gender through non-traditional research materials like artwork and other cultural artifacts; and surveys and statistical analyses can reveal that gender inequalities do in fact exist, affording crucial leverage for feminist activists in their efforts to influence public policy (cf. Fonow and Cook 2005; Gottfried 1996).

In other cases, feminist researchers create new methods in the pursuit of better knowledge of gender relations. The quintessential method of this type is consciousness-raising, a crucial tool in second-wave feminism, which typically involves small groups of individuals who meet to discuss their personal experiences. These gatherings, which may also take the form of “speak-outs” and “write-ins,” help participants recognize the hidden and taken-for-granted aspects of their lives that enable personal transformation and provide insights for devising strategies for change. Other techniques have been invented in the course of asking questions whose answers are difficult to access through traditional methods. These include dramatization through role play, which allows research subjects to collaborate in research and to find their own voice; conversation, which presents multiple voices as a way of gathering and displaying data; identification, which “breathes life” into the person being studied through the personal reflections of the scholar doing the study; structured conceptualization, which entails synthesizing information in the form of a map in order to display how ideas are related to one another; photography, which compiles images of the research subjects to tell a visual story of their lives and experiences, sometimes involving their participation in the presentation of findings; and taped self-interviews, which enable respondents to answer questions at their convenience in the privacy of their own homes (for a list of details and examples, see Reinharz 1992). These solutions, combined with extensive
feminist adaptations of existing techniques, suggest—contrary to the conventional wisdom—that there may in fact be a number of feminist research methods, consistent with different definitions of “feminism” and various feminist goals in the research process.

**Feminist Methods in Political Science**

Feminist discussions of methods and methodologies have implications for the substance and goals of political research done in a feminist vein. These, in turn, have ramifications for how scholars teach political science, in relation to the content and the pedagogical techniques used in courses on women, gender, and politics. The 45 syllabi examined for this article cover a range of topics in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. They were collected from public and private institutions, undergraduate and graduate courses, and male and female professors. Attention was paid to course descriptions, readings, formats, and assignments to discern whether, how, and to what extent feminist ideas and concerns were integrated into course material. This review reveals that instructors, as reflected in the syllabi, did seek to introduce students to new ways of understanding the political world through gendered lenses, often drawing on work using a variety of different research methods. More interestingly, however, many courses also utilized one or more innovative teaching techniques to (1) engage students with developments in the “real world” and (2) equip them with new skills and insights to facilitate personal transformation and empowerment.

**Course Content**

An analysis of the syllabi indicates that professors in all courses endeavor to introduce students to new ways of “doing” political science. Consistent with feminist literature in the field more generally, they familiarize students with the concept of “gender,” enlarge the scope of what is considered to be “political,” and offer insights into possible strategies for political “change.” Many of these courses begin with a section on feminism and gender theory. Providing an overview of diverse feminist approaches, they emphasize “gender” as a social construct that has a range of important implications for political life, starting with the tendency to associate men with the public sphere and women with the private. Many U.S.-based courses, in particular, also make conscious efforts to recognize diversity among women by incorporating attention to race, class, and sexuality. A key aim is to bring a gender perspective into an array of topics in political science, exploring the limits of existing paradigms and literatures. In many cases, this entails calling attention to women as subjects and objects of public policy, noting the various roles that women have played as political actors and the often distinct impact that otherwise neutral-sounding policies may have on women versus men. A large number of courses address these dynamics by highlighting gaps between women and men in terms of their voting and legislative behavior. Some also focus on women’s experiences as a means to explore how women may draw on norms of femininity in unanticipated ways, for example by pointing to their skills as mothers to assert their suitability for leadership roles. The intent in all instances is to analyze how gender operates in the political realm and, as a consequence, rethink and reconceptualize political concepts through a feminist lens.

A second feature of these courses is a shared effort to address, but also go beyond, the confines of formal politics. Seeking to break down the public/private divide, many instructors draw attention to the partial nature of how “politics” has been studied, in some cases by quoting the feminist slogan: “the personal is political.” To this end, they point to the neglected experiences and arguments of women to expand the range of actors and issues understood to be relevant to political debate. Nearly all courses include a section on women’s social movement organizing and participation in other voluntary sector activities. A key reason for this is historical: women have largely been excluded from other arenas of political participation, like elections, political office, and international politics. In addition, while formal barriers, like the lack of suffrage, have been overcome in most countries, women still occupy relatively few top-level political positions. As a consequence, a great deal of research on women and politics has focused on women’s activities in civil society. Most courses, however, also address a range of different types of formal political participation, examining trends in women as voters, party activists, candidates, and elected officials. Further, a sizeable number of courses extend the realm of “politics” to the media, the judiciary, bureaucratic agencies of the state, and various types of international organizations. In a similar set of moves, many courses cover a range of issues often associated with women, like equality law, educational equity, workplace and family issues, health, reproductive rights, and violence against women. However, at the same time, there is also an increasing tendency to include issues not traditionally viewed through a gender lens, like human rights, development, trade, migration, nationalism, national security, war, and science and technology.

A third notable element of course content is discussion of efforts to promote political change. One syllabus, indeed, describes the course in question as “subversive and reconstructive” and frames it explicitly as an “intellectual and political journey.” The aim, according to the instructor, is not only to expose the limits of conventional modes of political analysis, but also to move from describing the world to thinking about how to reconstitute these realities. This goal is attempted via several distinct course designs. The majority of courses focus on politics in a single country, like the U.S., but many also include some degree of cross-national comparison as a means to (1) raise students’ awareness of distinct trends elsewhere and (2) explore why change has occurred in some countries but not in others. While crucial for improved knowledge of political processes, exposure to such information is also intended to foster the ability to imagine an alternative to the status quo. Another technique involves introducing students to particular strategies that have been developed around the globe to empower women and create more gender-sensitive public policy. Instructors in these courses include units...
on gender quotas, policies to increase the selection of female candidates to political office, and gender mainstreaming, an approach to policy-making that requires considering the gendered implications of all public policies. They also draw attention to actors who have played important roles in advancing gender equality, both expected, like movement activists, and less expected, like state bureaucrats. A final approach is to brainstorm and introduce scholarly evidence as to how political life might change, or not, with the greater inclusion of women. Discussions highlight the stakes to maintaining the status quo, but also encourage students to consider possible limits to change, for example by noting that the increased presence of women is not always associated with dramatic shifts in policy outcomes.

Course Methodology

Paralleling debates on feminist research methods, the readings used in gender and politics courses reflect a range of different methods and methodologies. While none of the syllabi surveyed assign books or articles on research methods, or even address questions related to the philosophy of science in their reading lists, almost all include a session or more on the concepts of “sex” and “gender” and an overview of different types of “feminism.” Many instructors take care to emphasize diversity across feminist approaches, noting that these present distinct frameworks for understanding and analyzing dynamics of gender, politics, and change. As such, many syllabi trace the development of feminist thinking, as well as outline ongoing feminist debates, on a particular topic. The result is that courses tend to offer insights into the distinctiveness of feminist analysis, at the same time that they recognize the multiplicity of feminist contributions to political science.

In terms of the more specific methods employed in the readings, what is striking about these courses is their openness to studies using a variety of different research tools. Although some textbooks are assigned, including Conway, Ahern, and Steurmagel (2005), Harrison (2003), and Paxton and Hughes (2007), the vast majority of readings are taken from articles and book chapters (but see Krook and Childs 2009). In general, the choice of methods in each text is related to the topic under investigation: archival analyses and ethnographies prevail in studies of women’s movements, elite interviews and statistical analyses of cross-national data when the subject is women in parliaments, surveys when the question relates to elite and public opinion, and textual analysis in work on law and public policy. In many cases, several methods are used in conjunction with one another. These patterns may appear surprising to some, given that feminist research is often seen as having a preference for qualitative methods. This is due to perceived difficulties in operationalizing “gender” as a variable for quantitative analysis. While “sex” can be recorded as a simple dichotomous measure, such an assertion is controversial among some feminists, who argue that “sex” too is socially constructed, and as such, should also be understood as existing along a continuum of identity (cf. Butler 1990).

Yet, perhaps one of the most notable features of feminist work is its “problem-driven” nature: a recent review discovers a distinctive willingness on the part of feminists to employ various theoretical frames and to explore possibilities for synthesizing or juxtaposing methods in innovative ways (Krook and Squires 2006). As such, the diversity of methods employed in the readings assigned in gender and politics courses simply provides a reflection of the eclectic tools that feminist researchers have used in their pursuit of better knowledge of the political world. All the same, there are several methods which appear to be less prevalent across these courses as a whole, including game theory and rational choice, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and interpretive methods. These tools have been used in gender and politics research, but tend to be less common. Thus, it is not surprising that such readings are rarely assigned in these courses. However, it is crucial to emphasize that these patterns do not necessarily stem from their ontological and epistemological incompatibilities with feminist research. Rather, the tendency to use some methods more than others is more likely connected to the fact that there is still much to be explored with regard to the gendered nature of political life.

Finally, it is worth noting that some of the materials assigned in the courses reviewed do not simply rely on traditional “readings.” Some instructors ask students to read novels and watch films for later discussion in class, primarily—it is assumed—as a means to capture the complexities of women’s (and sometimes men’s) lived experiences. A large number of courses also require students to consult and reflect upon a range of different primary sources. These include, most commonly, internet links to online materials like reports from international organizations; websites of feminist and human rights NGOs; and databases on policies and statistics related to women, gender, and politics. Depending on the focus of the course in question, they may also entail newspaper articles and opinion pieces on current events; interviews transcribed in a book or available recorded online; court cases and decisions; texts in political theory, especially in relation to questions of political representation; and political biographies and autobiographies. Assigning materials such as these requires students to offer their own analyses and interpretations of gendered political events.

Course Pedagogy

The intellectual and political commitments of feminism, in turn, have an impact on course instruction. In some instances, a feminist philosophy is explicitly spelled out, as with one professor who writes: “As a feminist teacher, I am committed to a mode of learning that is shared and collaborative.” It is the case that most courses do make use of conventional teaching formats, like giving lectures, showing films, inviting guest speakers, holding seminars, and conducting email discussions. They also have assignments similar to those in other political science courses, like take-home and in-class exams, research papers, book reviews, and short reflection papers on course readings. Nonetheless, the syllabi analyzed here reveal that many instructors also incorporate more unusual teaching for-
mats and course assignments. Reflecting feminist interest in political change and empowerment, several take specific steps to connect the materials introduced inside the classroom to the “real world.” This involves providing students with opportunities to literally go outside the classroom by offering information about internships, arranging meetings with congressional staffers, watching politics “in action” by attending a local party women’s conference, and engaging in “service learning” by tutoring local refugee women. It also entails transforming the outside world into the classroom by inviting various political women in to discuss their experiences and paths to political office. A related strategy is to require students to bring in news articles for class discussion, using these new items to link the theories and concepts introduced in class to help students better understand and analyze recent political developments.

A second major trend, as indicated in the syllabi, is to use course assignments as a means for cultivating new skills and encouraging personal transformation. This is accomplished through a series of diverse and original course activities and requirements. Several courses include training sessions on how to run for elected office. In some cases, this entails inviting guest speakers who offer advice on how to get involved in politics as activists, campaign workers, and candidates. In others, students learn specific political skills, like doing background research, preparing speeches, making presentations, training in giving television and radio interviews, writing op-ed pieces and blog entries, and engaging in effective networking. Other courses focus on improving students’ communication skills by scheduling tasks that require them to synthesize and articulate arguments related to gender and politics. In some instances, the assignment is oriented toward the collective: several instructors plan in-class debates, either formal tête-a-têtes or more informal group discussions, for which students receive some background readings and orienting questions to prepare. In some courses, the assignment is more individually based: students are asked to make oral presentations that summarize the readings as a means for initiating and leading a class discussion, or—perhaps more dauntingly—to offer a five-minute speech to the class about the importance of women’s political participation, representation, and leadership.

Other assignments are more writing-based. One instructor requires students to write a short advocacy paper making a case for a specific government policy on an issue affecting women. A variation used by other professors is to ask students to write an op-ed or letter to the editor on an issue of the students’ choice, with the intent to influence policy-making. Another project assigned in several courses is elite interviewing. One course calls for students to interview a woman active in influencing policy on women, presumably with the goal of helping students understand how policy-making “works” and what the constraints and opportunities are for women to act on behalf of women as a group. Another instructor requires students to conduct separate interviews with one man and one woman in the same leadership position. Students are then to write a paper reflecting on if and how men and women lead differently in these positions. By making the question of “difference” an empirical question, rather than a theoretical given, this assignment encourages students to grapple with the concept of “gender” in a real world laboratory, pushing them to consider when and where it may be relevant—or not.

A final example is one of the most common assignments across the syllabi surveyed. At its most basic, this task involves doing research and analyzing the profiles and experiences of individual female politicians. It appears in a number of different versions. In some courses, students are asked to write a review of a book, selected from a list of biographies and autobiographies of political women. Another professor requires students to keep a weekly journal of a female leader, living or dead. If the woman is still alive, students are to follow current events, keep clippings, and discuss successes and failures. If the figure is historical, students need to find and analyze as many original sources as possible. A second variation of this assignment is to write a background paper on a female member of Congress, focusing on her professional background, personal history, issue priorities, and committee allocations. A closely related alternative is to construct a biography of a female leader, anywhere around the world, which discusses her upbringing, her rise to power and the context in which it occurred, and some of the important events and decisions she made during her tenure in office. In some instances, students are obliged to draw explicit links between these findings and various themes introduced in the course. In others, they are required to follow and analyze ongoing election campaigns. One instructor asks students to focus on a competitive House or Senate campaign involving a female candidate, comparing the strategies and behavior of the woman and her male opponent. Another directs students to use a combination of academic readings and newspaper reports to develop a profile of the candidate and evaluate her race in relation to the literature on female candidates. Taken together, these assignments seek to give students a greater understanding of how women might attain political office, as well as what types of barriers to political parity still remain.

Conclusions

Feminist research and teaching in political science is thus marked by efforts to produce better knowledge of the political world, as well as to engage in a broader project of political transformation at both individual and collective levels. Some instructors explicitly recognize that such goals may not be easily achieved. Indeed, one even acknowledges on the first page of the syllabus that this may be a “controversial and even painful course” for some students, in that it is likely to challenge their prevailing views of the world around them. Although feminist aims are themselves diverse, the review of syllabi undertaken here indicates that there are perceptible trends in how courses on women, gender, and politics are designed to reflect the intellectual and political goals of academic feminism. This includes a distinctive willingness to utilize a range of different research methods, in pursuit of answers to different types of questions in feminist political science. Yet, the attention given in these courses to personal
transformation and empowerment, in particular, is notable for its attempts to bridge scholarly writings and political developments outside the classroom. Together with the feminist stance on the need to engage in “problem-driven” research, this approach to teaching and learning may offer novel lessons for other scholars, who struggle with how to make politics “real” and “relevant” for their students. Features of feminist research and teaching might thus be understood as a model of “good practice,” instructive for many other courses offered in political science.

Notes

1 Many thanks to Amy Mazur and Gary Goertz for compiling this collection of syllabi.

2 There are many ways to categorize various feminist approaches. This article discusses only three, but other variants include socialist feminism, maternal feminism, and Black feminism, to name but a few.

References


Symposium: Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Identity

Measuring the State’s Institutionalization of Ethnic Categories across Time and Space

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In this article, we describe a research strategy for measuring the degree of state institutionalization of ethnic categories across time and space, and we present some preliminary data associated with this work. Our approach is both qualitative and quantitative: we attempt to unearth and to carefully classify key historical facts and texts, and also to develop calibrated numerical indices. Because our work is ongoing, we hope that this article may stimulate suggestions for revisions to our approach to conceptualization and measurement.

We take seriously the currently dominant constructivist theoretical understanding of ethnic identification, recognizing the political activation of such identities as a phenomenon to be explained with reference to discrete historical events and processes, not merely as “givens.” This theoretical orientation has prevailed in large part because of the outstanding detailed studies by political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and historians who offered theoretically compelling accounts of the ways in which state institutions have been central to the development of ethnic identities (Anderson 1996, Gellner 1983, Barth 1969, Laitin 1986, Marx 1998). Meanwhile, on a quite distinctive track, a large body of research pioneered by economists, but also vigorously pursued by political scien-
tists, has been concerned with estimating the consequences of ethnic diversity for a range of substantively important outcomes, including rates of economic growth, government policy, and patterns of violence (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, as has been widely noted (see, for example, Chandra 2001)—and we will not repeat such critiques here—the quantitative analyses associated with this latter body of research have rested almost entirely on data that reflect little incorporation of constructivist insights. And yet, the compelling nature of that research program has led many scholars, including several of the contributors to this symposium, to attempt to develop new approaches to conceptualization and measurement, with the hopes that we may yield more valid assessments of the causes and consequences of this ethnic identification and mobilization.

We believe that the unique contribution of the project described will be to systematically incorporate the insights from earlier scholarship on state institutions in a manner that allows us to carry out broader comparative analyses across time and space. Although we certainly recognize that state institutions are not the only relevant factors in the construction of ethnic identities, we believe that a number of studies have compellingly demonstrated the key role played by these institutions, warranting this type of expanded investigation. Our goal is to investigate the history of state institutions on a country-by-country basis, generating a rich database of both specific historical facts and the development of an Institutionalized Ethnicity Index (IEI), which summarizes the degree to which ethnic distinctions figure within the state-institutional environment. This is likely to facilitate cross-national research on the causes and consequences of particular ethnic institutions, their aggregates, and their legacies, and should serve as a useful complement and corrective to extant analyses.

State Institutions that Create or Reify Ethnic Categories

In line with constructivist theories of ethnic group formation, institutions may create incentives/facilities for, or constraints upon, ethnic identification and mobilization. In a Gramscian manner, institutions may make particular sets of identities hegemonic (Laitin 1986). They are also likely to reflect existing ethnic schemas. We proceed with the core assumption that the higher the frequency with which state institutions make ethnic distinctions, the greater the likelihood that both ordinary citizens as well as political elites will perceive ethnic identity to be a salient category for politics, and press claims with respect to such identities.

As a first cut at systematizing an approach, we focus exclusively on formal state institutions at the national level. There exists a high degree of institutional isomorphism in the international state system, and a well-established battery of instruments available to constitutional planners and to national and ethnic political entrepreneurs for the identification and categorization of their populations. We consider a range of key institutions that are used by most states as organizational and administrative tools, and we explore the extent to which ethnic group distinctions are incorporated into such rules. Future research will need to consider informal and sub-national institutions.

In our conceptualization of institutions, we have attempted to strip away normative concerns of “fairness,” and the potential effects of institutions (such as violence, socioeconomic disparities, or identification), because these are the very factors that we hypothesize may cause or be caused by the state’s institutionalization of ethnic categories. As compared with other approaches, issues of subjective coder interpretation and reactivity are significantly reduced because we can rely upon written historical documents and we are able to develop fairly straightforward rules for evaluating the presence or absence of particular institutions.

We consider only state institutions that have the potential to directly address questions of identity, ethnicity, and membership in the national community. Because states seek to monitor their populations and regulate questions of citizenship, justice, and access to power, they must choose to either recognize ethnic groups or to ignore them. We do not consider institutions that indirectly influence ethnic politics in the form of electoral design, which might have intended and unintended consequences with respect to the mobilization and organization of ethnic groups. We also do not consider in this framework civil society organizations or political parties that engage the state, but which we consider as residing within the societal domain. As shown in Table 1, we identify nine different categories of institutions that have been used by states to regulate human behavior, often in terms of ethnic categories. In the sections that follow, we delineate the particular ways in which state institutions make ethnic distinctions, which serve as the basis for our coding of the historical record. We also note our theoretical expectations for how the institution might provide (dis)incentives for ethnic differentiation, mobilization, and conflict.

Counting and Identifying: Censuses and Passports/Identity Cards

Virtually all modern states use a variety of techniques to count and to identify their citizens. For our purposes, a central question is the extent to which, in addition to identifying national citizenship or membership, these institutions also distinguish among various sub-national ethnic categories. Several scholars have already convincingly described the ways in which such categorizations both reflect and reproduce those categories as the basis for political competition (Nobles 2000; Kertzer and Arel 2002). Our fundamental premise here is that in order for citizens to believe that ethnic-based injustices exist or to consider mobilization of grievances along these lines, there must be some information about those groups, and group members must be identifiable. While other instruments are obviously available for such tasks, the census—both the act of carrying it out and the data it generates—and identity documents that label citizens are particularly important.

Recent scholarship emphasizes that the counting of ethnic groups is by no means a neutral exercise. The act of enumerating ethnicity can itself shape the categories used in ethnic classification within society. Scholars claim that official census categories not only reflect national understandings of
Table 1: Ethnic Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Evidence of Institutionalization of Ethnic Categories</th>
<th>Theoretical Prediction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counting and</td>
<td>1. Census</td>
<td>Any mention of ethnic categories or labels on questionnaire or enumeration form.</td>
<td>Forces individuals to “choose” an official identity, or to accept one that has been assigned; generates official data in ethnic terms, which in turn are used for ethnic political competition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying</td>
<td>2. ID Cards/Passports</td>
<td>Any mention of ethnic categories or labels on documents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and</td>
<td>3. Delegation of Autonomy</td>
<td>There is any legal provision for separate laws or authority for ethnic groups.</td>
<td>Any distinctions in the political arena made in terms of access to the vote or to leadership positions creates incentives for political mobilization along these lines. Reifies the notion of “ethnic” leaders or an ethnic vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>4. Voting and Civic Engagement Regulation</td>
<td>The government uses ethnic identity in any way to influence voting rights, responsibilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Leadership Regulation</td>
<td>The government reserves certain executive, judicial, or legislative positions based on ethnic quotas or preference policies. (Note distinctions between affirmative preferences and restrictions.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space and</td>
<td>6. Spatial Separation of People</td>
<td>The government legalizes any separation of people by ethnic group in terms of residential areas or use of public facilities. (Note distinctions between reservations, ethno-federalism, forced segregation, and denationalization.)</td>
<td>Government policies that restrict personal movement or interactions in any way based on ethnic categories are likely to reflect and to create bases for mobilization along ethnic lines, and to reduce inter-ethnic contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>7. Marriage Law</td>
<td>The government makes any legal prohibitions on marriage across ethnic lines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>8. Employment Regulation</td>
<td>Official sanction of use of ethnic identity for hiring decisions. (Note distinctions between affirmative preferences and restrictions.)</td>
<td>By recognizing difference, makes this “real” and creates incentives to mobilize both on part of the preferred and excluded groups; necessitates criteria for membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Personal</td>
<td>9. Education Regulation</td>
<td>Official sanction of ethnic identity for selection/admissions. (Note distinctions between affirmative preferences and restrictions.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advancement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have the data on the size and characteristics of our population. The list of these characteristics is extensive, including age, gender, income, education, and many others. We also conduct surveys to gather this information from our citizens. This allows us to understand the needs and preferences of our population better. For example, we can use this data to tailor our policies and programs to meet the needs of different groups. Additionally, we can use this data to improve our services and programs. For instance, if we find that a particular group is underserved, we can take steps to improve our services to that group. Overall, the data we collect helps us to better understand the needs of our population and to make informed decisions about our policies and programs. Additionally, we use this data to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of our policies and programs. For example, we can track changes in the distribution of income over time to see if our policies have been effective in reducing poverty. We can also use this data to identify areas where we need to improve our services and programs. Finally, we use this data to inform our decision-making processes. For example, if we want to allocate resources to a particular sector, we can use this data to identify the sectors that are most in need of additional resources.
Politics and Authority:
Autonomy, Voting/Civic Engagement, Leadership

State leaders aspire to project authority throughout their territory. The very idea of the national state implies an attempt to unify the population behind a cohesive identity. But again, when the idea of ethnic difference becomes central within society, states may make clear distinctions about the nature of political authority that depend upon individual ethnic affiliations, from the perspectives of both ordinary citizens and leaders. We investigate the institutionalization of ethnic autonomy, political participation, and access to positions of leadership. We hypothesize that when political authority is officially parsed out in terms of ethnic groups, this can provide the basis for enduring identification and mobilization along such lines.

A primary concern is with the degree to which the state itself projects power uniformly across all citizens, or if power is institutionally delegated to particular ethnic groups and associated leaders. In our research, we have tried to identify instances where through the constitution or other law, autonomy is afforded to ethnic leaders of at least one distinct ethnic group to regulate marriages, judicial hearings, or other personal behaviors. When certain forms of authority are specifically reserved for ethnic leaders, we identify such instances as examples of ethnic autonomy. Because we are interested in the ways in which state institutions create and reinforce specific group boundaries, the mere recognition of chieftaincy on the part of the state would not be relevant in our classification scheme, unless the state’s institutional recognition of chieftaincy itself clearly distinguished at least one particular group from any others.

Second, we classify countries in terms of any official restrictions on voting or any form of civic engagement (organizing, protesting, etc.) based on ethnic identities. Prohibitions against the organization of ethnically-hateful or discriminatory groups would not count unless such prohibitions applied explicitly to the behavior of certain ethnic groups but not others.

Third, we consider any distinctions made in terms of gaining leadership positions. In order to be consistent, and reliable in our classification, we are concerned with identifying only explicit—written or explicitly articulated—rules concerning the ethnic identities of voters or office-holders in the executive or the legislature. Analogous to job and education preference policies (see below), we look for institutions that attempt to balance ethnic participation, such as formula-based power-sharing quotas. We also look for restrictions that deny members of an (otherwise legally resident) ethnic group from obtaining a leadership position.

The explicit division of political power in terms of law, vote, or leadership signifies the centrality of ethnic boundaries, and the hypothesized effects on continued identification and claims-making requires little elaboration. Nonetheless, we should reiterate that we are centrally concerned with explicitly ethnic boundaries. For example, if the use of poll taxes effectively eliminated certain ethnic groups from voting, but according to the rules, certain members of the “in” group were also incidentally disenfranchised and/or if a small handful of “out” group members were able to vote, we would not count this as an ethnic boundary. On the other hand, because of the centrality of space or territory to the constitution of many ethnic groups, where space is used as a clear connotation of ethnic difference (e.g., “North,” “South” or “federal territory”), we sometimes use such labels as indicators of ethnic groups. For example, if representation in a national legislature is allocated by federal units, and if at least one of those units is explicitly ethnic—what we describe below as ethno-federalism—we consider this a case where leadership is also ethnically institutionalized.

Space and Personal Interaction

We consider the extent to which states mediate the movement and interactions of people in their personal lives through the legal regulation of space, residence, and personal contact. Clearly, such restrictions imply a high salience for ethnic categories, and provide foundations for conflict, or may be solutions to prior conflict. At certain times in history some states have implemented policies of ethnic separation as regards the use of public places and residential areas. The most striking instances of this are racial segregation in the first part of the twentieth century in the US and in apartheid South Africa. It is important to note here that while there are many instances of ethnic groups facing effective restrictions as regards the utilization of public facilities and common spaces across the world, we are concerned here with instances where this restriction is state-imposed. In particular, we identify cases in which certain facilities, such as schools, are reserved for the explicit use of members of particular ethnic groups. Other forms of de facto residential segregation may stem from the mechanism of socioeconomic difference, and to the extent that such differences are not rigidly enforced and/or named, we hypothesize that they will play a much weaker role in the constitution of distinctly ethnic boundaries. Moreover, for the purposes of cross-national comparison, the identification of de facto residential segregation is much more difficult to measure, and thus subject to greater reliability concerns.

We identify four gradations of ethnic separation of space, and where multiple forms exist for a single ethnic cleavage in any decade, we code for the most extreme form. First, there are what we call “voluntary reservations.” These are spaces that are specifically demarcated for ethnic groups, within which members enjoy a degree of autonomy, but members of those groups may move freely inside and outside of the borders, and they are fully entitled to avoid such reservations all together. Second, we code for “ethno-federalism.” In such cases, there is a specific demarcation of a regular federal unit within a larger federation providing a degree of ethnic autonomy. Leading indicators of the presence of such institutions are the linguistic-demarcation of territorial units and the use of ethnic laws (for example, religious law) as an official rule of law for that sub-national unit. Nonetheless, country cases are coded as such only when group members are still legally free to move between federal units, and need not reside in the one associated with their own ethnic group. Third, we code for actual cases of “forced separation,” which would include cases where...
there are any laws limiting the use of certain public or residential spaces for members of some ethnic groups and not others. Finally, we code for “denationalization,” in cases in which members of certain ethnic groups are not allowed to enjoy regular citizenship identification, even though they are not nationals of other countries.

As a separate form of ethnic institutionalization, we investigate whether the state prohibits marriage or sexual contact across ethnic lines.

Opportunities for Personal Advancement: Employment and Education

Ethnic divisions of labor (Hechter 1978) and/or divisions of educational opportunities are often particularly important bases for social and political mobilization, which at the very least reinforce widespread perceptions of ethnic difference. We are concerned with instances in which these divisions are legally mediated and/or mandated by the state. For both work and education, states may attempt to reinforce or to redress ethnic inequalities, but in either case, the use of ethnic distinctions in regulating these sets of opportunities reflects and creates bases for ethnic political competition. Again, it is tempting to try to differentiate such approaches in terms of their fundamentally just or unjust qualities, but our intent is simply to expose where there may be bases for mobilization, and so we avoid such assessments. We simply attempt to identify preference and quota policies that make explicit reference to members of ethnic groups. Whatever the cause or rationale of their creation, for our purposes, the very existence of reservations for individuals based on their ethnic identity constitutes an important source of institutionalization.

While helpful, this approach does not completely eliminate all sources of ambiguity. In many countries and time periods, preference policies are drawn up in somewhat coded language. For example, the Nigerian constitution often refers to mandates for government employment to reflect the “federal character” of the country. When preference policies are articulated in a manner that is consistent with the institutionalization of the spatial separation of people, we code these as being instances of ethnic preferences.

Table 2: Case Selection for Initial Data Collection and Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELF</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Latin America/Caribbean</th>
<th>North America/Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above .7</td>
<td>South Africa (.88)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso (.71)</td>
<td>Canada (.77)</td>
<td>India (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso (.86)</td>
<td>Nigeria (.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.5–.69</td>
<td>Brazil (.59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.30–.49</td>
<td>Botswana (.4)</td>
<td>Costa Rica (.46)</td>
<td>France (.32)</td>
<td>Sri Lanka (.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom (.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–.29</td>
<td>Lesotho (.218)</td>
<td>Rwanda (.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1985 ELF data reported from Roeder 2001.)

Multiple Cleavages

A central challenge for students of ethnic politics is to determine which groups or identities should be considered relevant or salient (e.g., Posner 2005). At times, a seemingly intractable dilemma is that scholars have failed to identify appropriate rules for adjudicating among the overlap of identities that any individual may hold (Chandra 2006; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Why, for example, should one identify “African-Americans” and not “Scandinavian-Americans” as an ethnic group? Our approach is not plagued by such problems because we simultaneously investigate the multiple cleavages that might be recognized by the state, and we are not forced to make arbitrary decisions about salience or potential overlap. We allow for the possibility of six different sets of ethnic categories (language, religion, caste, indigenous, race, ethnic/other) and search for evidence that these categories have been used in all of the institutions described above. While religious and linguistic categories are largely self-explanatory, we classify race categories as those ethnic categories explicitly described in terms of physical characteristics (e.g., color) and/or referred to as “race” by given state institutions; caste categories as those linked to a codified caste system recognized by religious scripture, or those referred to as “caste” by state institutions; indigenous categories as those groups referred to as “indigenous,” “original inhabitant,” or “natives” by institutions, except when the group(s) are also commonly linked to one of the other categories already described (for example, “natives” are considered a race group in South Africa); and ethnic/other is a residual category used when state institutions refer to specific ethnic or “tribal” groups that could not be classified in one of the above-mentioned categories (for instance, an ethnic group that is not distinguished by use of a single language).

Data for Sixteen Countries

Because data gathering on the history of state institutions is extremely labor-intensive, we have initially gathered observations for 16 country cases (not for dozens or more than 100 as has become typical for studies of ethnic fractional-
ization) spanning three developing regions, and several of the high-income countries. This initial (at times painstaking) research was meant to provide the foundation for the development of strategies and classification rules which could then be applied to subsequent research for a broader set of countries, and potentially over a longer period of time. We make no claims to the representativeness of this sample for the larger universe of all countries. Rather, we first selected several of the countries based on our own familiarity with those cases, and then we expanded the sample to a size we agreed would be sufficiently large to identify a wide range of variation in institutionalized ethnicity. In expanding the sample, we tried to identify countries that we had reason to believe varied widely in terms of ethnic politics and across a sufficiently wide geographic scope, and across a wide range of ethnic diversity as measured by ELF scores (Table 2), that we could put significant stress on our analytic constructs and associated classification rules.

We used “country-decades” as the unit of analysis, though we have also attempted to specify the exact years in which particular laws or policies have been enacted or repealed. We have begun the collection of data at 1900 or the decade during which independence was claimed, whichever came later for the country in question. If an institution existed at any time during the decade, we count the institution as being present during that decade. Our dataset includes 122 country-decade observations of each institution, for each of the six cleavages.

In order to learn if institutions codified ethnicity, we attempted to obtain actual primary documents wherever possible, and as a second step, we tried to attain authoritative secondary sources based on primary analyses of relevant documents and data and/or by contacting foreign nationals, diplomatic representatives, and scholarly authorities.

For each country-decade, we investigated the (non)-existence of all of the aforementioned institutions. For certain types of institutions, it is far easier to be certain that an institution exists than to know that it doesn’t; for example, in the case of “ethnic autonomy,” if we found specific provisions allowing for such autonomy, we knew for certain that this existed and no further research was required, but we could only be “fairly confident” that a particular institution did not exist if, after significant searching, we could find no evidence.

**Index Creation**

After gathering data on the respective institutions, we constructed what we term an Institutionalized Ethnicity Index (IEI). The core assumption undergirding construction of the index is that the more institutions that codify a particular ethnic category, the deeper the level of institutionalization, and likely the salience of a particular category, with greater potential for conflict. We began by creating an index for each of the

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**Figure 1: Institutionalized Ethnicity Index Scores in 16 Countries (1900–2006)**

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six ethnic categories, allowing for a maximum 9-point score counting 1 point for the presence of each of the first 9 institutions identified in Table 1. As indicated above and in the table, we also noted certain instances of the degree or nature of institutionalization, but for the basic summary scores, we do not take these into account.

In Figure 1, we depict the IEI cleavage scores for each of our 16 countries for the period 1900–2000, but starting in the decade of independence for those countries not already independent in 1900. It is possible to identify four overall patterns: A few countries have generally very high IEI scores, with at least one cleavage reaching scores of 5 or above: South Africa, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Canada. At the other extreme, five countries have consistently very low IEI scores, never scoring higher than a 1 for more than a single decade: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Lesotho, and France. In between are Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Within this group, we observe that some countries have one or more cleavages scoring higher than a 1 for more than a single decade: Botswana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Canada. At the other extreme, we see that some countries have at least one cleavage reaching scores of 5 or above: South Africa.

A few countries have generally very high IEI scores, with at least one cleavage reaching scores of 5 or above: South Africa, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Canada. At the other extreme, five countries have consistently very low IEI scores, never scoring higher than a 1 for more than a single decade: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Lesotho, and France. In between are Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Brazil, Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Within this group, we observe that some countries have one or more cleavages scoring higher than a 1 for more than a single decade: Botswana, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Canada. At the other extreme, we see that some countries have at least one cleavage reaching scores of 5 or above: South Africa.

In the 1994 genocide. As compared with ethnic demographic scores (such as the ELF index reported in Table 2), we believe these data provide a much more meaningful and historically nuanced portrait of ethnic politics. This approach does a nice job of summarizing in a quantitative format the types of institutions and patterns of institutional change that were described qualitatively in a number of key studies, and will provide a solid foundation for more rigorous analyses of the causes and consequences of those institutions.

Conclusion

This is not the place to discuss the broader substantive or theoretical implications of our initial research, or the more nuanced ways in which we hope to exploit both the qualitative and quantitative data described above. Rather, for the purposes of this symposium, what we believe to be the most significant is our detailing of an approach that has tried to build upon the insights of innovative qualitative-historical research in a manner that will allow us, and other scholars, to carry out more disciplined and wide-ranging comparative analyses of critical questions. The process of developing a quantitative index forced us to clarify the essential institutional features that drive ethnic cognitions and behaviors, which in turn has set us in search of historical knowledge and texts. Following recent contributions advocating such mixed method approaches (e.g., Brady and Collier 2004), we believe the strategy detailed here is a promising one for tackling the thorny conceptual and measurement problems implied by the phenomenon of ethnic politics.

Notes

1 For example, we are investigating the relationship between institutionalized ethnicity and the outbreak of ethnic civil wars, using both quantitative analyses and country histories. We will also consider the impact on patterns of economic growth, and social policy.

2 Because we seek to identify particular cleavages and to code censuses in earlier decades, we could not simply use Morning’s data for our purposes.

3 In particular, Brazil, India, and South Africa.

References


Design Measures of Ethnic Identity: The Problems of Overlap and Incompleteness

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A great deal of new work in the field of ethnic politics has focused on improving the quality of the data we put into our measures—and critiquing the quality of the data that went into measures such as the Index of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (the ELF index) (Chandra 2009, Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, Cederman and Girardin 2007, Posner 2004).1

In this article, I shift the focus to improving the quality of the assumptions that drive our measures. The ELF index and many of the new measures which have followed it are based on the assumptions that the ethnic categories that describe a population are mutually exclusive. But the membership of one ethnic category, whether nominal or activated, often overlaps with the membership of another. I refer to this as the problem of “overlap.” The ELF index and some additional measures also assume that the ethnic categories that describe a population are exhaustive. But it is often the case that only a part of population can be categorized in ethnic terms. I refer to this as the problem of “incompleteness.” Quite apart from improving the quality of the data that they describe, improving the quality of our measures requires us to improve the quality of our assumptions to take these problems into account.

I then introduce one new measure of the activation of ethnic identities by political parties—EVOTE—that does not employ the assumptions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. EVOTE is drawn from a time-series cross-national dataset that I am currently in the process of constructing (referred to hereafter as CDEI (Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions). CDEI collects data on ethnic categories activated in competitive politics by political parties and the institutional context in which such politicization takes place. The full domain of CDEI is all countries that held at least one lower-house legislative election in any of three decades: 1976–1986, 1986–1996, and 1996–2006. The data and examples in this article however, are taken from the 1986–1996 cross-section. They describe a hundred countries which held a party-based election for the lower-house of the legislature between 1986 and 1996.

EVOTE is only one of many measures that are or could be designed without making the restrictive assumptions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. Other such measures we are developing in CDEI include measures of the effective number of ethnic parties, of the degree of dispersion of ethnic group vote across ethnic parties that represent it, of the degree of inclusion of ethnic parties in government, and of the dimensions to which ethnic categories activated by political parties belong. These were introduced and discussed at a workshop, “Measuring Ethnicity,” held at New York University in October 2008. Other scholars are also developing measures that do not, as far as I can tell, assume exhaustiveness and exclusiveness. These include the Index of Institutionalized Ethnicity (IEI), proposed by Lieberman and Singh in this symposium (Lieberman and Singh 2008), ECI, proposed by Steven Wilkinson (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008), among others.

What is an Ethnic “Group”?2

The Oxford English Dictionary associates the word “group” with two meanings: “A number of people or things regarded as forming a unity or whole on the grounds of some mutual or common relation or purpose,” or “classed together because of a degree of similarity.” The second meaning suggests that those who belong to a group simply share membership in a category—a descriptive label that describes and distinguishes them from others regardless of their own feelings on the matter. The first meaning suggests that those who share group membership not only share a descriptive label but also think of themselves as a collective with a shared consciousness.

The identities that comparative political sciences classify as ethnic are often no more than descriptive categories—but our theories, often unjustifiably, associate members of these categories with a shared collective consciousness (Brubaker 2004). In my own work, and in the course of this article, I treat an ethnic identity purely as a descriptive category and try to avoid using the ambiguous term “group” altogether. But when referring to the usage of other comparative political scientists who do use the word “group,” I also follow suit, trying either to clarify what I think it means in the work from which it is drawn or consider all possible interpretations of what it could mean.

By an “ethnic” category, I mean a category in which membership depends on a subset of descent-based attributes. All categories based on descent-based attributes, according to this definition, are not ethnic identity categories. And some non-ethnic identities also require descent-based rules for membership. But all ethnic identities require some descent-based attributes for membership. This definition captures the classification of ethnic identities in comparative politics to a greater degree than the alternatives (for elaboration, see Chandra 2006, 2007).

Nominal ethnic identities are those ethnic identity categories in which an individual’s descent-based attributes make her eligible for membership. Activated ethnic identities are those ethnic categories in which she actually professes membership or to which she is assigned membership by others. All individuals have a repertoire of nominal ethnic identities from which one or more may be activated.3

The ethnic “structure” of a population consists of all the repertoires of nominal ethnic identity categories of all individuals in that population—and the attributes from which these nominal categories are generated (for elaboration, see Chandra 2009 and Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Suppose, in an example to which I will return throughout this article, individuals in a population are characterized by two types of skin colour: black and white. And suppose that they are characterized by two places of origin: foreign and native (Chandra and Boulet...
2006). These attributes can generate a very large number of
categorical categories, including “Blacks” (consisting of those
individuals with the attribute-repertoires black and foreign or
black and native), “Whites” (consisting of those individuals
with the attribute-repertoires white and foreign or white and
native), “White Natives” (consisting only of those individuals
who are both white skinned and native), “Foreigners” (con-
sisting of those individuals who are either white skinned and
foreign or black skinned and foreign), “Black Natives” (con-
sisting only of those individuals who are both black skinned
and native), and so on. All these nominal categories belong to
this population’s ethnic “structure” whether or not anyone
actually identifies with them.

By ethnic “practice,” I mean those categories actually ac-
tivated by a country’s population in a specific context. The
context can vary: the categories activated in party politics can
be different from categories activated in voting behaviour and
both can be different from categories activated in private life.
Suppose, for instance, that in the population above, individu-
als who have the attributes of black skin and a foreign place of
origin) describe themselves as “Black” during elections—al-
though they also qualify for membership in the nominal cat-
goers of “Foreigner” or “Black Foreigner,” these are not the
ones in which they declare membership. We would then term
the category “Black” as the activated category in this context.

The Assumptions of Mutual Exclusiveness and
Exhaustiveness in the ELF Index and Other Measures

The ELF Index is calculated according to the formula $1–\sum s_i^2$, where $s_i$ is the proportion of the $i$th activated ethnic
category, $i=\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. This formula requires the ethnic cat-
goers to be mutually exclusive (i.e., if you are in ethnic cat-
ogory 1, you are not in ethnic categories 2–$n$) and exhaustive (every member of the population is in some ethnic category). Given mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, this index
measures the probability that two randomly chosen individu-
als from a country’s population belong to different groups.
Thus, a society with two groups, a majority of 80% and a
minority of 20%, would have an ELF score of $1–(.64+.04) = .32$.
A society with several small groups of 25% each would have
a higher ELF score of $1–(.0625+.0625+.0625+0.0625) = .75$. In
the absence of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, this
measure would be meaningless: it would no longer measure
the probability that two randomly chosen individuals from a
country’s population belong to different groups.

The Problem of Overlap

The “attributes” from which a country’s nominal or ac-
tivated ethnic categories are generated can indeed be arrayed on
one or more mutually exclusive attribute dimensions. Thus,
if we define as “foreign” as anyone whose parents were born
outside the boundaries of a country, and “native” as all those
whose parents were not born outside the country, we have a
mutually exclusive attribute dimension of place of origin where
everyone is either foreign or native. If there are people who
don’t quite fit, we can simply place them in a residual value.”

But the ELF index and related measures purport to de-
scribe the ethnic identity categories that characterize a popu-
lation—not the attributes from which they are generated.
These categories are often not mutually exclusive. To illus-
strate, consider first the nominal categories in our hypothetical
example above. Some of these categories such as “Black” and
“White,” indeed have mutually exclusive memberships, be-
cause the attributes that qualify individuals for membership in
each—the attribute of “black” skin for the category Black and
the attribute of “white” skin for the category White—are mu-
tually exclusive by definition. But many others are not. Con-
sider the categories White (consisting of those individuals
with the attribute-repertoires white and foreign or white and
native) and “White Natives” (consisting only of those indivi-
duals who are both white skinned and native). These cat-
egories have overlapping memberships: given their attributes,
those who are White can also be described as “White and
Native.”

The real world is full of such examples. The United States
is perhaps the closest example to the hypothetical case above.
Nominal ethnic identity categories in the US include “White,”
“Black,” “WASP,” “Immigrant,” “Irish-American,” “Latino,”
“Catholic,” “West Indian,” and so on. The categories “White”
and “WASP” overlap, as do the categories “White,” “Irish-
American,” and “Catholic.” The categories “Black,” “Catholic,”
and “West Indian” overlap too. So do the categories “Immigrant,” “Black,” “Irish-American” and “Latino.” We could
reproduce examples of such overlap when surveying the eth-
ic structure of most countries.

Suppose the term “group” refers to the activated catego-
ries embedded in a population’s ethnic “practice.” There is no
logical reason to expect individuals to activate only mutually
exclusive categories—and we do not so far have a theory that
makes such a prediction. In our hypothetical example, sup-
pose that individuals activate the categories “Foreign,” “Black,”
and “White Native.” These categories have overlapping mem-
erships: some of those who have the attributes for mem-
bership in the category “Foreign” also qualify for membership in
the category “Black.”

Indeed, at least judging from CDEI data on ethnic practice
in party politics, overlapping categories routinely show up in
party politics. Very occasionally, we do find cases in which
activated categories belong to a category-dimension. In
Guyana, for instance, the two activated categories in our data—
Afro-Guyanese and East Indian—could be said to be mutually
exclusive and belong to a single dimension based on region of
origin. But these are exceptions that prove the rule. In most of
the 100 countries that we study, the ethnic categories acti-
vated do not belong to any commonsensical family. CDEI’s
count of politically activated ethnic categories in India, for
instance, produces the following categories: Hindu, Muslim,
Sikh, OBCs, Scheduled Castes, Jharkhandis, Assamese, and
Tamils. The categories Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh belong to the
attribute-dimension of religion, the category OBC and Sched-
uled Caste belong to the attribute-dimension of caste, the cat-
egories Assamese and Tamils belong to the coinciding dimen-
sions of region and language, and the category Jharkhandi
belongs to the dimension of subregion. Many of them overlap
with each other. To cite just a few examples, the membership of the categories Hindu, Muslim, Scheduled Caste, Assamese Tamil, and Jharkhandi overlaps. So does the membership of the categories Muslim, OBC, Tamil, and Assamese. In Belgium, the activated categories are Flemish Speakers, French Speakers, Walloons, Brussels, French-speaking Brussels, Native-Flemish-Belgian, Native-French-Belgian, and German. The category Flemish Speakers overlaps with the category Native Bulgarians, as does the category Walloon.

### The Problem of Incompleteness

Is it reasonable to believe that counts of ethnic “groups” represent an exhaustive description of individuals in a population? If by the term ethnic “group” we mean all the nominal ethnic identities in a country’s ethnic structure in which individuals are eligible for membership, then the answer is yes. All individuals have nominal ethnic identities, whether or not they actually activate them. Thus a population can be described exhaustively by a count of nominal ethnic identity categories, although, for the reasons articulated above, this exhaustive count may consist of overlapping categories.

But if by ethnic “group” we mean the categories activated in ethnic “practice,” then the answer is no. There is no reason to expect that all individuals in a population should activate ethnic identity categories. To illustrate, consider the study of ethnicity in a Transylvanian town conducted by Brubaker et al. (2006). This study found that in many contexts, those who were nominally members of the Romanian ethnic category did not activate their Romanian ethnic identity, while those who were of Hungarian ethnicity did. Indeed, in many countries, including the US, UK, Myanmar, and India, majority groups often do not activate ethnic identities—the word “ethnic” is typically reserved for “minorities.”

Indeed, the data in CDEI shows that there are only a few very polarized countries at particular points in time, such as Yugoslavia in 1992, where almost the entire population lines up behind parties activating an ethnic identity—but even in such countries, the ethnic identification may not be complete. CDEI shows that 86% of the population in Yugoslavia voted for ethnic parties in 1992, leaving a minority of voters who voted for other types of parties. Even if we make the strong assumption that voting for an ethnic party means activating an ethnic identity category, this suggests that a significant proportion of the population did not activate an ethnic identity category at all. In most countries in the dataset, voters voted for parties that activated a wide range of categories, non-ethnic as well as ethnic. In the recent US presidential elections, for instance, some voters appear to have activated class identities (e.g., middle-class), others their party identities (Republican or Democrat), others identities based on age (e.g., pensioners or young people) and still others their racial identities (e.g., Black).

### Implications of the Problems of Overlap and Incompleteness for our Measures

The preceding sections argue that if by “ethnic groups” we mean all the nominal ethnic groups embedded in a country’s ethnic structure, then they can in many instances not be taken to be mutually exclusive. They can in principle be exhaustive. But because this exhaustive set of nominal categories includes those with overlapping memberships, it cannot be accurately summarized through the ELF index and other comparable measures.

The categories activated in ethnic practice, by contrast, are often neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. As measures of either ethnic structure or ethnic practice broadly defined, then, measures that employ these assumptions are meaningless. They distort rather than simplify the empirical world that they aim to describe and generate uninterpretable results.

Does this mean that we should not employ the assumptions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness in our measures? No—but we should recognize that we can only employ these assumptions to describe specific concepts in specific conditions and interpret our results accordingly. We could, for instance, indeed employ the assumptions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness to summarize any single attribute-dimension. For example, if we were describing India’s ethnic structure, we could probably come up with mutually exclusive lists of attributes on the attribute-dimensions of tribe, religion, language, race, nationality, caste, and region. There may well none be a single “correct” level of aggregation on these dimensions, and some attributes will belong to multiple dimensions. But I can imagine some systematic rules that allow us to construct these attribute-dimensions.

This list of attribute-dimensions is likely to include more than one dimension per country. In the example I just gave, there are two attribute-dimensions: skin color and place of origin. In the real world, many countries have multiple attribute dimensions. In the case of India, the dimensions I can think of are at least seven. In the US, they are at least six, including race, religion, language, region, tribe, and nationality. In Malaysia, similarly, there are at least five, including race, language, region, religion, and tribe. We will need, therefore, a statistical measure of ethnic “structure” which, unlike the ELF index, is designed to capture this multi-dimensionality. Even if we were able to design such measures, furthermore, we would need to modify our interpretations of statistical results. Summarizing the repertoire of attribute-dimensions in a population’s ethnic structure is not the same thing as summarizing the repertoire of ethnic identity categories in a country’s structure.

Alternatively, we might want to consider attribute-dimensions one by one, considering, as Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) do, the effect of the dimensions of language or religion or other such dimensions separately. A concentration index like the ELF index could be used in this case, since it eliminates the problem of overlap. But here, too, we would need to modify our interpretations carefully. Results generated from a consideration of an individual attribute-dimension embedded in a country’s ethnic structure should be interpreted as narrow results about specific attribute-dimensions—not as general results about “ethnicity.” Further, they should be interpreted as results about nominal rather than activated dimensions, since we have no reason to believe that
activated identities fall on a single dimension. Finally, they should be interpreted as results that apply not to ethnic identity categories themselves, but to the raw materials from which those categories are generated.

**A New Measure: EVOTE**

The EVOTE measure is one of those generated from the CDEI. It measures the total percentage of the vote share obtained by ethnic parties in a given country, taken together, in the lower-house legislative election closest to 1996 in the 1986–1996 decade. EVOTE is obtained by aggregating the votes obtained by individual ethnic parties in a given country (EVOTE = Vote for Ethnic Party 1 + Vote for Ethnic Party 2 + Vote for Ethnic Party 3 ….).

This measure is constructed as follows: for each country included in the dataset, we first obtain a list of parties and vote shares at as disaggregated a level for the relevant legislative election. We then classify each political party in each country for which vote shares are available according to whether it activates a target category based on ethnicity in several ways: does it activate ethnicity in its name, in its platform, in its support base (defined two ways), or in its leadership.

The EVOTE measure discussed here refers entirely to the votes won by parties that are classified as ethnic by platform. But in principle, we could construct the same measure by aggregating the votes of parties that are ethnic by name, by support base (differently defined), and by leadership.

The classification of parties is based on a content analysis of the election campaign of the party in question using four sources: the *Europa World Yearbook*, the *Political Handbook of the World*, news sources from FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), and LexisNexis searches. For each party, we obtain a sample of campaign materials (speeches at election rallies, policy pronouncements, and so on) as reported in FBIS and LexisNexis for a period up to three months before the election date. These include reports from the international media and translations of local news reports from newspapers, radio and TV. These samples are primary sources that report what parties are actually saying to voters at the time of the election. Where the samples are too small to permit reliable codings, we turn to local newspapers and secondary sources as a last resort. These sources give us a sample of articles for the election platform of each party individually.

We code each sample for each party by platform in the following way: If we find that a political party makes an open and exclusive appeal to some ethnic category or set of categories, and that such an appeal is central to its campaign, we code it as an ethnic party. If we find that a political party makes an open and inclusive appeal to all ethnic categories that define a population and makes such an appeal central to its election campaign, we code it as a multi-ethnic party. And if we find that a political party does not make an open or a central appeal to an ethnic category, whether exclusive or inclusive, we code it as a non-ethnic party.

Consider the case of India as an example of our coding procedures. Hundreds of parties competed in India in the 1991 parliamentary elections (the elections closest to but before 1996) but most of them obtained a miniscule percentage of the vote. We obtained disaggregated data on all parties that obtained at least .01% of the vote, thus including 66 parties in our dataset. (Note that this means that our dataset excludes both parties which did not contest a particular election, and parties that obtained less than .01% of the vote. As such, it undercounts small and failed parties). We then coded each of these 66 parties based on a content analysis of its party platform. Of the 66 parties, we coded 13 parties, accounting for 51.81% of the vote, as non-ethnic, 18 parties, accounting for 38.95% of the vote, as ethnic, and were not able to find sufficient articles on election platforms to code the remaining 35 parties, accounting for 10.24% of the vote (these were very few).

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**Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of EVOTE**

![Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of EVOTE](image)
small parties, with a mean vote of .14%).

When a party made an explicit ethnic appeal, we also collected data on the name of its target ethnic category and the size of the population that each ethnic category constitutes. In India, for instance, ethnic parties, taken together, explicitly mobilized the following ethnic categories: Hindus (82%), Muslims (12.12%); Sikhs (1.94%); OBCs (52%), Scheduled Castes (16.48%), Jharkhandis (3.18%), Assamese (2.64%), and Tamils (6.6%).

In these data, EVOTE ranges from 0 (in 44 out of 100 cases) to a maximum of 85.63 (for Yugoslavia in 1992, with Israel in 1992 and Zimbabwe in 1995 close behind), with a mean of 12.95. The graph below represents the frequency distribution of EVOTE in these data.

EVOTE is a precise measure of the politicization of ethnic identities in practice and not simply of ethnic structure. As a measure of ethnic practice, it does not require the assumptions that ethnic categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive when they are often not. To illustrate, let’s return to the categories activated in the 1991 elections in India. Of these, the categories Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh are mutually exclusive in relation to each other, but overlap with the categories OBCs, Scheduled Castes, Jharkhandis, Assamese, and Tamils. The percentage of the vote captured by ethnic parties also indicates that they do not exhaust the categories activated by the population: to the extent that the majority of the vote in these elections went to non-ethnic parties, we must assume that a significant proportion of the population activated identity categories other than those defined by ethnic identity.

Given that categories in practice are often neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, putting them into the ELF index yields a nonsensical number. By contrast, EVOTE remains meaningful without these assumptions. The total proportion of the vote won by ethnic parties is unaffected by whether the ethnic parties in question mobilize mutually exclusive or overlapping categories. In India, it so happens that the parties activate overlapping categories. But the value of EVOTE would be the same even if the parties in question activated mutually exclusive categories. Similarly, EVOTE also does not impose the requirement that the categories activated by political parties be complete, since it is the votes won by the parties that mobilize each category that are added, not the proportion of the population made up by the categories themselves. Rather, it allows us to observe such completeness in the data. In countries in which all individuals activate ethnic identities in their voting behaviour, the value of EVOTE would be 100%. In countries in which only some individuals activate ethnic identities in their voting behaviour, the value of EVOTE would be less than 100%.

**Perfection vs. Interpretability**

EVOTE is a narrow measure of the activation of ethnic identity by political parties in their explicit appeals. I expect to use EVOTE to examine whether such explicit use of categories by political parties is associated with breakdown and instability. But it is not an all-purpose measure. It conveys no information about the effect of other ways in which ethnic identity categories may be politicized, either through the implicit behaviour of political parties, or through the behaviour of voters rather than parties or through the use of ethnic identity in non-electoral contexts. A study of the relationship between EVOTE and breakdown and stability, thus, is informative about the relationship between one aspect of ethnicity and these variables, but not about all aspects. Designing an array of such narrow concepts and measures is a more promising strategy to explore the effect of ethnicity than designing a single all-purpose measure of “ethnicity.”

Even as a narrow measure, EVOTE has plenty of biases and limitations that need to be corrected for or at a minimum taken into account in the interpretation of results generated from it. To cite only two from a long list, it systematically under-counts small parties, and measurement error in the coding of ethnic parties from which it is generated is correlated with the size of the party and the region it is from. Using EVOTE for individual analyses will surely uncover instances of bias and error that we have not considered so far. But the main case for EVOTE—and other measures that abandon the assumptions of exhaustiveness and exclusiveness—is not that it is perfect, but that it is *interpretable*. That is a minimal standard, worth defending in a field where it is too often ignored.

**Notes**

1 This article makes arguments developed more fully in an ongoing book manuscript and introduced in several articles, including Chandra (2006, 2008, 2009), Chandra and Wilkinson (2008).

2 I use this precisely defined distinction between “nominal” and “activated” categories rather than the similar-sounding distinctions “latent” and “saliency” of ethnic identities, “dormant” and “mobilized” identities, and “commensurably real” and “politically relevant” identities (Posner 2004, 2005). Salient or mobilized or politically relevant identities or group memberships are often taken to mean not only shared membership but also the sharing of some content, such as common preferences or culture or symbols. But as I use it here, “activating” an ethnic category simply requires an individual to claim membership in it—it does not require her to subscribe to its content, or even necessarily to associate with other members of that category, although she may also do that.

3 Note that there is nothing “objective” about how we define and group values on a common dimension. We might just as easily define as foreign those who are themselves born abroad, or those whose ancestors in the last 100 years were born abroad, etc. But the main point here is that we can, and usually do, construct subjective definitions that group attributes into mutually exclusive families. These attributes then become the raw materials by which nominal and activated categories are constructed.

4 For a different view, see Posner (2005), which is premised on the view that activated categories fall into mutually exclusive “categories” or “dimensions.”

**References**


This symposium is on the one hand a testament to the incredible progress that has been made in the measurement of social identities, and in particular ethnic identities, over the last several years; on the other hand, the articles also highlight how much work is yet to be done. Our contribution to this debate is to focus on content and comparison of social identities: we make a case for why the content, or meaning, of social identities matters, and how measuring content will help us with another major task, which is to be able to make comparisons across types of identities, e.g., ethnicity, race, caste, religious association, gender, class, etc. We begin with a discussion of why content matters and how it is related to the ability to make comparisons. We then outline the “Identity as a Variable” analytical framework for measuring the content and contestation in social identities (Abdelal et al. 2006, 2009) and we discuss the variety of methodological techniques that can be used to measure identity content by briefly describing the contributions to our recently published edited volume, *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists*, which illustrates several different ways that scholars have operationalized the measurement of the content of ethnic and other identities.

**Why Content Matters**

Measurement of ethnic identity means many things. As Kanchan Chandra points out in this symposium, there is a theoretically significant difference between nominal and activated ethnic identities, and the measurement techniques for addressing each needs to be different. In addition, we can also add the concepts of *groupness* and *content* to what might be measured by ethnic identity, both of which are analytically distinct from lists of nominal or activated identities.

“Groupness,” along the lines proposed by Brubaker and Cooper (2000), describes the degree to which individuals identify with a group. At a minimum, groupness is merely a dichotomous variable—either groupness exists, or it does not (e.g., the survey question, “Check this box if you are African-American”). Or, there may be degrees of groupness—measuring how much individuals identify with a given group (e.g., the survey question, “How strongly do you identify as African-American?”). Whatever way one measures groupness, it is almost certainly going to fall victim to the problem of overlap as discussed by Chandra; that is, the list of groups in a question is unlikely to capture all the possible identities that a person might have, or it is likely to treat them as mutually exclusive. More importantly, the conception of groupness takes the meaning of a group among its members for granted and therefore ignores the content of the identity, i.e., the shared behavioral expectations, goals, views of other groups, and interpretative processes that constitute the meaning of the group. In addition, the meaning or content of identity varies across individuals within groups, and that too is excluded by the concept of groupness. Hence, the concept of groupness, by sidestepping the question of content or what the group means to its members, ignores one of the most theoretically and empirically significant aspects of social identity.

The content or meaning of social identities, we argue, is the mechanism which links having an identity to specific behavior, to the formation of interests, and to relations with other groups. For example, if we consider a foreign-born, black, female, Christian, New Yorker, we need to know the meaning of all those labels to say anything about this woman’s behavior (e.g., who she will likely vote for, where she will choose to live, what languages she will speak, what kind of food she will eat, what holidays she will celebrate, etc.). The content of her identities is also the key to her interests and goals, such as which party she identifies with, whether she values education, which
charities she supports, and which political issues she will get involved with. The identity content will tell us something about her likely relations with other groups, such as whites, foreigners, Catholics vs. Muslims, etc., and finally, content will likely tell us something about how this person hierarchically sorts out her multiple identities, i.e., which one is most important to her. We believe that the framework we outline below that details types of identity content, and contestation over that content, allows for assessment of the meaning of social identities.

Comparisons of Types of Identities

A serious conceptual challenge in the identity literature concerns the question of how to compare different types of identities, e.g., ethnicity, race, national identities, gender, caste, religious identities, and class. We know that individuals often have more than one type of identity and sometimes multiple identities within the same type (e.g., more than one ethnic identity), and these identities may be hierarchical (i.e., one identity is more important than another). To acknowledge that there are different types of identities brings up the theoretical question of what differentiates these identities and what they have in common, if anything. In addition, there is the empirical question of whether a dataset should include all of these types of identities (or a subset of types) or whether they should be treated separately.

The literature thus far is not, in our opinion, entirely satisfactory. Some datasets purport to measure one thing, e.g., ethnic categories only, but include others such as religious categories. For example, Russian census data claims to exclude religion, but includes “Jewish” and a few other religious categories on the idea that some religious identities are actually ethnic identities. In addition, some datasets explicitly claim to measure more than one category, but are widely used as a proxy for one; e.g., the Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation Index (ELF) has both ethnicity and language in its title but is perhaps the most widely measure of “ethnicity.” These cases highlight the blurry conceptual distinction between religion, ethnicity, and language. An alternative is to focus only on one type of identity, say language or ethnicity (Alesina et al. 2003). Yet when this is done regarding ethnicity, we know it to be problematic because of the fact that focusing only on ethnicity excludes other politically relevant comparable identities, and that fact is often not reflected in the interpretation of the data (as Chandra discusses in this symposium and elsewhere in more detail; see Chandra 2006).

Finally, some scholars broaden the term ethnicity to encompass other types of identity, both in theory and in practice. Donald Horowitz writes, “Ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and ‘castes’” (Horowitz 1985: 53). On the empirical level, in the Index of Institutionalized Ethnicity (IEI) discussed by Lieberman and Singh in this symposium, ethnic categories include “language, religion, caste, indigenous, race, and ethnic/other” categories. Similarly, EVOTE, discussed by Chandra in this symposium, includes multiple types of identities (or dimensions, in her terminology). We agree that it is intuitively sensible to broaden the concept of ethnicity in particular data sets, because otherwise theoretically important categories would be left out.

Nevertheless, while broadening the term ethnicity to mean multiple types of identity is one solution, we suggest an alternative, namely to disaggregate types of identity content so that comparisons across identity types can be made based on shared types of content. For example, social norms regarding language and dietary restrictions can be compared among ethnic and religious groups; worldviews or cognitive schemas can be compared across gender, class, and racial groups; shared goals could be compared across religious or national identity groups, and so on. Moreover, by concentrating on the comparison of types of content, such as relational comparisons, we can squarely address concepts like status hierarchies, which might include caste, religion, and ethnicity.

Brubaker et al. (2004) attempted to compare and differentiate race, ethnicity, and national identities, arguing that cognition is a way to address all three identity types. While we do not disagree that cognition or cognitive content of identities may be a way to compare identity types, we argue that cognition is not the only comparable type of content and it is also not just race, ethnicity, and national identity which demand comparison and differentiation from each other. As the examples above suggest, scholarly work on all social identities might be better served by an analytic framework that allows for comparison and differentiation among identity types, and we argue that focusing on types of content is the key to such a framework.

An Analytic Framework for Measuring the Content and Contestation of Identities

Toward the development of an analytic framework that allows for comparison and differentiation among the many types of identities, we offer a definition of a collective identity as a social category that varies along two dimensions: content and contestation. Content describes the meaning of a collective identity. Moreover, the content of social identities may take the form of four mutually exclusive types: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons with other social categories, and cognitive models. Contestation refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared category. Our conceptualization thus enables collective identities to be compared according to the agreement and disagreement about their meanings by the members of the group.

Constitutive Norms

In brief, norms are behavioral expectations for a given identity group (Jepperson et al. 1996). The normative content of a collective identity specifies its constitutive rules—the practices that define that identity and lead other actors to recognize it. For example, for an ethnic group this kind of content could include “rules” on language use, religion, dress codes, etc. Note that types of identities can be embedded in norms, e.g., Armenians are also Christians; to convert to Islam would make others in the group seriously question one’s “Armenian-ness.” Also, different types of identities might have
different norms, but there could be some overlap: Religious identities, for example, might have norms that include dietary restrictions, birth, or marriage ceremonies, but they might also include dress codes or language use similar to ethnic group norms. All of the rules that determine group membership and putative attributes of the group can be thought of in terms of constitutive norms, which can be informal or formal so long as they set collective behavioral expectations for members of the group. Moreover, these constitutive identity group norms likely derive from a broader set of social norms that emanate from multiple centers of authority. Hence constitutive norms also link particular identity groups to larger historical and social contexts.

Social Purposes

The content of a collective identity may be purposive, in the sense that the group attaches specific goals to its identity. This purposive content is analytically similar to the common-sense notion that what groups want depends on who they think they are. Thus, identities can lead actors to work towards particular group purposes or goals. For example, most national identity groups share the goal of supporting their nation-state, or in the case of nationalist movements, establishing a nation state. Similarly, a religious identity might include shared purposes, such as working to increase converts, reduce poverty, or end the death penalty, etc. Whereas the normative content of an identity refers to practices that lead to individual obligation and social recognition, the purposive content of an identity helps to define group interests, goals, or preferences. Both the normative and purposive content of an identity may impose obligations on members, but in distinctive ways: constitutive norms impose an obligation to engage in practices that define the group, whereas social purposes create obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more likely.

Relational Comparisons

The content of a collective identity includes relational comparisons when the identity is defined in terms of references to other collective identities. In other words, an identity may be defined by what it is not—that is, by some other identities. Relational content of collective identities can include, for example, the extent to which one social identity excludes the holding of another (exclusivity); the relative status of an identity compared to others; and the existence or level of hostility presented by other identities. Gender and class identities present obvious illustrations of relational content; even the category of “transgender” references sex-based differences between men and women, and it’s hard to imagine any definition of class which does not include a comparison with other economic groups, i.e., absent relational comparisons. However, gender and class identities are not the only types that have relational content: many ethnic and religious identities also include relational comparisons, however the comparisons are usually targeted, e.g., Chinese may compare themselves to Japanese or Koreans in terms of defining who they are, but not to Mexicans or Algerians.

Relational content is also crucial for social identity theory (SIT), which hypothesizes that the creation of an in-group identity will tend to produce competitive behavior with out-groups, because the process of in-group identity creation by necessity requires, or leads to, the devaluation of out-groups (Tajfel 1981). In social identity theory, the central causal process in behavior derives from in-group and out-group differentiation, not the roles or identity traits per se that are attributed to in-groups and out-groups. In this case, action is in some sense a reaction to, and conditioned by the existence of, those who are different. Some relationships (those with groups socially recognized as similar) will be more cooperative than others (those with groups recognized as different) even if the same issue is at stake (such as territory, power, or status). SIT is one of the most well-established research programs in social psychology and it provides a clear mechanism linking identities and behavior.

Cognitive Models

Finally, the content of an identity can come in the form of cognitive models. In the broadest sense, a cognitive model may be thought of as a worldview, or a framework that allows members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions. The cognitive content of a collective identity describes how group membership is associated with explanations of how the world works as well as descriptions of the social reality of the group—a group’s ontology and epistemology. For example, according to Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “what cognitive perspectives suggest, in short, is that race, ethnicity, and nation are not things in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one’s problems and predicaments, identifying one’s interests, and orienting one’s action” (2004: 47).

Cognitive content, rather than implying an identity-based theory of action (à la norms or SIT), implies a theory of identity-based interpretation and development of interests (which of course may be closely related to action). Thus, attention to cognitive models suggests how identity affects the way actors understand the world and how their preferences regarding material or social action can be influenced by their identities.

Contestation

The content or collective meaning of identities is neither fixed nor predetermined. Rather, content is the outcome of a process of social contestation within the group. Indeed, much of identity discourse is the working out of the meaning of a particular collective identity through the contestation of its members. Individuals are continuously proposing and shaping the meanings of the groups to which they belong, hence content is always contested and contestation is the key to understanding how the meaning or content of identities change over time. For example, Episcopalian congregants debate whether to accept gay priests, Israelis debate the acceptability of territorial boundaries, etc.

Specific interpretations of the meaning of an identity are
sometimes widely shared among members of a group and sometimes less widely shared. At a minimum, contestation can be thought of as a matter of degree—the content of collective identities can be more or less contested. Indeed, the further apart the contending interpretations of a collective identity prove to be, the more that identity will be fragmented into conflicting and potentially inconsistent understandings of what the group’s purposes or relations should be.

Because the content of an identity is the product of contestation, the very data that a scholar extracts from a group elucidate, in manner and degree, the members’ consensus and disagreement about constitutive norms, consensus and congruence of the social purposes ascribed to an identity, agreement about meanings attached to out-groups, and coherence of shared cognitive models. By treating contestation as an empirical question, one can take snapshots of the degree of stability or flux in identities as they evolve, as they are challenged, and as they are constructed and reconstructed, hence addressing the theoretical tension between measurement and the fluidity of social identities. In addition, a focus on contestation allows one to examine the strategic process of identity construction including issues of authenticity, internalization, etc.

Finally, by considering the level of contestation regarding each type of content within identities, one arrives at a necessarily constructivist approach to identity without having to assume that actors on the ground view their identities as constructed. Where there is little contestation, one might conclude that that part of identity content is taken for granted or considered “natural.” Thus, one can appreciate some apparently “primordial” aspects of identity without taking a primordialist theoretical stance that denies the possibility for contestation at different times and places.

Methods for Measuring Identity Content and Contestation

In our survey of the scholarly literature on identity, we found that surveys, content analysis, discourse analysis, and ethnography were the most widely used methods. We did not discover any systematic links between these methods and the types of identity or the types of content they were used to measure, although nearly all studies of identity included some sort of case study. We also identified two additional methods—cognitive mapping and experiments—that offer great promise to supplement the dominant methods. In order to highlight the variety of methods available to identity researchers, below we briefly describe some of the ongoing work on measurement of identities that appears in our recently published edited volume, Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Part I of the volume considers identity definition, conceptualization, and measurement alternatives. The first chapter is an extended discussion of our analytical framework for measuring identity content and contestation described above. The next two chapters demonstrate how various methods can be combined to define and measure identity. Chapter 2, by Henry E. Brady and Cynthia S. Kaplan, considers the conceptualization and measurement of politically relevant social identities in four Soviet republics, using several different methods and types of data—history, demography, surveys, primary source materials, content analysis, and discourse analysis—in order to measure the political role of ethnicity at the mass public and elite level. Similarly, Chapter 3, by Donald A. Sylvan and Amanda K. Metskas, considers a range of methodological options, but in this chapter the focus is on Israeli-Palestinian relations. Based on five research projects that used experimental, survey, interview, narrative, and text-based data, Sylvan and Metskas consider the trade-offs between alternative approaches to measuring identity in this context.

The remaining chapters all proceed by presenting a measurement method that the authors have applied to a particular empirical issue. In essence, these chapters represent extended methodological discussions based on individual authors’ experiences using identity as a variable in larger research projects. Each of these chapters details the workings of a particular definition and method, discussing both its advantages and disadvantages. The chapters are divided into four sections: surveys, content analysis (including cognitive mapping), discourse analysis and ethnography, and experiments.

In the section on surveys, Chapter 4, by Taeku Lee, examines the conspicuous gap between social theory on race and ethnicity, which stresses its fluidity, multiplicity, and contingency, and quantitative, survey-based studies of race and ethnicity, which remain focused on finding a common, fixed set of categories that reliably and validly reflect how individuals think of themselves in racial or ethnic terms. This chapter proposes a new approach to measuring ethnoracial self-identification. Lee’s “identity point allocation” method gives respondents latitude over how many groups to identify with and how to weight the strength of their identification with each group. Chapter 5, by Jack Citrin and David O. Sears, explores the implications of holding multiple identities, concentrating on how individuals balance national and ethnic identities in multiethnic states. Citrin and Sears’s case study considers the United States and the current demographic and ideological challenge to the idea of E pluribus unum. By reviewing alternative measures of identity and some of the obstacles to systematic measurement, the chapter argues for the need to build upon more qualitative explorations of the content of identities before undertaking survey research. It then uses survey research—both national samples for representativeness and pooled data from Los Angeles—to explore how citizens conceive of and prioritize their national and ethnic identities. In Chapter 6, Michael Dawson explores the concept of racial identity. Much of the work on black political identity, and increasingly work focused on Latino/a and Asian American political identity as well, has focused on one particular construction of racial identity—that of “linked fate.” Empirically, Dawson tests the degree to which racial identity, operationalized by the concept of “linked fate,” is still able to shape African Americans’ political beliefs.

The next section contains three chapters that use content analysis to measure identity. In Chapter 7, Kimberly A. Neuendorf and Paul D. Skalski consider content analysis in terms of a quantitative investigation based on the coding of
message characteristics. They present three main coding possibilities: human coding from a preset scheme; computer text coding from a preset scheme; and “emergent” computer text coding, where dimensions derive from the data at hand. The chapter examines each approach using original identity-based data as well as data taken from the research of other identity scholars, and the advantages and limitations of the various approaches are considered. Chapter 8, by Robalyn Stone and Michael Young, examines computer-generated cognitive maps as a tool for extracting information about identity concepts in texts. Cognitive maps are a representation of the fundamental underlying belief system expressed in a text. The chapter uses two unique software programs: Profiler Plus and Worldview. Stone and Young show how these applications can be used to examine how different Iraqi leaders conceive of the main traits and characteristics of different ethnic and religious identities, illuminating the conceptual distance across individuals within identity groups. Chapter 9, by Kanchan Chandra, has been outlined to some extent in her contribution to this symposium. In the chapter, she discusses an important new constructivist dataset on several concepts related to ethnic identity and institutions—CDEI (Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions) including EVOTE, which is the focus of the chapter.

The next two chapters illustrate how discourse analysis and ethnography can illuminate the measurement of identity content. Chapter 10 discusses a constructivist theory of identity that is at once social, structural, and cognitive. The author, Ted Hopf, invokes discourse analysis to explore three logics of social order—consequentialism, appropriateness, and habit—and to relate them to the concept of identity. He then applies this theory to the study of a state’s foreign policy choices, and in particular, the case of the Sino-Soviet split. Chapter 11, by Laura Adams, reviews the way that identity has been measured in a select but diverse group of ethnographic studies, focused mainly on post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The chapter outlines the strengths and weaknesses of ethnographic methods and explores the ways that ethnographers deal with the challenges of their research process.

Finally, the last chapter explores the possibility of employing the experimental method to measure social identities. In Chapter 13, Rose McDermott provides an overview of the experimental literature on identity research. This chapter begins with a substantive discussion of the experimental work that has been conducted on social identity, which as it turns out is concerned almost exclusively with the ramifications, implications, and limitations of social identity theory. The chapter discusses limitations of existing experimental work for applications to political science, and examines some of the ways in which the method of experimentation might be expanded to investigate other realms of social identity in political contexts.

Conclusions

Identity content, and the social contestation that produces and follows it, we argue is a critical part of measuring ethnic and other social identities. It is by disaggregating and examining the content of identity that we can make comparisons across identity types. Moreover, identity content helps us understand the mechanisms by which having an identity shapes interests and actions; in particular, we argue that constitutive norms and relational comparisons suggest mechanisms for identity-based behavior, and social purposes and cognitive content address the formation of identity-based interests.

Finally, we want to emphasize the variety of methodological choices available to scholars interested in measuring identity content and making comparisons across identity types. In our edited volume we sought to include several different methodologies on a wide range of empirical topics across political science. We hope that this collection moves the debate on measuring the content of social identities forward by suggesting that methodological rigor need not imply the use of a single method or definition of identity. By examining identity content using diverse research strategies, we hope to get a step closer to explaining the power of identity as a variable.

Notes

1 This article largely summarizes our recent work; see Abdelal et al. (2006, 2009).

2 In Chandra’s terminology, these different types of identities represent different “dimensions.”

3 Some use other terms besides “worldviews.” Denzau and North (1994), for example, use “shared mental models.”

References


The concept of identity has become increasingly prominent in the social sciences and humanities. Analysis of the development of social identities is an important focus of scholarly research, and scholars using social identities as the building blocks of social, political, and economic life have attempted to account for a number of discrete outcomes by treating identities as causal factors. The dominant implication of the vast literature on identity is that social identities are among the most important social facts of the world in which we live. Abdelai, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott have brought together leading scholars from a variety of disciplines to consider the conceptual and methodological challenges associated with treating identity as a variable, offer a synthetic theoretical framework, and demonstrate the possibilities offered by various methods of measurement. The book represents a collection of empirically-grounded theoretical discussions of a range of methodological techniques for the study of identities.


This book provides a fresh and stimulating approach to causal analysis in the social sciences. International experts provide not just the philosophical arguments for a case-based approach to research but also detailed chapters on “why to,” “when to” and “how to.” Traditional distinctions between qualitative and quantitative are rejected in favor of a case-based approach which is applicable across the social sciences and beyond.


Offering students and researchers in the behavioral and social sciences a brief and accessible introduction to the comparative method, it is ideal for students of public administration, policy, sociology, political science, social psychology, and international relations. It provides readers with basic guidelines for comparative research by addressing all key methodological issues.


Careful work with concepts is a cornerstone of good social science methodology. Concepts and Method in Social Science demonstrates the crucial role of concepts, providing a timely contribution that draws both on the classic work of Giovanni Sartori and the writing of a younger generation of scholars. In this volume, major writings of Sartori are juxtaposed with other work that exemplifies important approaches to concept analysis. The book is organized into three key sections: Part I: Sartori on Concepts and Methods—including an examination of the necessary logical steps in moving from conceptual-ization to measurement and the relationships among meanings, terms and observations; Part II: Extending the Sartori Tradition—eminent scholars analyze five key ideas in concept analysis: revolution, culture, democracy, peasants and institutionalization within the context of the Sartori tradition; Part III: In the Academy and Beyond—both an engaging autobiographical essay written by Giovanni Sartori and reflections from former students provide a unique context in which to situate this varied and rigorous discussion of concept analysis and qualitative methods. Concepts and Method in Social Science is an accessible text that is well suited to advanced undergraduates and graduate students, providing a distinct and coherent introduction to comparative political analysis.


In recent years, political parties and national legislatures in more than 100 countries have adopted quotas for the selection of female candidates to political office. Despite the rapid diffusion of these measures around the globe, most research has focused on single countries—or, at most, the presence of quotas within one world region. Due to limited evidence, explanations for adoption and impact of gender quotas derived from one study frequently contradict findings from other cases. Quotas for Women in Politics is the first book to address quotas as a global phenomenon in order to provide greater analytical leverage in explaining their spread and impact in diverse contexts around the world. It is organized around two sets of questions: First, why are quotas adopted? Which actors are involved in quota campaigns, and why do they support or oppose quota measures? Second, what effects do quotas have on existing patterns of political representation? Are these provisions sufficient for bringing more women into politics? Or does their impact depend on other features of the broader political context? Synthesizing the literature on quota policies, Mona Lena Krook develops a framework for analyzing the spread of quota provisions and the reasons for variations in their effects. She then uses this framework to examine and compare different types of quota policies in Pakistan and India; Sweden and the United Kingdom; and Argentina and France.


The measurement of human rights has long been debated within the various academic disciplines that focus on human rights, as well as within the larger international community of practitioners working in the field of human rights. Written by leading experts in the field, this is the most up-to-date and comprehensive book on how to measure human rights. Measuring Human Rights draws explicitly on the international law of human rights to derive the content of human rights that ought to be measured; contains a comprehensive methodological framework for operationalizing this human rights content into human rights measures; includes separate chapters on the methods, strengths, and biases of different human rights measures, including events-based, standards-based, survey-based, and socio-economic and administrative statistics; covers measures of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; and includes a complete bibliography, as well as sources and locations for datasets useful for the measurement of human rights. This volume offers a significant and timely addition to this important area of work in the field of human rights, and will be of interest to academics and NGOs, INGOs, international governmental organiza-
tions, international financial institutions, and national governments themselves.


Although democracy is a widely held value, concrete measurement of it is elusive. Gerardo L. Munck’s constructive assessment of the methods used to measure democracies promises to bring order to the debate in academia and in practice. Drawing on his years of academic research on democracy and measurement and his practical experience evaluating democratic practices for the United Nations and the Organization of American States, Munck’s discussion bridges the theories of academia with practical applications. In proposing a more open and collaborative relationship between theory and action, he makes the case for reassessing how democracy is measured and encourages fundamental changes in methodology. Munck’s field-tested framework for quantifying and qualifying democracy is built around two instruments he developed: the UN Development Programme’s Electoral Democracy Index and a case-by-case election-monitoring tool used by the OAS. *Measuring Democracy* offers specific, real-world lessons that scholars and practitioners can use to improve the quality and utility of data about democracy.


In his challenging new book Rein Taagepera argues that society needs more from social sciences than they have delivered. One reason for falling short is that social sciences have depended excessively on regression and other statistical approaches, neglecting logical model building. Science is not only about the empirical “What is?” but also very much about the conceptual “How should it be on logical grounds?” Statistical approaches are essentially descriptive, while quantitatively formulated logical models are predictive in an explanatory way. *Making Social Sciences More Scientific* contrasts the predominance of statistics in today’s social sciences and predominance of quantitatively predictive logical models in physics. It shows how to construct predictive models and gives social science examples. *Making Social Sciences More Scientific* is useful to students who wish to learn the basics of the scientific method and to all those researchers who look for ways to do better social science.

**Article Notes**


This article offers an anti-naturalist philosophical critique of the naturalist tendencies within qualitative concept formation as developed most prominently by Giovanni Sartori and David Collier. We begin by articulating the philosophical distinction between naturalism and anti-naturalism. Whereas naturalism assumes that the study of human life is not essentially different from the study of natural phenomena, anti-naturalism highlights the meaningful and contingent nature of social life, the situatedness of the scholar, and so the dialogical nature of social science. These two contrasting philosophical approaches inspire, in turn, different strategies of concept formation. Naturalism encourages concept formation that involves reification, essentialism, and an instrumentalist view of language. Anti-naturalism, conversely, challenges reified concepts for eliding the place of meanings, essentialist concepts for eliding the place of contingency, and linguistic instrumentalism for eliding the situatedness of the scholar and the dialogical nature of social science. Based on this philosophical framework, we subject qualitative concept formation to a philosophical critique. We show how the conceptual strategies developed by Sartori and Collier embody a reification, essentialism, and instrumentalist view of language associated with naturalism. Although Collier’s work on concept formation is much more flexible and nuanced than Sartori’s, it too remains attached to a discredited naturalism.


Social scientists increasingly exploit *natural experiments* in their research. This article surveys recent applications in political science, with the goal of illustrating the inferential advantages provided by this research design. When treatment assignment is less than “as if” random, studies may be something less than natural experiments, and familiar threats to valid causal inference in observational settings can arise. The author proposes a continuum of plausibility for natural experiments, defined by the extent to which treatment assignment is plausibly “as if” random, and locates several leading studies along this continuum.


This paper analyzes the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset using a new methodology based on machine learning tools for subgroup discovery. While the PITF used static data, this study employs both static and dynamic descriptors covering the five-year period before onset. The methodology provides several descriptive models of countries especially prone to political instability. For the most part, these models corroborate the PITF’s findings and support earlier theoretical works. The paper also shows the value of subgroup discovery as a tool for developing a unified concept of political instability as well as for similar research designs.


Historical explanations seek to identify the causes of outcomes in particular cases. Although social scientists commonly develop historical explanations, they lack criteria for distinguishing different types of causes and for evaluating the relative importance of alternative causes of the same outcome. This article first provides an inventory of the five types of causes that are normally used in historical explanations: (1) necessary but not sufficient, (2) sufficient but not necessary, (3) necessary and sufficient, (4) INUS, and (5) SUIN causes. It then introduces a new method—sequence elaboration—for evaluating the relative importance of causes. Sequence elaboration assesses the importance of causes through consideration of their position within a sequence and through consideration of the types of causes that make up the sequence as a whole. Throughout the article, methodological points are illustrated with substantive examples from the field of international and comparative studies.

A substantial intellectual movement has been growing in the social sciences around the adoption of mechanism- and process-based explanations as complements to variable-based explanations, or even as substitutes for them. But once we have recognized the validity and dignity of studying mechanisms and processes, what is the next step? Recently, both political scientists’ and sociologists’ discussions have begun to turn away from correlation to mechanism-based approaches to causation. But there is still a widespread assumption that mechanisms are unobservable. We maintain that ways can be developed to observe the presence or absence of mechanisms either directly or indirectly. In this paper, by way of example, we put forward four methods—two direct and two indirect—for measuring mechanisms of contention.


In a key finding in the democratic peace literature, Mansfield and Snyder argue that states with weak institutions undergoing incomplete transitions to democracy are more likely to initiate an external war than other types of states. We show that the empirical data do not support this claim. We find a dearth of observations wherein complete democracies with weak institutions participated in war. Additionally, we find that the statistical relationship between incomplete democratization and war is entirely dependent on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I. We also find that the case selection in Mansfield and Snyder rarely involved incomplete democracies with weak institutions. We therefore conclude that the finding that incomplete democracies with weak institutions are more likely to initiate or participate in war is not supported by the empirical data.


In a recent contribution to this journal, Munck and Snyder found that many studies suffer from a deficient application of qualitative and quantitative methods. They argue that the combination of small-n and large-n analysis represents a viable method for promoting the production of knowledge. Recently, Evan Lieberman proposed nested analysis as a rigorous approach for comparative research that builds on the complementary strengths of quantitative and qualitative analysis. In this paper, the author examines the methodological potential of nested inference to advance comparative political analysis, arguing that the specific methodological problems of nested designs have not been fully appreciated. It is shown that, under certain circumstances, nothing is gained from a nested analysis. On the contrary, one might lose more than one gains compared to single-method designs. The author suggests specific methodological principles that take these problems into account to make nested analysis fruitful for comparative studies.
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Discussant: Craig A. Parsons, University of Oregon

Constructing Cross-National Datasets: Challenges and Lessons
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Participants: Amy R. Poteete, Concordia University; Ronald A. Francisco, University of Kansas; Monty G. Marshall, George Mason University; Amy G. Mazur, Washington State University; Wolfgang Merkel, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Germany
Discussant: Jose Antonio Cheibub, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign

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Participants:
Matthew C. Ingram, University of New Mexico: “Bridging Theory, Building Courts: Crossing Subfield Boundaries to Clarify Causation in Judicial Politics.”
Beth Neitzel, University of California-Irvine: “Unfinished Business: Examining the Meaning and Implications of Political Fragmentation for Judicial Institutions and Behavior.”
Juan Rebolledo and Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University: “Measuring the Rule of Law.”
Druscilla L. Scribner, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh: “Selecting and Collecting Data in Comparative Judicial Politics.”
Discussant: Jeffrey Staton, Emory University