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Letter from the Co-Presidents

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Citizenship and Migration Studies in an Era of Nationalist Populism

Following WWII, questions of citizenship and migration were treated in the context of the nation-state. Issues of membership, belonging, and immigrant incorporation became secondary in the broader literature that focused on modernization, democratization, and critiques emanating from political economy perspectives. The relevant groups were largely classes not citizens and immigrants. Only in the “peculiar” American context did social science still raise questions about race, ethnicity, and immigrant membership and incorporation. At the end of the Cold War, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars rushed to proclaim “the end of history,” pushing the literature even further into expectations about the perpetual hegemony of the liberal democratic world order. The result was further fragmentation of the field, normatively, conceptually, and methodologically. Democratic institutions were understood as safe and sound, the issue was how to improve them in ways that made them more inclusive and representative of the interests of the weak and the excluded. And down that path we proceeded with critiques of the state, neoliberalism, economic globalization, as America emerged the sole hegemon.

Signs of major change have existed for several years now. Scholars have been analyzing extreme-right populist parties for more than a decade. The French Front National has been growing for much longer than that. Five years ago, the Greek Golden Dawn became the country’s third largest party. Only three years ago, a referendum turned Hungary into an “illiberal democracy,” a term Hungarian leader Victor Orban proudly endorsed. In December 2016, the Austrian Freedom Party, riding the same extreme right populist wave, came within a breath of the country’s presidency. In May 2017, Marine Le Pen with a message railing against immigrants, multiculturalism, and the EU got within an inch of the French presidency. Many would add to these Turkey’s controversial constitutional referendum of April 2017, which introduced sweeping increases in the power of the executive, turning Erdogan into an elected strongman.

Yet, it is the more recent Trump Presidency in the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom that made it clear to academics and pundits alike that the broader context may be changing. These two pivotal moments in key western...
states signal fundamental changes in the relationship between society, states and immigrants.

In its first 100 days alone, the Trump Presidency sought to fulfill a series of populist campaign promises with great enthusiasm. Symbolically, the Spanish language version of the White House website went dark the minute the new government stepped foot in the building. The administration promised it is revising the content, but three months later the site is still down. On the substantive side, the administration issued two versions of an executive order that sought to temporarily halt travel into the U.S. from several majority-Muslim countries and put a permanent stop to the admission of Syrian refugees. Both were enjoined by federal courts which found them to be racially rather than rationally motivated. The administration has also (unsuccessfully) negotiated with Congress to commit funding for a “big, beautiful” border wall with Mexico, promoted as the solution to illegal immigration into the United States.

“it is the more recent Trump Presidency…and the Brexit referendum…that made it clear to academics and pundits alike that the broader context may be changing”

Populist rhetoric implemented as policy is not exclusive to this side of the Atlantic. Across the pond, scapegoating of immigrants was a prominent feature of the “Leave” campaign that led to Brexit in June 2016. Immigrants were blamed for everything from the woes of the National Health System to terrorism and threats to national identity. The European Union bureaucracy was the object of much contempt. The French and Austrian presidential campaigns differed from the UK rhetoric only in the language of delivery. The themes were almost identical. Muslim refugees, largely from war torn Iraq and Syria, are an existential threat to national cultures; immigrants drain national coffers; foreigners don’t learn the national language and cannot assimilate into local society; immigrants are terrorists, rapists, criminals.

Erdogan received congratulatory calls from both President Trump and Putin after his referendum in Turkey, despite allegations of voter fraud and stuffed ballot boxes, or having unleashed a campaign of fear and intimidation. The new constitutional rules make him head of the executive, solely responsible for appointing ministers, judges, and top agency personnel. He can also impose a state of emergency and dissolve Parliament at will. Erdogan has curtailed the freedom of the press and purged thousands of academics, teachers, civil servants, and judges, whom he accused of being supporters of exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, a purported enemy of the regime. The opposition party has been branded the political arm of a “terrorist group” (the Kurds).

Institutionalists would say that these accumulating points of punctuation have the potential to reshape the liberal international order that emerged out of the Bretton Woods conference following WWII. Free trade, open borders, generous welfare sys-
tems, and even liberal democracy itself, are all being challenged by movements and political parties that view the world through “us first” populist ideologies. In the process, the rights of non-citizens and citizens who are members of various minority groups are questioned, challenged and redefined in ways that reshape intrastate and interstate political dynamics.

In almost every case, demographic change induced by voluntary and/or involuntary migration seems central to the emergence and rise of nationalist populism. Hostility to immigration is certainly at the core of these populist narratives. These movements understand politics as a zero-sum game in which their side has been losing for a long time. Their side is the “nation,” an often amorphous and ambiguous “us” that leaves room for broad coalitions of the disgruntled. These developments on the ground represent major challenges and opportunities for our section and our field more broadly as they re-introduce a century old question posed by Sinclair Lewis: Can’t it happen here?

For decades, the field of political science has sustained artificial silos. Americanists have maintained the pretention that the U.S. is an “exceptional” case that cannot be effectively compared to other countries, even other liberal democracies. In part, this was because of an assumption that Sinclair Lewis was wrong and “it” (a collapse of democratic institutions) could not happen here. Comparative politics—for the most part—has been happy to oblige, shifting its gaze and analytical tools away from the United States. Upon the “end of history” and with a hoped (rather than truly theorized) progression of democracy on a linear trajectory, Europeanists took on an optimistic, cosmopolitan view of the future. Many question the relationship between racism and anti-immigrant attitudes and policy preferences and policy outcomes across democracies. In fairness, we have been interrogating this for a long time. Yet, maybe a narrow focus on policy is not enough. Maybe we need to question the role of exclusionary public attitudes in relation to public support for liberal democratic institutions.

The anti-immigrant, anti-democratic wave that has engulfed both sides of the Atlantic presents an opportunity to rethink disciplinary divides, both geographic and methodological. Our section is one of the most pluralistic divisions of the American Political Science Association. We have embraced Americanists, Theorists, Comparativists, International Relations specialists, Legal Scholars and Globalists. Among us, empiricists converse with political theorists, area studies specialists, sociologists, anthropologists, legal scholars, and social psychologists. Our section represents the values and ideals that are being threatened across the world today.

“In almost every case, demographic change induced by voluntary and/or involuntary migration seems central to the emergence and rise of nationalist populism”

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
“Our section represents the values and ideals that are being threatened across the world today”

Our focus on fundamental democratic ideals of citizenship and belonging, not only as a point of normative consensus but as a focus of study, puts us at the center of current developments. We carry a social responsibility to provide ideas for debate and road maps for understanding. Collectively, we have the tools to make sense of the crisis of liberal democracy as it is being experienced in many places and explore both its roots and its consequences. The challenge is huge and the stakes are very high.

To contact the Co-Presidents, email Kamal Sadiq (kamal@uci.edu) and Alexandra Filindra (aleka@uic.edu).
Letter from the Co-Editors

We are very pleased to present to you the second issue of the APSA Migration and Citizenship Newsletter that we have co-edited together. For this issue we decided to look at migration and integration at the local level. For a long time the nation-state seemed to be the natural unit of analysis for the study of immigration and citizenship issues. By migration people most often understand the crossing of national boundaries and in most cases it is the nation-state that regulates migration flows, integration, as well as naturalization requirements. Regulations have, however, also become more relevant at the supra-national level in the case of the European Union or at the regional level in federal states.

Moreover, it has become apparent that the local level might constitute a more relevant unit of analysis for migration issues as migrants not only cross national boundaries but also move to specific cities; furthermore, migration has become a salient issue especially in urban regions. In other words, the local level is the place where immigrants integrate and interact with natives. Accordingly, it is the place where migrants can be studied and regulations might be most relevant. This issue of the Newsletter touches upon a diverse range of topics related to immigrant integration at the local level, as well as immigrant citizenship practices. For example, Els de Graauw has brought together a number of eminent scholars who work on various aspects of local migration and integration policies in the U.S for the Symposium section of this issue. The importance of states and cities as actors in migration politics also appears in the Policy Brief by Alvaro Huerta who, among others, emphasizes the resistance at the regional and local levels against Donald Trump’s “War on Immigrants” policies. In a further contribution, David FitzGerald and John Skrentny offer our readers a primer on the Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California San Diego, while Kelsey Norman discusses how important it is during

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one’s Ph.D. to have mentors come from a range of backgrounds and institutional places for the issue’s Mentorship Corner.

We hope that you will enjoy the contributions in this issue and would like to thank all of the authors for their valuable work, as well as Jakob Biernath for his assistance. If you have any suggestions for the various sections of the newsletter, please contact us. Future issues will continue to rely on your ideas and contributions.

Marc and Kristy

To contact the Newsletter Co-Editors, email Marc Helbling (marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de) and Kristy A. Belton (kbelton@isanet.org).
Symposium: The Politics of Immigration and Integration in U.S. Municipalities
Symposium Coordinator & Introductory Essay Author, Els de Graauw, Baruch College, The City University of New York

Introduction

In analyses of immigration and citizenship, political scientists have long focused attention on the nation state and the role of national leaders and national politics in explaining policies and practices that allow immigrants and refugees into a country, force them out, and influence their rights and integration within a host society. But there now is a growing body of scholarship—in North America, Europe, and elsewhere—that also considers the role of subnational political actors, including municipalities that have a long tradition of receiving immigrants and refugees as well as newer immigrant destinations. Even though they do not have (m)any formal powers over immigration and national citizenship, municipalities are increasingly trying to find a place for themselves in discussions and decisions about sovereignty and political membership, coming up with new strategies, programs, and policies that either welcome and integrate immigrants and refugees or exclude them from the polity. Such developments raise important questions about not only the power of municipalities vis-à-vis the nation state more generally, but also the effect that municipal politics and policies have on immigrants and refugees and the communities of which they are part.

The United States is a telling case in this regard. Throughout its history, different government entities have assumed responsibility for regulating immigration and national membership. During most of the nineteenth century, when there was not yet a federal immigration bureaucracy, individual states, municipalities, and even seaports processed most immigrants and determined which foreigners were admitted or excluded from the country. Only in 1891, when the U.S. Congress created the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration in the Treasury Department, did the federal government take on a greater role in implementing national immigration policy. During the twentieth century, the primary responsibility for immigration control remained with the federal government, also because the courts repeatedly declared that only the federal government has the power to enact and enforce immigration law. For a long time, the federal preeminence in immigration as well as citizenship issues was a given.

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But since 2000, there has been a resurgence of subnational immigration policy activism. Cities and counties (and states) nationwide have proposed and enacted a record number of municipal (and state) laws, especially those aimed at regulating some aspect of undocumented or unauthorized immigration. The steep increase in the number of undocumented immigrants in recent decades, from an estimated 1.9 million in 1988 to an estimated 11.3 million in 2016, has made undocumented immigration a defining feature of immigration and citizenship debates at all levels of government. The gateway state of California was one of the first states to leap into the immigration fray in 1994 when its voters adopted Proposition 187, an initiative designed to deny undocumented immigrants publicly funded social services such as health care as well as primary and secondary education. Then, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks and the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 and again in 2007, many more municipalities (and states) have sought to fill the federal policy void by enacting their own policies targeting immigrants, and especially undocumented immigrants. While anti-immigrant municipal policies playing to fears of demographic and cultural change, like those enacted in Hazleton (PA) and Farmers Branch (TX) in 2006 and 2007, have received a lot of media attention, relatively more municipalities have instead taken steps to welcome and integrate immigrants and refugees.

The election of Donald Trump has only put municipal activism on immigration and integration issues, especially activism considered friendly towards immigrants and refugees, into sharper relief. In the first six months of Trump’s administration, federal policies and practices have increasingly focused on immigration enforcement, and they are putting more pressure on municipalities to toe the line. At the same time, the federal government has declared war on so-called sanctuary jurisdictions that limit how local law enforcement can cooperate with federal immigration agents. Now more than ever before, it is important to understand how U.S. municipalities view and understand their role in immigration and citizenship issues, what approaches they are taking to respond to newcomers in their midst, and the impact their laws and practices are having. The five essays in this symposium shed light on these issues and highlight some of the cutting-edge research being done in this area. All contributors address issues related to the contemporary municipal politics and policies of immigration and immigrant integration and exclusion; their diverse disciplinary backgrounds and trainings—from political science and public policy to anthropology, urban planning, ge-
ography, and law—suggests that studying these issues benefits from a multi-, inter-, and even cross-disciplinary perspective.

The essays explore different policy areas—from policing, sanctuary, and immigrant entrepreneurship to language access, voting, and institutional representation—in a range of municipalities, but a few themes and lessons stand out. One, municipal activism on immigration issues is notable across the country, including in traditional, re-emerging, and newer immigrant destinations as well as in large, mid-sized, and small municipalities. Some municipalities continue to resist newcomers, but a welcoming and accommodating stance is more common among today’s municipal officials. These are encouraging developments, especially in these trying political times when the energy of the Trump administration and other federal officials is on aggressively expanding immigration enforcement and curtailing the rights of immigrants and refugees.

Two, municipal officials are creative and practical in developing policies and programs that address immigrant and refugee communities while navigating both the constraints and opportunities of U.S. federalism. Federal pre-eminence in immigration issues can limit and stunt municipal action when the latter encroaches on federal power or conflicts with federal goals. In other cases, though, federal (and state) policies can actually provide important scaffolding for accommodating municipal responses to immigrants and refugees. Federal civil rights legislation (and similar state legislation), for example, has made it easier for municipalities to develop language access policies and practices that enable also limited English proficient newcomers to communicate with local officials and partake in local programs. In still other cases, where municipal actors can draw on their powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of all their residents, they can develop new or expand existing programs to better address the unique needs and interests of immigrants and refugees, as in the case of municipal entrepreneurship policies and programs.

The municipal responses to immigration discussed in the five essays below show that even as municipal leaders and institutions are subservient to federal (and state) officials, it does not leave them without options or possibilities to design policies and programs catering to a range of newcomers.

"a welcoming and accommodating stance is more common among today’s municipal officials"

“even as municipal leaders and institutions are subservient to federal (and state) officials, it does not leave them without options or possibilities to design policies and programs catering to a range of newcomers”
states also would be more proactive in developing laws, practices, and institutions that accommodate immigrants and refugees. Newcomer integration would likely be faster, easier, and more successful, and communities would be more cohesive and thriving for all, if different levels of government shared in the responsibility. With a wide range of municipalities having launched different integration policies and practices, we can now monitor and study which work and which don't, and successful initiatives can possibly be replicated and scaled up to the state and national levels.

And finally, several contributors remind us (as I also do in my work) that municipal governments should not go at it alone in responding to newcomers. Successful responses need to be vertically integrated to include different levels of government and horizontally applied to draw on the expertise of various governmental and non-governmental actors. More specifically, immigrants and refugees need to be at the table and have a say in the policies that affect their lives and the larger communities they are part of. Municipal officials should also draw on the energy, ideas, and work of community-based nonprofit organizations as well as the leadership and support of philanthropy, business, education, faith-based, and other institutions. Only by working together across levels of government and across public and private sectors can we make sure that the incorporation of newcomers continues to contribute to the nation’s economic vitality, its civic and political health, and its cultural diversity.

“immigrants and refugees need to be at the table and have a say in the policies that affect their lives and the larger communities they are part of”

The first essay in this symposium provides an important quantitative overview of how U.S. municipal governments are responding to immigrants and refugees. Abigail Fisher Williamson surveyed elected and appointed officials from over 1,000 towns and cities nationwide to measure their formal laws and informal practices aimed at, or disproportionately affecting, immigrants. She finds that most municipalities comply with federal law. And while many municipalities are inactive (doing nothing either to welcome or restrict immigrants), those that are proactive are more likely to accommodate than rebuff newcomers. Her important descriptive data provides a first step to better understanding what shapes municipal responses to immigrants and their effect on immigrants and a host of incorporation outcomes.

The second essay, by Marie Provine, Scott Decker, Paul Lewis, and Monica Varsanyi looks at local police practices vis-à-vis immigrants. Using their rich quantitative and qualitative research on police departments and sheriff’s offices nationwide, they ask whether the Trump administration can count on the cooperation of local law enforcement personnel to help with the interior enforcement of federal immigration law. All in all, they expect Trump to face notable barriers here, including the widespread use of community policing practices, officer autonomy and discretion, and the lack of incen-
tives for local law enforcement to follow federal immigration directives. Their essay underscores that America’s strong tradition of federalism offers some important protections from an increasingly incursive federal immigration enforcement apparatus.

The next essay by Tom K. Wong analyzes the effect of county-level sanctuary policies on crime and the local economy. He uses a unique Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) dataset to measure how counties with and without so-called sanctuary policies fare on a range of social and economic indicators. His analysis shows that sanctuary counties have lower crime rates and stronger economies compared to non-sanctuary counties. This essay shows the power that empirical evidence can have in the debate about interior immigration and immigrant integration in the United States.

In the fourth essay, Cathy Yang Liu and Xi Huang take a look at another tool that local policymakers have to influence immigrant integration and overall community well-being, with a focus on programs in new immigrant destinations aimed at promoting immigrant entrepreneurship. Given the relative newness of immigration to these municipalities, where institutional structures and community support for immigrants and refugees are still evolving, they identify the barriers that still stand in the way of immigrants’ successful entrepreneurship and municipalities’ long-term goal of economic development. This essay shows not only the creative endeavors that new immigrant destinations are undertaking in attempts to harness the economic potential of newcomers for the benefit of all, but it also highlights the limits of such endeavors in policy environments that are notably more challenging than those in many established immigrant destinations.

In the final essay, Ron Hayduk and Kathleen Coll take a look at yet another distinct issue area where certain municipalities are pushing the agenda on immigrant integration, namely local voting rights for immigrants. While voting rights for noncitizen immigrants were common in the United States during the 19th century, today only a dozen mostly progressive municipalities allow them to vote in local elections. How these rights were secured and how they are implemented varies across municipalities, underscoring the importance of local context in campaigns for immigrant voting rights. The essay also underscores the role of immigrants and civil society organizations in framing the debate and pushing politicians and voters to reconsider the established link between voting and formal U.S. citizenship.

I hope you will enjoy reading these essays as much as I did. They provide an excellent introduction to the interesting research that U.S.-focused scholars are doing on the municipal politics and policies of immigration and immigrant integration. Much more of this research is needed, along with more comparative work that places the U.S. experience in conversation with the immigration and integration work of municipal governments in Canada, Europe, and elsewhere. I hope these essays will generate more interest in local-level research and spark conversations among students and scholars, including on what kinds of data to use, how to go about analyzing these data, how to de-
velop theories that better explain municipal (in)action on immigration and integration issues, and how to use this research to influence current policy debates.

Please direct inquiries about the Symposium’s Introductory article to Els de Graauw (Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu).
Measuring Local Government Context of Reception through the 2016 Municipal Responses to Immigrants Survey

By Abigail Fisher Williamson,1 Trinity College

Introduction

As immigrants have dispersed away from traditional gateways over the past thirty years, U.S. towns and cities of all sizes have become home to immigrant residents. Today, more than 8,000 U.S. localities are at least 5 percent foreign born. In two-thirds of U.S. localities with more than 50,000 residents, at least one in ten residents is an immigrant (American Community Survey 2009-2013). Yet immigrant destination towns and cities receive limited and mixed information from the federal government on how to respond to immigrant residents. Local governments must provide certain services to immigrants, such as K-12 public education and language access to services, but federal policies also increasingly obligate local participation in immigration enforcement through programs like Secure Communities. This sparse and conflicting federal guidance has contributed to a wide array of local government responses to immigrants, with some places actively welcoming immigrants and others actively restricting them. In this piece, I describe a large survey of municipal responses to immigrants and demonstrate its potential to inform our understanding of these responses and their effects on immigrants and the communities in which they live. Specifically, the survey indicates that U.S. immigrant destinations are much more likely to accommodate than restrict immigrants and suggests that federal and state policies that support serving immigrants play a critical role in fostering accommodating local government responses.

The Need for a Survey of Municipal Responses

A variety of case studies has documented local government responses to immigrants and their effects (de Graauw 2016; Frasure-Yokley 2015; Jones-Correa 2008; Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Marrow 2011; Mollenkopf and Pastor 2017; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). Drawing on a limited number of formal immigration-related ordinances, quantitative analyses have explored the factors associated with more and less restrictive municipal responses to immigrants (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Steil and Vasi 2014; Walker and Leitner 2011). While these approaches provide valuable insights, they tend to direct attention toward towns on the extremes of local responses, without providing information on the overall landscape of municipal responses.

1 Support for this project was provided by The Pew Charitable Trusts. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Pew Charitable Trusts. The author thanks Shanna Weitz, Raekwon Wheeler, and Brooke Williams for their research assistance.
A far-reaching, standardized measurement of local government responses to immigrants offers the opportunity not only to describe the overall landscape, but also to more comprehensively examine what factors shape municipal reception of immigrants and how municipal reception affects outcomes for immigrants and the communities in which they live and work.

The Municipal Responses to Immigrants Survey 2016

With these goals in mind, the 2016 Municipal Responses to Immigrants Survey (MRIS16) solicited information from a stratified random sample of 1,003 U.S. towns and cities with a population of at least 5,000, which were at least 5 percent foreign-born. Since these places range from small villages to the largest cities in the country but share the characteristic of having non-trivial foreign-born populations, I will refer to them collectively as “immigrant destinations.” Previous studies demonstrate that responses to immigrants can vary across officials within a given immigrant destination (Jones-Correa 2008; Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Marrow 2011). Therefore, the MRIS16 is the first national survey of its kind to include both appointed and elected officials in each destination—specifically, the police chief, the city manager (or a high-ranking appointed official), the mayor, and a randomly selected city councilor. Previous studies also indicate that while few localities have passed formal ordinances, many implement informal practices that are either aimed at immigrants or disproportionately impact them (Lewis et al. 2013; Varsanyi 2010). Consequently, the MRIS16 drew on the literature and extensive fieldwork in immigrant destinations nationwide (Williamson 2017a) to ask about formal and informal responses to immigrants, officials’ views about the role of local government in responding to immigrants, and officials’ perceptions of immigrants’ local contributions.

“the MRIS16 is the first national survey of its kind to include both appointed and elected officials in each destination”

From February-May 2016, the multi-modal mail and web survey received responses from 1,400 officials across 814 immigrant destinations nationwide. Overall, the MRIS16 attracted responses from 81 percent of destinations surveyed and 35 percent of the officials surveyed, response rates that compare favorably with other recent surveys of organizational executives and exceed recent response rates for elected officials (Baruch and Holtom 2008; Butler and Dynes 2016; Cycyota and Harrison 2006; Lewis

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2 Ramakrishnan and Lewis (2005) surveyed mayors, city councilors, police chiefs, and planning directors in Californian immigrant destinations. Since then, Lewis and his colleagues (2013) have conducted two surveys of law enforcement officials in immigrant destinations nationwide. Rubaii-Barrett (2008) surveyed U.S. members of the International City and County Managers Association. Williams (2013) surveyed police officials and library directors in destinations nationwide. Where possible, the MRIS16 draws on previously validated questions from these surveys.

3 The survey was administered by the University of Virginia’s Center for Survey Research.

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
et al. 2013). Responding officials reflect the demographic characteristics of municipal officials nationwide (ICMA 2012). Responding destinations likewise do not differ from non-responding destinations with respect to demographic or partisan characteristics, with the exception of the fact that non-responding destinations are modestly wealthier with respect to median income and home values (Williamson 2017b). The descriptive results presented here are weighted back to the sample frame, such that the proportions reported represent the landscape of responses across immigrant destinations greater than 5,000 nationwide.\(^4\)

### The Landscape of Municipal Response: Ample Accommodation, Rare Restriction

Municipal responses can be compliant with federal requirements for serving immigrant residents, or they can go beyond federal requirements, whether in the direction of accommodation or restriction. Because municipalities operate within federal constraints, federal mandates—such as the requirement to provide English language learning classes in public schools—serve as a useful baseline for comparison and distinguish merely compliant responses from proactively accommodating or restrictive responses. Beyond compliance, accommodating responses are those that aim to increase immigrants’ presence or opportunities, while restrictive responses are those that aim to diminish them (Williamson 2017a). The MRIS16 finds that U.S. immigrant destinations are largely compliant with federal requirements and that when destinations take independent action, they are much more likely to accommodate than to restrict immigrants.

One example is municipal responses with respect to language access for non-English speakers. Federal civil rights regulations require that local governments receiving federal funding and serving substantial non-English speaking populations provide translation and interpretation that allow this population to access public services.\(^5\) Given that this requirement rests on the size of the linguistic minority population, we would ex-

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4 Specifically, the data is weighted back to the sample frame on the basis of population size, median household income, region, and residence in a Canadian or Mexican border state. The weighted data matches the sample frame on a wide variety of demographic and contextual characteristics.

5 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin. Because language is often directly tied to national origin, this provision has been interpreted to require that federal fund recipients provide language access (Lau v. Nichols, 1974). An executive order issued in 2000 further requires that federal agencies devise plans that allow limited English proficient (LEP) populations to “meaningfully access” services (Executive Order No. 13166).
pect that if U.S. destinations were largely compliant with federal requirements, as the foreign-born population in a locality increased, it would be more likely to provide translation and interpretation assistance.

*Figure 1. Frequency of Translating Informational Materials by Proportion Foreign Born (FB)*

As Figure 1 displays, indeed, this is the case. The MRIS16 asked officials how often informational materials provided at city hall or in the police department were translated into non-English languages. As the first column of Figure 1 indicates, nationwide, 28 percent of immigrant destinations are translating materials often to always, while 43 percent of destinations are translating materials only upon request or less often. Among immigrant destinations that are more than 20 percent foreign-born, however, 54 percent translate materials often or always, while only 16 percent provide translations only upon request or less frequently. While not all immigrant destinations are readily providing translation of written materials, destinations with more immigrants are more likely to do so.

The same holds true for interpretation. The overwhelming majority of cities report some form of formal interpretation capacity, whether having a bilingual employee or
contracting with a translation service. Overall, only 11 percent of cities report that they rely exclusively on residents’ family or friends to interpret. In cities that are more than 20 percent foreign born, only 5 percent report relying exclusively on residents’ kin for interpretation.

Beyond compliance with these federal mandates, very few destinations are actively restricting language access. Only 1 percent report an “English-only” or “official English” policy. In contrast, many destinations are actively accommodating with respect to language access. Nearly half (47 percent) report that they have implemented hiring practices to attract bilingual candidates, such as providing additional compensation for these employees.

The example of language access parallels the overall landscape of municipal responses to the foreign born—immigrant destinations are largely compliant with federal law, though some remain inactive; where they go above and beyond requirements or where they innovate, they tend to accommodate rather than to restrict. Indeed, while cases of restrictive municipal ordinances in places like Hazleton (PA) were prominent in 2006-2007, such ordinances are rarer today and many have been scaled back in response to advocacy and court action (Williamson 2017a). In 2016, no more than 3 percent of immigrant destinations reported having passed any of these formal restrictive ordinances, with the exception of ordinances requiring municipal contractors to use E-Verify, which were reported by 14 percent of destinations. Of course, some destinations implement ordinances ostensibly unrelated to immigrants that nonetheless disproportionately impact them, such as day labor and certain zoning policies (Varsanyi 2010). Yet the MRIS16 suggests that even this type of “backdoor” restriction is not prevalent. Among destinations that reported problems with housing, including code violations and overcrowding, only 16 percent said they had passed zoning policies in response to immigration.

In contrast, efforts to accommodate immigrants are far more prevalent. The MRIS16 asked local officials about a range of practices aimed at engaging immigrants in local government, supporting immigrant organizations, providing services to immigrants, and informing the public about immigrants. Among the most prevalent practices, 60 percent of immigrant destinations nationwide report that they have hired immigrants or co-ethnics in local government. Nearly half (49 percent) report that have recruited immigrants or co-ethnics to serve on local boards or commissions. Forty-four percent

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6 Subsequent systematic examination of the 92 destinations reporting an E-Verify ordinance found evidence of a formal policy in only 10 of 92 destinations, while an additional 29 destinations included E-Verify clauses in at least some contracts. For the remaining majority of destinations reporting an E-Verify policy, they may have been referring to state policies or use of E-Verify in local government hiring and not among contractors.
say they provide in-kind support to immigrant organizations, such as allowing the use of municipal facilities free of charge (though only 19 percent say they fund immigrant organizations directly). Forty-one percent say they partner with local nonprofit organizations to provide services to immigrants, while 20 percent say they have restructured local social services to better serve immigrants.

Overall, 84 percent of immigrant destinations have implemented at least one accommodating practice and 56 percent have implemented three or more such practices. In contrast, less than a third of destinations (31 percent) has implemented any restrictive practices and only 9 percent have implemented more than one such practice. Arguably, however, some of the accommodating practices—such as holding events that celebrate immigrants—are easier to implement than a restrictive ordinance or zoning policy. With this potential imbalance in mind, I created indexes of restriction and accommodation taking into account only responses to immigrants that go beyond federal requirements and require some degree of collective decision-making and deliberation. The indexes represent the proportion of these more challenging restrictive or accommodating practices that a destination implemented given the number of such practices it was asked about. To set a harder test for my claim that local governments tend toward accommodation, these indexes include all of the restrictive responses measured on the survey, but only a subset of accommodating responses that meets this higher bar.

“Overall, 84 percent of immigrant destinations have implemented at least one accommodating practice and 56 percent have implemented three or more such practices”

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7 Further detail on the composition of these indexes is available from the author.

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As Figure 2 depicts, even with respect to these harder-to-implement practices, destinations are much more likely to accommodate than restrict. Collectively, 11 percent of destinations reported restrictive responses alone, while more than a third of destinations (34 percent) reported accommodating responses alone. An additional 19 percent reported a mix of accommodation and restriction, though of these a majority were more accommodating than restrictive. Overall, 19 percent of destinations were more restrictive than accommodating when taking into account only these strenuous accommodating policies, while 45 percent were more accommodating than restrictive.

That said, Figure 2 also makes clear that many immigrant destinations—a plurality of 36 percent—have not implemented any of these more rigorous responses. Nearly half of these somewhat inactive destinations have implemented some of the less strenuous accommodating practices, but they have not taken substantial collective action either on behalf of or in opposition to immigrants, suggesting the importance of understanding the effects of municipal inaction on immigrant incorporation.
A Research Agenda for Municipal Responses to Immigrants

In sum, the MRIS16 indicates that U.S. immigrant destinations are substantially more likely to be accommodating toward immigrants than restrictive, though many immigrant destinations have implemented few substantial policies in response to foreign-born residents. This descriptive view of the national landscape of municipal responses is important in itself, but the MRIS16 is perhaps of greater scholarly interest because of the broader questions it allows us to investigate. With local governments playing an increasingly active role in immigrant incorporation efforts, it is crucial to understand both what shapes municipal responses and how these responses shape immigrant and community outcomes.

**Municipal Response as the Dependent Variable**

Since many destinations have not enacted formal immigrant-related policies, the MRIS16 enables examination of factors shaping informal responses to immigrants across a random sample of destinations nationwide. One question of particular interest at this political moment is whether the tenor of state and federal immigration policies shapes a destination’s own responses to immigrants. While previous analyses of the factors shaping formal ordinances have not found state policy climate to be a significant factor in shaping local responses (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Steil and Vasi 2014), when it comes to the survey’s more encompassing measure of formal and informal municipal responses, a more accommodating state policy climate towards immigrants is associated with greater accommodation and less restriction among localities in that state, even when holding constant other salient factors.

Similarly, looking toward federal policies, localities that report the presence of a noticeable refugee population are more likely to implement accommodating policies toward immigrants, holding other factors constant. While localities do not get to choose whether they become refugee resettlement destinations, federal government policies make refugees eligible for a broader range of services than most immigrants upon arrival (Bloemraad 2006). These mandates send a signal to local government officials that refugees are clients of municipal services and involve officials in the work of serving refugees (Marrow 2011). The MRIS16 indicates that experience with accommodating federal refugee policies spills over to developing immigrant-focused infrastructures and political will to serve immigrants more broadly (Williamson 2017a).

These findings that the tenor of state and federal policies impacts local policies suggest that the Trump administration’s stance toward immigration could detract from local efforts to accommodate immigrants. They further suggest that a bottom-up strategy to advance immigrant incorporation may be incomplete if the forces that strongly influence accommodating policies on the local level often come from the top.
Municipal Response as the Independent Variable

Perhaps even more importantly, the MRIS16 offers the potential to better understand how context of reception affects immigrants and their communities. For instance, do differing municipal responses result in different incorporation outcomes for immigrants? To what extent do different kinds of responses to immigrants support or undermine local economic development? And a particularly crucial question in today’s political environment, do differing municipal responses shape local residents’ attitudes toward immigrants? Nationwide, we see growing efforts to spread welcoming practices on the local level, making it all the more crucial to understand which kinds of local responses to immigrants foster both immigrant advancement and public acceptance.

References


Please direct inquiries about “Measuring Local Government Context of Reception through the 2016 Municipal Responses to Immigrants Survey” to Abigail Fisher Williamson (Abigail.Williamson@trincoll.edu).

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Going Local: Cities Confront Immigration Enforcement in the Trump Era

Immigration Federalism in the Context of Local Law Enforcement

This essay addresses the federal government’s attempt to draw cities and local law-enforcement departments more directly into the detection and deportation of unauthorized immigrants. In President Trump’s “new populist” America, national leaders presume a pliant and controlled set of law enforcement agents in the interior of the country doing the bidding of national immigration authorities. This assumption is unrealistic in a country with a strong tradition of federalism, and where there are thousands of relatively autonomous local governments that see themselves as having some control over law enforcement within their boundaries. The strong local commitment to community policing and the desire to address issues in locally sensitive ways also challenge a top-down federal mandate.

Ad hoc, informal partnerships between local law enforcement and federal immigration agents have existed for a long time. In the past, the focus was on deporting mobsters and other presumed dangerous individuals. The federal government’s first serious attempt to formalize and expand these partnerships occurred in 1996, when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). AEDPA provided local authority to arrest previously deported immigrants and IIRIRA invited local law enforcement agencies to help federal agents identify and report immigrants without legal status.

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through its 287(g) program. Given states’ constitutional control over law enforcement, these laws were invitations, rather than mandates, for local law enforcement to become involved in federal immigration enforcement. Relatively speaking, few local agencies took up the federal government’s invitations for training, but police departments in some cities responded to federal incentives to form more issue-specific partnerships targeting gangs and other problem areas.

Under President Obama, the federal government continued to refine its efforts to get more immigration information into local hands and to seek local assistance in detaining suspected violators of immigration laws, but local governments and activists rebuffed many of these efforts. For example, in 2008 the Obama Administration rolled out the Secure Communities program, which mandated information sharing between local jails and the federal immigration databases. However, resistance to this program was pronounced in localities across the United States. Though the Obama Administration claimed that it was “going after the bad guys,” data collected by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) consistently demonstrated that a significant proportion of immigrants detained as a result of Secure Communities were non-violent offenders; often, they were simply individuals swept up in other law enforcement actions. Despite objections voiced shortly after the program took effect in 2008, it was not until 2014, after a series of lawsuits and many refusals to participate, that the Department of Homeland Security finally acknowledged the need to change course.

Despite the ineffectiveness of earlier efforts and considerable resistance at the state and local levels, President Trump, with the help of the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, is attempting to build on these earlier efforts to engage local police and sheriffs in immigration enforcement, but this time with coercion, not persuasion. The Justice Department now threatens to withdraw federal funds from “sanctuary cities,” and it is using negative publicity in an attempt to shame them into compliance. Resistant cities and police departments are exploring their legal options for resisting these mandates, setting the stage for a new kind of battle over the meaning of federalism in a constitution framed around limited and separated powers. Historically, states have been protagonists in these conflicts. This time, cities and local police agencies are the federal government’s targets, and their constitutional standing is unclear. Cities, unlike states, get no mention in the U.S. Constitution.

To get a sense of how the new initiatives are being developed under the Trump administration, we rely on findings from our recent study of the role of local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement, *Policing Immigrants: Local Law En-

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 forcement on the Front Lines (Chicago, 2016). Our study surveyed police departments and sheriff’s offices nationwide and developed seven in-depth case studies in cities with varying approaches to immigration enforcement. Our findings strongly suggest that the Trump administration will face overwhelming barriers in its attempts to control the local policing of immigration law.

Community Policing

First, and most importantly, employing aggressive methods to target immigrants undermines the norms of community policing that prevail in local law enforcement. Community policing became the dominant approach to local law enforcement after urban riots in the 1970s and 1980s revealed a wide gap between urban communities and their police departments. Law-enforcement agencies—especially police chiefs in cities with diverse populations—began to embrace the idea when they became convinced that effective policing requires the active cooperation and assistance of all local residents, who are asked to offer their eyes and ears in the fight against crime. Gaining the trust and confidence of all law-abiding residents thus became a priority in many policing agencies across the nation. National police organizations like the Major Chiefs Association of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing adopted the concept and practice and have applied them to reject immigration enforcement at the local level. The President’s Task Force stated: “Law enforcement agencies should build relationships based on trust with immigrant communities. This is central to overall public safety.” Our study also revealed broad-based adherence, not just to the concept of community policing, but also to the actions required for its implementation, including bike patrols, community meetings, crime maps, and police participation in neighborhood gatherings. Almost every police department and many sheriff’s offices we surveyed had adopted several of these techniques for staying in touch with residents. In our interviews, law-enforcement leaders uniformly embraced

“law-enforcement leaders uniformly embraced community policing as a key to public safety and gaining the trust of resident immigrants as a priority”

“the norms of community policing… prevail in local law enforcement”

9 Ibid.

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community policing as a key to public safety and gaining the trust of resident immigrants as a priority.

Officer Discretion

A second obstacle in any effort to control how police and sheriffs enforce the law arises from the autonomy officers enjoy in their day-to-day work. As many observers have noted, much law-enforcement activity is discretionary. Police officers, by the nature of their work, must make many decisions quickly and often with limited training, policy or supervision. This is particularly true in immigration enforcement, where the nation as a whole is deeply divided about the proper course of action with resident immigrants who lack legal status or who have committed crimes.

The lack of clear policy guidance, especially in an area as controversial as immigration control, creates a wide space for law-enforcement officers and other street-level bureaucrats to make decisions that can either propel an immigrant toward deportation or offer a pass. Often local law enforcement encounters unauthorized immigrants as victims, which necessarily complicates enforcement issues. Difficult questions arise about whether to arrest possible victims of human trafficking, how to deal with undocumented children and their parents, whether to detain undocumented witnesses of crime, how to identify and respond to victims of sex trafficking or how to respond to domestic violence involving immigrants without legal status. Neither government nor law enforcement leaders have provided a playbook to guide officers as they face these real-life situations. Indeed, our study showed that, except among the largest cities, relatively few local law-enforcement agencies had provided training or written guidelines for their officers regarding interactions with immigrants.

Our research found evidence of agreement among street-level personnel about the desirability of calibrating immigration enforcement to the seriousness of the crime. We asked chiefs and sheriffs to estimate under which specific scenarios their personnel would be likely to call in federal immigration agents. The spectrum ran from incidents of violent crime to shoplifting and reporting witnesses and victims of crime. We found a rough consensus that the

“involvement in crime, arrests, and imprisonment are all lower for new immigrants, regardless of status, than U.S. citizens”

“except among the largest cities, relatively few local law-enforcement agencies had provided training or written guidelines for their officers regarding interactions with immigrants”


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more violent the crime, the more appropriate it would be to inform federal officials. But
even the scenario in which an immigrant victim comes forward to report a crime evoked
a small percentage of responses favoring contacting immigration authorities.

Lack of Incentives

A third issue concerns incentives. Federal, state, and local governments each answer to
different constituencies, mandates, and funding priorities. The federal government has
always prioritized its own concerns, most recently with achieving high, and unprece-
dented, numbers of deportations. In cities and towns, on the other hand, costs, public
safety, and economic development, sometimes through immigrant labor, are the rele-
vant concerns. To blur functions between the federal and local levels is bound to pro-
voke resistance in some places. One of the police chiefs we interviewed put it this way:
“"I thought, you know, if we’re breaking down doors looking for immigrants, how in the
world are we going to get information on the bad guys? You know? A lot [of immigrants]
don’t trust us to begin with, and then if we’re starting to kick doors down and looking for
green cards, you know, it makes it even harder. So, my thought process was, "Wait a
minute, this is a federal issue. We’ll continue to do our job and let the federal govern-
ment do their job."”

These sentiments are not shared by everyone,
as police chiefs and sheriffs of small- or medium-
sized departments are often more amenable to fed-
eral partnerships to enforce immigration law. Even in
places amenable to federal priorities, however, local
politics strongly influence how programs will be im-
plemented. At its peak, for example, there were more
287(g) agreements between the federal government
and law-enforcement agencies in North Carolina than
in any other state. This emphasis arose less from the
immigration challenges North Carolina was facing at
the time than from local political pressures and preferences. Our study found that the
conservatism of local voters was one of the most telling predictors of how aggressively
city and county police agencies engaged in immigration enforce-
ment.”

11 Chief Roger Maclean, Allentown, Pennsylvania Police Department. Interview with authors, August
2009.

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Promoting Immigrant Integration

Finally, the renewed emphasis on enforcement delays the long-standing need to educate the public about both the costs and the benefits of immigration, and to engage with and promote productive integration strategies at the local level. The entanglement of police and sheriffs in detecting unauthorized immigrants has sent a particularly powerful negative message to new immigrant communities, helping to cast these newcomers as quasi-criminals with no place in American society. The extent to which these residents contribute labor, form families, and participate in civic life tends to receive little public attention. Long-standing and consistent research findings demonstrate that new immigrant groups are not disproportionately involved in crime or criminal behavior. Indeed, involvement in crime, arrests, and imprisonment are all lower for new immigrants, regardless of status, than U.S. citizens.

Education, health services, and housing are important concerns in the places that new immigrants settle. Neglect of these issues has helped to frame immigration as a burden imposed by the federal government on local governments. In this pernicious atmosphere, immigrant advocacy groups and nongovernmental organizations are forced into a defensive posture, focusing on the hardships of deportation rather than the powerful integrative role they could otherwise play.\(^\text{12}\)

Conclusion

In *Policing Immigrants*, we noted the emergence of a “problematic policy patchwork” in the realm of state and local immigration enforcement: a number of states and localities were implementing policies and practices that were discriminatory towards immigrant residents, while others—even neighboring jurisdictions—were promoting pro-immigrant policies. Despite the presence of pro-immigrant communities, the confusion created by this patchwork led to a downward spiral of trust between immigrant communities and the police, as immigrants in areas with conflicting practices and policies were more likely to avoid all local law enforcement officers for fear of being detained. The current decade has produced considerable variation in the response to immigration. Not all of the patchwork’s consequences are problematic. The ability to tailor a response to local circumstances is a great benefit of our federal system. The patchwork allows local jurisdictions to craft responses that accommodate local issues, capabilities, and histories, and in doing so, these localities can serve again as “laboratories of democracy,” as opposed


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What is needed is a broadly shared sense that immigrants and their children who have settled in the United States have a legitimate claim to remain. An enforcement policy that acknowledges the need to accept long-term unauthorized residents as legitimate members of the American community, combined with federal policy that respects community policing, are key elements for going forward. The fact that such individuals are important contributors to the economic, social, and community well-being of American society is at the heart of this argument. This means that federal engagement of local police and sheriffs must be limited to cases where the threat to public safety and security is real. To do otherwise is to reshape the mission of local police and sheriffs, which raises constitutional and political issues that should be avoided in a robust federal system. Such an approach also undermines trust in local law enforcement, a key element in engaging communities and enhancing public safety and community cohesion.

These broad principles, however, leave a lot of room for policy development. To achieve a comprehensive approach to immigration enforcement in the nation’s interior, all relevant parties should be involved, and sub-national participation should be codified in some admissions decisions, as occurs in Canada. The relevant participants should include, at a minimum, law enforcement agencies at all levels, representatives of immigrants’ rights groups, municipal leaders familiar with immigrant integration issues, and academic and think-tank scholars who can provide relevant insights and research. The federal government, whether through executive action or congressional legislation, should not attempt to resolve the policy paradox of interior enforcement by itself. The immigration-related challenges faced by local law enforcement make this an appropriate time for a new national commission to develop policy recommendations in the context of continued immigration in a changing, challenging, and increasingly globalized environment.

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13 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis coined the phrase “laboratories of democracy” in 1932 to highlight the potential for states “to try novel and social experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” In the 2000s, the majority of state and local action in immigration was fairly discriminatory in nature, so legal scholar Michael Wishnie claimed that we were entering an era in which the states were now acting as “laboratories of bigotry.”

The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy

By Tom K. Wong, University of California, San Diego

Introduction

As the Trump administration has begun to implement its immigration policy agenda, the issue of local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement officials is back in the spotlight. Using an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) dataset obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, the analyses here provide new insights about how so-called sanctuary counties perform across a range of social and economic indicators when compared to non-sanctuary counties.

In this analysis, we define sanctuary counties as counties that do not assist federal immigration enforcement officials by holding undocumented immigrants in custody beyond the date when they would otherwise be entitled to release (i.e., ICE detainers). We statistically match counties based on demographic characteristics and then compare sanctuary counties to non-sanctuary counties to better understand the impacts that sanctuary policies have on a local jurisdiction.

The data are clear. Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. Moreover, economies are stronger in sanctuary counties—from higher median household income, less poverty, less reliance on public assistance, higher labor force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower unemployment—compared to non-sanctuary counties.

Sanctuary Jurisdictions, Detainers, and Notifications

To what extent should local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) be required to assist federal immigration enforcement officials? For over a decade, local law enforcement executives have argued against assisting federal immigration enforcement agencies such as ICE. According to a report issued by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, “state and local law enforcement should not be involved in the enforcement of civil im-

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15 The author thanks the Immigrant Legal Resource Center for providing the underlying FOIA data on sanctuary counties for this analysis. He also thanks Philip E. Wolgin and Tom Jawetz of the Center for American Progress, Melissa Keaney of the National Immigration Law Center, and Lena Graber of the Immigrant Legal Resource Center for their comments and advice. He also thanks Sebastian Navarro, Anjleena Sahni, and Kate Panian for their research assistance. A version of this analysis was published by the Center for American Progress and can be found at: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-effects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy.

migration laws since such involvement would likely have a chilling effect on both legal and illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investigations.”\(^\text{17}\) The Major Cities Chiefs Association, which represents the sixty-eight largest LEAs in the United States, similarly concluded that commingling the work of local police with federal immigration enforcement efforts “would result in increased crime against immigrants and in the broader community, create a class of silent victims and eliminate the potential for assistance from immigrants in solving crimes or preventing future terrorist acts.”\(^\text{18}\) Assisting in federal immigration enforcement efforts can drive a wedge between local law enforcement officials and the communities they serve, which undermines public safety. Still, the debate over whether localities should engage in federal immigration enforcement remains unsettled.

One of the ways that localities become entangled in federal immigration enforcement is through an Immigration Detainer (ICE Form I-247D).\(^\text{19}\) A detainer is a request that a LEA detain a person for up to 48 additional hours after his or her release date so that ICE can decide whether to take the person into custody for immigration detention and removal proceedings. Detainers were widely used in the now defunct Secure Communities program,\(^\text{20}\) which ended in 2014, and they continue to be used in the successor Priority Enforcement Program.\(^\text{21}\)

When former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson ended Secure Communities, he stated, “A number of federal courts have rejected the authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to detain immigrants pursuant to federal detainers issued under the current Secure Communities program.”\(^\text{22}\) Indeed, a series of court decisions have ruled that the use of detainers violates Fourth Amendment and due process rights.\(^\text{23}\) For example, in *Galarza v. Szalcyzk*,\(^\text{24}\) a man was held under a detainer for three days after he posted bail despite having a driver’s license and social security card, and telling police that he was born in New Jersey. The man was released only when ICE confirmed that he was an American citizen. He subsequently filed a civil rights suit against the United States, the City of Allentown (PA), and Lehigh County (PA) challenging his unlawful detention. After positive rulings by the federal dis-

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\(^\text{20}\) [https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities](https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities)

\(^\text{21}\) [http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/432](http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/432)

\(^\text{22}\) [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf)


strict court and the court of appeals, he settled for nearly $150,000 in damages. Other similar lawsuits have proven costly for the jurisdictions that have held people on detainers.25

The sanctuary jurisdictions analyzed here are defined as counties that ICE has identified, beginning mostly in January 2014, as not willing to accept detainers. In the dataset, ICE codes 2,492 counties by their “Current Detainer/Notification Acceptance Status.”26 These counties account for 92.2 percent of the total U.S. population and 95.3 percent of the total foreign-born population in the United States. Of the 2,492 counties coded by ICE, 608 are defined as sanctuary jurisdictions.

Data and Method

The analyses begin by comparing all sanctuary counties to all non-sanctuary counties in the ICE dataset across a range of social and economic indicators with an eye on identifying statistically significant differences. Data on crime comes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.27 Data on economic indicators comes from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates.28

Next, the analysis pushes further by using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to statistically match sanctuary counties to non-sanctuary counties.29 CEM is a method for improving causal inferences that estimates the Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (SATT). In words, CEM statistically matches sanctuary counties to comparable

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25 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. R.I.), affirmed on appeal, 2015 WL4385945 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment claim where she was held for 24 hours on an ICE detainer issued without probable cause); Galarza v. Szolczyk, No. 10-6815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *10, *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (unpub.) (holding that where plaintiff was held for 3 days after posting bail based on an ICE detainer, he stated a Fourth Amendment claim against both federal and local defendants; it was clearly established that the “detainer caused a seizure” that must be supported by “probable cause”), reversed on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the County operating the jail, too, may be liable for violating the Fourth Amendment); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 12-02317, 2014 WL 1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s detention on an ICE detainer after she would otherwise have been released “constituted a new arrest, and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment;” and resulting in a settlement in the amount of $30,100); Mendoza v. Osterberg, No. 13-65, 2014 WL 3784141, at *6 (D. Neb. July 31, 2014) (recognizing that “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person,” and thus, “[i]n order to issue a detainer[,] there must be probable cause”) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citations omitted); Villars v. Kubitowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment claim where he was held on an ICE detainer that “lacked probable cause,” and resulting in settlement as to local defendants); Uroza v. Salt Lake County, No. 11-713, 2013 WL 653968, at *5-6 (D. Ut. Feb. 21, 2013) (holding that plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment claim where ICE issued his detainer without probable cause; finding it clearly established that “immigration enforcement agents need probable cause to arrest . . . [and] detainees who post bail should be set free in the absence of probable cause to detain them again,” and resulting in settlement as to local defendants in amount of $75,000).

26 After data cleaning and removing duplicates.

27 https://ucr.fbi.gov


non-sanctuary counties, compares differences in outcomes between sanctuary counties and the matched (and weighted) non-sanctuary counties, allows us to evaluate these differences while controlling for differences in population, the foreign-born percentage of the population, and the percentage of the population that is Latino, and then uses the results of the analysis to estimate the effect that being a sanctuary county has on crime and the economy.

Findings

Crime

Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. Crime is defined here as the total number of violent crimes (murders, rapes, robberies, and assaults) and property crimes (burglaries, larceny, motor vehicle thefts, and arsons) per 10,000 people. The data indicates that crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties in large central metro counties, small metro counties, micropolitan counties, and noncore (rural) counties. Large central metro counties show the most pronounced difference. Large central metro sanctuary counties have 65.4 crimes fewer per 10,000 people than large central metro non-sanctuary counties.

Perhaps more importantly, the results of the CEM analysis show that crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, including total population and the foreign-born percentage of the population. The results of the CEM analysis show that there are on average 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people in sanctuary counties, and this result is highly statistically significant.

Median Household Income

Median household income is statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. This holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications. The results of the CEM analysis show that median household income is on average $4,352.70 higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant.

“There is…no evidence to suggest that income gains in sanctuary counties accrue to Latinos at the expense of Whites”
shows that White median household income is statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. This also holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications. The results of the CEM analysis show that White median household income is on average $2,836.10 higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant.

On the other hand, while Latino median household income is generally higher in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties, these differences are not statistically significant. There is thus no evidence to suggest that income gains in sanctuary counties accrue to Latinos at the expense of Whites. A closer look at the data also shows no evidence that incomes gains in sanctuary counties accrue to Latinos at the expense of African Americans, as median household income for African Americans is also generally higher in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties.

**Poverty and Reliance on Public Assistance**

Consistent with higher median household income, the data also show that poverty is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties, and this generally holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications.

Beginning with total poverty, the results of the CEM analysis show that the percentage of people who live at or below the federal poverty line is on average 2.3 percent lower in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant. Moreover, White poverty is on average 1.4 percent lower in sanctuary counties and Latino poverty is on average 2.9 percent lower in sanctuary counties.

Relatedly, there is significantly less reliance on public assistance in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. Public benefits usage—whether it is the percentage of households that receive food stamps/SNAP, the percentage of households that receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or the percentage of children under 18 who live in households that receive public assistance—is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties, and this generally holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications.

Beginning with food stamps/SNAP, the results of the CEM analysis show that the percentage of households that receive food stamps/SNAP is on average 2.6 percent lower in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant. The percentage of households that receive SSI is on average 0.9 percent lower in sanctuary counties and
the percentage of children under 18 in households that receive public assistance is on average 4.9 percent lower in sanctuary counties.

*Labor Force Participation and (Un)employment Statistics*

Another indicator of a strong local economy is labor force participation. The labor force participation rate is defined as the proportion of the population that is 16 years and over that is in the labor force, meaning working or are actively looking for a job.

The labor force participation rate is statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties. This generally holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications. The results of the CEM analysis show that the labor force participation rate is on average 2.5 percent higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant.

Unpacking the data again shows that higher labor force participation rates are driven by Whites. The results of the CEM analysis show that White labor force participation is on average 2.5 percent higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant.

The results for Latino labor force participation are more nuanced. Higher Latino labor force participation is generally concentrated in smaller sanctuary counties compared to smaller non-sanctuary counties. For example, Latino labor force participation is 5.2 percent higher in noncore (rural) sanctuary counties compared to noncore (rural) non-sanctuary counties. However, Latino labor force participation is 2.7 percent lower in large central metro sanctuary counties compared to large central metro non-sanctuary counties. Given the differences in Latino labor force participation across small and large counties, the average effect obtained in the CEM analysis is that Latino labor force participation is 1.2 percent higher in sanctuary counties, but this result only borders on statistical significance.

The employment-to-population ratio is another indicator of a strong local economy. The employment-to-population ratio is the number of people 16 years and over who are employed divided by the total number of people 16 years and over.

“this much is clear: crime is lower and economies are stronger in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties”

The results when analyzing the employment-to-population ratio mirror the trends we see in the data when it comes to labor force participation. More specifically, the employment-to-population ratio is statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties...

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30 [http://www.census.gov/people/laborforce/about/acs_employ.html](http://www.census.gov/people/laborforce/about/acs_employ.html)
31 [https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS12300000](https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS12300000)

[http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home](http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home)
compared to non-sanctuary counties. This generally holds true across the entire range of urban-rural classifications. The results of the CEM analysis show that the employment-to-population ratio is on average 3.1 percent higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics, and this result is highly statistically significant.

Unpacking the data again shows that higher employment-to-population ratios are driven by Whites. The results of the CEM analysis show that the White employment-to-population ratio is on average 3.2 percent higher in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics and this result is highly statistically significant. The results for the Latino employment-to-population ratio are generally statistically insignificant.

Unemployment—whether measured by total unemployment or White unemployment—is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to non-sanctuary counties.

Beginning with the total unemployment, the results of the CEM analysis show that the unemployment rate is on average 1.1 percent lower in sanctuary counties when statistically matching and then controlling for population characteristics and this result is highly statistically significant. The White unemployment rate is on average 0.8 percent lower in sanctuary counties. The data indicate that the Latino unemployment rate is on average 1.0 percent higher in sanctuary counties, which again suggests that the economic gains to sanctuary counties do not accrue to Latinos at the expense of Whites.

Conclusion

As the interior immigration enforcement debate in the United States continues, it is increasingly important that political scientists, whenever possible, bring empirical evidence to the table during these discussions. As this analysis shows, this much is clear: crime is lower and economies are stronger in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties.

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32 [http://www.census.gov/people/laborforce/about/acs_employ.html](http://www.census.gov/people/laborforce/about/acs_employ.html)

[http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home](http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home)
Appendix of Results

Table 1 reports the results of the CEM analysis for all of the indicators described in this report.

Table 1. CEM Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>SATT</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate</td>
<td>-35.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>4352.7</td>
<td>575.1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income—White, non-Latino</td>
<td>2836.1</td>
<td>568.3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income—Latino</td>
<td>1328.9</td>
<td>736.4</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-2.337</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty—White, non-Latino</td>
<td>-1.361</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty—Latino</td>
<td>-2.966</td>
<td>.721</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamps/SNAP</td>
<td>-2.559</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>-0.879</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children Under 18 in Households w/Public Assistance</td>
<td>-4.967</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation</td>
<td>2.456</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation—White, non-Latino</td>
<td>2.546</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Participation—Latino</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-to-Population Ratio</td>
<td>3.103</td>
<td>.369</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-to-Population Ratio—White, non-Latino</td>
<td>3.165</td>
<td>.359</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-to-Population Ratio—Latino</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-1.056</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment—White, non-Latino</td>
<td>-.829</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment—Latino</td>
<td>1.015</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: SATT refers to the sample average treatment effect on the treated. SE refers to the standard errors. All replication data are available upon request.

Please direct inquiries about “The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy” to Tom K. Wong (tomkwong@ucsd.edu).
Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Local Policy Responses in New Immigrant Destinations

Cathy Yang Liu, Georgia State University
Xi Huang, Georgia State University

Introduction

In recent years, a growing number of U.S. localities have adopted a combination of immigrant welcoming, integration, and economic development initiatives that seek to leverage immigrant resources for local development. This new wave of policies rose in the context of federal inaction and localized activism on immigration matters (Varsanyi 2008). Since the beginning of the 21st century, a few hundred immigration policies have been proposed and/or implemented (Walker and Leitner 2011). These local ordinances mainly center on the issue of undocumented immigrants and are predominantly restrictive in nature. However, the desire to revitalize local economies in the face of the Great Recession has triggered pro-immigration initiatives across localities. This trend is particularly salient in Rust Belt cities where decades of staggering growth have compounded their economic struggles.

Local leaders attempt to use strategies such as attracting immigrant talent and investment, developing the immigrant workforce, and promoting immigrant entrepreneurship to help revitalize the local communities. However, unlike long-standing immigrant destinations such as New York and Los Angeles, the institutional structures and community support in the new destinations for immigrant entrepreneurship are still evolving (Wang and Li 2007). In this context, this piece strives to provide a systematic review of immigrant integration efforts proposed or implemented in the new immigrant destinations with the focus on programs aimed at promoting immigrant entrepreneurship. In doing so, we identify gaps in the local environment for immigrant business and room for future program improvement.

Immigrants are highly entrepreneurial. While immigrants constitute 13 percent of the national population, they make up 18 percent of small business owners (Kallick 2012). They also represent 25 percent of all new business owners (Fairlie and Lofstrom 2015), indicating substantially higher business formation rates than non-immigrants.

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
Self-employment provides an avenue of economic progress for immigrants, especially when they face blocked opportunities in formal employment (Light 1972). It also contributes to host economies through expanding employment, increasing diversity, and transforming urban spaces (Fairlie 2012; Kallick 2015; Zhou 2004).

Despite the prevalence of entrepreneurship among immigrants, they face various barriers in businesses creation and expansion (Fairlie 2012; Wainer 2015). Their disadvantages include language barriers, depreciated home country-acquired human capital, lack of social capital, and unfamiliarity with local regulatory systems (Fairlie 2012), which are all strongly related to the institutional context of the host community (Kloosterman, van der Leun, and Rath 1999). To the extent that immigrant entrepreneurship is locally embedded, policies aimed at changing local institutional structures may increase opportunities for the aspirant self-employed immigrant and maximize the untapped economic development potential for this group.

The Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Local Policy Responses

Immigrant entrepreneurship has played an important role in the U.S. economy. From Little Havana in Miami to Chinatown in New York City, entrepreneurship and business ownership provides an alternative route of upward mobility for immigrants as well as a primary source of job creation, innovation, and economic growth (Wilson and Portes 1980; Zhou 1992).

“Many of the nation’s most successful companies, such as Goldman Sachs, Google, Yahoo, and eBay, can trace their origins to immigrant founders”

Most successful companies, such as Goldman Sachs, Google, Yahoo, and eBay, can trace their origins to immigrant founders. According to the 2007 Survey of Business Owner data, immigrant-owned firms generated over $775 billion in revenue, $125 billion in payroll, and $100 billion in income, and employed one out of every ten workers. Immigrant entrepreneurs also contribute significantly to the knowledge economy, having founded about one quarter of engineering and technology companies in the past decade (Wadhwa et al. 2007) and about 16 percent of “high-impact” companies in high-tech industries had at least one immigrant entrepreneur in their founding teams nationwide (Hart and Acs 2011). In addition, immigrant-owned businesses not only serve the local areas by hiring local workers and providing essential goods and services, but they also produce social, physical, and political benefits to surrounding communities (Zhou and Cho 2010; Liu et al. 2014). Moreover, they establish stronger transnational ties in their business operations in terms of exporting, outsourcing, and operating overseas offices (Wang and Liu 2015).
Immigrants’ settlement pattern has expanded over the years, reaching many new destinations across the country (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). As these places have little experience with immigration, the arrival of newcomers poses a challenge to local institutions. While some recent local policies are restrictive in nature, a new wave of welcoming policies arise in the horizon. In the Rust Belt and Midwest regions with population loss and economic decline, many local governments have turned to immigration to fuel economic development (Huang and Liu 2017). For example, local leaders in St. Louis identified the relative shortage of immigrants as a main reason for the region’s slow economic growth, and in response they initiated the St. Louis Mosaic Project to attract and retain immigrants (Strauss 2012). In Detroit, a comprehensive study of the local economy singled out immigration, entrepreneurship, and innovation as potential growth strategies. The resulting Global Detroit, a comprehensive immigrant attraction and retention effort, seeks to revitalize the local Detroit economy by strengthening its global connections (Global Detroit 2015). In Dayton, the city has instituted an immigrant-welcoming initiative that encourages business and entrepreneurship development, increases access to government and social services, and promotes cultural awareness and friendliness in the city (Welcome Dayton 2015).

“[There is] growing local awareness and belief that immigrants and their businesses are critical in reversing further population loss and economic decline for cities in the Rust Belt”

Immigrant Entrepreneurship Development Strategies and Programs

At the core of most local immigrant integration efforts in the new immigrant destinations lies immigrant entrepreneurship development. This reflects growing local awareness and belief that immigrants and their businesses are critical in reversing further population loss and economic decline for cities in the Rust Belt. According to a 2009 study by the Fiscal Policy Institute (Kallick 2009), the ratios of immigrants’ economic output to their population size in cities like Baltimore, Detroit, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Cleveland far exceed the average of the 25 largest metro areas in the country, indicating a disproportionally large economic contribution of the immigrant populations in these regions. Immigrants’ tendency towards entrepreneurship is also higher in many Rust Belt cities than in other metro areas. A 2012 report shows that the ratio of immigrant to non-immigrant entrepreneurship rates was twice as high in Baltimore and Detroit as in New York, San Francisco, and Boston. Other new destinations such as St. Louis, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh also had higher than average immigrant entrepreneurship rates (Kallick 2012). However, as discussed earlier, immigrant business owners tend to face a multitude of barriers that, if left unaddressed, would undermine successful immigrant entrepreneurship and local governments’ long-term goal of economic development. The
barriers we identify include: information gaps, lack of business training, inadequate access to financial capital, and lack of legal status.

Information Gaps

“immigrant business owners tend to face a multitude of barriers… information gaps, lack of business training, inadequate access to financial capital, and lack of legal status”

Many small business owners lack access to critical information concerning existing regulatory requirements of business operation and financing resources (Servon et al. 2010). This is especially true among minority and immigrant business owners given their English language skills and unfamiliarity with local business support services (Fairlie and Lofstrom 2015; Wainer 2015). Most localities host entrepreneurship development programs and assistance centers in community colleges, chambers of commerce, or civil society organizations. These programs and resources, however, are underutilized by immigrant entrepreneurs simply due to immigrants’ unawareness of their existence or fear of inability to understand (Wainer 2015). Many foreign-born business owners are also unaccustomed to the business culture and the regulatory system in the United States. Local governments can take action and develop programs to narrow or bridge these gaps. Modeling after some innovative practices and programs in traditional immigrant gateways, many recent immigrant destinations are in the process of developing interactive startup guide to help ease this process for new business owners. Atlanta, for example, instituted a one-stop shop that centralizes information about various business requirements pertaining to license acquisition, tax law compliance, and other business assistance (Welcoming Atlanta 2017). Other new or pre-immigrant destinations such as Detroit and Baltimore also set up online hubs or physical centers that serve as information clearinghouses for the cities’ business support services, often offering services in multiple languages (Global Detroit 2017).

Lack of Business Training

A related challenge for immigrant business owners is their lack of business training in the United States (Wainer 2015). The business knowledge immigrants acquired in their home countries might not be readily applicable to the U.S. setting. Especially for entrepreneurs who have mostly operated in the informal economy, institutional business experience is either nonexistent or not up to par with U.S. regulatory institutions. Additionally, many small entrepreneurs lack the skills and capacity to expand business beyond their current size or outside the niche market. In response, cities have started to offer

http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home
different types of programs to address these skills and capacity gaps. The first type includes knowledge-based and social capital-based programs that provide business and financial literacy training and programs to help connect immigrant entrepreneurs to local business communities. For example, in Dayton, the Welcome Dayton initiative works with the Minority Business Assistance Center to provide immigrant entrepreneurs with micro-enterprise training on basic business skills, financial management, accounting and taxes, licensing permits, insurance, and other regulatory information (Welcome Dayton 2017). In Philadelphia, the Welcoming Center for New Pennsylvanians offers English training and business workshops to immigrant entrepreneurs and seek to increase immigrant representation in business organizations.

The second type focuses on capacity building of immigrant enterprises, which provides one-on-one assistance customized to each business. Services range from business planning, marketing, hiring, to tax filing and loan packaging. In Louisville, Kentucky, the Office of Globalization launched the Refugees and Immigrants Succeeding in Entrepreneurship (RISE) program, providing individual business counseling and hands-on guidance during the start-up phase of an immigrant enterprise (Louisville Office of Globalization 2017).

**Inadequate Access to Financial Capital**

One of the most important barriers to business startup and growth faced by small business owners including immigrants is inadequate access to financial capital. Data from the 2007 nationally representative Survey of Business Owners (SBO) show that roughly two thirds of small business owners use personal or family savings as their source of startup capital. This share is even higher for immigrant owners (Fairlie 2012). This may be attributable to immigrants’ unfamiliarity and mistrust of formal financial institutions, especially for those who mostly worked on a cash basis back home. Some immigrant business assistance centers described earlier offer training in financial literacy and management, loan packing, and record development to immigrant entrepreneurs. However, these centers usually have limited capacities.

“the financial gap is largely attributable to lack of financing opportunities accessible to immigrant entrepreneurs”

More importantly, the financial gap is largely attributable to lack of financing opportunities accessible to immigrant entrepreneurs (Servon et al. 2010; Wainer 2015). Many conventional financial institutions are unwilling to reach out and serve immigrant entrepreneurs due to immigrants’ lack of liquidity and credit history. In response, some cities have sought to improve the local financing infrastructure beyond the formal sector for immigrant small businesses. Baltimore, for example, initiated BaltimoreMICRO to offer revolving loan funds to small businesses that are unable to secure financing from a
traditional lender. The city is also in the process of establishing a program that helps immigrants build their credit scores (New Americans Task Force 2016). The St. Louis Mosaic Project collaborates with local community development financial institutions to provide micro-lending and asset-building assistance to low- and moderate-income immigrant entrepreneurs (St. Louis Mosaic Project 2017). In Minneapolis, home to a large number of Muslim immigrants from East African countries, the city’s Alternative Financing Program provides local small businesses an alternative and culturally sensitive microfinancing tool that is profit-based, because Islamic law prohibits Muslims from paying interest (City of Minneapolis 2017).

“Lack of legal status not only underlies all the challenges described above but also limits immigrants’ successful integration and potential to contribute to local communities.”

Lack of Legal Status

Legal status represents another critical barrier to business ownership among immigrants. Lack of legal status not only underlies all the challenges described above but also limits immigrants’ successful integration and potential to contribute to local communities. Since naturalization and immigration are in the federal policy domain, local governments and civil society organizations can only indirectly address this barrier. For example, some organizations that provide entrepreneurship training are open to both legal and unauthorized immigrants. Des Moines has credit unions that make loans without checking immigration status (Wainer 2015).

Another effort is to expand opportunities for foreign entrepreneurs to work in the U.S. legally. One innovative program currently operating in this realm is offered by the national coalition Global Entrepreneurs in Residence (Global EIR). Global EIR provides space for local partners and participating universities to provide support and resources to a select number of highly-skilled foreign students with their application to the cap-exempted H-1B visas. In partnership with the St. Louis Mosaic Project and Global EIR Coalition, University of Missouri-St Louis launched the first program in the Midwest region for international entrepreneurs (Gateway Accelerate 2017).

Immigrants are often unaware of these efforts or they are reluctant to deal with any institution for the fear of being identified as unauthorized. The barrier of legal status deters would-be entrepreneurs who are undocumented immigrants from starting a business. It also deters undocumented micro-enterprise owners from growing their business given their inability to obtain loans, own properties that can be used as collateral or to participate in government contracts (Fairlie and Lofstrom 2015).

Conclusion
Compared to the positive policy environment for immigrant entrepreneurship in traditional immigrant destinations such as New York and Los Angeles, local government programs in the new destinations are more sporadic in nature and focus on areas that are relatively less resource intensive like information hubs and business training. For example, while almost every new immigrant destination we review in this piece has a program bridging the information gaps for immigrant entrepreneurs, only a few (e.g. Detroit, Baltimore, Pittsburgh and Minneapolis) directly offer financial assistance and microfinancing opportunities for this group of entrepreneurs. Moreover, many of these government efforts have not been institutionalized into formal offices. They exist in the form of initiatives, programs, task forces and committees, as can be found in Dayton, Columbus, Charlotte, Lincoln, and Pittsburgh. While these arrangements represent an important first step, they generally have less capacity and resources to support and sustain their course of action.

“while almost every new immigrant destination…has a program bridging the information gaps for immigrant entrepreneurs, only a few…directly offer financial assistance and microfinancing opportunities”

In addition, executive leadership is critical in the current landscape of local policies promoting immigrant entrepreneurship. Moving forward, a comprehensive reform of the local policy infrastructure is much in need. This requires not only the creation of single initiatives or programs, but a concerted and systematic change across public and private sectors. In the absence of federal integration action, it falls on the subnational governments to frame various immigrant-related policies. This presents a great opportunity for localities to redefine their future growth trajectories. To the extent that immigrant-owned businesses have untapped potential, strategies and programs aimed at addressing the unmet needs of immigrant business owners can increase their contributions to local economies and put the cities at a comparative edge over other similar cities without the programs. The above discussed programs provide a framework for such initiatives, but more work will be needed to evaluate their effectiveness over time.


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Please direct inquiries about “Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Local Policy Responses” to Cathy Yang Liu (cyliu@gsu.edu) and Xi Huang (xhuang9@student.gsu.edu).
Urban Citizenship? Campaigns to Restore Immigrant Voting Rights in the U.S.

Ron Hayduk, San Francisco State University

Kathleen Coll, University of San Francisco

Introduction

Today, international migration challenges dominant notions of belonging and citizenship as mobile citizens may retain or regain their right to vote in elections in their native countries. During the past few decades, many countries have granted dual citizenship and allowed emigres to retain voting rights in their home countries. Similarly, in at least 45 countries noncitizen residents can vote in local, regional, or even national elections. As the pace of global migration has increased, the idea that political rights should follow or accompany migrants has also grown and gained traction.

A prominent slogan of the massive 2006 immigrant rights protests was “today we march, tomorrow we vote.” Yet, even as the number of elected representatives from immigrant backgrounds has increased, the number of Latino and Asian elected officials lags far behind their numbers in the population and that of other groups. Gerrymandering, racial bloc voting, and single-member districts contribute to this “representation gap,” but the lack of voting rights for noncitizens is also a factor. The cumulative lack of political power—from fewer votes to fewer representatives—translates into fewer pathways to opportunity and government policies that benefit immigrants. Although hardly homogeneous, as a group immigrants tend to score low on many social indicators of well-being, including income, poverty, housing, hunger, and education. This level of political exclusion approximates that of women, African Americans, and youth before laws were changed to incorporate them into the electorate (in 1920, 1965, and 1971 respectively). What do these conditions mean for such basic democratic principles as “one person, one vote,” “government rests on the consent of the governed,” and “no taxation without representation”? Immigrant political exclusion challenges the ideals of a modern democracy, cutting to the heart of our political practice.

33 Parallels exist for two additional disenfranchised groups: (1) the 4.5 million mostly Black and Latino ex-offenders who are denied voting rights by state felony disenfranchisement laws and (2) the approximately 5 million residents in U.S. territories who cannot vote in U.S. federal elections.

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In response to these conditions, several jurisdictions have expanded voting rights to newcomers in local elections, including ten jurisdictions in Maryland and San Francisco. Dozens of others from coast to coast have considered restoring immigrant voting rights, including in New York, California, Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and Washington, D.C. Campaigns to restore immigrant voting rights are a small part of the larger movement for immigrant rights.

Who Is Waging Campaigns for Immigrant Voting Rights, Why, How, to What End(s)?

For the past 15 years, we have been engaged in research and advocacy related to noncitizen voting rights. This paper is a small part of a larger project that chronicles and analyzes these developments, building upon our previous work. Our analysis is based on interviews, surveys, and participant observation with immigrant voting rights advocates, opponents, community organizations, elected officials, government agency personnel, members of the media, and nonpartisan policy organizations. We conducted research on dozens of cities and states across the United States, including in Massachusetts, New York, California, Connecticut, Vermont, Maryland, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Maine, and Illinois. In addition, we draw upon academic studies, reports from government agencies and policy organizations, census and election data, public opinion polls, public testimony, and news articles. Our aim is to shed light on campaigns to restore noncitizen voting in local elections, highlighting what we have learned about ingredients involved in their advances and defeats.

While some campaigns have been led by immigrant rights organizations, others arose due to the initiative of elected officials. Some campaigns have sought to extend voting rights only to legal permanent residents (LPRs), or specific stakeholders such as parents in public school board elections, while other campaigns are more expansive and seek voting rights for all adult residents, regardless of status, in all local elections in a jurisdiction. Some measures have been passed—or were defeated—by a majority of voters (ballot proposal) while others have been passed—or were defeated—by elected representatives such as city councils (local statutes). In nearly every case, campaigns have been contentious and the outcomes quite close.

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Contemporary Campaigns in the United States

Today, twelve jurisdictions allow all residents to vote in local elections, regardless of citizenship or immigration status, including ten towns in Maryland, Chicago (in local school council elections), and San Francisco (see Table 1). All grant voting rights to residents without regard to immigration status. More than a dozen additional jurisdictions have considered restoring immigrant-voting rights. Some campaigns seek to restore immigrant voting to all residents—both documented and undocumented immigrants (NYC, MD, and SF)—while other campaigns seek to enfranchise only legal permanent residents (MA, Washington D.C., Portland (ME), and Burlington (VT)). Some campaigns are waged via ballot proposals (SF, Portland, and Burlington), while others seek to enact local laws via legislative processes (NYC, DC, MA, and MD). Some campaigns have not yet led to the introduction of specific legislation (Pasadena (CA), New Haven and Bridgeport (CT), Carrboro (NC), Madison (WI), and Seattle (WA)).

“While some campaigns have been led by immigrant rights organizations, others arose due to the initiative of elected officials”

Table 1. Contemporary Immigrant Voting Campaigns in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Type of Law</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>Outcome(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NYC:</td>
<td>Statue</td>
<td>a) 1969-2002</td>
<td>a) School elections</td>
<td>a) Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>b) 2005, 2013</td>
<td>b) LPRs*</td>
<td>b) Not enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) city elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>c) 2014</td>
<td>c) All residents</td>
<td>c) Not enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) state elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>Local statute</td>
<td>1989 to date</td>
<td>Public school elections</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland35</td>
<td>10 local statues</td>
<td>1990s to 2017</td>
<td>All residents</td>
<td>10 towns implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>Ballot proposal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>School board elections</td>
<td>2004: 51-49% failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010: 54-46% failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>2016: 53-47% passed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 Takoma Park, Barnesville, Martin’s Additions, Somerset, Garrett Park, Chevy Chase Section Three and Five, Hyattsville, Glen Echo, and Mount Rainer.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Location</th>
<th>Type of Statute</th>
<th>Earliest Passage</th>
<th>Eligibility</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>State statute</td>
<td>1990s, 2000s, 2016</td>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Passed; needs state approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>State statute</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Not enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>State statute</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>LPRs with property</td>
<td>Not enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>State statute</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Not enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland, ME</td>
<td>Ballot proposal</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington, VT</td>
<td>Ballot proposal</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Legal Permanent Residents

Source: compiled by the authors

Whether campaigns for immigrant voting rights were initiated by immigrants or elected officials, several characteristics stand out in each case: (1) demographic shifts propelled immigrant mobilization; (2) proponents of noncitizen voting engaged in grassroots organizing and coalition building, and they lobbied elected officials and engaged local media; and (3) politicians, mostly liberal Democrats, some Green Party members and representatives of immigrant and minority background, enacted or supported legislation. Opponents, a mix of conservative or incumbent Democrats and/or Republicans have raised objections to immigrant voting rights. Among their concerns are that granting voting rights to noncitizens would diminish the value and meaning of citizenship, reduce incentives for immigrants to naturalize, create divided loyalties, lead to less informed voters, skew results in close elections, increase voter fraud, and affect contentious public policy issues.37

36 Cambridge, Amherst, Newton, and Brookline passed local laws allowing noncitizens to vote in local elections, but they have not gotten state-enabling legislation needed to allow the localities to implement the local laws. In 2007, the Boston City Council narrowly rejected, by a vote of 7-6, a proposal to grant legal permanent residents voting rights in local elections.


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Lessons Learned Across Campaigns

Our analysis of these campaigns revealed seven important lessons. **First**, immigrant voting rights campaigns usually occur in areas with growing immigrant populations that have developed community-based organizations. Campaigns have emerged most often in culturally and politically progressive small to mid-sized towns and cities, such as Takoma Park (MD), Amherst and Cambridge (MA), Burlington (VT), and San Francisco (CA). These cities include university towns with large numbers of professional class immigrants and histories of welcoming immigrants and refugees, including local “Sanctuary Ordinances.” More politically and culturally moderate and larger cities have also mounted local campaigns, including New York City, Washington, D.C., and Portland (ME). Less frequently, advocates have explored campaigns in more conservative localities but have yet to fully launch them, including in Denver (CO), San Bernardino (CA), Carrboro (NC), Florida, Minnesota, and Texas.

“Campaigns have emerged most often in culturally and politically progressive small to mid-sized towns and cities”

**Second**, campaigns are usually led by immigrants in alliance with civil rights and progressive groups. For example, in Cambridge (MA) during the 1990s, Haitian immigrants spearheaded a campaign for immigrant voting also with the goal of seeking to protect rent control that was under threat. They later allied with Latino community-based organizations and diverse individuals from Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In Amherst (MA), Puerto Ricans and Central Americans led the campaign along with progressives, following the enactment of a local sanctuary policy. In Portland (ME), Somalis and other refugees worked with progressives in leading the campaign for immigrant voting rights. In Washington, D.C., Central Americans campaigned in alliance with civil rights leaders during the 1990s and 2004. In Burlington (VT), African immigrants (who organized after being rebuffed from gaining access to public recreation fields to play soccer) worked on the campaign with a range of progressive organizations and individuals. And most recently, in Hyattsville (MD), a Latino community-based organization named CASA was one of the leading advocates for immigrant voting rights, working together with civil rights allies and progressive whites.

Indeed, campaigns tend to gain traction when advocates develop a broad coalition among diverse groups of supporters. In New York City, the voting rights coalition formed in 2004 included a range of community-based organizations—faith-based, immigrant and civil rights, labor unions, and progressive groups—which expanded and

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built greater capacity to lobby for a City Council measure that gained broad support in more recent years. In San Francisco (CA), Latino, Asian, and Black alliances have been key. In Portland (ME), alliances between young Green party activists, Somali refugees, and policy organizations disrupted traditional notions of who constituted natural political allies. Gaining the support of established organizations, such as labor unions, civil rights and voting rights organizations, and funders, has proven significant. Alliances can increase a campaign’s capacity, provide broader legitimacy, and help increase media attention—all of which can help propel immigrant voting rights campaigns forward.

Third, in every jurisdiction the support of credible and visible elected officials who can effectively champion the cause has been critical. Unless people in power can craft and propose legislation or submit ballot initiatives, immigrant voting rights campaigns do not get far. However, campaigns that are primarily led by elected officials—with little participation from community-based organizations capable of generating broad-based support—have mixed results at best. Planning and carrying out an immigrant voting rights campaign without first obtaining the buy-in and support of immigrant rights organizations and grassroots community leaders can be detrimental. In Rockville (MD), for example, Mayor Larry Giammo pursued immigrant voting rights soon after being elected in 2001. However, because he did not sufficiently consult with community stakeholders to lay the groundwork for a viable campaign, opposition thwarted the idea. As is the case for campaigns in other policy arenas, the combination of inside and outside advocacy strategies and partners is often what proves to be most effective.

Fourth, the level of opposition and political context matters. In some cases, opponents of noncitizen voting measures counter-mobilized and their actions proved decisive. For example, in the San Francisco ballot initiative campaign of 2004, Don Fisher (the former CEO of the clothing store The Gap) contributed $50,000 to pay for opposition mailings and to support the work of an anti-immigrant organization called Save Our State (SOS), which the Southern Poverty Law Center describes as a hate group. In Burlington (VT) in 2015, a front-page article printed in the

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state’s largest newspaper two days before the local election in Burlington contributed to the defeat of the immigrant voting ballot initiative (but there also was a lack of effective grassroots mobilization).

For the most part, however, organized opposition to immigrant voting campaigns has been less pronounced and less visible than the mobilizations by supporters. This may in part be due to the fact that many immigrant voting rights campaigns have been waged in politically liberal locales. In jurisdictions using ballot initiatives, the timing of the election can also affect outcomes. Midterm elections have low voter turnout and fewer sympathetic voters, as was the case in 2010 in San Francisco, while presidential elections have higher turnout—particularly of minorities—who can help propel a ballot measure to victory, as was the case in San Francisco in 2016. Gaining the support of most residents—usually progressive whites, people of color, and naturalized immigrants—proved necessary for success, such as in San Francisco in 2016. Not surprisingly, public officials who support immigrant voting rights tend to be ethnic and racial minorities and progressives.

Fifth, convincing stakeholders of the merit of immigrant voting rights often required a good amount of time for political education and debate, both within the immigrant rights community and among other stakeholders and the larger public. It has been challenging to grapple with the complexities involved in immigrant voting rights campaigns. It is not a message that translates easily into a catchy slogan for a bumper sticker, as was the case with the campaign to win a $15 per hour minimum wage. Most people, when they first hear about immigrant voting rights, think it is illegal or improper; it takes time to delve into the issue and properly explain the issue to voters and even policymakers.

“From 1776 to 1926, noncitizens were able to vote at the local, state, and even federal elections in as many as 40 states”

Advocates draw upon the extensive history of immigrant voting practices across the country to show that it has legal precedent and actually helped to promote immigrant integration. From 1776 to 1926, noncitizens were able to vote at the local, state, and even federal elections in as many as 40 states. Advocates emphasize that these early immigrant voting laws operated on the notion that immigrants were legitimate stakeholders in the community, thereby challenging and disrupting the commonly held idea today that voting is inevitably tied to U.S. citizenship. To underscore their point, advocates invoke democratic ideals such as “no taxation without representation,” and they link current struggles for immigrant voting to earlier civil rights and suffrage movements led by African Americans and women. In the words of one NYC advocate, “if you have a stake in local governance, you should have a say [...] without the vote, your voice can be ignored.” Contemporary migration and citizenship scholars similarly articulate a
“stakeholder” principle, arguing for migrant voting rights in democratic polities. Ultimately, campaigns seek to make the case that immigrant enfranchisement and political equality benefit everyone.

Sixth, the “success” of local immigrant voting efforts cannot be judged solely by whether or not they achieve the goal of establishing local voting rights. Success can also be measured by local stakeholders advancing other goals, such as when immigrant advocates build larger coalitions and solidarity with other groups across sectors, thereby increasing the capacity of immigrant communities. Mobilization for immigrant voting rights can educate both community members and elected officials about immigrant concerns and provide support for other local-level immigrant integration policies, such as language access, school and neighborhood improvement, legal services, municipal ID cards, or police reform. In such instances, campaigns build immigrant leadership and civic participation, and they increase civic skills, community capacity, and alliances with other groups. They also improve government responsiveness, and they improve the quality and implementation of policies affecting immigrant communities.

Finally, the importance of immigrant leadership in voting rights and other immigrant rights campaigns becomes even more important in the wake of the 2016 elections and increased federal enforcement activities. How can local jurisdictions balance the need for transparency in elections with protections against voter suppression? Should proposals for immigrant voting rights include all immigrants or only legal permanent residents? Localities are grappling with these important questions in the current political climate.

Conclusion

Imagine if the 22 million immigrants residing in the United States who are not currently American citizens could vote? It would change political dynamics in states and locales where noncitizens are concentrated. Demographic change provides new incentives for insurgent factions and candidates to challenge dominant political organizations and leaders, and it would reintroduce competition in many non-competitive districts. As the voting population of cities and states diversifies, political groups will seek to enlist and mobilize—or perhaps demobilize and neutralize—new emerging constituencies.

Campaigns for immigrant voting rights represent efforts to reframe immigrants as future citizens rather than permanent aliens. In an era in which especially immigrants of


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color are treated with hostility, these campaigns are affirmative, positive political interventions that organize both immigrants and citizens around principles of justice, inclusion, and equality. We can learn as much about active citizenship from community groups that seek, but fail, to pass such measures as we do from those that succeed in gaining formal voting rights. Despite the messiness of their engagement with government actors and institutions, advocates organized, developed their capacities and leadership, built coalitions, and advanced agendas. Sometimes they even changed laws and policies.

Given the new national political terrain under the Trump administration, however, we can no longer discuss immigrant political empowerment at the local level without considering the harsh and devastating anti-immigrant measures being pursued at the federal level. Just as we have learned that sanctuary cities cannot function as sanctuaries absent of state protections, so too immigrant voting at the local level needs policies to advance immigrant incorporation while limiting federal enforcement possibilities. The case of Rosa María Ortega, a legal permanent resident with U.S.-citizen children with no prior criminal record illustrates this harsh new context. After apparently misunderstanding the voter registration forms, she voted in two elections, and received a felony conviction and sentence of eight years in prison to be followed by deportation. Prior to 2017, similar cases might have resulted in denial of a naturalization application or probation, but now immigrants who vote without authorization, for any reason, face the possibility of a prison sentence and deportation. The stark reality of the corrosive impact of this new political terrain underscores the point that immigrants need be at the table in deciding whether or not to wage a campaign for immigrant voting rights, and if so, when and how to do it.

Please direct inquiries about “Urban Citizenship?” to Ron Hayduk (rhayduk@sfsu.edu) and Kathleen Coll (kmcoll@usfca.edu).
Policy Brief
The ‘War on Immigrants’: Policies in the Trump Era

By Alvaro Huerta
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, Department of Urban & Regional Planning (URP) and Department of Ethnic & Women’s Studies (EWS)

President Donald J. Trump and his administration’s immigration agenda centers on draconian, enforcement-based policies and executive orders, exacerbating an already dysfunctional immigration system. As an extension of Trump’s then–presidential campaign, the Trump administration’s immigration policies also represent racist and xenophobic practices, such as anti-Mexicanism and Islamophobia. Like Trump’s "Make America Great Again" campaign slogan, these immigration policies and orders promote an isolationist and white nativist philosophy, hearkening back to the more oppressive periods of U.S. history when racialized groups (e.g., Latinos, African Americans) lacked basic civil rights, privileges and freedoms under the law.

Complicating matters, Trump’s immigration policies and orders are plagued with hyperboles and falsifications (Huerta 2017, 2017), making it difficult to differentiate between fact and fiction/fantasy (e.g., Mexico will pay for the border wall). However, while Trump has engaged in an ongoing “war on immigrants” campaign—in actions and words/Tweets—against immigrants and their families/communities, a growing social movement of immigrant activists, immigrant advocates and elected officials have emerged to defend the civil and human rights of those who live and work in America’s shadows.

Anti-Mexicanism and Islamophobia

On January 2, 1960, when then-Senator John F. Kennedy announced his candidacy for President of the United States, the charismatic leader proclaimed: “The Presidency is the most powerful office in the Free World. Through its leadership can come a more vital life for all of our people. In it are centered the hopes of the globe around us for freedom and a more secure life…”1 In contrast to JFK’s aspirational announcement, on June 16, 2015, then-presidential candidate Trump infamously uttered: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best…They’re sending people that have lots

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of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists…” (Lee 2015).

By targeting individuals of Mexican origin, Trump launched his presidential campaign on a racist political platform based on anti-Mexicanism—a long-standing American tradition embraced mostly by millions of white citizens/voters. Trump’s derogatory campaign also included the creation of a “deportation force” (i.e., a military-style force) to deport millions of Mexicans, similar to those of the 1950s with “Operation Wetback.”

During this racist program, the U.S. government deported over one million Mexican immigrants (including citizens of Mexican heritage) (Huerta 2013, 2015; Hyman and Islander 2016). In an excellent essay, “La Realidad: The Realities of Anti-Mexicanism—A Paradigm,” the historian Dr. Juan Gómez-Quiñones (2017) contextualizes the case of anti-Mexicanism: “U.S. anti-Mexicanism is a race premised set of historical and contemporary ascriptions, convictions and discriminatory practices inflicted on persons of Mexican descent, longstanding and pervasive in the United States…Anti-Mexicanism is a form of nativism practiced by colonialists and their inheritors…”

Similar to the inhumane internment camps of over 125,000 Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans during the 1940s, Trump’s immigration policies are intertwined with a long history of racism and xenophobia in the U.S., where Mexicans, Asians, Arabs (particularly Muslims) and other racialized groups represent threats to national security. Compared to European immigrants (particularly Northern and Western Europeans of current and past generations), these racialized groups are also viewed as inferior by the dominant culture, as articulated by the late Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington’s (2009) racist essay, “The Hispanic Challenge.” That is, Trump and his administration didn’t invent racist and xenophobic policies or practices, since countless American leaders and prior administrations have also demonized and scapegoated racialized immigrants throughout U.S. history. For instance, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe, like the Italians, Jews, Poles, Greeks and other groups, also experienced discrimination as ethnic and religious groups (e.g., Catholic, Jewish) (Painter 2015).

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Arab immigrants and Arab Americans (particularly Muslims) have been targets of racism in the U.S. It’s clearly evident that Trump’s

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2 While the language of a “deportation force” has disappeared from President Trump’s racist lexicon and immigration policy agenda, the idea or plan for mass deportations is gradually underway.
proposed Muslim ban during his then-campaign represented a case of Islamophobia. Similarly, Islamophobia is also manifested in Trump’s revised travel ban from the Muslim-dominated countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (Barbash 2017, Parlapiano and Singhvi 2017). While the revised travel ban order excludes the label “Muslim,” based on Trump’s presidential candidacy (e.g., speeches, interviews), Trump is fulfilling a campaign promise of a Muslim ban.

“War on Immigrants” and Resistance

While President Lyndon B. Johnson initiated the “war on poverty” and President Richard Nixon ignited the “war on drugs,” Trump has championed the “war on immigrants.” Trump’s “war on immigrants” policies (and rhetoric) include demonizing Mexican immigrants, persisting on building a border wall (paid by U.S. tax-payers), imposing a Muslim travel ban, targeting all undocumented immigrants for deportation (regardless of criminal history)3 and other draconian proposals. This includes separating children from their parents when detained together at the border4 and prosecuting individuals (e.g., parents, relatives) who pay human smugglers or coyotes to cross undocumented children into the U.S.

There’s also a psychological component to the “war on immigrants,” where Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents are apprehending/arresting undocumented immigrants in places like courts and near schools,5 where immigration agents have commonly ignored or respected as “safe” places. By doing so, the Trump administration is causing widespread panic among undocumented immigrants. Given that undocumented immigrants are not marginal or isolated actors—they’re embedded in communities and families/households that often include U.S. citizens (i.e., mixed-status households)—Trump’s “war on immigrants” campaign has also caused panic among Latina/o communities, including Asian American communities and others with immigrant sub-populations.

Moreover, Trump’s “war on immigrants” agenda hasn’t spared “sanctuary cities.”6 According to Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, “sanctuaries cities” impose restrictions with immigration-enforcement authorities: “These are areas that mostly do not cooperate with federal requests to hand over undocumented immigrants arrested

5 YouTube (CNN). “ICE Arrests Dad en Route to School.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aaceudhvOQ
by local police on unrelated charges, or where local police departments do not want to become an immigration enforcement body."

As part of a growing movement in response to these hostile federal actions, many elected officials across the nation have joined in solidarity with immigrant communities, along with activists and advocates, in defying the Trump administration’s racist and xenophobic policies. In California, for instance, state leaders and elected officials have filed lawsuits and taken legislative actions, such as Senate Bill 54 to make California a “sanctuary state.”

“in response to these hostile federal actions, many elected officials across the nation have joined in solidarity with immigrant communities”

In short, during these turbulent and uncertain times for millions of immigrants, it’s imperative that we—those of us who believe in justice and dignity for all—advocate for humane and just policies for those on the margins, especially given their major contributions and sacrifices on a daily basis to the U.S.

References


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Research Institute Profile
Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS)

The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) was established at the University of California, San Diego in 1999 by political scientist Wayne Cornelius. Every year it hosts up to a dozen visiting scholars from around the world, a seminar series, workshops, and conferences. CCIS activities are marked by their inter-disciplinarity, with contributions from the social sciences, history, and public health. The Center disseminates research findings to broad publics through media briefings, affiliate op-eds, an online working paper series, and by regularly including journalists, NGOs, and policymakers in its activities. A network of more than 400 affiliates, a quarter of whom are at University of California campuses, makes CCIS a global research hub. Information is updated at http://ccis.ucsd.edu/ and on Twitter @ccisucsd.

The research programs at CCIS take a broad, comparative perspective on international migration while also leveraging its position in California and on the U.S.-Mexico border. Much of the work has direct relevance to public policy. Current research falls into five main areas.

The California Immigration Research Initiative

“If California were its own country, it would have the world’s fourth largest immigrant population”

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The California Immigration Research Initiative is based at CCIS in collaboration with the UCLA Program on International Migration, the Center for Research on Immigration Population and Public Policy at UC Irvine, the Center for Latino Policy Research at UC Berkeley, and the Immigration Research Group at UC Riverside. The initiative involves collaborative survey work with the “California Health Interview Survey” and “Asians and Latinos in the United States and California,” fellowships for UC doctoral students whose research includes a substantial California component, and an annual conference that brings together faculty and advanced graduate students from across the UC system. An online working paper series written in accessible language will share the results of this research with broader publics.

Politics and Policy of U.S. Immigration

Several faculty in political science, sociology, and history are researching the politics and policies of U.S. immigration at the federal and subnational levels. Recent and ongoing projects at the federal level include theorization of the determinants of immigration policy, the shift from a strange-bedfellows model of ad hoc coalitions on immigration policy to a much more partisan divide, how policymakers have used the specter of criminality to target particular ethnic groups throughout US history, and the effects of demographic change on ethnic voting patterns in a way that questioned, even before the 2016 election, whether a growing non-white electorate would benefit Democrats.

Empirical work at the subnational level includes analysis showing that “sanctuary cities” have lower crime rates than other jurisdictions, a statistical profile of the DACA-mented population and how it differs from the population that was eligible for the program, the efficacy of techniques used to mobilize low-propensity voters, and the way that voter suppression policies disproportionately affect ethnic minority voters.

Affiliated scholars are broadly engaged with assessing the immigration policies of the new administration and their political implications. Faculty have given expert legal testimony and written amicus briefs in landmark court cases around sanctuary cities and the Trump administration’s travel bans on travelers from six primarily Muslim countries.

STEM

High-skilled immigration, particularly in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) fields, has emerged as a major theme in policy circles. A major project on the immigration of scientists and engineers and the training of native populations is being conducted by a research team of faculty and graduate students from sociology and economics researching policies in the United States, Europe, and Chile.
Work on the United States explores the sources and dynamics of demand for STEM immigrants. Faculty and graduate students are exploring the needs for immigrant works in the private sector for STEM jobs, as well as the role that international students studying STEM subjects play in research universities. Another approach here explores the role and adequacy of U.S. training institutions in imparting STEM skills for Americans. These projects also engage the statistical tools the government uses to measure workforce development and skills gaps. Faculty have advised the National Science Board, the National Science Foundation, and the National Academy of Sciences regarding survey instruments and academic research findings related to the STEM workforce and STEM immigrants’ role in the knowledge economy.

Asylum and Refugee Policy

CCIS faculty and graduate students in sociology, anthropology, and Latin American Studies are researching refugee policies around the world. Current projects include an analysis of policies created by countries in North America, Europe, and Australia to prevent asylum seekers from ever reaching a territory where they can ask for asylum; a study of how the Jordanian state attempts to maintain its sovereignty while interacting with the “surrogate state” of the UNHCR and other actors to manage successive flows of refugees; human rights abuses of Central American women transiting Mexico; how Salvadoran youth use outmigration as one of several strategies to deal with violence; and San Diego as a destination for refugees from East Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.

Mexican Migration to the United States

UC San Diego lies just 47 kilometers from Mexico and the busiest border crossing in the Western Hemisphere. A longstanding concern of the Center has been to analyze how U.S. border enforcement and immigration policy and Mexican government initiatives affect mobility between Mexico and the United States. There are more immigrants of Mexican birth living in the United States than immigrants of all nationalities combined in any other country in the world. After decades of growth, the size of this population has stabilized, and unauthorized immigration has sharply declined.
“CCIS has studied Mexican migration to the United States from multiple angles since its inception”

even as its political salience increases. CCIS has studied Mexican migration to the United States from multiple angles since its inception. The hallmarks of this research have been consistent binational partnerships and attention to migrant-origin as well as destination communities. Recurring partnerships include investigators and students from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte and Universidad Autónoma de Baja California in Tijuana, the Universidad Autónoma Benito Juárez in Oaxaca, and the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia in Mérida. Projects have analyzed the impact of U.S. policy on irregular migration from Mexico, binational ties and their economic and political implications, and the gap between the educational aspirations and attainment of residents of the San Diego-Tijuana “Cali-Baja” region. These results have been widely shared through briefings of congressional staffers, local policymakers, presentations in communities of origin, and publications in both English and Spanish.

Please direct inquiries about the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Research Institute Profile to CCIS co-Directors, John Skrentny (jskrentny@ucsd.edu) and David S. FitzGerald (dfitzgerald@ucsd.edu).
Mentoring Matters
Diversifying Membership in Graduate School

By Kelsey P. Norman
Sié Chéou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy and Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver

When entering graduate school each doctoral student is usually assigned a formal mentor, or an advisor. This individual may change over time, but they will likely be your primary source of mentorship over the years that you spend earning your doctorate. Having just completed my PhD and reflecting back upon my six years as a student, I realize that I relied on a variety of sources for mentorship, often beyond my own institution. In this short article I argue for the benefit of diverse mentorship, and I focus on three different arenas: how to build an immediate circle of membership (a committee) at your university, how to develop an external network of mentorship, and how to find mentorship beyond academia. Based on my experience, it takes all of these forms of mentorship to successfully complete a dissertation and to develop relationships that will extend beyond graduate school.

Building a Committee

I entered my PhD program already knowing that I wanted to study migration, but thinking that I would do a comparison of OECD countries and immigrant outcomes. In other words, I planned to focus on migration to the Global North. I selected my advisor based on this interest, but also because he had a strong reputation for mentoring students who went on to do well in academia. When about a year into my program I decided that I instead wanted to research migration in the Global South, and specifically the Middle East, I made the decision to keep my advisor, even though our substantive interests no longer directly aligned. He brought along an extensive history of mentorship, as well as a great deal of general knowledge about the field of migration, and because I was fortunate to be in a department that had at least three individuals focusing on migration in different regions, I knew I could supplement his knowledge and mentorship with that of others. I asked a second professor who focuses on migration and citizenship in Western Europe to be on my committee, as well as a third whose research examines migration in several Global South countries in Asia.

This team of three committee members was with me from the end of my first year until my defense this spring, and I have continually drawn on each of their knowledge areas throughout the process. Additionally, my dissertation topic necessitated extended fieldwork, and all three of them were willing to advise me via email, Skype or meet with
me at conferences, as I was often away from my home institution. Lastly, it was important to me to have at least one woman on my committee who could provide gender-specific professional guidance, and I was fortunate that one of the migration experts I had recruited also happened to be female.

External Mentorship

The migration-related expertise of my committee was essential in formulating my research program and pursuing fieldwork, but my committee was lacking someone with a substantive regional focus on the Middle East. This is where developing external networks was essential. During the second year in my doctoral program I began presenting my research at annual conferences. Over the next several years I tried out all four major North American conferences—APSA, ISA, WPSA and Western—but the two that I now attend regularly are ISA and APSA. During these conferences, I went to as many panels as I could manage, spoke with presenters and asked questions, attended business meetings and receptions, and slowly developed a network of senior and junior scholars who I could look to for mentorship.

I also made efforts to connect with other associations and networks—including the Middle East Studies Association, the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Project on Middle East Political Science—that have a specific regional focus. While I identify primarily as a migration scholar, I knew that in order to study the region I had to be aware of more than just the migration literature. I was also fortunate to attend several MENA-specific conferences at universities in the United States and United Kingdom that further connected me to a number of scholars who have since become sources of mentorship.

Lastly, while conducting fieldwork I was affiliated with two research institutions—the Center for Migration Studies at the American University of Cairo and the Center for Migration Research at Istanbul Bilgi University—that helped me to cement my networks in the region. The academics associated with these institutions often have country or region-specific expertise on migration, and speaking with them about my work or offering to give a presentation at their center gave my research a more nuanced understanding.

The result of this multi-year process is that I am now connected to a network of scholars—some senior, but many junior or other PhD students—looking specifically at

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the Middle East and migration. I see them at conferences and speak with them frequently via Skype, email or social media. They give me advice about my research or professional development, and we speak about how to make our research relevant to the current migration challenges at hand. It is an exciting time to be researching migration, and particularly migration in the Middle East, and this process of external mentorship has been critical to my growth as an engaged academic.

**Mentorship Beyond Academia**

This last type of mentorship may be more or less useful depending upon your individual goals. For me, it was important to also look for mentorship from those who care about my topic from a non-academic perspective: policy-makers, activists, NGOs, and individual migrants and refugees. My fieldwork involved developing relationships with these individuals in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey in order to understand how migration policy is constructed in each country and how it changes over time. Yet this process involved more than just lining up an interview. I had to slowly build networks of trust, make multiple visits to each country, and demonstrate that my research was going to have policy-relevant outcomes, in order for each individual to choose to take the time to speak with me.

“It seems that universities increasingly want to know how we are impacting an audience beyond academia”

In turn, I learned how to be a more conscientious researcher, and had to develop ways to be accountable to those I interviewed or populations I researched. First, I gave public lectures in the cities where I conducted interviews and invited interviewees to attend and ask questions. Second, I sent any policy reports or academic articles I published to those interviewees who expressed interest in seeing my research output. Lastly, while in the field I attended community events such as educational evenings organized for school-aged children, not only due to my interest as a researcher but as a way to give back my time to those who had generously lent me theirs.

Once I was back in the United States at my home institution and writing up my dissertation, I continued to leverage my research findings for a policy-oriented audience. I was in contact with editors of non-academic or quasi-academic outlets, and spoke at several community events in front of public audiences. This was especially important given the timing—I returned home in July 2015 just as the global refugee crisis was making headlines each day—but I also found this to be increasingly important on the job market. Hiring committees asked me to discuss what policy-relevant research I was publishing, and whether I was giving public lectures in my community to non-academic audiences. It seems that universities increasingly want to know how we are impacting
an audience beyond academia, even as our first commitment remains publishing academic articles and teaching.

Lastly, building mentorship connections beyond academia might be particularly important if you think you may pursue professional opportunities in policy, government or private sectors after finishing your doctorate. In the event that you decide academia is not for you, you will have already developed a network in these other areas, making the transition that much easier.

Please direct inquiries about this Mentoring Matters article to Kelsey P. Norman (kpnorman@gmail.com).
Section News

Election Results

We are pleased to report that with 40% of our Section Membership voting in our recent Section elections, the following individuals became part of our Executive Council. A warm congratulations to them and we look forward to working with them during their respective terms!

Sara Wallace Goodman, Co-President
Gerasimos Tsourapas, Treasurer
Jeannette Money & Tom Wong, Section Program Co-Chairs, APSA

2018 Annual Convention
Beth Whitaker & Justin Gest, Faculty Council Members
Beyza Ekin Buyuker, Graduate Student Council Member

APSA 2017 Section Events

We hope to see you at our upcoming Migration & Citizenship Studies Section events at the 2017 Annual Convention in San Francisco. In addition to our many sponsored panels, we would especially like to draw your attention to our Business Meeting and Reception:

Migration and Citizenship Section Business Meeting
Friday, September 1, 6:30 to 7:30pm, location TBA (please check the final online program)

Migration and Citizenship Section Reception
Friday, September 1, 7:30 to 9:00pm, location TBA (please check the final online program)

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Member Achievements

Yehonatan Abramson (Johns Hopkins University)
• Published "Making a Homeland, Constructing a Diaspora: The Case of Taglit-Birthright Israel," Political Geography 58: 14-23.

Sener Akturk (Koc University)
• Published "Post-imperial democracies and new projects of nationhood in Eurasia: Transforming the nation through migration in Russia and Turkey," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(4): 1101-20.

Kristy A. Belton (International Studies Association)

Joachim Blatter (University of Lucerne)
• Received a Grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation (2018-2020): "Towards transnational voting in/for Europe!"

Stefanie Chambers (Trinity College)

Els de Graauw (Baruch College, The City University of New York)
• Was granted tenure and promoted to Associate Professor of Political Science at Baruch College, starting fall 2017.
• Published the co-edited volume (with Erik Bleich and Irene Bloemraad) Migrants, Minorities and the Media: Information, Representations and Participation in the Public Sphere (Routledge).
• Published (with Irene Bloemraad) "Working Together: Building Successful Policy and Program Partnerships for Immigrant Integration," Journal on Migration and Human Security 5(1): 105-123.

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• Was awarded a PSC-CUNY 48 Research Award for the project on “How Cities and States Integrate Immigrants Under the Administration of Donald Trump.”
• Co-organized the “Immigration Politics in the Trump Era: Labor and Community Perspectives” Conference at the CUNY Murphy Institute.

Jill Simone Gross (Hunter College, City University of New York)
• Published “Hybridization and Urban Governance: Malleability, Modality, or Mind-Set?” Urban Affairs Review 53(3): 559-577.

Ron Hayduk (San Francisco State University)
• Published (with Kristen Hackett and Diana Tamashiro Folla) “Immigrant Engagement in Participatory Budgeting in New York City,” New Political Science 39(1): 76-94.

Jason E. Kehrberg (Muskingum University)

Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)
• Was awarded Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Insight grant for a five-year project on Canadian citizenship and nationality law and policy.

Helen B. Marrow (Tufts University)
• Was awarded the 2017 Donald W. Light Award for the Applied or Public Practice of Medical Sociology from the Medical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association.

Rahsaan Maxwell (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
• Published “Occupations, National Identity, and Immigrant Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 50(2): 232-263.
Heather Silber Mohamed (Clark University)

Kelsey P. Norman (University of California, Irvine)

Clarisa Perez-Armendariz (Santa Clara University)
- Published (with David Crow) "Talk Without Borders: Why Political Discussion Makes Latin Americans With Relatives Abroad More Critical of Their Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies*. Online first.

Margaret E. Peters (University of California, Los Angeles)

Doris Marie Provine (Arizona State University)
- Published (with Monica W. Varsanyi, Paul G. Lewis and Scott Decker) *Policing Immigrants: Local Law Enforcement on the Front Lines*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jeffrey D. Pugh (University of Massachusetts, Boston)
- Published (with David Sulewski and Julie Moreno) "Adapting Community Mediation for Colombian Forced Migrants in Ecuador," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 34(4): 409-30.

Neil G. Ruiz (Pew Research Center)
- Became the Associate Director of the new Global Migration and Demography Program at Pew Research Center in Washington, DC.
- Published (with S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn) “Higher share of students than tourists, business travelers over-stayed deadlines to leave U.S. in 2016,” *Pew Research Center*, June 6, 2017.
- Published “More foreign grads of U.S. colleges are staying in the country to work,” *Pew Research Center*, May 18, 2017.
- Published “Key facts about the U.S. H-1B visa program,” *Pew Research Center*, April 27, 2017.

Caress Schenk (Nazarbayev University)

Jacqueline Stevens (Northwestern University)
- Posted a blog about lawsuit against an immigration judge in Atlanta and the Executive Office of Immigration Review. [http://stateswithoutnations.blogs](http://stateswithoutnations.blogs)

**Michael Sullivan** (Saint Mary’s University, San Antonio)

**Gerasimos Tsourapas** (University of Birmingham)
- Received the International Studies Association (ISA) 2017 Martin O. Heisler Award for the paper "Labor Migrants as Political Leverage? Population Mobility and Coercion in the Arab World."
- Received a British Academy - Leverhulme Small Research Grant "The Politics of Forced Migration in the Mediterranean: Interstate Bargaining and Issue-Linkage in Greece & Jordan."

**Monica W. Varsanyi** (John Jay College, City University of New York)
- National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend Grant to support the project "The Contentious Evolution of Hispanic Identity during the Chicano Movement in New Mexico, 1962-1974."

**Dvora Yanow** (Wageningen University, Netherlands)
- Was awarded a fellowship by the Rockefeller Foundation for an academic writing residency at its center in Bellagio, Italy, for April 13-May 11. The fellowship was given for development of a book whose working title is "The Treachery of Categories: Counting, Immigrant Integration, and the State."

**NOTE:** Please send Member News for the next Newsletter to Marc at marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de by November 30, 2017 with the subject “Member News” in the heading of the email.

Member news includes new publications, jobs, conferences organized (not attended), grants received, etc. since publication of the previous newsletter. Please use the following format: Name, affiliation in parentheses and then bullet points for each news item. E.g. Haley Comet (Catzrenein University)
- Achievement
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Climate Change


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Governance


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http://community.apsanet.org/migrationcitizenship/home

War


Articles

American Political Science Review


American Journal of Political Science


Comparative Political Studies


Ethics and International Affairs


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**European Journal of Political Research**


**Government and Opposition**


**Journal of Common Market Studies**


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