Over the last decade, political science has seen an outpouring of diffusion research. Numerous scholars have investigated the wave-like spread of political or policy innovations across a number of autonomous decision-making units. After the trail-blazing study by Samuel Huntington, political regime change has drawn particular attention from students of diffusion. This burgeoning literature has mostly analyzed progressive change, especially the demise of authoritarian rule and subsequent move toward democracy. But in recent years, autocracy has fortified itself and has started to spread in the world; for instance, in reaction to the color revolutions that rippled across the post-Communist world from 2000 to 2005, Vladimir Putin has tightened authoritarian rule in Russia and promoted this regime type among his country’s neighbors.

My new book project provides a historical perspective on these recent developments by trying to explain earlier waves of autocracy, namely the spread of authoritarianism and fascism during the interwar years and the rash of Latin American military coups in the 1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, these dramatic moves away from political liberalism and

Discussions of democratization have increasingly turned to the question of backsliding. As democratic experiments spread around the world, the study of backsliding has become perhaps more important than even transition as a focus of analysis. Understood as authoritarian retrenchment, failed reform, or a sign of incomplete transition, backsliding has also been a central concern of policymakers. Analysts had barely begun discussing the Arab Spring before concern about an Arab Winter crept into the conversation. And scholars have maintained that backsliding is likely to be an issue for most contemporary democratizers who, unlike historical democratizers, lack the luxury of gradualism. Such perspectives, while usefully highlighting the challenges that accompany democratization, are problematic, both in their conceptualization of backsliding and in their attribution to historical democratizers of a path of democratization that never actually existed. In particular, they ignore the many contradictions and ambiguities that have always accompanied processes of democratization.

In recent years, students of democratization have increasingly turned to the experience of historical democratizers for critical insights in the dynamics of democratic development. What has been termed “the historical turn” has focused primarily on the Western European experience but with significant implications for the study of contemporary democratizers. Because the dynamics of democratic development in these cases have in many ways informed our theories of democratization, this mode of inquiry has offered important theoretical challenges to the dominant schools of democratization studies. At the most basic level, new research into the development of historical democratizers has introduced important empirical correctives to our understanding of political development in these countries, challenging the received wisdom which often attributes a gradual and relatively

1. Daniel Byman “After the Hope of an Arab Spring, the Chill of an Arab Winter” Washington Post, December 1 2011.

What allows some political parties or alliances to retain power for decades in countries with free elections? This phenomenon—what I will call one-party dominance—has intrigued and puzzled scholars for at least 60 years, extending back to long periods of single-party or coalition rule in first wave democracies such as France, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Luxembourg. These cases were joined in the post-WWII period by prominent instances of dominance in all of the former Axis powers—West Germany, Austria, Japan, and Italy—as well as in many of the newly-founded post-colonial states, notably in Israel, India, Malaysia, and Singapore. More recently, one-party dominance has also appeared in third wave democracies large and small, ranging from well-known cases such as the African National Congress in post-apartheid South Africa to less familiar ones such as the Human Rights Protection Party in Samoa.

In this essay, I show how work on the earlier examples of one-party dominance provides valuable insights and theoretical tools for research on current cases. Recent work on one-party dominance has mostly taken its cues from the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes rather than scholarship on party system development and change. Yet findings from first wave democracies offer a rich source of concepts, theories and empirical evidence that deserves greater consideration by researchers interested in one-party dominance.

What Is One-Party Dominance, and How Do We Operationalize It?

The concept of one-party dominance is an old one, dating back at least to Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties, and notably extended by Giovanni Sartori in his influential Parties and Party Systems. In its colloquial usage, “dominance” captures an

other innovations. We feel both humbled and encouraged to continue their good work.

As Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt observed in their Comparative Political Studies article from 2010, a good deal of research on democratization has taken a historical turn. Yet, it is also evident that while many scholars study historical cases of regime change and endurance, only a small number explicitly apply the lessons from the past to contemporary puzzles. How have and should findings from historical cases influence questions, concepts, and theories in our research on recent regime change? The contributors to this issue of the newsletter provide some answers that we believe are relevant to a broad audience.

Kurt Weyland’s examination of the spread of authoritarianism in Europe between the World Wars and in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s highlights the value that cognitive psychology can bring to our study of contemporary regime change. He shows how the concept of asymmetrical loss aversion is useful in explaining the historical cases and the later democratization of Latin America. Venelin Ganev draws on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, observer of first wave democracies, to help us better understand democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe after 1989. How is it that democratic institutions and practices foreign to the local cultures of Eastern Europe thrived? Ganev shows us that Toqueville’s writings offer an answer. Amel Ahmed draws on her firsthand research on early democratizers to problematize the concept of backsliding or movement away from democracy. She shows how her proposed approach casts the current political changes in Egypt in a different light. In his piece, Kharis Templeman examines what can be viewed as incomplete democratization and regime endurance—a single party’s or political alliance’s retention of power despite free elections. He demonstrates how contemporary one-party dominance in Africa and Asia can be better understood with theory from and comparison to historical cases. Together, these pieces underscore how the past can help us better explain the present.

Finally, we naturally warmly welcome proposals for themes from you and initiatives to become guest-editors for an issue! Looking ahead, we anticipate a series of issues on new emerging forms of both democracy and autocracy, as well as on both domestic and international dimensions of democratization and autocratization. The upcoming winter issue (under Yiting Wang’s leadership) will focus on the international/diffusion side of the spread of authoritarianism. Finally, we are very grateful to Melissa Aten for her diligence and professionalism, always making our work easy and fun.

On behalf of the Editorial Committee, Kelly M. McMann
Weyland, CONTINUED
(continued from page 1)

democracy constituted reactions to the perceived threat of revolution. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 suggested to a wide range of political actors that leftist radicals had good chances of taking power, conservative sectors used any means to forestall this danger. The fear of Communism triggered disproportionate loss aversion, which prompted a fierce backlash, led to the abandonment of democracy, and induced many political sectors to demand, accept or acquiesce in dictatorial rule.

By substantiating this novel argument, my new project diverges from the optimistic perspective informing much of American political science. Modernization theory, in particular, sees history as a process of advancement and has difficulty accounting for retrogression. Constructivism, a prominent approach to diffusion research, also tends to assume that modern norms and values spread and displace traditional, backward habits and practices. But contrary to these progressive expectations, there were important time periods during which political liberalism and democracy looked weak and feared to decay while authoritarianism, fascism, or military dictatorship found support and spread from country to country.

These reverse waves, which even a conservative like Huntington mentioned only briefly,2 deserve systematic scholarly attention. The abridgment of political liberty and the atrocities committed by many of these regimes endow this topic with substantive relevance. Indeed, what if nuclear weapons had allowed Germany’s National-Socialist regime, the most important product of the interwar wave of autocracy, to win WWII and push history in a very regressive direction? Political development does not reliably move toward modern, advanced institutions and practices. The diffusion of authoritarian rule also holds great theoretical significance. The breadth and depth of these non-progressive waves may require a rethinking of prevailing approaches.

For these reasons, my new book project investigates the autocratic wave of the interwar years and the rash of military coups in Latin America during the 1960s/70s. This study of reactionary diffusion is in line with the recent reorientation of the regime change literature, which has moved from democratization to authoritarianism. Diffusion studies should broaden their view as well and examine the spread of dictatorship – not only of political liberalism and democracy, as my recent volume did by examining the revolutions of 1848, the preemptive reforms adopted in response to the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the third wave of democratization in Latin America (late 1970s to 1990).3

Given that regressive regime changes run counter to the main approaches to diffusion studies, what explains their occurrence? My argument arises from the second contentious wave analyzed in my 2014 book, namely the riptide of conflicts triggered by the Russian Revolution all over Europe. The speeches, letters, diaries, and memoirs left behind by the main actors in the German Revolution of 1918/19, for instance, document the acute fear caused by the downfall of Czarism and the subsequent Bolshevik takeover. The surprising ease with which a long-ruling autocracy crumbled and a revolutionary vanguard grabbed power induced conservatives, centrist, and even mainstream Social Democrats to fear the spread of Communism beyond Russia’s borders. While radical leftists, especially the Spartakus Group of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, eagerly promoted the world revolution, a wide range of anti-Communist forces were determined to forestall this danger at all cost. Ironically, both the overeager revolutionaries and their fierce adversaries acted on the same underlying belief, which they derived from the dramatic Russian Revolution via inferential shortcuts (documented amply by cognitive psychologists):4 both sides rashly inferred from this unique experience that established states were precarious and that Communism could easily take hold in their own country. The fact that left-wingers and right-wingers shared this perception across their stark ideological divide shows that it reflected cognitive heuristics, not wishful thinking by the left or scare tactics by the right.

This perception of fragility inspired radical left-wingers to try to imitate the Russian Revolution at any apparent opportunity. The resulting rash of uprisings in 1919 exacerbated the sense of jeopardy among non-Communists and induced them to squash extremist stirrings with full force. Thus, the same belief inspired by the Russian precedent spurred Communists to action, yet also provoked brutal reaction, namely the suppression of the Spartakus Uprising in Berlin, of the radical “council republics” in Bremen and Munich, and of the fleeting Soviet Republic in Hungary. In sum, precipitous efforts to emulate the Bolshevik Revolution prompted fierce responses and striking overreactions.


My new project extrapolates from this initial sequence of overoptimistic radicalism and its disproportionate suppression and develops an analogous argument to explain the subsequent wave of dictatorships that rippled across Europe and Latin America during the 1920s and 1930s. This theory posits that the persistence of the Communist threat was a decisive reason for the downfall of many liberal regimes. Communism consolidated its hold on Russia and continued to support revolutionaries all over the world, fueling strong concerns among the right and even the center. The perceived ease of revolution instilled genuine anxiety on the other side of the ideological spectrum, which cannot be reduced to rightwing fear-mongering. This threat perception exacerbated ideological polarization and weakened many democracies, especially in countries that had emerged from autocratic rule only recently. Because their fundamental interests seemed endangered, broad conservative sectors had minimal faith in democracy, if not active aversion. Determined to defend the established sociopolitical order, these groupings came to see liberalism and democracy as weak and vulnerable; more and more people longed for “stronger,” more dynamic and forceful types of rule, especially authoritarianism and fascism.

While these pressures for regime change were informed by the above-mentioned overestimation of Communists’ chances for political success, they were driven by a fundamental human motivation, namely our disproportionate aversion to losses. As cognitive psychologists have thoroughly documented, losses weigh much more heavily on people’s minds than gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, people go out of their way to safeguard their current entitlements against threats. My new study argues that this asymmetrical loss aversion explains why the specter of extremist revolution provoked such a powerful reaction: anti-Communists greatly outnumbered Communists, and they were determined to resort to any means to block radical challenges. This skewed set of preferences accounts for the growing willingness to sacrifice liberal safeguards, abandon democracy, and advocate, endorse, or at least acquiesce in autocratic rule, as a reliable protection against revolutionary extremism. The intense loss aversion activated by genuine fear of Communism thus helps explain why reaction proved much more powerful than revolution and why radical-left efforts to emulate the Soviet precedent were overwhelmed by a groundswell of authoritarianism and fascism.

This argument is inspired primarily by the historical experiences of Europe. Yet interestingly, it can also explain the wave of military coups in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. In the New World, the Cuban Revolution set in motion similar sequences of quick emulation efforts and brutal repression; and then of continued Communist activism and the eventual breakdown of democracy in one country after the other. The amazing success of Fidel Castro and his small band of comrades in defeating a fearful dictator and installing a revolutionary, soon openly Marxist regime—right on the doorstep of the hegemonic United States—triggered the same kinds of inferences that the Russian Revolutions of 1917 had inspired. Both radical left-wingers and political forces on the other side of the ideological spectrum jumped to the conclusion that established regimes were precarious and that determined assaults held good chances of bringing them down. As it had happened in Europe from 1918 onward, a dramatic revolutionary precedent therefore set in motion a rash of emulation efforts in Latin America. These imitative guerrilla challenges affected a wide range of diverse countries—middle-income or truly poor, democratic or authoritarian, institutionalized or personalistic. This indiscriminate diffusion suggests that the outburst of leftist radicalism was guided by facile, simplistic beliefs derived from the Cuban success, not by careful, thorough assessments of opportunities and constraints.

Interestingly, conservative and centrist sectors again shared these beliefs in the fragility of the existing order and the ease with which Communists could overthrow it. Therefore, as in Europe after the Russian Revolution, attempts at emulation in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution ran afoul of merciless repression as well. Concerned that established regimes were brittle and vulnerable, status-quo-oriented groupings combated radical challenges with any means necessary. Precisely because the right shared the left’s conviction in the chances of revolutionary success, it attacked subversive efforts with full force. Thus, while the left and the right pursued antagonistic goals, they both embraced the inference derived from the Cuban events, namely that leftwing extremists had an uncanny ability to overthrow the current sociopolitical system. Given their divergent interests, this shared belief did not result from wishful thinking on the left or manipulative fear-mongering on the right. Instead, it reflected basic cognitive shortcuts that drive diffusion processes, as my 2014 book documented for waves of democratic contention and the new study substantiates for the spread of authoritarianism.


As in Europe during the interwar years, loss aversion also operated in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, as the profound fear of Communism among the right and center shows. Due to these asymmetrical concerns, attempts to emulate the Cuban Revolution drew a disproportionate reaction. The forces of order responded with fierce repression, and important sectors of the citizenry and elites endorsed and supported these countermeasures. Typically, defenders of the status quo vastly outnumbered and outgunned those who tried to overturn it.

This imbalance marked subsequent developments as well. As the Cuban Revolution survived concerted U.S. pressures and as the Castro regime continued to foment and inspire the export of extremism, conservative and centrist sectors saw the threat of Communism persist. The Cuban precedent had a strong radicalizing effect on leftwing forces, such as the Socialist Party of Chile, which came to advocate armed struggle; and it turned the groundswell of progressive populism in several Latin American countries menacing, at least in the eyes of right-wingers. Because ample middle-class groupings, business people, conservative politicians, and military leaders regarded the existing regimes as weak and helpless in the face of radical advances, they came to opt for authoritarian rule in one country after the other. Loss aversion induced these sectors to preclude the specter of Communism at all cost and to endorse or accept military dictatorship as the lesser evil.

In sum, the same sequence of waves played out twice, at different world-historical moments and with different regional epicenters. An unprecedented, dramatic revolution made people of all ideological stripes believe in the fragility of the established order. This cognitive inference in turn unleashed a rash of emulative rebellions, but also disproportionate repression. And as the Communist threat persisted, loss aversion led broad sectors of the population and especially elites to advocate the installation of autocracy. Leftist action prompted rightist reaction; radical challenges drew conservative responses, but of far greater magnitude and intensity, due to loss aversion. These commonalities across the two most striking waves of reactionary regimes suggest the crucial role of basic mechanisms of cognitive psychology, which shape human choice and information processing.

At the same time, the comparison across two waves casts doubt on alternative arguments that claim to explain either one of these diffusion processes. Waves of regime change could result from pressure or imposition by a great power. In line with this theory, the United States provided support and legitimation for counter-insurgency and anti-Communist authoritarianism in Latin America; thus, the regional “hegemon” played a significant role in the second wave of reactionary rule. But clearly, this factor was not decisive in the first wave. The spread of authoritarianism and fascism during the interwar years unfolded mostly in a horizontal fashion, without “vertical” promotion by a great power. Mussolini’s Italy was too weak to exert influence (beyond Austria), and Nazi Germany acquired strength only in the second half of the 1930s, when the autocratic wave was long under way. The two-wave comparison thus suggests that the spread of inferences and feasibility judgments among autonomous countries is sufficient for setting in motion processes of reactionary regime diffusion; power applied by international hegemons is not a necessary condition.

The project’s broad comparison also casts doubt on ideational theories of horizontal diffusion. For instance, autocracy, especially fascism, held significant appeal and attraction during the interwar years; Benito Mussolini drew admiration from an amazing range of intellectuals, poets, artists, and philosophers. Constructivists could therefore adopt a historicist approach and conceive of modernity and progress in relative, subjectivist terms – whatever “public opinion” regarded as advanced and promising at the time. Such an explanation would highlight the cultural pessimism that took hold in Europe during the late 19th century and slowly sapped the developmental optimism prevailing in the preceding decades. Due to this profound inflection of the Zeitgeist, liberalism no longer seemed to embody progress, but became identified with relativism, weakness, and decadence. By contrast, forceful leadership, the axis around which autocracy revolves, now came to look like the best way of marshaling national energies for a dynamic future.

But in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, military rule did not depict itself as a fundamental alternative to liberal democracy; it spread without such a principled appeal. Many of the dictatorships made no claims to genuine legitimacy, but wanted to serve as temporary housecleaners who would forcefully straighten out flawed democracies – and then hand power back to civilians. Thus, this wave of coups suggests that ideational, normative appeal is not the decisive motor of reactionary diffusion. A close look at the first wave casts further doubt on this modified version of constructivism. Interestingly, the regime type regarded as particularly attractive at that time,
namely fascism, spread much less widely than more traditional, backward, stodgy forms of authoritarianism; in fact, on a number of occasions, the imposition of authoritarianism was designed to forestall not only Communism, but also fascism, whose plebeian nature and mobilizational tendencies conservative sectors disliked.

As constructivist idealism founders on the two-wave comparison, so does economic structuralism. The most prominent explanation for the wave of Latin American coups arose from Guillermo O’Donnell’s arguments about the crisis of “easy” import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and the requirements of industrial deepening, which were said to prompt the authoritarian concentration of power in Argentina and Brazil.8 But this political-economy argument is not very convincing. Above all, it cannot account for the reactionary wave of the 1920s and 1930s. While fascist Italy can be characterized as a “developmental dictatorship,”9 the countries to which autocracy spread in Europe and Latin America cover a diverse set of socioeconomic preconditions; many were so backward that industrial deepening was not on the agenda. In fact, even in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, the rash of military coups advanced beyond the middle-income nations of the Southern Cone; it afflicted underdeveloped countries such as Bolivia, which was not about to leave the early stages of ISI behind. Essentially, reactionary waves were too wide-ranging and indiscriminate to be attributable to specific socioeconomic structures or conjunctures.

Interestingly, the argument about reactionary diffusion that can best explain the two waves of authoritarian rule may also elucidate the subsequent spread of democracy. In particular, it sheds light on the special features of the “third wave” in Latin America, which lacked the clear, singular precedent of other waves of democratization and which unfolded in a much more complex, less tightly clustered fashion. The analysis of the preceding rash of military coups suggests a crucial permissive cause, namely the fading of left-wing radicalism, which had been boosted by the Cuban Revolution.10 As rightwing dictatorships suppressed leftist extremism and left-wingers learned from their political failures and therefore moderated, conservative and centrist sectors perceived much lower threats, saw less “need” for authoritarian rule, and came to tolerate and accept democracy. Thus, the third wave in Latin America did not only result from the upswing of democratic diffusion, but also from the downswing of reactionary diffusion. Opposing waves of political regime change intersect in complex ways, causing crosscurrents and undertows.

In sum, the analysis of the two main waves of authoritarian rule shed light on important political transformations and yield broader theoretical conclusions. The new study highlights that during important time periods, history moved “in the wrong direction.” Therefore, theoretical approaches that assume ongoing political progress, such as modernization theory and constructivism, need some rethinking.

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The Disjuncture between Mores and Institutions

Tocqueville was well aware of the fact that any attempt to democratize a non-democratic polity by means of institutional engineering might result in a situation that might be best characterized as disjuncture between imported institutions and local mores. What is the scenario most likely to unfold when a disjuncture transpires? The answer with which Tocqueville's name is usually associated is that the mores will trump the institutions, i.e., hubristic institutional engineering will fail once it encounters the stiff resistance of local customs and “habits of the heart.” Tocqueville expressed this view on many occasions, but perhaps nowhere as emphatically as in Democracy in America: “physical causes contribute less than laws, and laws infinitely less than mores … The importance of mores is a common truth to which study and experience constantly lead. It seems to me that I find it placed in my mind like a central point; I see it at the end of all of my ideas.”1

In the literature on postcommunist democratizations the name of Tocqueville is rarely mentioned (an important exception is the pioneering work of Aurelian Craiutu).2 But throughout the 1990s much of the literature on the subject was permeated by the sentiment he articulated: most analysts treated with skepticism the argument that countries like Hungary and Poland would be able to build democracy within a generation; similar arguments about countries like Romania and Bulgaria elicited sheer ridicule.3 The conventional wisdom was Tocquevillian: at least in the short and medium run, local mores will derail the effort to transplant democratic institutions.

With the benefit of hindsight we can now say that this conventional wisdom was not borne out by the facts. By 2007, all former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe had become members of the European Union. Of course, in and of itself this fact does not mean that they have evolved into model democracies. But it does mean that postcommunist experiments with democracy produced results much better than anyone anticipated.

What are the implications of this success for Tocqueville’s thesis about the disjuncture between mores and institutions? One possible answer to this question is that Tocqueville has been proven wrong – that East European experiences with imported institutional models have exposed the intellectual limitations of his arguments and that therefore his work is irrelevant to the study of post-89 democratizations. In what follows I will offer a different answer. I will argue that Tocqueville’s various writings contain insights that suggest that he treated the proposition about the primacy of mores over imported institutions more as a hypothesis rather than the basis of a law-like generalization. In other words, he did assert that ordinarily it would be reasonable to expect that the attempt to change mores through institutional engineering might fail, but he also made it clear that under certain circumstances the encounter with novel institutions may in fact alter mores and thus add a momentum to, not curb, processes of democratic change. In my view, it is on this aspect of his analyses that we need to focus.

Unsettled Mores

Tocqueville certainly believed mores to be a factor decisively shaping a nation’s politics. However, both his historical explorations and his personal experiences made it clear to him that sometimes extraordinary developments may unsettle mores. Or, as he put it, “sometimes in the life of peoples, a moment occurs when ancient customs are changed, mores destroyed, beliefs shaken, the prestige of memories has vanished… Then men no longer see the country except in a weak and doubtful light…” (DA, p.386). So what might happen when mores are unsetled and can no longer play the role of the glue that holds together the body politic? Tocqueville considers two scenarios.

The first scenario might be called descent into feckless individualism. If amidst the confusion and turmoil typical for acute political crises the citizenry see no opportunities for effective political participation, they may be overwhelmed by the feeling that their connections with a broader community have been severed and “withdraw into a narrow and unenlightened individualism,” (DA, p.386). Once mores are unsettled, new, more individualistic mores emerge that are inimical to the spirit of democratic liberty.

But Tocqueville also considers a second scenario – a scenario that revolves around the encounter of unsettled mores with institutionalized opportunities for political involvement. In order to illustrate his point, Tocqueville gives a very interesting
example: recent immigrants to the United States. Despite the fact that they come from very different backgrounds and have internalized an array of mores, they almost instantly “get involved in the affairs of their town, their district, and the entire state” (DA, p.381). This example is worth thinking about. From the point of view of the relationship between mores and institutions this is clearly the kind of situation I characterized as disjuncture: what all immigrants shared, despite their diversity, was mores acquired in an environment less free and less egalitarian than America’s cultural milieu. Hence these mores did not “fit” the institutionalized practices which immigrants encountered upon their arrival. What American democracy offered them, however, was the chance to get involved in political affairs. As a result, immigrants’ mores did not undermine the democratic institutions which would be considered alien in their native lands; rather, what has been happening, and will continue to happen, Tocqueville asserted, is that the institutions changed the mores so that “each person ... takes an active part in the government of society,” (DA, p.387). Under certain circumstances, then, the people may consider the confusion and uncertainty that surround them not as a pretext to withdraw in their private spheres, but as an invitation to display “an interest in the fate of their country and ... participate in its government” (DA, p.387). According to Tocqueville, therefore, it is possible that a crisis which begins with unsettled mores may end with the reassertion of democratic institutions.

In 1989-1990 both components of Tocqueville’s second scenario, namely unsettled mores and opportunities for political participation, materialized in Eastern Europe. It would be an exaggeration to claim that after the collapse of communist dictatorships East Europeans felt like immigrants in their own countries, but that settled mores were radically shattered is undeniable. On the other hand, however, within a year all these countries had held multi-party elections for newly established parliaments and local municipal councils.

My claim that the “habits of the heart” were unsettled should not be construed to mean that they instantly became irrelevant. It is not possible to answer the question why unrepentant former communists won the first free elections in Bulgaria and Romania but reformed communist parties lost in Poland and Hungary without discussing the cultural landscapes in the respective countries. But even in the former set of cases the introduction of novel institutions failed to trigger a mores-driven anti-democratic momentum. While local mores did shape voters’ preferences, they did not motivate them to reject imported things like free elections and a pluralistic public sphere. And by the late 1990s the anti-communist opposition had won national elections in both countries – a clear sign that the foreign institutional transplants had had a mores-transforming effect.

Of course, I do not want to offer a simplistic and self-congratulatory interpretation here. I am not arguing, Pollyannaishly, that in 1989 the people “took their fate in their own hands.” In fact, that did not happen – real power in most of these countries was in the hands of former secret service officers, shady conglomerates, networks of corrupt politicians and organized criminal groups. But once the participatory opportunities of the early 1990s materialized, politics in the region became a spectacle from which the citizens’ part could no longer be written off by aspiring dictators. Democratic citizens did not rule – but they could and did throw the rascals out. In this limited sense, local practices were permanently changed by imported democratic institutions.

The Entry of the Masses in the Political Process

The collapse of one-party regimes in Eastern Europe was precipitated by massive anti-government mobilization – it marked the moment when “the people” assertively entered the political arena. Tocqueville was well aware that the masses’ entry might be problematic: “It cannot be doubted that the moment when political rights are granted to a people who have, until then, been deprived of them is a moment of crisis, a crisis often necessary, but always dangerous.” (DA, p.392). He characterized the main danger in the following way: “The common man, at the moment when he is granted political rights, finds himself in relation to these rights, in the same position as the child vis-à-vis all of nature. In this case, the celebrated phrase of Hobbes applies to him, Homo puer robustus... The child inflicts death when he is unaware of the value of life; he takes property from others before knowing that someone can rob him of his.” (DA, p.392).

In other words, the rise of the people may trigger what might be called the Homo puer robustus run amok scenario: chaotic violence and a series of confiscations or appropriations that may destabilize the very concept of private property and exacerbate to the point of murderous conflict latent tensions between different social groups. The opportunities which liberty presents might be used to negate such important attributes of democracy as the peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for the rights of others.
Among the most remarkable facts about the end of East European communism is that the entry of the masses was, for the most part, peaceful and orderly. So a good Tocquevillian question to ask would be: why is it that at this particular juncture the discrepancies between non-democratic mores and democratic opportunities did not result in violence and destructive turmoil? Once we ask this question, I think, two salient aspects of the historical context become noticeable, one ideological and one structural.

The ideological aspect of Sovietized Eastern Europe is that across the region the idea that violence can be effectively used to resolve political problems had been completely discredited. The ideas of leading dissidents who valorized peaceful resistance as well as popular disillusionment with the communist rhetoric about the virtues of violent revolutionary action had created a climate of opinion where the use of violence in pursuit of political objectives was rejected by virtually everyone except the Marxist regimes’ most fanatical supporters.

The structural reason why the dangers Tocqueville worried about were averted is that the type of redistribution he envisaged – the have-nots strip the haves of their possessions – was impossible in a postcommunist context. While there were nomenklatura cadres who were relatively better off, they were still incomparably poorer than the rich aristocrats or wealthy bourgeois that could be a natural target in countries like France (or Russia in 1917, or Eastern Europe in the late 1940s). As I have argued elsewhere, the most important fact about early postcommunism is that what had to be redistributed were publicly held resources rather than privately owned assets. Hence the scenario Tocqueville conjured up was impossible because there were no rich classes, there was virtually nothing to confiscate, and private property was not a resentment-generating political factor. Given the peculiarity of socio-historical context, then, the kind of chaotic action whereby the deprived masses dispossess the privileged and derail democracy in the process could not materialize.

In sum, Tocqueville recognized that the arrival of the masses is fraught with dangers because it may lead to violent manifestations of majority rule – but also necessary because it might be the first step in a sequence of events that eventually bring about, rather than render impossible, the consolidation of democracy. If and when a gap between existing mores and newly established institutions such as expanded suffrage and free elections opens up, certain ideological and structural factors might create a transformative dynamic that pushes countries toward, and not away from, democratic forms of governance.

**Electoral Elite Competition**

One particularly striking example of an effort to change local political practices through the transplantation of foreign models was the attempt to adopt constitutions that would set the terms of elite competition for, and exercise of, power. But since none of the nations of Eastern Europe except Czechoslovakia had experienced constitutional rule in their modern history, there was no reason to expect that national political elites would respect imported “parchment institutions.” To the contrary, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that foreign institutions would wilt quickly when transplanted into the inhospitable soil of non-democratic mores.

As we know by now, this did not happen. Why? I would argue that Tocqueville’s analysis of elite behavior in the context of electoral competition may help us answer this question. His argument is that political elites who are forced to compete for votes are transformed by the experience – their mores change dramatically once they confront the novel reality of multi-candidate electoral contests.

If and when aspiring politicians realize that their careers depend on voters’ reactions, Tocqueville points out, a psychological transformation begins: “When the public governs … several of the passions that chill and divide hearts are then forced to withdraw deep into the soul and hide there. Pride conceals itself, scorn dares not to show itself” (DA, 889). The outcome of this transformation is described in the following way: “It then happens that you think about your fellows out of ambition and that often, in a way, you find it in your interest to forget yourself” (DA 889). When rules change, elites find it in their interest to forget themselves: I cannot think of a more radical way of conveying the message that imported institutions might have a transformative impact on pre-existing mores and identities. What really matters, Tocqueville seems to be saying, is not whether political elites have genuinely internalized democratic normative principles, but whether they are forced by the circumstances to act as if they have embraced such principles. Self-restraining elites: that

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is exactly what imported constitutions purported to create amidst non-democratic mores. Tocqueville’s analysis of the psychological effects of electoral contests on politicians who had not been socialized in a democratic environment and yet were forced to abide by democratic rules when they ran for public office might help us understand why the project might succeed.

Another relevant observation which Tocqueville offers is that what he describes as “the desire to be elected” might stimulate self-interested politicians to cooperate within the framework of democratic politics rather than seek its destruction. This desire can be disruptive – it motivates elites to “make war on each other” and foments “particular hatreds.” At the same it heals some of the wounds it inflicts: this same desire “leads all [political] men in the long run to lend each other natural support” (DA 890). This statement lends itself to the following interpretation: new constitutions survive because, broadly speaking, they serve the interests of local elites. Most of these elites have the incentive to compete against, but also collaborate with, rivals who are interested in maintaining the integrity of democratic procedures – and to oppose those who aspire to establish a system where power is concentrated in the hands of unaccountable cliques. To be sure, this “collaboration” might damage the public good: seemingly rival political groups might strike corrupt deals and reduce policy-making to the pursuit of their own well-being. The quality of democracy might suffer as a result. But it makes it more unlikely that democracy will be replaced by something else – as East European experiences in the 1990s amply demonstrate.


In sum, Tocqueville’s oeuvre provides an excellent point of departure for scholars who wish to integrate in their studies of the “third wave” analytical clues from the literature on the “first wave.” His sharp observations about the ways in which constitutional changes and institutional experiments reshape established behavioral patterns, the relationship between rulers and ruled in a post-authoritarian context, and evolving modes of elite interaction may still guide the research of social scientists striving to comprehend the political dynamics underpinning democratic consolidations in the modern world.

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Tunisia Forever (2011)

(photo courtesy of Wassim Ben Rhouma/Flickr/Creative Commons)
The notion of backsliding in contemporary democratization studies can be traced to Samuel Huntington's highly influential work on the three waves of democracy and particularly his insights into the reverse waves. The reasons for reversals, Huntington explained, were as varied as those for democratization itself. Nonetheless, by conceptualizing the contradictions of democratization as reversals, Huntington invited scholars to think of certain types of political change as a move backward in time. Indeed, he maintained in his discussion of reversals that “History is not unidirectional,” suggesting that reversals represent a theoretical move back on an imagined linear trajectory. From the perspective of the historical turn, this conceptualization introduces highly problematic temporalities. While it is true that political change follows complex trajectories, history can only move forward. Contradictions and ambiguities are always a part of this, and even if the process leads to the introduction of un-democratic institutions or practices, a historically grounded view of political change requires that we recognize even these developments as forward movement.

In this view, forward movement does not necessarily mean progress toward a more democratic endpoint but carries with it ambiguities and contradictions that result in a complex and often disjointed institutional collage. Moving away from the idea of wholesale regime change, the historical turn approach offers a model of asynchronic change, whereby the institutions of democracy emerge at different times and for different purposes. For example, the push for suffrage expansion and that for electoral reform in Europe in the 19th century emerged from distinct movements and during different episodes of political change. Though in some countries the movements overlapped briefly at the turn of the century, the goals of suffrage expansion and that of electoral reform were often very much at odds; the former advanced by a coalition of workers’ organizations and progressive parties seeking a reconfiguration of the political order, the latter by a coalition of anti-democratic and conservative forces working to maintain their power in the changing political landscape. While today the development of universal suffrage and electoral reform have been homogenized into a single narrative of democratization, a historically grounded look into the circumstances of their emergence reveals their contradictory roles in the formation of 19th century democracy.

For this reason, the focus of scholarship in the historical turn is often on the development of specific institutions rather than attempts to explain entire regimes. The shift from whole regimes to discrete institutional arenas brings with it a longer gaze, as scholars seeking to understand the broad contours of political change must look for it in successive historical episodes, some of which may contain dramatic displays of democratic opening, but many of which will be much subtler. Thus, in addition to the typical critical junctures in the history of democratization such as 1848, 1918, and 1945 when the main institutions of democracy were implemented in most countries, we might also look at moments when these institutions were reformed such as the introduction of the secret ballot, the adoption of obligatory voting, or the development of investiture rules. Moreover, this mode of “episode analysis” takes seriously both successful reform and partial or failed reform, as it is often in these episodes that we find the sources of political change: partial reform may shift the path of future reformers and failed reforms may provide actors with powerful mobilizing narratives to take into later episodes. Take, for example, the Chartist Movement in Britain in the 1830s and 1840s which yielded little in the way of tangible results at the time but set the stage for working class mobilization, which did, in fact, yield fruit decades later. To be sure, the Chartist movement was quite distinct from later workers’ movements that pushed for suffrage expansion and the implication here is not that one seamlessly led to another, but rather that the Chartists Movement provided a set of political and rhetorical tools that actors in later episodes could try to utilize for their own purposes. Without this frame of reference, it would be difficult to understand the dynamics of political change in England in the 1860s and 1880s.

Importantly, this approach also suggests that the institutional landscape at every point in time may contain unresolved ambiguities and contradictions. It is, therefore, crucial to take seriously the
internal institutional configuration of political systems at each point in time. Analyses of democratization have generally concentrated attention on the regime as a whole as a unit of analysis, considered dichotomously (as democracy vs. non-democracy, at times with the addition of an intermediate class of hybrid regimes). By contrast, an important insight of the historical turn approach is that many institutional features that appear inconsistent with democratic reforms may, in fact, be essential for regime stability. In particular, scholars have shown that important institutional features of authoritarian regimes often constitute part of the complex institutional collages that emerge from clashes over democratic reform. More often than not, the outcome of an episode of democratic reform is the combination of reformist institutions with institutional safeguards that protect pre-democratic elites who would otherwise oppose democratic openings. Unelected upper chambers, institutional privileges to the military or the clergy, dependence of the judiciary on the executive, independent central banks protecting business interests, limits on land or property restitution, biased electoral systems, and other institutional arrangements are often crucial in making possible the democratization of other institutional arenas (such as competitive elections and universal suffrage). In some cases, such institutional safeguards may be temporary and ultimately give way in subsequent waves of reform. In other cases, however, they may become entrenched in the system, forming a permanent part of a new politico-institutional order. Thus while mechanisms, such as indirect elections and plural voting, did ultimately give way to more inclusionary reforms, the various mechanisms of “minority representation” introduced through the 19th and early 20th centuries became a permanent feature of political systems throughout Europe, helping to maintain the power of established pre-democratic parties and diminish that of nascent workers parties. The historical turn approach underscores that friction or complementarity between different institutional arenas or the different timing in their development will have important consequences for democracy, often introducing features that may seem contradictory from the perspective of wholesale regime change but are, in fact, essential to the dynamics of democratization, conceived as asynchronic political change.

In this view, the very notion of backsliding sets up a temporal fiction, creating the illusion that political systems can somehow approximate a previous episode in their history. Within the historical turn framework, however, instances of so-called backsliding would be seen as forward motion towards a new political status quo in which inclusionary measures are combined with new modes of exclusion. Even in cases where old institutions are re-introduced into the political system, their political function almost always changes. Each successive stage of political change contains contradictions, and while some features of the political system may bear a resemblance to a previous state, they will necessarily entail a reorganization of political life that transforms their function significantly.

Some might object that such a reading of the concept of backsliding is much too literal -- that in the ordinary usage of the term, backsliding is simply meant to indicate a move back to a non-democratic form of government. However, even this more general usage is highly problematic. It suggests that non-democratic states are comparable enough to make such claims analytically useful. In fact, we know that non-democracy is as complex and varied as democracy, and if our goal is to capture the dynamics of political change, setting up such simplistic binaries will surely frustrate our efforts.

Take, for example, recent developments in the Egyptian transition, which some have labeled as “backsliding”: The ouster of Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected president, through military coup; the subsequent election of the Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, the military general who led the coup; and the general contraction of civil liberties that has ensued. While these events certainly tarnish the country’s claim to democracy, to call it “backsliding” would suggest that the current state of affairs bears some meaningful resemblance to the regime of Hosni Mubarak. However, reading forward from the revolutionary events of 2011, we see that both the institutions of the regime and the coalition of actors who have supported it at each stage reflect a path dependence that at no point moves back to a previous state of affairs. The constitution has changed at each stage, as has the electoral system, civil society regulations, and a wide range of other institutional features. And at each stage
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it has been a different constellation of actors that have come together to support the status quo. The liberal-conservative coalition that supports the current political system is not only very different from the Islamist coalition of Morsi’s government, but it is also very different from the populist clientelism of the Mubarak era. That leaders may have use for institutions that bear some similarity does not mean that the institutions are being used in the same way. And while at each stage we see inclusionary reforms combined with exclusionary measures, we find that the political calculus is quite different. Moreover, it is not clear that the regimes of either Morsi or Al-Sisi have represented a more democratic status quo than the Mubarak era. Particularly with regard to the regulation of NGOs and the contraction of civil liberties in some arenas, both would seem to fall well below the mark of an inclusive democratic polity.

The point is not to cast aspersions on the Egyptian transition, but to show that for contemporary democratizers, as with historical democratizers, political change moves asynchronically. That is to say, modes of political inclusion are combined with exclusions at each stage of the process in ways that would defy any linear notions of development. In fact, the contradictions across arenas are, in many ways, what facilitate political change. For example, the closed nature of the political system under Mubarak made NGO activity less threatening, whereas, the introduction of competitive elections under Morsi and Al-Sisi meant that civil society organizations could pose a more credible threat. In this case, the introduction of competitive elections entailed tradeoffs which came at the cost of civil liberties. To view this as backsliding is to miss the point that these contradictions supply the logic of political change.

The model of asynchronic political change found within the historical turn framework helps to make sense of democratization as a piecemeal and often incomplete process where actors may not have a strong sense of the direction in which they are headed. This certainly reflects the process for historical democratizers. And while it can be argued that the situation is different today – that countries do embark on democratization with a strong sense of what the endpoint should be and with the expectation of wholesale regime change – it is clear that for most countries this is not the reality. Wholesale regime change often meets with resistance, resulting in the non-uniform application of democratic elements. Thus, the asynchronicity emerges de facto as the defining feature of political change. However, whereas previous schools of democratization studies see in this signs of backsliding, within the historical turn scholarship it is seen as part of the process.

Adopting an asynchronic model of political change also has important policy implications: rather than offering blanket remedies in the form of economic or institutional adjustments, the asynchronic model calls for a more nuanced approach, positing that so-called “backsliding” need not always be remedied. Indeed, certain safeguards that could be viewed as backsliding, in some cases, may in fact help to strengthen and consolidate democracy in the long run. It is often through the tradeoffs and complementarities across and within institutional arenas that the process progresses. This means that at any given point there will be contradictions in the system, but these need not be a sign of authoritarian retrenchment. Even events that might be viewed as democratic crises can contribute to long-term democratic stability if they allow for adjustment of the political apparatus, such that they reflect new social configurations.

The approaches advanced in the historical turn do not subscribe to an unduly relativistic view of democracy. However, they do suggest that we need to relax our assumptions about democratization moving toward a singular endpoint of greater inclusiveness where non-democratic institutions are progressively stripped away. The experience of historical democratizers shows us that the institutional landscape after each episode of reform is likely to be contradictory from the point of view of democratic inclusion. Hence, we need more nuanced ways of discerning what safeguards are detrimental to the endurance of democratic government and what safeguards can be accommodated in the democratic regime or its future evolution.

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11. For example a new NGO law passed under Morsi placed heavy restrictions on the funding of NGOs and their management and a protest law signed into law by Adly Mansour, the interim President under the military rule of Al-Sisi, imposed heavy fines and jail time on those participating in public demonstrations without government authorization. See Mariz Tadros, “The Politics of Mobilising for Gender Justice in Egypt from Mubarak to Morsi and Beyond”, IDS Research Paper, Published online May 2 2014; Mohammed Abdelaal, “Egypt’s Public Protest Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a Further Restriction?”

(continued from page 2)

outwardly simple idea: that one party or coalition not only wins power, but wins so decisively and consistently as to preclude any realistic alternatives. Like many old concepts, though, it has over the decades been operationalized in many different ways, along the way accumulating modifying adjectives, shifts in emphasis, and a tangled array of alternative definitions and measures. Thus, today we do not have one term but half a dozen variants: dominance, dominant party, dominant party system, dominant party regime, and their close relatives the predominant, one- or single-party and hegemonic party regimes. This multiplicity of competing terms stems from three unresolved issues that have bedeviled research on dominance: (1) the appropriate level of analysis, (2) the kinds of regimes in which one-party dominance is puzzling, and (3) the universe of cases to compare. Older work on first wave cases offers helpful guidance for thinking about each of these problems.

(1) Is One-Party Dominance about Regimes, Party Systems, or Parties?
The first issue is about the level of analysis: does one-party dominance refer to a type of regime, party system, or party? Although often used interchangeably, each of these is potentially quite distinct and engages different questions and bodies of research. If we define our dependent variable as regime survival, then the central question of dominance is why “dominant party regimes” are so durable—a concern which dovetails with the burgeoning literature on variation within autocracies. But if we instead define it as electoral performance, then we are tasked with accounting for why one party so consistently outpaces all its competitors in elections. That question sends us in a very different direction, to the rich and variegated body of work on voting behavior, partisanship, and party appeals. And if we define it as ruling party survival, then the question is about why some parties last so long in power. Depending on whether one wants to limit this question to democracies or to include autocracies as well, the relevant research could include findings about the determinants of elections or about leader survival.

(2) Democracies versus Autocracies: Does Dominance Mean The Same Thing in Both?
The second issue is about the limits on electoral contestation for power: when we talk about “dominance” in democracies and autocracies, are we even talking about the same outcome? And if so, can we assume the same causes operate in both settings? Recent work is split on this question: some has proceeded on the assumption that dominance is only really puzzling in a democratic context, where one party consistently wins even when restrictions on opposition parties are absent.2 Other work has asserted that the difference between dominance in autocratic and democratic regimes is a matter of degree, not of kind, and that the same mechanisms are at work in both settings. Moreover, a key indicator of democracy is the presence of elections that incumbents lose; as a practical matter, distinguishing between autocracies and democracies is therefore especially fraught in the cases of one-party dominance, whose central feature is the absence of ruling party turnover.

(3) Compared to What? Where are the “Non-Dominant” Cases?
The third issue involves a selection bias problem: most recent research has proceeded by comparing cases of one-party dominance to each other. But if we want to understand why dominance occurs in the first place, then we need to look not only at cases of “successful” dominance but also at “unsuccessful” ones, however we might define those outcomes. And that raises a difficult question: what are the corresponding “non-dominant” cases to which we should compare? To put the question slightly differently, how should we define the universe of cases within which one-party dominance can occur?

It turns out that old scholarship on first wave cases provides good answers to all these questions, if we take the time to examine it carefully. Sartori’s work is particularly valuable in this regard. He argues clearly and convincingly that one-party dominance is really about a type of party system, rather than party or regime.3 Dominant party systems are distinct because they are both highly institutionalized and highly asymmetric: one party is much more likely than any other to win and retain power over several election cycles, and as a consequence, that party retains control of government for long periods of time. Sartori also explicitly includes both democratic and authoritarian cases, but distinguishes between “predominant” party systems in the former and “hegemonic” in the latter. And he suggests that the line between dominant “hegemonic” and closed single-party systems should be drawn between regimes that legally allow multiparty contestation for power and those that do not: Singapore versus China, for instance.


If we follow this conceptual scheme, then, the central question of one-party dominance is: what sustains party system asymmetry? The appropriate universe of cases in which to investigate this question is the set of democracies and electoral autocracies: all regimes in which winning contested elections is the primary way to win and retain power. And the first place to go for potential explanations of one-party dominance is to the research on party system stability and change, rather than party or regime organization. This is not to say that the other issues are not important—clearly, questions about authoritarian regime survival or leader turnover are worth investigating, too. But the further we get away from a focus on the party system, the more we have to stretch the idea of “one-party dominance” beyond its original meaning and context, and the less useful it is as an organizing concept. In recent work, cases as disparate as Conservative Party rule in Britain under Thatcher and China under the Chinese Communist Party have been called “dominant.” And we have probably stretched too far when we end up lumping together one of the world’s oldest democracies with its most prominent single-party autocracy.

Recent Explanations of One-Party Dominance in the Third Wave

The thrust of most recent work on one-party dominance can be summed up in one phrase: resource advantages. Scholars have documented an impressive array of ways that ruling parties in these systems exploit public assets for partisan ends, greatly biasing the electoral playing field before any elections are even held. These include the diversion of public funds from state-owned or party-owned enterprises, and directly from the public budget, to fund party activities; control over public-sector jobs for patronage and spoils; manipulation of state laws for kickbacks and campaign contributions from businesses; and the prevention of businesses from assisting challengers, as through discriminating use of tax audits. They also typically involve the use of state resources, both monetary and organizational, to mobilize voters to turn out to the polls, and to maintain their loyalty to the ruling party. In the more repressive regimes, these resources are of course supplemented with more overt forms of manipulation, including restrictive laws on speech and assembly, intimidation and harassment of opposition candidates and supporters, and outright vote fraud. But these tactics are typically signs of weakness: as long as other resources remain available, the most formidable dominant parties have little need for them.

Recent scholarship suggests at least three distinct mechanisms through which these resources can sustain party system asymmetry. One is a story about clientelism: the ruling party targets benefits to supporters and denies them to opponents, ensuring a large bloc of loyal voters that will turn out en masse for the incumbent at election time no matter who the candidates are or what positions their parties take. The second is about elite recruitment and spatial positioning: a biased electoral playing field means that opposition parties tend to attract candidates and activists who are highly ideologically motivated and hold relatively extreme views, while the ruling party attracts pragmatists who care mostly about holding office. As a consequence, opposition parties remain unable to moderate their ideological positions to appeal to the median voter. The third is about coordination in elections: resource advantages enable the ruling party to keep its own elites unified through side-payoffs, and to convert support into votes, votes into seats, and seats into power more efficiently than its competitors.

Despite the different mechanisms, these theories all generate the same prediction: the systematic use of public resources for partisan ends is what sustains party system asymmetry and keeps dominant parties in power. Resources create such enormous electoral advantages for ruling party candidates that defeat is unlikely, even when the incumbent party is widely reviled, and even when state repression is absent. Only when resources decline—for example, because of financial crises, privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), rising incomes and social mobility, or institutional changes that disrupt clientelist networks or reduce politicization of state employment—does the party system start to become more symmetric, and ruling party defeat become a real possibility.

How First Wave Theories Can Help Us Understand Deviant Third Wave Cases

Taken as a whole, this recent work has significantly improved our understanding of party system asymmetry. It has established much firmer micro-foundations specifying the relevant actors and their motives, and it has provided better explanations for stylized facts about dominant party systems—for instance, that electoral competition usually involves a centrist incumbent versus extremist challengers.


5. Scheiner, Democracy without Competition in Japan.


and that many voters continue to support the incumbent party even when they openly disapprove of its record in power.

Nevertheless, in advancing our understanding of dominance in the third wave, this research has tended to play down what was good about old scholarship and overlook what was known about old first wave cases. The emphasis on resource advantages is an understandable reaction to unresolved empirical puzzles and the vagueness of some theories about party system development and change. But in recent years, the pendulum may have swung too far: some of these theories are still essential for understanding third wave party systems.

For example, in several of the newish regimes of Asia and Africa, the patterns of party system asymmetry do not map neatly onto a resource advantage explanation. Take the case of Taiwan. Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) held a commanding resource advantage when it first began facing fully contested elections at the central government level in the 1990s. It had a vast patronage machine and financial resources that dwarfed those of its opponents, controlled most of the island’s print and broadcast media, and held a firm grip over the civil service, the military, and the security services. And it remained one of the richest political parties in the world, directly controlling at minimum several billion dollars in assets through party-owned enterprises and indirectly influencing the spending of billions more by SOEs. By contrast, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the primary opposition, remained close to broke and struggled even to pay party worker salaries throughout the 1990s. If we take the predictions of resource advantage theories at face value, the KMT’s steady erosion in electoral support and its defeat in the 2000 presidential election simply should not have happened. From this perspective, Taiwan looks like a deviant case.

But we do not have to craft an intricate new theory to account for Taiwan. We merely need to return to the older tradition of work on social cleavages and party realignments. And when we do, a vital cleavage is staring us in the face: Taiwanese independence, which moved from a taboo subject under martial law in the 1980s to the primary issue dividing the parties by the end of the 1990s. Moreover, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism was, initially at least, a “wedge” issue that worked to the opposition’s favor and the KMT’s detriment. The KMT’s core vote base was mainland émigrés, but they were less than 15 percent of the electorate; the party relied as well on a large share of the “native” Taiwanese vote to win elections. The opposition DPP, by contrast, could focus its appeals exclusively on this latter group—and self-determination for the island was a popular position that it embraced from its earliest days. The result was a realignment that the KMT’s vast resources were unable to prevent: the DPP steadily gained support from native Taiwanese vote, prompting the ruling party to move toward a centrist position on Taiwan’s political status, which in turn led to the defection of many of its core supporters to a new mainland-dominated party, the New Party. In short, realignment around the independence issue rapidly reduced the asymmetry of the party system, even as the KMT’s resource advantages remained enormous.

Nor is Taiwan the only case where a resource advantage explanation is potentially misleading. The reverse situation holds in Malaysia, where the long-time ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) and its main constituent party, UMNO, have survived a series of increasingly threatening economic shocks and elite defections to remain in power today. Most notably, the Asian Financial Crisis that hit Malaysia in 1997-98 dramatically reduced the finances available to the coalition for patronage and voter mobilization. As resource advantage theories would predict, BN suffered from elite defections to the opposition—none more serious than the deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim—and a surge in support for opposition parties around the country. But the combined opposition in Malaysia was hindered then, as it is today, by the sharp regional, religious, and ethnic divisions that have long characterized Malaysian society. Under Malaysia’s system of plurality-rule single-member districts, knocking the BN out of power requires pre-election cooperation and voter coordination between parties appealing to a largely conservative, Islamic, ethnically Malay rural base, on the one hand, and to a largely urban, secular, well-educated, wealthy, and disproportionately ethnically Chinese and Indian base on the other. More than 15 years after the Asian Financial Crisis hit, the opposition has still not managed to break through despite a dramatic decline in vote share for the ruling coalition. Whereas the primary underlying social cleavage proved


advantageous to the opposition in Taiwan, it has consistently hindered opposition coordination in Malaysia, despite the decline in the BN’s access to state resources.

Another case where the recent emphasis on resource advantages appears to miss something important is in South Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) has held uninterrupted power since taking office at the end of apartheid in 1994. In May 2014, the party won its fifth consecutive election, all with over 60 percent of the national popular vote; the nearest competitor, the Democratic Alliance, won less than 23 percent. Resource theories are not very persuasive in accounting for this remarkably stable party system asymmetry. For one, there are few hints of the kind of underhanded ruling party election tactics that are widespread elsewhere on the continent: South Africa consistently scores high on various indicators of democracy, including freedoms of press and assembly, a well-regarded election administration, and an independent judiciary. Moreover, South Africa’s electoral system features closed-list PR elected in a single national district: it is hard to think of a system less susceptible to gerrymandering and malapportionment that favors the ruling party, or less likely to encourage the development of clientelist party-voter or candidate-voter ties.

If we turn to research on first wave cases, however, there is a straightforward explanation of the ANC’s continued dominance: partisanship. Classics such as Philip Converse’s “Of Time and Partisan Stability” and Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments” remind us that most voters in established party systems can be fiercely loyal to a political party without quid pro quo exchanges of any kind.10 And these partisan ties, once formed, are both remarkably stable over time and the single best predictor of voting behavior in any given election. Viewed from this perspective, it should not be surprising to us that South Africa’s party system has changed only gradually over the post-apartheid era. The circumstances surrounding the ANC’s ascension to power—its long history of struggle against apartheid, its peaceful negotiated takeover of the new regime, and the extraordinary popularity of Nelson Mandela, its first president—combined to solder to the party the majority of an entire generation of black South Africans.

Earlier examples of one-party dominance are instructive here, as well. As in South Africa, many of these cases emerged at the beginning of the democratic period. In Germany, Austria, Israel, India, Italy, and arguably even in Japan, the ruling party started out with a significant lead in partisan support, and it took a generation or more for opposition alternatives to approach parity in vote share and for these first incumbents to relinquish executive control: 20 years after the first election in Germany, 25 in Austria, 26 in India, 29 in Israel, 33 in Italy, and 38 in Japan. These examples imply that, at least to the present, the ANC’s continued dominance in South Africa is due not to resources delivered through clientelist networks but to a an enduring psychological affinity forged at a moment when an entire generation of black South Africans came to view the ANC as the national savior, the party that ended apartheid. And these cases also suggest that, whatever might happen to the ANC’s resource advantages, the decline of party system asymmetry in South Africa will probably occur only gradually, through the process of generational replacement—and the opportunities for opposition party growth will be limited and expand only incrementally, as well.

**Democratic Regimes, But Dominant Party Systems**

Recent work on one-party dominance has for the most part focused on the more authoritarian end of the spectrum, taking its cues from the rapidly growing literature on political survival and change in autocracies. Although this work has significantly improved our understanding of dominance in more repressive political settings, it has less to say about prolonged one-party rule in many of the third wave democracies. For these cases, old work on first-wave party systems offers a rich source of concepts, theories, and empirical evidence that deserves renewed consideration in the study of one-party dominance.

SECTION NEWS

2014 Section Awards

Juan Linz Dissertation Award Co-Winners: Paula Valeria Munoz (UT Austin) for “Campaign Clientelism in Peru: An Informational Theory”; Leonid Pesakhin (Yale University) for “Long Shadow of the Past: Identity, Norms, and Political Behavior.”

This year’s award committee included Gwyneth McClendon (Harvard University) (chair), John D. Stephens (University of North Carolina), and Noam Lupu (University of Wisconsin-Madison).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winners: Paula Valeria Munoz’s dissertation, Campaign Clientelism in Peru, is a rich empirical examination of clientelist electoral strategies in a setting of weak party organizations. Focusing on Peru, she outlines a theory of the informational role that clientelistic practices play in the absence of political machines: by providing material incentives for voters to participate in mass rallies and other campaign events, she argues, politicians who cannot rely on powerful party brands or allegiances demonstrate their strength and electoral promise. Using an impressive combination of observational survey data, focus groups, field observation and a survey experiment, Munoz digs deeply for the observable implications of her theory. The resulting dissertation is both a pleasure to read and remarkably incisive, especially since it investigates a type of behavior that is not typically recorded or publicized in a systematic way. Although the study of clientelism is an area of comparative democratization that is already filled with impressive and important work, Munoz’s dissertation makes an empirically rich contribution that could easily extend to weakly institutionalized party systems in other developing countries.

The committee is also extremely pleased to award the Linz Prize to Leonid Pesakhin’s dissertation, Long Shadow of the Past: Identity, Norms, and Political Behavior. This dissertation masterfully sheds light on the ways in which past political institutions and arrangements can influence present political identities, attitudes and behavior. Joining other studies employing clever natural experiments, Pesakhin situates his empirical investigation along the now-defunct border of the Austrian and Russian empires in contemporary Ukraine, convincingly arguing that the exact placement of the part of the border between the two that he examines was arbitrary, thus “as-if” randomly dividing otherwise similar people into different political arrangements and into different national communities for well over a century. Pesakhin then presents results from an original interview-based survey that he conducted of more than 1600 rural villagers living on either side of that border and uses the survey responses to explore the ways in which the “invisible line” of that now-defunct border continues to influence the identities and political attitudes of these citizens. Most impressive, Pesakhin conducts comparisons of different historical regions within the geographical bands around the arbitrary border, in order to identify mechanisms by which local elites, particularly through schools and churches, carry the past into the present. Pesakhin’s dissertation cannot help but compel a more nuanced conceptualization of comparative democratic behavior from its readers.

Best Book Award Co-Winners: Scott Mainwaring (University of Notre Dame) and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (University of Pittsburgh) for Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall (Cambridge, 2014); Susan C. Stokes (Yale University), Thad Dunning (Yale University), Marcelo Nazareno (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba), and Valeria Brusco (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba) for Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge, 2013).

This year’s committee included Milan Svolik (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign) (chair), Michael Coppedge (University of Notre Dame), and Dali Yang (University of Chicago).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winners: We reviewed 29 nominated books and after carefully deliberating decided to award this year’s best book prize to two books. The first awarded book is Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism by Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco; the second awarded book is Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán.

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses a number of key questions in the study of accountability, clientelism, and redistributive politics: Why do we observe clientelistic politics in some countries but programmatic redistribution in other? Why do clientelistic parties reward core instead of swing voters? Why is clientelism so pervasive in developing countries but rare in advanced democracies?

The book’s key theoretical innovation is to focus brokers – the local intermediaries that link the party leadership to the voters. Brokers help parties address a major informational problem in the clientelistic exchange of votes for benefits: Who are the voters who can be swayed by the promise of a particularistic reward? How do we distinguish them from those voters that have already made up their mind about whether to vote for or against the party? This is what brokers know. Yet by holding that information, brokers also gain power and thus create an agency problem for the machine: They may favor loyal, core voters
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instead the politically crucial swing voters or even misappropriate resources.

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism employs this theoretical insight to explain not only key empirical regularities in clientelistic politics but also its persistence and demise. Economic development and urbanization make it harder for brokers to form or maintain the personal relationships that are the source of their political indispensability. Once brokers become obsolete, party leaders are happy to trade them in favor of policies that are more effective in developed democracies – that is mass, programmatic redistribution. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism thus helps us understand the transition from clientelistic to programmatic redistributive policies – a key step in the process of democratic consolidation.

Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America, the co-winner of this year’s best book award, gives the most comprehensive analysis to date of the emergence, survival, and fall of democracy and dictatorship in Latin America since 1900.

In order to explain regime outcomes, the authors examine the political preferences of key, powerful actors; that is, presidents, the leaders of parties, unions, and business associations, and the military. A major innovation in Democra
cies and Dictatorships in Latin America is the authors’ focus on the extent to which these actors favor democracy as an intrinsically desirable end -- whether they believe that democracy is the best political regime even if it does not favor their substantive economic interests. The second explanatory factor in the book is the international environment. Notably, the authors disentangle the effects of regional regime diffusion from the consequences of the shift toward democracy promotion in American foreign policy.

Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America also makes an impressive empirical contribution to the study of democratization and Latin American politics. It presents a new classification of regimes into democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian between 1900 and 2010 in all of Latin America. Moreover, for each of the countries in the region throughout the period 1944-2010, the book identifies key actors under each administration and codes their attitudes toward democracy as well as the degree of their political moderation or radicalism. This data will be an invaluable resource for future research on Latin America.

Best Article Award: Lisa Blaydes (Stanford University) and Eric Chaney (Harvard University) for “The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE,” published in the February 2013 American Political Science Review.

This year’s award committee included Robert D. Woodberry (National University of Singapore) (chair), John Gerring (Boston University), and John A. Doces (Bucknell University).


Some articles are great because they answer an old question decisively, other articles are great because they provide a new perspective on an old question and provide new data for analyzing that question in a way that opens up debate. “The Feudal Revolution” by Blaydes and Chaney is this later type of article.

Many scholars have puzzled over why the Muslim world was politically, militarily and technologically superior to Europe in earlier periods, but later fell behind. Many scholars have also debated why Europe (or at least parts of it) developed greater rule of law, early parliamentary organizations and earlier democracy. Blaydes and Chaney suggest that one important factor was the rise of feudalism in Western Europe. According to them, because the fall of the Roman Empire was more complete in the West than the East, successor Empires (i.e., the Carolingians) could not rely on an established bureaucracy and thus could not extract sufficient tax resources to maintain a standing army. Thus, they relied on networks of local landowners who paid taxes in the form of soldiers and knights in times of war. However, because these soldiers and knights were not directly under the king, local elites had greater power relative to the sovereign and were able to limit his power. The negotiations of kings with local barons, lords, and bishops created the foundation for parliaments and resulted in greater protection of private property, ultimately (ironically) creating greater political stability and longer life expectancies for kings. However in the East, Muslim rulers were able to take over earlier Byzantine and Persian bureaucracies and thus were able to extract more taxes and established standing armies of foreign slaves (Mamlukes). As a result, local elites had less ability to limit abuse by sultans, rule of law suffered, parliaments were not established, and political instability increased. Thus, ironically, sultans had shorter reigns and were more likely to be overthrown.

Blaydes and Chaney attempt to demonstrate their thesis with a major new dataset which codes the lengths of reigns of the vast majority of rulers in Europe and the Near East and geocodes the borders of the polities these rulers controlled. They also employ a series of clever experiments using the timing of change and regional variation in the patterns to test the plausibility of their preferred explanation versus other explanations.

No one article can adequately deal with all
the complexities of 1,000 years of history over such a broad region of the world. As we read we kept on thinking of alternative explanations such as the Gregorian legal reforms circa 1050-1080, the timing of when the Byzantines were being defeated or ruled by Venetian invaders (which can shorten lengths of reigns), etc. We also wished for more precise data about the actual implementation of feudalism and other competing explanations. But what impressed us was that Blaydes and Chaney provided data that could allow us to plausibly make comparisons over such a long period of time, over such diverse settings; and that they made their argument in such an elegant and clever way. While this article will not shut down any of the debates it takes on, it will hopefully get scholars thinking about new factors that may have influenced the rise of parliaments and the rule of law and scurrying to find additional data to test these and other explanations even more rigorously. We look forward to the debate.

Best Field Work Award: Milli Lake
(Arizona State University)
Honorable Mention: Calvert Jones (City College of New York)

This year’s award committee included
Adam Auerbach (University of Notre Dame) (chair), Sarah Parkinson (University of Minnesota), and Jill Schwedler (Hunter College).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winners: The 2014 selection committee has very enthusiastically selected Milli Lake to receive the Best Fieldwork Award from the Comparative Democratization Section of APSA for her dissertation, “The Politics of Punishment: Politics, Power and the State in Judicial Responses to Gender Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa.” Situated in an environment of dramatic violence, social conflict, and weak state institutions, Congolese courts have been remarkably progressive in advancing human rights law, particularly toward the protection of victims of gender-based violence. Lake finds that the weak state presence in the DRC has allowed international NGOs to directly encourage courts in the realm of human rights law and protection for victims of violence. The selection committee was deeply impressed with Lake’s fieldwork on several fronts. Lake spent over a year in the DRC collecting original court documents, observing court proceedings, conducting interviews and focus groups, and administering a survey among victims of gender-based violence. She additionally spent several months conducting comparative fieldwork on the same issues in South Africa. The committee was particularly impressed by her drive to represent under-studied populations in comparative research and her simultaneous awareness of the risks of re-traumatization. For these many reasons, we are pleased to name Milli Lake the receipt of the 2014 Best Fieldwork Award from the Comparative Democratization Section.

The 2014 selection committee is also pleased to award Calvert Jones with an Honorable Mention for her deeply innovative, multi-method fieldwork conducted in the United Arab Emirates. Jones’s dissertation, “Bedouins into Bourgeois? Social Engineering for a Market Economy in the United Arab Emirates,” examines how state leaders attempt to craft more entrepreneurial and innovative citizens who are ready to compete economically while at the same time being less reliant on the state and less likely to engage in contentious political action. To these ends, leaders have brought in international teachers and organizations to educate and construct a new UAE citizen. Jones’s research, however, reveals a critical unforeseen consequence—these efforts of social engineering have served to further encourage attitudes of entitlement and suppress entrepreneurship. Fearing dismissal, teachers and staff excessively praise students and do not challenge problems existing in the current system. Themes of nationalism further undermine the crafting of an entrepreneurial citizen. Jones’s fieldwork involved the deployment of an impressive set of methods—ethnography, interviews, and a survey of approximately 2000 Emirati high-school students. It provides an exemplar of multi-method fieldwork technique and data triangulation. Jones’s research thus represents a significant contribution to scholarship on the political sociology of citizens and the state.

Best Paper Award: Christian Houle
(Michigan State University), for “Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”

This year’s award committee included
Olukunle P. Owolabi (Villanova University) (chair), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella), Maya Tudor (Blavatnik School of Government).

Committee Remarks on the Award Winner: We found Houle’s paper to be particularly innovative, as he develops new indicators to measure ethnic inequality (between group inequality) and class inequality (within-group inequality) in 14 Sub-Saharan democracies, from 1980 to 2005. His main finding, that ethnic inequality is particularly harmful for democracy when class inequality is low, contributes to social science literature on ethnicity, inequality, and democratization. This paper has a tremendous amount of potential, although there are still one or two methodological ambiguities that need to be worked out. We are pleased to award Christian Houle the best paper in comparative democratization, and we look forward to seeing this article in print in the near future.”
NEWS FROM MEMBERS:

Claire L. Adida, assistant professor of political science, University of California San Diego, Gwyneth McClendon, assistant professor of government, Harvard University, Eric Kramon, and Jessica Gottlieb won the Experiments in Governance and Politics Network Regranting Initiative Award for a project entitled “Can Common Knowledge Improve Common Goods? A Field Experiment in an African Democracy.”

Naazneen H. Barma, assistant professor of national security affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Elisabeth Huybens, and Loren Vituela edited Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts (World Bank, 2014). Drawing on mixed-method empirical research carried out on nine public agencies in Lao PDR, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Timor Leste, this volume identifies the shared causal mechanisms underpinning institutional success in fragile states by examining the inner workings of these institutions, along with the external operational environment and sociopolitical context in which they exist.

Michael Bernhard, Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Chair of Political Science, University of Florida, and Keith Weghorst published a piece entitled “From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa” in the October 2014 Comparative Political Studies.

Carew Boulding, assistant professor of political science, University of Colorado at Boulder, published NGOs, Political Protest, and Civil Society (Cambridge University Press, 2014), in which she argues that NGOs have an important effect on political participation in the developing world and finds that in countries where democratic institutions are weak, NGOs encourage much more contentious political participation, including demonstrations, riots, and protests. However, as long as democracy is functioning above a minimal level, the political protest that results from NGO activity is not generally incompatible with democracy.


Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, is coauthor (with Stephen Whitefield) of “The Study of Communist and Post-Communist Politics” in Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford’s Development of the Study of Politics and International Relations in Comparative Perspective, edited by Christopher Hood, Desmond King, and Gillian Peele and published by Oxford University Press in 2014. Professor Brown has been elected to the Council of the British Academy.

Lena Bustikova, assistant professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State University, published “Revenge of the Radical Right” in the October 2014 Comparative Political Studies, in which the author presents a new theory of the success and failure of radical right parties that emphasizes their reactive natures and views them as backlash against the political successes of minorities and concessions extracted on their behalf.


Javier Corrales, professor and chair of political science, Amherst College, and Michael Penfold published “Manipulating Term Limits in Latin America” in the October 2014 Journal of Democracy, in which the authors examine how the relaxation or elimination of presidential term limits in many Latin American countries have impacted democracy in the region. Corrales was also awarded a Five College Digital Humanities grant to help develop the first ever timeline of LGBT rights in the Americas.


Elisabeth Gidengil, Hiram Mills Professor of Political Science, McGill University, and Ekrem Karakoç, assistant professor of political science, Binghamton University, SUNY, published “Which Matters More in the Electoral Success of Islamist (Successor) Parties—Religion or Performance?” in a forthcoming issue of Party Politics (but now available online). The authors examine whether the electoral success of Islamist parties depends on the support of religious voters or more to their performance in dealing with key political and economic issues.

Kenneth F. Greene, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, is spending the 2014-15 academic year as the Chair of Excellence and visiting professor at the Juan March Institute-Carlos III University in Madrid. He also published a new article, “Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance” (with Chappell Lawson) in the October 2014 Comparative Politics.
Samuel Greene, acting dean of King’s Global Institutes, and director of King’s Russia Institute, King’s College London, published Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia (Stanford University Press, 2014). The book traces the evolution of the relationship between citizens and the Russian state beginning in 2005 and running through the summer of 2013 and finds an active citizenry that struggles to gain traction against a ruling elite that would prefer to ignore them.

Mary Alice Haddad, associate professor of government, Wesleyan University, contributed a chapter entitled “Paradoxes of Democratization: Environmental Politics in East Asia” to the book Routledge Handbook of Environment and Society in Asia, edited by Paul Harris and Graeme Lang and published by Routledge in 2014.

Henry Hale, associate professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University, published Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book examines how in countries where the rule of law is weak and corruption is pervasive democratic or authoritarian breakthroughs are often merely predictable phases in longer-term cyclic dynamics, or patronal politics.

Jonathan Hartlyn, KR Reckford Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Jana Morgan, assistant professor of political science, University of Tennessee, Alixandra T. Stoyan, Sara Niedzwiecki, and Rosario Espinal published “Trust in Government Institutions: The Effects of Performance and Participation in the Dominican Republic and Haiti” in a forthcoming issue of International Political Science Review.

Karrie J. Koesel, assistant professor of political science, University of Oregon, published Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences (Cambridge University Press, 2014), in which she explores what religious and political authority want from one another, how they negotiate the terms of their relationship, and how cooperative or conflicting their interactions are in Russia and China.


Staffan I. Lindberg, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, was awarded “Best Article Prize” for “Mapping Accountability: Core Concept and Subtypes,” which was published in International Review of Administrative Sciences in 2013. He is also the coauthor of “A New Approach to Measuring Democracy” in the July 2014 Journal of Democracy.

Devra Moehler, assistant professor of communication, Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, and Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz won the American Political Science Association’s Best Paper Award for the experimental section and an honorable mention for the comparative politics section’s Sage Best Paper Award for their work on “Mobilization by the Media? A field Experiment on Partisan Media Effects in Africa.”

Cas Mudde was promoted to associate professor with tenure in the department of international affairs at the University of Georgia. He recently published two readers: Political Extremism (SAGE, 2014, 4 volumes) and Youth and the Extreme Right (IDEbate, 2014).

Joan M. Nelson’s article, “Will Malaysia Follow the Path of Taiwan and Mexico?” was published in the July 2014 Journal of Democracy. The article notes the considerable similarities between the dominant party systems and their unraveling in Taiwan and Mexico before 2000 and Malaysia before 2008, and then explores causes for Malaysia’s contrasting trajectory in recent years.


Howard Sanborn, associate professor of international studies and political science, Virginia Military Institute, and Clayton L. Thyne, associate professor of political science and director of the Peace Studies Program, University of Kentucky, published “Learning Democracy: Education and the Fall of Authoritarian Regimes” in the October 2014 British Journal of Political Science. The authors consider how levels of education influence democratization and under what conditions education is most likely to promote democracy.

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how in twenty-five years Moroccan women activists altered their national gender institution to improve substantially the lives of all Moroccan women. They operationalize and offer an institutional template for studying change in national gender institutions that can be adopted by practitioners and scholars in other country settings.

Scot Schraufnagel, associate professor of political science, Northern Illinois University, Michael Buehler, lecturer in comparative politics, University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, and Maureen Lowry-Fritz published “Voter Turnout in Democratizing Southeast Asia: A comparative Analysis of Electoral Participation in Five Countries” in the July 2014 Taiwan Journal of Democracy.


During the summer of 2014, Siroky was a visiting researcher at the University of Bern, Switzerland, where he completed a project on Jurassic separatism with Michael Hechter. He was also a guest lecturer at Yale University’s Summer Program in Prague, Czech Republic, at Qafqaz University in Baku, Azerbaijan, and at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany. From September 2014 to September 2017, he will be the co-principle investigator on a $980,000 National Science Foundation grant called “Religious Infusion and Asymmetric Group Conflict” with Carolyn Warner and Steven Neuberg.

Alberto Simpser, associate professor of political science, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, won the Sage Best Paper Award at the American Political Science Association’s 2014 annual meeting in Washington, D.C., for his paper on “The Intergenerational Persistence of Attitudes Towards Corruption.” The prize is awarded to the best paper in the field of comparative politics presented at the previous year’s APSA annual meeting.

Svend-Erik Skaaning, professor of political science, Aarhus University, has been awarded the Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences Award for young, talented researchers. Moreover, together with Jørgen Møller he has published The Rule of Law: Definitions, Measures, Patterns, and Causes (Palgrave). Skaaning has also released the Civil Liberties Dataset (CLD), offering indicators of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion for all countries in the world from 1976 to 2010. The coding procedures and other information are described in detail in “Respect for Civil Liberties during the Third Wave of Democratization: Presenting a New Dataset,” which appears in the July 2014 Social Indicators Research (co-authored with Jørgen Møller).


Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, received a Fernand Braudel Senior Fellowship to spend a sabbatical year at the European University Institute in Florence for the 2015-2016 academic year. Teorell, Staffan I. Lindberg, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, John Gerring, professor of political science, Boston University, and Michael Coppedge, professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, published “V-Dem: A New Way to Measure Democracy” in the July 2014 Journal of Democracy.

Tariq Thachil, assistant professor of political science, Yale University, published Elite Parties, Poor Voters: How Social Services Win Votes in India (Cambridge University Press, 2014). The book examines why poor voters vote against their material interests in developing democracies, and the use of social services to win votes, through a mixture of qualitative fieldwork and survey data from India. Thachil also published an article based on this book, entitled “Elite Parties, Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India,” which appeared in the May 2014 American Political Science Review.

Henry Thomson, Ph.D. candidate, department of political science, University of Minnesota, joined Nuffield College, Oxford, as a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow in September. He published “Landholding Inequality, Political Strategy and Authoritarian Repression: Structure and Agency in Bismarck’s Second Founding of the German Empire” in the June 2014 Studies in Comparative International Development.

Guillermo Trejo, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, published “The Ballot and the Street: An
Electoral Theory of Social Protest in Autocracies” in the June 2014 Perspectives on Politics. Trejo shows that the introduction of multiparty elections in a wide variety of autocracies around the world gave rise to major cycles of protest and discusses why the relationship between the ballot and the street is a crucial factor for understanding the dynamics of stability and change of authoritarian regimes.

Ashutosh Varshney, Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences, Brown University, published “Hindu Nationalism in Power?” in the October 2014 Journal of Democracy, in which he examines whether India under the BJP will see a period of renewed communal violence or if Hindu-nationalist politicians will be reined in by constitutional constraints and their desire to stay in power. Varshney’s book Battles Half Won: India’s Improbable Democracy (Penguin, 2013) will be out in paperback in October 2014.

Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brown University, published Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy (Cambridge U Press, Oct 2014), in which she argues that the combination of a growing middle class and intense political competition can create incentives for local politicians to stop using clientelism. The book uses evidence from field work, a dataset on social policy implementation in a large sample of Argentine municipalities, and a survey experiment to support its claims.

New Research

Journal of Democracy

The October 2014 (Vol. 25, no. 4) Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles on India, Euroskepticism, Indonesia’s 2014 elections, and external influence and democratization.

"From Politics to Protest” by Ivan Krastev
The protests that have been erupting around the world may signal the twilight of both the idea of revolution and the notion of political reformism.

India’s Watershed Vote
I. “Behind Modi’s Victory” by Eswaran Sridharan
India’s sixteenth general election ushered in a new era in the country’s politics, putting Narendra Modi and the BJP firmly in charge. What accounts for the sharp swing away from the long-dominant Congress party?

II. “Hindu Nationalism in Power?” by Ashutosh Varshney
Will India under the BJP see a period of renewed communal violence, or will Hindu-nationalist politicians be reined in by constitutional constraints and their desire to stay in power?

III. “What It Means for the Economy” by Rajiv Kumar
Modi promised “good days” to aspiring young Indians, and they voted for him in droves. But he is off to a slow start in carrying out the economic reforms necessary to ensure that better days lie ahead.

IV. “The Risks Ahead” by Sumit Ganguly
Will the Modi government focus on the economy, or will it seek to implement a transformational Hindu-nationalist agenda?

“Growth, Security, and Democracy in Africa” by Richard Joseph
Democracy’s fortunes rose in Africa in the 1990s, but more recently have been in retreat. The forces of democratic resurgence remain in play, however, as a look at the key case of Nigeria suggests.

Euroskepticism Arrives
I. “Marginal No More” by Liubomir Topaloff
The European Parliament elections of May 2014 were not an “earthquake,” but they did signal that Euroskeptic parties are drawing closer to the European political mainstream.

II. “The Missing Debate” by João Carlos Espada
Disagreements over how much power should reside in Brussels must be allowed to become a normal aspect of debates about European affairs.

Indonesia’s 2014 Elections
I. “Parliament and Patronage” by Edward Aspinall
Indonesia’s 2014 legislative elections went smoothly. Yet the “money politics” that featured so heavily in these contests suggests a grave need to reform the country’s electoral system.

II. “How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived” by Marcus Mietzner
Indonesians came close to electing as their new president a populist challenger promising to restore the country’s predemocratic order. Democracy prevailed in the end, but its continued vulnerability was exposed.

External Influences and Democratization
I. “Gatekeepers and Linkages” by Jakob Tolstrup
Levitsky and Way’s account of linkage and leverage leaves out the key role of “gatekeeper” elites.

II. “The Revenge of Geopolitics” by Ghia Nodia
Advancing the democratic cause is threatening to autocrats and they will fight back.

III. “Structure vs. Choice” by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
Linkage and leverage largely reflect long-term structural factors, and only in certain situations can they be affected by policy choices.
“Manipulating Term Limits in Latin America” by Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold
More and more Latin American countries have sought to relax or even eliminate presidential term limits. What are the consequences for democracy?

The July 2014 (Vol. 25, no. 3) Journal of Democracy features a cluster of articles on “The Maidan and Beyond,” as well as individual case studies on Malaysia, Russia, and El Salvador.

“The End of the Transitions Era?” by Marc F. Plattner
Regime change will always be a feature of political life, but we are unlikely to see again transitions to democracy on the scale of the “the wave.”

The Maidan and Beyond
I. “The House That Yanukovych Built” by Serhiy Kudelia
The events surrounding the EuroMaidan cannot be understood apart from the preceding five years of increasingly corrupt and authoritarian rule.

II. “Civil Society and Democratization” by Lucan Way
Despite the spirit of participation that characterized the Maidan, organized civil society groups were not a key factor.

III. “Who Were the Protestors?” by Olga Onuch
Survey data reveal the makeup of the crowds in the Maidan and the factors that motivated them to take part in the protests.

IV. “The Media’s Role” by Sergii Leshchenko
Media, both new and traditional and both Russian and Ukrainian, played a major role in the EuroMaidan story from the very outset.

V. “Ukraine’s Radical Right” by Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland
Russian propagandists—echoed by some Western commentators—portray Ukraine as a haven of nationalist extremism. The truth is quite different.

VI. “Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration” by Anders Aslund
Controlling corruption is a huge challenge for Ukraine, especially in the natural-gas industry. The steps needed are well understood, if only the political will to take them can be summoned.

VII. “The Russia Factor” by Lilia Shevtsova
The regime of Vladimir Putin has been a key driver of the crisis in Ukraine. Under challenge at home for several years now, it turned to Ukraine in part to firm up its own grip on power in Russia.

VIII. “Finding Ukraine” by Nadia Diuk
Ukrainians flocked to the Maidan to express a “choice for Europe,” but they may also have forged the beginnings of a new Ukrainian identity.

Gay Rights: Why Democracy Matters” by Omar G. Encarnación
The year 2013 featured unprecedented strides for gay rights in some parts of the world, particularly in Western Europe and the Americas, but also startling setbacks elsewhere, as in Russia and some countries in Africa.

“Will Malaysia Follow the Path of Taiwan and Mexico?” by Joan Nelson
The hegemonic-party systems of Taiwan and Mexico began to loosen in the 1980s, eventually yielding to democracy. Malaysia’s ruling party, by contrast, has tightened the reins of power in the face of increasing opposition.

“Russia’s Nationalists Flirt with Democracy” by Pal Kolsto
Russia has witnessed a growing rapprochement between some of its nationalists and some of its democrats, but this trend is threatened by divisions over the annexation of Crimea.

“Is Small Really Beautiful? The Microstate Mistake” by Jan Erk and Wouter Veenendaal
Tiny countries have come in for praise as miniature models of democracy, but closer examination tells a mainly more somber tale.

“El Salvador’s Beleaguered Democracy” by Forrest D. Colburn and Arturo Cruz S.
In February 2014, Salvadorean narrowly elected as president a former FMLN guerrilla commander, but he will have to deal with a dire economy and horrific levels of crime.

In order to mark democracy’s progress and to inform policy, we need to be able to measure democracy in sufficient detail. The V-Dem Project aims to deliver exactly such a tool.

Inequalities and Democracy in Southeast Asia”

“Inequalities and Democracy in Southeast Asia” by Aurel Croissant and Jeffrey Haynes

“Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery Is Central” by Lee Jones

“Health Care and Democratization in Indonesia” by Edward Aspinall

“Civil Society Activism and Political Parties in Malaysia: Differences over Local Representation” by Garry Rodan

“Considerations on Inequality and Politics in Thailand” by Kevin Hewison

“Of Inequality and Irritation: New Agendas and Activism in Malaysia and Singapore” by Meredith L. Weiss

“Exploring the Impact of Mass Cultural
Changes on the Patterns of Democratic Reform” by Kavita Heijstek-Ziemann

“The External-Domestic Interplay in Democracy Promotion: A Case Study on Public Administration Reform in Croatia” by Lisa Groß and Sonja Grimm


“Recrafting the National Imaginary and the New ‘Vanguardism’” by Brian D. Shoup and Carolyn E. Holmes

SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

*American Political Science Review, Vol. 108, no. 2, May 2014*

“Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India” by Simon Chauchard

“Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China” by Xiaobo Lü

“Elite Parties and Poor Voters: Theory and Evidence from India” by Tariq Thachil

*Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 47, no. 2, June 2014*

“Kim Jong-il’s Military-First Politics and Beyond: Military Control Mechanisms and the Problem of Power Succession” by Jongseok Woo

“Assessing the Leadership Transition in North Korea: Using Network Analysis of Field Inspections, 1997–2012” by John Ishiyama

“Re-Evaluating Democratic Revolutions, Nationalism and Organized Crime in Ukraine from a Comparative Perspective” by Taras Kuzio

“From the Provinces to the Parliament: How the Ukrainian Radical Right Mobilized in Galicia” by Alina Polyakova

“An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan Compared” by Irina Khmelko and Yevgen Pereguda

“Was Tito’s Yugoslavia Totalitarian?” by Sergei Flere and Rudi Klanjšek

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. 12, October 2014*

“Labor Shortages, Rural Inequality, and Democratization” by Martin Ardanaz and Isabela Mares

“Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation” by Herbert Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm

“From Formlessness to Structure? The Institutionalization of Competitive Party Systems in Africa” by Keith R. Weghorst and Michael Bernhard

“Revenge of the Radical Right” by Lenka Bustikova

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. 11, September 2014*

“Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide” by Dawn Brancati

“Multicultural Policy and Political Support in European Democracies” by Jack Citrin, Morris Levy, and Matthew Wright

“Voter Polarization, Strength of Partisanship, and Support for Extremist Parties” by Lawrence Ezrow, Margit Tavits, and Jonathan Homola

“Refining the Oil Curse: Country-Level Evidence From Exogenous Variations in Resource Income” by Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. 10, September 2014*

“When Do Political Parties Protest Election Results?” by Svitlana Chernykh

“Veto Players and the Value of Political Control: A Theory With Evidence From Energy Privatization” by David Szakonyi and Johannes Urpelainen

“Improving Social Well-Being Through New Democratic Institutions” by Michael Touchton and Brian Wampler
**New Research**

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. 9, August 2014*

“Distributive Politics in a Multiparty System: The Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Turkey” by S. Erdem Aytaç

“Oil, Democracy, and Context: A Meta-Analysis” by Anar K. Ahmadov

“Electoral Gender Quotas: A Conceptual Analysis” by Mona Lena Krook

“Partisan Politics and Privatization in OECD Countries” by Herbert Obinger, Carina Schmitt, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer

“How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters” by Agnes Akkerman, Cas Muddé, and Andrej Zaslove

*Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47, no. 8, July 2014*

“Who Votes in Latin America? A Test of Three Theoretical Perspectives” by Miguel Carreras and Néstor Castañeda-Angarita

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To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg or Melissa Aten.

**Executive Editor**

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