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Letter from the Co-Presidents

The American Political Science Association recently added a new section on “Class and Inequality”, meaning that we are no longer the newest APSA section. In fact, as we write this, the APSA website reports that we are down to 339 members, from a recent height of 389—so if you’re reading this and haven’t renewed your membership for 2014, please do so! Some lapses are, to be sure, par for the course in the first part of a new calendar year. And we remain very respectably sized, larger than 17 of the APSA’s now 45 sections.

We also note that efforts to create still more new sections are underway—though many in the APSA express understandable concern that this proliferation puts strains on the resources of the association and its members. More seriously still, it may also contribute to the fragmentation that is the dark side of being part of a discipline that addresses wide-ranging topics with a commendable variety of methods. At least at the margins, adding more sections may increase the likelihood that many political scientists communicate chiefly with fellow political scientists who do what they do, in the ways that they do it. It is therefore appropriate, even for a new section like ours, to pause occasionally and consider why our collective existence is or, gulp, isn’t justified.

Perhaps ironically, the easiest justification is very internal to the discipline: migration and citizenship are topics that by their nature demand to be studied by multiple methods in multiple sub-fields. Migration and demographic changes among citizens are inescapably matters of numbers: how many of what sorts of people have moved where, what segments of the population are growing, what segments are declining, and why? What are the economic, social, environmental, epidemiological, military, and political push and pull factors, and the patterns of reproduction and mortality, which give rise to these numbers? Without very good quantitative empirical work, we cannot have even minimally informed analyses of these topics.

But precisely because contested patterns of migration and transformations in citizenries and citizenship policies are on the rise in many parts of the world today, there are many topics on which we cannot get reliable large-n quantitative data. We need fieldwork observations of pro- and anti-immigrant groups, often ethnographic studies of the forms of community activism different immigrant and citizen groups are engaged in, and interviews with leaders of many sorts—from international and national policymakers to local officials and social movement activists. And we are unlikely to grasp the meanings of immigrant and citizenship experiences from a wide range of political actors and ordinary people, past and present, without qualitative interpretive analyses that help us grasp motives, aspirations, and senses of affiliation and obligation.
What’s more, we need some of each of these different kinds of works performed by scholars who focus on U.S. politics, North American politics, Central and South American politics, European politics, South Asian and East Asian politics, African politics, comparative politics more broadly, international relations, international organizations and transnational advocacy groups, Western and non-Western political theory and the history of ideas, and more (sorry if we left your work out!). Precisely because it is often not easy to get out of our sub-disciplinary and methodological silos, having a common section insures that different flavors of migration and citizenship scholars do not ONLY talk to migration and citizenship scholars much like themselves, or other scholars in their subfields. It helps us all to see what we do in the broader perspective that we require to do our work well.

The prolific presence of migration and citizenship scholars in all the discipline’s subfields and methodological camps only reflects, however, the deeper justification for our section. The great mid-20th century political scientist (and turncoat law professor) Harold Lasswell famously wrote that politics was about “Who Gets What, When, and How”—by which he meant political analysis should focus on the distribution of power, economic benefits, and other desirable things. All those things matter enormously, but what Lasswell’s formula missed is that politics is also about “Who Gets to Be a Who”—not (or not only) in the sense of how one becomes one of Horton’s tiny protégés, but in the profoundly fundamental sense of who gets to belong to a political community, and with what standing.

That is why Michael Walzer wisely wrote in *Spheres of Justice* that membership is perhaps the most important good that political societies distribute. Yet even Walzer’s insight was framed in a way that seems very partial today, for his focus was on membership in nation-states. Tremendously important as those remain, today both citizenship and migration need to be explicitly considered in relationship to a much broader range of political communities, including the transnational European Union, partly autonomous regions like Quebec and Catalonia, indigenous societies, interconnected global cities, and much more. The truth that political science too long neglected is that the politics not only of how nations are built, but of how political identities of all sorts come to be constructed and altered, is among the most basic and significant forms of politics, if it is not indeed (dare we say it!) the most basic. Other sections concerned with race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and, yes, class and inequality, among other topics, can also be seen to contribute greatly to our understanding of this politics. But no scholars do so more centrally than those who work on migration and citizenship. And that reality—the fundamental importance of what we study for understanding politics—is perhaps the most compelling, enduring reason why the APSA should have a section devoted to our research.

And why you should renew those memberships! Then come to the superb panels that program chairs Jane Junn and Willem Maas are putting together for the APSA 2014 Annual Meeting in Washington, featuring your work and work that will help your work, and ours. We both hope to see you there.

Before closing, we wish to extend heartfelt thanks and enormous appreciation to our hard-working section officers who will complete their terms in Washington: Leila Kawar, tireless Secretary and co-founder of the section; Antje Ellermann, who as Newsletter Editor has immediately created
something we can all be proud of going forward, and who has done so much else, and to retiring Council Members Gallya Lahav, John Mollenkopf, and Hilary Mellinger, who have all been invaluable.

Finally, on behalf of the entire section, but especially on his own behalf, Rogers would like to thank Els for her extraordinary two years of service as our Co-President, after playing a crucial role with Leila Kawar and Willem Maas in getting the section created. Though we have officially been Co-Presidents, in reality Els has provided the energy, the good judgment, and the conscientious hard work that have spurred the section’s continuing progress, in ways that have also been exceptionally transparent and responsive to the views of everyone involved. We are all in her debt. Come to our section meeting and reception and let her know!

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Letter from the Editor

What is the place of migration and citizenship scholarship within the discipline of political science? Where do political scientists belong within the broader interdisciplinary field of migration studies? It seems only fitting that, after the first newsletter’s symposium focused on the first question, this issue’s symposium focuses on the second. The two questions are related, of course, as Rogers Smith in his Mentorship Corner contribution reminds us: as political scientists, we can only be effective migration and citizenship scholars if we establish a place for us in both the discipline and the larger migration community. Yet, while straddling this boundary comes with its own rewards, most of us know how challenging it can be. Our symposium Citizenship Studies and Disciplinary Conventions: (How) Do They Matter?—organized by Irene Bloemraad, with contributions by Erin Chung, David Cook-Martín & David FitzGerald, Alexandra Délano, Christian Joppke, Willem Maas, Maarten Vink, Elke Winter, and Matthew Wright—makes a compelling case for the need to engage in interdisciplinary work. However, there also is a strong sense that, among the cognate disciplines, political scientists face steeper hurdles when it comes to boundary crossing. While these challenges might be less daunting for the senior scholars among us, untenured colleagues may disregard them at their peril. At the same time as the top disciplinary journals are now (finally) publishing works on migration and citizenship, there is a lingering sense that it is harder to have our work accepted in these venues, if only—as one of our symposium authors points out—for reasons of data limitations that work against a bias in favor of quantitative scholarship in many of the top (U.S.) political science journals. So we have to work hard (as we should)—and likely harder than others (which, in the ideal world, we should not have to) —to make our mark in the discipline. Our symposium authors clearly establish the benefits of engaging in interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary work. But we also need to ask: is this always a wise move for junior scholars? Do publications in the top
migration journals get the recognition they deserve in disciplinary tenure and promotion decisions? In many departments (though not all), the answer remains no.

Let me throw out another set of considerations that increasingly matter for professional advancement: citation counts. There is no question that—with possibly a few exceptions such as work on parties and elections—migration and citizenship scholars face a smaller audience in political science than in migration studies more generally. While this is an impressionistic point—and I can think of several works that defy its logic—a migration scholar might reasonably expect to receive higher citation counts from publications in prominent interdisciplinary venues than from those in top political science journals. If I am correct (and I would not mind being wrong!), then we’re facing a trade-off between playing by the publication rules of the discipline, on the one hand, and having a broad scholarly impact, on the other. Clearly this trade-off lessens over time: over the years, we can diversify our publications, so to speak. But this trade-off can present a dilemma for junior scholars who are just starting out.

In this issue’s Teacher’s Corner, Anna Boucher and Justin Gest tackle the question of how to teach migration studies in a truly comparative perspective, given the area study (or even single-country) bias of much of the field. The authors introduce us to their new data tool, Crossroads of Migration, and demonstrate its use in the classroom. I am particularly pleased that we have two contributions authored by graduate students. Gerasimos Tsourapas in Notes From the Field shares with us his experiences of conducting fieldwork in post-2011 Egypt—experiences that likely carry over to research in conflict zones more broadly. Konrad Kalicki in our Policy Brief discusses recent developments in wealth-based citizenship policies in Europe. Finally, in the Research Institute Profile column, Alexandra DéLano and Miriam Ticktin showcase the recently launched Zolberg Center on Global Migration at the New School for Social Research.

This is my final issue before handing over the reins to my successor. It has been a pleasure editing this newsletter and I have accumulated a lot of debt in the process. A big thank you to the three Co-Presidents—Els de Graauw, Willem Maas, and Rogers Smith—who have supported me over the past two years. I owe a debt of gratitude to Hannah Ordman, my editorial assistant, who with
exceptional skill made the publication process manageable. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank all contributors to the past four issues. Without you, there would have been no newsletter.

I look forward to seeing many of you at APSA,

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Symposium:
Citizenship Studies and Disciplinary Conventions: (How) Do They Matter?

Introduction:
Citizenship Studies and Disciplinary Conventions: (How) Do They Matter?
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This special symposium on the study of citizenship and disciplinary conventions grew out of an email exchange with Antje Ellermann last year. The inaugural issue of the Migration & Citizenship newsletter had just been published. As someone outside political science (at least as reflected in my formal teaching appointment), I was keen to see how colleagues in a "sister" discipline were defining the cutting edge of migration and citizenship studies.

The intellectual engagement woven through the newsletter’s pages was impressive, and I wrote to Antje with my compliments. But then I added some armchair analysis. The articles and list of publications suggested, I wrote, a deep divide between “comparative” migration and citizenship studies, focused on Europe and often qualitative, versus “American politics”, which tended to study the United States in splendid isolation, often with quantitative data.

Antje found my point interesting (or perhaps she was just being polite), though she suggested an alternative categorization: scholarship of the United States on its own, EU cases, “big” European cases vs. the US, and “settler countries” comparisons (especially Canada vs. Australia, and perhaps the US). She also asked, given my email, would I consider writing a piece on citizenship for the newsletter?

It is clearly easier to draw sweeping conclusions about another discipline than one’s own. The charitable view would suggest that outsiders see the landscape of debates better than someone
laboring within the disciplinary field. A less charitable view would put my comments down to academic hubris.

Indeed, as I considered Antje’s request, I began to lean to hubris. I also began to wonder whether my view of political science wasn’t just a function of my own, likely dated, complaints about how the discipline carves up its subfields, at least in North America. My undergraduate degree is in political science, but I left the discipline in large part because I found the division of labor between domestic politics (American or Canadian), comparative politics, international relations and political theory too constraining. I was interested in comparing two North American countries to each other and to Western Europe. I wondered whether the claims of the world-class Canadian political theorists to whom I was exposed in the mid-1990s would hold up to empirical scrutiny. I was fascinated by social movements and how immigrants engaged in domestic political action. Bringing these diverse strands together into one dissertation did not seem to fit into what political science was at that time.

But is this still the case? Antje’s invitation was an excellent opportunity to think about how disciplinary conventions—either within political science or between social sciences—affect how we, as scholars, approach the study of citizenship, from the questions we ask, to our methods, theories and answers. Looking forward, what possibilities open themselves to scholars who challenge disciplinary conventions?

Rather than a single article, a symposium was born. I posed my questions about citizenship studies and disciplinary conventions to a dozen people across sub-fields in political science and to a few political sociologists.¹ I encouraged everyone to reflect on the symposium questions in the context of their personal research trajectory. I tried to reach people early in their career as well as those well-established. I also sought people who use diverse methodologies and study a diverse set of countries.

Not everyone was able to take up my invitation. The perspective of those working in political theory or legal philosophy would have been especially welcome; one of the great strengths of citizenship studies within political science comes, I think, from scholars interrogating not just the law on the books, but also normative questions of what the law should be, whether we consider status, rights or other facets of citizenship. Given the absence of normative theory in much of sociology, this is an area of cross-disciplinary conversation from which I benefit greatly.

Of those who did accept my invitation, all offer thoughtful, fascinating reflections. Below, I identify some key interventions by each contributor. These cover reflections on principal theorists, the advantages and disadvantages of distinct methodologies, publication biases, tough job markets, the quantification of research “success”, Western-centric scholarship, the need for more history, and

¹ I tried to stay relatively close to the membership of the Migration and Citizenship section, but clearly this symposium is a narrow slice of “interdisciplinarity” as it fails to include scholars from legal anthropology and legal studies, who have been at the forefront of citizenship studies, as well as allied work in geography, ethnic studies, social anthropology, history and (perhaps less so) economics.

² As the contributions show, however, there is a strong bias in the symposium to North American and West European immigrant-receiving countries, a bias that reflects, I think, what is published. I leave for another symposium the topic of publication biases against research on citizenship and immigration in less traditional regions and, especially, research that compares traditional and new countries of immigration.
intriguing accounts of how symposium contributors are challenging traditional approaches in their own research.

Perhaps not surprisingly, all the contributors believe that understanding “citizenship” requires multidisciplinarity or interdisciplinarity. (The two terms, Maarten Vink hints, are perhaps not quite the same thing.) But approaches to how this is achieved vary, as do the constraints felt. Some contributors point out how multidisciplinarity can be achieved through edited volumes or special issues, with different people approaching citizenship from distinct perspectives. Others discuss team-based publishing, so co-authors can ensure that research findings are legible to a specific disciplinary audience. Still others try to engage in interdisciplinarity in their own sole-authored work, consciously borrowing analytical tools and theoretical frameworks from across (sub-)disciplines.

Is such boundary crossing easier outside political science? There is a hint that the answer might be “yes”, at least when it comes to journal publishing and status within the discipline. The problem might not be so much the topic—citizenship and immigration is important, though perhaps still of lower status than foreign policy, Congress or party systems—but it might be an issue of what counts as strong methods and legitimate theoretical frameworks in (especially American) journals. Books are a good alternative, but books might not be valued equally across sub-fields. With electronic access increasingly important for the dissemination of research results, books will also need to become as easily accessible as most journal articles.

The sociologists in the symposium—and I would include myself—hint that they feel fewer constraints. They report being able to borrow perspectives from across disciplines and to publish in a variety of venues. Although methodological fights exist, there is a broader acceptance of diverse evidentiary sources. At the same time, however, a focus on citizenship is decidedly outside the primary (American) sociology of immigration, which centers on “assimilation” debates and (somewhat less) transnationalism. The fact that all the sociologists jumped at the chance to participate in this symposium suggests that they feel power and politics have been ignored by their disciplinary brethren, making them eager to engage with political scientists. A conversation to be continued!

In his characteristic insightful—and incisive—style, Christian Joppke suggests that the “problem” of interdisciplinarity might be two distinct blinders: first, the carving up of academic life through the institutionalization and job constraints of disciplines, and second, the tendency to divide the study of citizenship and immigration as about either “America” or “the Rest”. He hints, in passing, that the more theoretically interesting work is done by those studying the world beyond America, especially those who can avoid the strictures of (American?) positivism.

Indeed, the issue of methods might be a third axis obstructing advances—and publication—on citizenship. This is an argument that Matthew Wright puts forward in his contribution to the symposium. He provocatively suggests that, within US political science, gaining “citizenship” as a disciplinary member might be, for students of citizenship and immigration, akin to a foreigner trying to gain Swiss nationality.
Wright focuses on the preferences—or biases—of reviewers and editors of the “big 3” mainstream political science journals, especially the desire for statistically significant results and causal identification. He notes that data constraints, such as few foreign-born respondents in standard surveys, skews research to center on the majority’s views of citizenship and immigration—the “N” is, of course, bigger—rather than on the minority. The framework of causality through random assignment also applies poorly to migration studies. As Wright notes, it is hard to imagine an Institutional Review Board allowing researchers to randomly assign citizenship to some immigrants but not others, in order to see if citizenship status matters.

Willem Maas identifies a somewhat different problem, one focused neither on choosing case studies nor method, but rather the effects that “publish or perish” has on all academics, political scientists or not. He worries that with increasing emphasis on publication quantity rather than quality, and fewer tenure track jobs, inter- or multi-disciplinarity pales before the problem younger scholars face in finding employment. He also worries that the academic reward system might be taking us from where he feels our focus should lie: on real-world problems, where scholars seek to describe and understand reality. He argues that if we take a problem-based approach, there is little alternative but to bridge disciplinary conventions, because problem-driven research is characterized by studying a single problem from many perspectives, inherently challenging disciplinary blinders.

But can identifying and understanding problems be separated from theory? Is theory bound by discipline? Joppke identifies three foundational scholars for the study of citizenship and immigration: Brubaker, Soysal and Kymlicka. None of the three is a political scientist, and all wrote their foundational work in the first half of the 1990s. Disciplinary background is perhaps irrelevant to Joppke’s choices, but the lack of any “foundational work” published in the last twenty years is surely a challenge to all scholars working in this area. It also invites alternative lists of foundational thinkers in the field of citizenship.

Elke Winter also mentions Brubaker in her reflection—and she alludes to the influence of Kymlicka—but she emphasizes how the field of citizenship and immigration studies has moved away from a “national model” approach. In its place, we find researchers creating indices that break apart the Weberian “ideal type” into distinct independent (or dependent) variables that can be evaluated, quantified and used to measure cross-national variation. She notes, for example, the impressive work done by Rainer Bauböck and colleagues at the EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, where researchers are not just parsing out the myriad ways one can gain or lose citizenship, but where they also share detailed profiles of dozens of nations. One of the EUDO directors, Maarten Vink, outlines in his contribution the immense networks, research hours and—one must assume—financial resources needed to carry out the data gathering and categorizing of laws and policies that are now available to scholars around the world.

Reflecting on his published work, Vink underscores its multi-disciplinarity, across law, political science, sociology, economics and political theory, but he shies away from the term “interdisciplinarity”. He notes that the reality of communicating with diverse disciplines, each with their distinctive theoretical vocabularies and methodologies, requires versatility rather than
synthesis. Perhaps this is the difference between being multi-lingual (multidisciplinary) rather than speaking Esperanto (interdisciplinary)? If so, deep interdisciplinarity is perhaps not only impossible, but not desirable since we lose the richness of any particular language in trying to speak a common, artificial one.

Vink also offers an important lesson for scholars who wish to do multi- (or inter-) disciplinary research: it is much easier when you have co-authors and leverage theoretical languages and methodological skills within a team. Implicit, at least from a North American vantage point, is the power of the European Union's financial support in pushing comparative research. This is an institutional, rather than disciplinary or intellectual reason for the arguably greater attention to comparison on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The U.S. National Science Foundation is having problems just funding U.S.-based political science, never mind supporting broad comparative data gathering and disseminating initiatives.

While impressed with the range of data now available to citizenship researchers, Winter worries about the swing from deterministic national models to complex indices unmoored from historical trajectories. Although she doesn’t frame it in this way, one is reminded of Charles Ragin's distinction between “case-oriented” and “variable-oriented” comparative research. Ragin argued forcefully that causal analysis, even with just a few cases, is possible if scholars understand cases as complex conjunctions of social, political and historical forces. Winter, along with other contributors, emphasizes the need for greater attention to what she calls “historical trajectories” to advance citizenship studies.

Such a historical approach stands out in the symposium contribution by David Cook-Martín and David FitzGerald. Their new book spans 22 countries in the Americas over two centuries. They argue that the assumed anomaly of racism in the immigration and nationality laws of liberal democracies is, instead, a patterned story with clear mechanisms over time. In fact, the United States and Canada led the way in bringing racial discrimination into migration and citizenship laws; the undemocratic governments of Latin America eventually followed their “liberal” neighbors to the north. This process can only be understood, they argue, by examining how international networks around eugenics, labor and nativism diffused ideas and made them salient in domestic politics. Cook-Martín and FitzGerald note that sociological accounts often miss this intersection of the domestic and international, a sphere better analyzed thus far by historians and political scientists.

Alexandra Délano also probes the intersection of the domestic and international, but from within the sub-field of International Relations. She would agree with Cook-Martín and FitzGerald about the value of IR concepts, but she underscores that migration and citizenship have not been a central concern for mainstream IR. Similarly, IR has not figured prominently in citizenship studies. She identifies three areas for productive conversation: around diasporic engagement practices of, for example, the Mexican and Ecuadorian consulates in the United States, which blur notions of sovereignty; on the role of international norms and global governance for conceptions and practices of citizenship; and on the role not just of sending and receiving states, but also regional or multilateral bodies. Maas also emphasizes how the continued institutionalization of the European Union problematizes simple state/individual conceptions of citizenship.
By bringing Caribbean and Latin American countries into our evidentiary and analytical tool-kit, Cook-Martín and FitzGerald remind us that another way to expand thinking on citizenship comes in examining countries beyond Europe and the Anglo-settler countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Erin Aeran Chung also makes this point in discussing the East Asian nations of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. Chung, like Winter, takes Brubaker’s ethnic/civic dichotomy as a starting point, and then argues that attention to East Asia forces a different conception, one of “contingent citizenship”. Across East Asia, modern nationhood was forged in a project of rapid industrialization and modernization in which economic development and security considerations were paramount. This means that rights for citizens were contingent on class, descent, gender or patriotism, challenging any neat insider/outsider citizenship distinction. Conversely, ancestry-based notions of citizenship produce, in East Asia, multiple generations of non-citizens who, in a variety of localities, have won or been granted citizenship-like rights without the legal status.

Chung’s contribution also echoes Cook-Martín and FitzGerald’s call for recognizing the centrality of race when thinking about citizenship. In her contribution (and her research), Chung argues that the intersection of race and citizenship plays out in unique ways in East Asian societies since some migrant-origin minority groups are phenotypically indistinguishable from the majority yet they are racialized. The resulting inclusions and exclusions, as seen in the growing phenomenon of international marriages across East Asia, spotlight the substantive contingencies of membership beyond the “paperwork” dimensions.

Whither citizenship studies? Beyond the points raised by the contributors, I’ll end by making a plea to take more seriously immigrants’ own agency, namely the participatory nature of citizenship.

In his contribution, Joppke justifies his selection of foundational scholars by linking each to what he sees as the three key facets of citizenship: status, rights and identity. Maarten Vink explicitly links his research agenda to the first, status, and outlines why it is so important. In identifying three facets of citizenship, Joppke acknowledges that some academics would include political participation, but he ultimately decides against it.3

But here we can, and should, broaden citizenship studies by bringing in insights from the behavioral politics tradition in domestic politics—when and why people engage in political acts—and from the social movements literature in sociology. I believe that the American debate on immigration reform, admittedly stalled, would not have advanced as far as it has without the social movement activism of DREAMers—unauthorized young people pushing for a path to citizenship—and the belief that Barack Obama won re-election in part because of the Latino vote. Importantly, one type of political activism demands formal citizenship, the other does not.

As many contributors note, the “national models” approach has had a significant impact on citizenship studies. Whether one views such models through a cultural, institutional or historical

3 Full disclosure: I am one of those scholars who includes participation as a conceptual facet of citizenship (see Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008).
lens, this tends to be a top-down, macro-level framework. What about immigrants’ agency? In Canada, although the ruling Conservative government is shifting citizenship discourse to a more traditional language—as Winter points out—it has not reduced immigration, ended dual citizenship, or eliminated multiculturalism, all goals of the Reform Party that the current prime minister once helped build. “Lock-in” effects (or policy feedback loops) based on high immigrant naturalization and the coming of age of a second-generation with citizenship also demands study, in North America and elsewhere.

Much of the research thus far suggests that political decisions over citizenship status and rights do not seem linked to immigrants’ political activism. State-centered decision-making may have characterized policy in the early post-World War II period in Europe (and East Asia?), but does it continue to hold today? Majority publics and immigrant-origin residents are increasingly politicized around citizenship and immigration. Does immigrant agency extend citizenship status, rights and identity to those born outside the polity? Is electoral power key, or is protest necessary? How is citizenship practiced, and contested, irrespective of formal status? These are important and understudied empirical questions, ones that demand theoretical creativity—across sub-fields and disciplines—in conceptualizing and understanding citizenship in contemporary times.

Catching Reality or Bowing to Disciplines: How to Move the Study of Citizenship
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Who would not cheer for interdisciplinarity? Only that it “smells funny”, as Frank Zappa once described “jazz”. Interdisciplinarity is one of the holiest lies in the small bit of social science that I toil on for a living.

Irene Bloemraad’s engaging invitation letter to this symposium, however, confounds two axes of evil that should be kept separate. One is the carving up of the study of citizenship by discipline that may prevent us to see the thing completely. A second is the division between those who study “America” (without actually having a name for it), while the others (“comparativists”) study the Rest, the latter often in a more theoretically ambitious way and sometimes oblivious of the positivist methods police that strangle creativity (but get you a good job).

Both axes of evil one finds equally in sociology and political science. The geographic axis is institutionalized in political science in terms of its very formal “American politics” v “comparative politics” division. But also in sociology, a world divides the geographically anonymous “race, class, gender” or “immigrant assimilation” mainstream from the more place-conscious minority that studies The Rest. It is true, however, that in other respects political science is a far flatter, more “disciplining”, and pigeon-holing cosmos than the anarchic sociology crowd, which is really a bunch of hippies (watch the different dress codes at APSA and ASA conventions). So I understand why
Irene Bloemraad (as she confessed to contributors in her invitation letter) deserted from political science to sociology early in her career.

The holy lie of interdisciplinarity is that, when things get rough, everyone denies it, for the sake of a decent graduate education and the so-called “job market”. Because, in the end, most get their degrees in a discipline and most get hired in departments that carry the name of a discipline (sociology, political science, law etc.). This may not be so bad because only the mastering of a canon enables one to see its limitations and to (wish to) go beyond it.

When I wrote Citizenship and Immigration\(^1\) (my apologies for the bland title), I did not think about disciplines. But neither did I think about interdisciplinarity. Having settled at a lower-tier (politely speaking: “difficult to categorize”) institution, yet in Paris (France, not Texas) and under excellent conditions, I did not even care about reviews anymore (which, much like “prizes” or “author meets critiques” panels, seem to hinge ever more on lobbying and early-career branding). My ambition was to press into a small book a synthetic review of the entire field (which excuses the title) and a contestable (that is, partial) argument of where liberal-state citizenship is moving in the context of international migration.

There are three watch-towers that helped me to position myself in the second, more ambitious part of the exercise. Identifying them by discipline, we have one philosopher and two sociologists. At least two of them never moved much beyond their “own” discipline (our two sociologists). The first to mention, of course, is Rogers Brubaker, a sociologist of mildly Bourdieusian leanings. His Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard UP 1992) single-handedly launched the very field of “citizenship and immigration”, while postulating the resilience of nation-states as they encounter the fact of immigration. The second watch-tower is also a sociologist, and one much more identifiable in terms of a “school”: Yasemin Soysal, a student of “new institutionalism” scholar John Meyer. Her Limits of Citizenship (University of Chicago Press 1994) was the opening shot of “post-national” thinking on citizenship. The third eminence is Will Kymlicka, a political philosopher. Kymlicka wrote the defining, normative-cum-empirical work on the ways in which culture and cultures are (and should be, from a liberal point of view) incorporated in the institution of citizenship, under the programmatic title of Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford UP 1995).

Twenty years after the three, I would not add a fourth work or author. None of the three, by the way, were an inch “interdisciplinary”. (Perhaps Kymlicka’s work was, because of its strong empirical component, but this empiricism is more at the service of a political project, to spread “multiculturalism”, than to bridge academic disciplines.) The field has hardly atrophied in the meantime; on the contrary, it is growing by the day. But the paradigms having been set, the field is growing more in the mode of normal science, with narrower questions and preoccupations than in the beginning, the pay-off being a great increase in methodological sophistication.

However, a nagging sense of incompleteness, even misguidedness of the Brubaker-Soysal-Kymlicka triumvirate set me in motion for Citizenship and Immigration. The thing itself, changing citizenship in the contemporary liberal state, appears in all three versions in rather narrow and truncated ways.

Isn't it ridiculous to find the nation-state triumphant in our era of “globalization”, where markets have proverbially taken the lead? At best, it is symbolic triumphalism that is often wrecked by postnational realities. And it is plainly wrong that citizenship is no longer the fulcrum of integration, as the postnationalists have claimed—witness the cascading recent reforms of citizenship laws in Europe. Finally, at least as political program and elite rhetoric, “multiculturalism” does not seem to be the wave of the future.

Not just were the triumvirate’s diagnoses wrong, they also espoused one-sided views of citizenship. Brubaker’s towering achievement is to spell out the logic of “closure” in citizenship, that is, its “externally exclusive” dimension that no one before had formulated so crisply. In my words, he covered mostly the status dimension of citizenship. Soysal did not talk about citizenship as status at all; hers was a statement on the rights dimension, in this returning to the legacy of T.H.Marshall. Finally, Kymlicka’s achievement, though notionally addressing the rights that minorities should enjoy under the umbrella of citizenship, was really a statement about the identity of citizenship, as necessarily imbued with the culture of the majority. Kymlicka conceded that contemporary states cannot but be nation-states; he just asked for the recognition of minority cultures as a price for this (though from a rigorously liberal view, that finds “culture”, that of majority and minority, necessary for individual freedom).

Lacking in all three was correct diagnosis and a multi-dimensional view of citizenship. These problems I tried to fix in Citizenship and Immigration. To the paradigms-cum-diagnoses of “national citizenship” (Brubaker), “postnational citizenship” (Soysal), and “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka), I propose an arrestinglly simple alternative: “liberal citizenship”, or, for a label that sticks, “citizenship lite”. This is a citizenship that:

- is increasingly easy to get (though in the shadow of immigration policies that are illiberal everywhere, including Canada);
- connotes ever less in terms of rights exclusively attached to it (immigrants being the winners on this front, which is the grain of truth in the postnational analysis);
- and is becoming thin and thinner in terms of the identities that states seek to project on it, variants of political liberalism everywhere with only fleeting local touches.

“Liberal citizenship” or “citizenship lite”, admittedly, is no theory, which makes it of limited value from a disciplinary point of view. It is a description. I would not even know where to situate the book expounding this view: is it sociology, is it political science, is it law? It is none of the three. It is not even “interdisciplinary”. Instead, it tried to catch reality, to put it naively but accurately.

Looking back at the book five years later, what would I change (say, for a second edition that, of course, will not be)? Not much really. When writing the book, I pondered whether I needed a fourth dimension of citizenship (in addition to the mentioned three, status, rights, identity), call it “political participation”. Having subsequently participated in two interesting books on the “political incorporation of immigrants” (both led by the energetic and admirably persistent Jennifer Hochschild), I remain unconvinced. Essentially, I admit, it was just laziness to stick to the chosen three. But there may be method in laziness because the political dimension of citizenship remains the one least touched by the imbroglio of migration, and it remains a distinct citizen privilege in most places, at least at the national level. And of all dimensions of integration, the political is clearly
the least urgent for immigrants, who mostly move for other reasons and have other things to worry about.

Five years later, two developments are noteworthy, one in the field of scholarship, one in the real world. To begin with scholarship, the trickle of work on “civic integration” and the new citizenship tests in Europe have grown into a small avalanche (though probably having seen its best days now). I was one of the earlier scholars to reflect on the trend comparatively, in an article published in *West European Politics* in 2007. In one of the most ambitious interpretations of civic integration to appear since, political scientist Sara Goodman-Wallace sees more variation in it than I do, tying it back to distinct national citizenship traditions. She thus speaks of “fortifying citizenship”, in contrast to my diagnosis of “citizenship lite”. I prefer to be found wrong instead of being ignored. But “fortifying” is a rather martial term for tests and requirements that are passed by the great majority of applicants for permanent residence or citizenship, and for schemes that tend to be heavily subsidized by states, including downloadable or nearly cost-free brochures that provide the right answers. I can hardly think of a more overworked, milked-out object of study, which by now is “indexed” and “content-analyzed” inward-out, with rapidly diminishing returns.

In my view, “fortification” may well be states’ intention behind civic integration, but the effort most often flounders on liberal-constitutional realities—see, for instance, the (well-deserved) fate of culturally zealous or morally inquisitive citizenship tests tried in some parts of Germany but that had to be quickly abandoned after protests by jurists and widespread media coverage. In sum, re-nationalization may well be the intention, but continued de-nationalization is the reality of evolving citizenship.

A more significant development in the past half-decade, appositely, was in the real world, in terms of yet another round in the unending saga of legally-produced European Union citizenship. In my book, I had looked at EU citizenship as exemplar of citizenship lite. Indeed, European Union citizenship is a citizenship “of our time”, exclusively about rights, above all the right of free movement, with no duty whatsoever, and decoupled from even the thinnest of identities. It is hugely ironical that just in the moment that “Europe” faces the abyss, with swastikas and riot police greeting the German chancellor in Greece, and Britain wishing to leave the Union altogether, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has put yet another spoiler onto the soapbox of European Union citizenship. When I wrote *Citizenship and Immigration* (in 2009), the Court had already lifted EU citizenship into the “fundamental status of nationals of member states” (in its 2001 Grzelczyk decision), forcing the dazzled member states to make even general tax-based and intentionally citizen-privileging social aids available to all European comers. After *Grzelczyk*, the latter could move unconditionally, as citizens, and not only, as before, conditionally, as market participants.

The next round, pushed by the ECJ’s further *Rottmann* (2010) and *Zambrano* (2011) decisions, was to remove one of the remaining anomalies of this “citizenship”, which is that it applied only in a cross-border situation, outside one’s state of citizenship. This had always entailed “reverse discrimination” for non-moving European citizens, which in my book (following jurists’ opinions) I rightly considered “unlikely to be stable”. Eventually it had to go, out of sheer legal logic, though weirdly out of touch with a rather opposite-moving sociopolitical reality.
The cross-border proviso fell quickly indeed, in *Rottmann* (March 2010). In this decision, the ECJ indicted Germany's de-naturalization of a person who had acquired German citizenship by fraud, because thus he lost also his EU citizenship. This situation was declared to fall within the scope of EU law (concretely, its citizenship clause) “by reason of its nature and its consequences”. This innocent-sounding formula is nothing short of revolutionary, because it meant that even the granting or denying of member state citizenship was no longer a sovereign state power, and that the European Union is now willing to intrude in one of the last bastions of state sovereignty in Europe: member states’ nationality laws. Ironically, this makes the EU look more like a state in the very moment that even the economic basics of the European project are put in question, not to mention that less and less ordinary people want to identify with Europe, as the explosive recent growth of eurosceptic right-wing parties testifies.

In *Zambrano*, the European Court confirmed its revolution in *Rottmann*, namely, that EU citizenship protected also citizens who had never crossed a border. In this case, the beneficiaries were rather more sympathetic types than the fugitive Dr. Rottmann: the two small children of a Columbian rejected asylum-seeker both of whom held Belgian (and thus European Union) citizenship at birth and would have been deprived of the “genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union” if they were forced to leave Belgium with their parents, as the Belgian government very much wanted.

One must realize the astounding lack of sync between the legal and sociopolitical realities of European Union citizenship, which reached new heights with these two rulings. In *Rottmann*, our European citizen hero is a criminal who had fled Austria for Germany only to escape his just punishment in Austria, and who was fully aware that he would lose his Austrian nationality upon naturalizing in Germany, his acquisition of German citizenship being based on a lie to the German authorities (of not having a criminal record). In *Zambrano*, who would not sympathize with innocent children helped here by Europe’s good judges? However, it is also fact that their parents, failed but “tolerated” asylum-seekers without permanent legal residence rights in Belgium, had strategically produced the Belgian (and thus European) citizenship of their children through *not* registering their birth in Belgium at the Columbian embassy, whereby the children had to become “Belgian” (and thus European) by rules to prevent statelessness. The Columbian parents thus bootstrapped their right to stay in Belgium, through fabricating the European citizenship of their children. This may all be perfectly legal, but it is a morally weak foundation for a European citizenship that is built by escaping the law or tricking oneself into legal residence.

So if I have any regret after writing *Citizenship and Immigration*, it would be not to have delved into the intricacies of EU citizenship more deeply—though nobody can be ahead of his time. Understanding EU citizenship requires long sessions of struggling with court decisions that are written not as nicely as US Supreme Court rules but in rather impenetrable Euro-legalese. To dust off the legal jargon and present this most astonishing new European “citizenship” in plain language would be one of the more useful ways of doing “interdisciplinary” work on citizenship today.²

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Finding a Place to Study Finding a Place
Matthew Wright, American University, mwright@american.edu

I want to draw a parallel between real-world citizenship and migration, what we study, and what one might call "disciplinary citizenship", roughly defined as securing a tenure-track job in political science. In so doing I’d like to draw your attention to the irony that the study of societal "outsiders" also seems to be predominantly carried out by disciplinary outsiders.

Of course, as a good social scientist, I cannot proceed without qualifying my argument. So here are four caveats: first, there is the silliness of having someone expound on "the discipline" as he sees it with just three post-PhD years under his belt, and without tenure. Second, this is written purely from the standpoint of hiring practice in American political science departments; I don’t pretend to understand what goes on in Europe or elsewhere, although I’ve heard the coffee is better. Third, my perspective is most applicable to a particular brand of political science, namely survey-based and empirical rather than normative and/or historical. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I fully realize that the "outsider" treatment received by many immigrants is far worse than anything academics face on the job market; the parallel is interesting, I think, but I don’t mean to stretch it too far either.

Having said all this, what is the argument exactly? Mainly that choosing to study issues in the domain of citizenship and migration puts young scholars at a serious job-market disadvantage against their peers in political science. They are, like the immigrants they study, often perceived as "outsiders", non-mainstream, and generally less preferable hires compared to those who study topics that fit more neatly within established disciplinary and sub-disciplinary boundaries. At a symbolical level, this makes it very difficult to take seriously the oft-spouted notion that political science is open to inter- and multi-disciplinarity. Substantively, there is a real risk that topics of vast importance to democracies around the world do not receive the kind of attention that they deserve, because outstanding people who would willingly study them are directed elsewhere for marketability reasons.

The marketing issue, as it applies to citizenship studies, requires some expansion. From within political science, a fledgling student of citizenship and migration must construct his or her scholarly identity in a way that is marketable to political science departments. This is something every job candidate needs to do, but it is less self-evident a task in this case than it is for, say, someone focusing on the relationship between party identification and vote choice. Even in the absence of hard data, I would guess that the number of faculty positions in political science specifically targeted at political science PhDs pursuing “migration” and/or "citizenship" is statistically zero in any given year. I daresay that the number of sociology positions (realistically) open to a junior political scientist interested in crossing the disciplinary divide is cosmically so.

This means, in practice, declaring oneself either an “Americanist” or a “Comparativist”, at least for job-hunting purposes, and throwing one’s file in with the general pool. “Hybrid” candidates cannot
(easily) have it both ways, even though there is a case to be made on substantive grounds. And there is very little mileage in selling oneself as somebody having “interdisciplinary” interests. There is no active discrimination involved, but I imagine that it is probably easier in such cases for pivotal hiring committee members to render a kind of “jack of all trades, master of none” evaluation. For somebody with this point of view, in a buyer’s market it makes more sense to choose the “master”, even at the cost of breadth of interests.

Though I do not speak from personal experience here, life does not seem any easier for people who study citizenship and migration in more focused ways. Those who study Europe are perhaps more “natural” comparativists, but in the U.S., comparativist positions are much thinner on the ground than “Americanist” ones, and in the vast majority of cases comparative positions are explicitly targeted towards Latin America, the Middle East, or Asia. Similarly, those studying immigrants from within the U.S. are shunted towards so-called “REP” positions (Race, Ethnicity, Politics), which are relatively few, and in most cases do not wind up under serious consideration for standard American “institutions” or American “behavior” positions.

Hence the irony I noted at the outset: for junior people in this line of work, it seems as though getting “citizenship” in the discipline is like gaining citizenship in a particularly rigid country. Political science, for all its myriad influences and wide ambit, seems like the Switzerland of the social sciences in that respect.

The one way, it seems to me, to gain job market traction under these conditions is by publishing in the (more or less) consensus “Top-3” political science journals—APSR, AJPS, and JOP. Of course there is nothing sacred about these outlets per se. Their value, rather, lies in the fact that they offer clear and cheap signals to “mainstream” political scientists—by which I mean the pivotal vote on a hiring committee—that the candidate in question is doing important work. Not just important to sociologists, historians, normative theorists, and other oddballs concerned with immigration and migration, you understand, but to political science.

If that’s the dish, I suppose the next step is to consider the recipe. Having submitted more than a few times to these journals, there seem to be several bars, above and beyond solid execution, that a given empirical study needs to surmount to achieve a non-trivial chance of publication: 1) It must address a “big”, “important”, and preferably “timely” issue; 2) It must report some kind of statistically significant finding in a methodologically robust way; and 3) That finding must be causally identified to an acceptable degree. I don’t think these criteria are particularly controversial in the descriptive sense. And while some would object to such criteria on normative grounds, that isn’t exactly the issue to me. My contention is somewhat narrower: namely, that these boxes are systematically more difficult to check off for those who study immigration and migration, than for those who study more “mainstream” topics.

Now, the first criterion is rarely a problem, if the first few lines of referee reports—which invariably play on the “Author[s] have chosen a pressing and salient issue to address” theme—are any indication. More often than not, the liabilities are in points 2 and 3.
Starting with the former, the bias towards publishing statistically significant results is both well-known and empirically established. Leaving aside the difficulty in establishing an arbitrary threshold for what qualifies as “significant”, there are solid reasons for rejecting null findings in an empirical study: we simply cannot tell in any statistical sense whether the non-finding stems from the absence of a relationship or the lack of statistical power to reject the null hypothesis even in the presence of one. The problem is that work on citizenship and migration, particularly where immigrants’ own behavior is concerned, tends to be disproportionately subject to this issue, either because the number of immigrant respondents to a survey is small, or because we are interested in “context” effects but lack a sufficiently large number of countries, cities, or what have you.

Point 3 tends to be even more of a problem, because research designs that permit strong causal identification are simply not feasible when it comes to questions like how policy regimes influence immigrants’ citizenship uptake and the like. Studies that deal with immigrant behavior are rarely amenable to randomized-control trials, for both logistical and ethical reasons, and natural experiments emerge only seldom.

These points help explain precisely why, in perusing top-3 articles on the topic of “citizenship” or “immigration”, one is inundated with a particular type of article, namely the kind that emphasizes mainstream public opinion and uses clever survey experiments to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that white Americans tend to favor illegal immigrants who are wealthy, fluent in English, and Norwegian over poor, non-English-speaking Hispanics. This kind of work, or at any rate the kind that eventually finds its way into the top-3, is generally excellent, to be sure, but it also has an easier time reassuring reviewers about power and identification. Researchers doing work that has a harder time doing so – and here I would include from personal experience anything based on immigrant or minority political attitudes/behaviors, though I would also assume the same for historical, case-study and other “small-n” work—has a much harder row to hoe.

Let me be clear about a couple of things: first, however it might seem, I am not whining about how difficult it is to get published in top journals. I think it should be hard, otherwise the clear and cheap signal loses its force. The point is, rather, to illustrate what I see as systematic constraints preventing citizenship/migration-oriented empirical research from being (seriously) considered in the first place. Second, I am not claiming that this type of work lacks viable publication outlets; indeed, the number of high-impact journals open to work on migration and citizenship is high, and while competition to get into these journals is stiff, at the very least one can submit work there with the understanding that it may actually get published. And finally, I am not suggesting that work published outside of the “top-3” cannot attain broad readership; only that this readership does not typically overlap with mainstream political science.

Taken together, these considerations allow me to address one of the main questions put to us by the guest editor of this symposium: “To what extent have disciplinary conventions—within political science or between academic disciplines—shaped citizenship studies in distinctive ways?” In a general sense, and at least in part because of the dynamics mentioned above, I think the study of citizenship and migration has been pushed quite heavily in the direction of things that can be easily studied—e.g. native political attitudes and xenophobia—and away from topics not easily subsumed into powerful and well-identified research designs. This certainly holds true with respect to the
study of “citizenship”, since it is relatively easy to study based on mainstream public opinion, but it is hard to imagine a research design that would randomly assign some immigrants to citizenship and others to denizenship in order to observe their behaviors. (Try that one out on your local IRB).

Do I have a solution? Unfortunately not. When I argue that something is systemically more difficult, I do not mean that it is impossible. And we may get help from unlikely places: Deans, Provosts, and other academic decision-makers are all much more amenable to concrete demonstrations of “interdisciplinarity” than the average faculty member. Policy schools are another natural place to do “political science” without being prisoners of the “Americanist / Comparative” divide. Finally, while they have yet to have real teeth, several departments have moved to reorganized subfield divisions away from American/Comparative and towards “Institutions”/“Behavior”.

There are, then, some cracks in the façade, and my hope is that in the years to come our work will come closer to achieving mainstream exposure (at least in part by adopting sounder research designs and better data), and that the mainstream will be ready for it when it comes hiring time.

**Bridging Disciplines in Citizenship Studies: Research Questions, Publication Norms, and Future Prospects**

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Contributors to this symposium are asked to comment on the extent to which disciplinary conventions, within political science or between academic disciplines, have shaped citizenship studies and what future possibilities might open themselves to those who challenge current disciplinary conventions. Contributors are also invited to highlight some of their own work, an invitation that scholars invariably find irresistible.

This invitation leads to three observations. First, bridging disciplinary conventions cannot only be a nice touch as an afterthought, something mentioned in the introduction and conclusion but not really shaping the body of research. It is necessary from the start, in the initial research design and throughout implementation, as some research questions require inter- or multidisciplinary answers. I’ll illustrate this using Willem Maas, ed., *Multilevel Citizenship* (Maas 2013a). Second, publication norms and practices may play a greater role in research “success” than strict disciplinary divides. I’ll illustrate this using Willem Maas, ed., *Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People* and the related special issue of the *European Journal of Migration and Law* (Maas 2013b; Maas 2013c). Third, the best and most transformative scholarship in citizenship studies will likely be less and less tied to specific disciplinary conventions, although researchers will need to work within career-determined norms and circumstances. Here I’ll counterpose the growing field of citizenship studies with some challenges facing academia and academics, concluding with some thoughts about the future prospects of citizenship studies within political science.
Research questions

The aim of scholarship should be to describe and understand reality. By making this claim, I assume (perhaps prematurely) that political scientists and those working in related disciplines are coming to agree with the idea that the best research is not theory—or method—driven but instead is inspired by real-world problems, the idea that political scientists should be “principled social critics whose goal is embellish political argument with political reality [...] roving ombudsmen for the truth rather than partisans of any particular message” (Shapiro 2005, 15, focusing in this quotation on political theorists but applicable more broadly to all social scientists). Whether the research methods used are qualitative, quantitative-statistical, or mixed—and whether the aim is analytical, empirical, normative, or some combination—the goal of problem-driven research is to produce and evaluate evidence. (Relatedly, in a way I still find inspirational, one of my undergraduate advisors frequently repeated that a key goal of teaching should be to encourage students to question their assumptions, to open up new ways of seeing things.)

Problem-driven research is characterized by studying a single problem from many different perspectives, and thus inherently challenges disciplinary conventions and barriers. The work involved in specifying questions and then answering them well necessitates ranging beyond any one particular theory or method. Unless a discipline or subdiscipline is unusually heterogeneous in terms of theoretical and methodological predilections, finding the best way to answer important or complex questions will usually involve approaching it from several different directions. (Simple or trivial questions can likely be answered more easily.) I think it’s a positive development that job market candidates increasingly trumpet their mixed methods and/or problem-driven approach; it means they’re less likely to be stuck in any one way of looking at things, but have considered alternatives. This is particularly true for studies of citizenship, whose subject inherently involves bridging disciplinary conventions and divides.

To illustrate how questions involving citizenship require inter- or multidisciplinary answers, let me discuss Multilevel Citizenship (Maas 2013a), which resulted from a workshop I organized. The book aims to challenge the dominant conception of citizenship as a unitary and homogeneous legal status granted to an individual by a sovereign state. It provides examples of alternative concepts of citizenship as they operated or operate in practice or as they are emerging or re-emerging. The focus is on levels of citizenship, particularly nested and overlapping geographical levels: citizenship not only of the state but of substate, suprastate, or nonstate political communities. Citizenship, the book argues, is a political construction; accepting unquestioningly its now-dominant definition obscures much of the messiness of politics by substituting an anodyne status quo. The chapters thus consider political projects that are not necessarily tied to particular states but rather exist over, under, around, and through them.

Accomplishing this agenda means looking at the problem from a variety of angles. The ten chapters following my introductory chapter are written respectively from the perspective of comparative politics and political theory (Luicy Pedroza on denizen enfranchisement), American political development and political theory (Rogers Smith on the duties of governments in Mexican America), American politics with a normative bite (Jenn Kinney and Elizabeth Cohen on non-citizens’ rights and immigration federalism), history and Middle Eastern / imperial studies (Will Hanley on Egyptian/Ottoman citizenship), comparative legal history (Elizabeth Dale on Shanghai and the Su
Bao case), critical international relations and Indigenous studies (Sheryl Lightfoot on the international Indigenous rights movement), comparative federalism and local politics (Marc Helbling on multilevel citizenship in Switzerland), comparative federalism and political theory (Eldar Sarajlić on Bosnia and Herzegovina), normative theory and legal analysis (Türküler İşıksel on corporate citizenship), and anthropology and urban politics (Catherine Neveu on the politics of scales that underlie political movements and projects). These (sub-)disciplinary labels are my descriptions; the authors may have different ways of describing their work and aims. The general point is that answering this type of question not only invites but requires a boundary-breaking response.

**Publication norms**
The idea of publish-or-perish has apparently existed since the 1940s, and it shapes the careers of everyone working in academia today. It is easy to lament practices like the UK’s Research Assessment Exercise and its successor, the Research Excellence Framework, which allocate funding by counting research output in questionable ways, arguably privileging frequent “least publishable units” over infrequent groundbreaking work: quantity over quality.

The REF, bibliometrics, and citation scores illustrate my second point, that publication norms and practices may help determine research success more than strict disciplinary divides. For illustration, let me point to Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People and the related special issue of the European Journal of Migration and Law (Maas 2013b; Maas 2013c), flowing from another workshop I organized. The book is published by Martinus Nijhoff, an imprint of Brill, which also publishes the quarterly *EJML*. Most authors are political scientists (and one geographer), but the work appeared in a law journal and a legal book series. This incidentally makes the book quite expensive, but several authors needed quick publication for tenure purposes, so the cost of the book (which affects how many people have access to read it) was less important than its speedy appearance.

Similarly, responding to what academics need for career success, many publishers are moving to a dual-publication model, in which journal special issues are simultaneously published as books. Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People includes eight chapters, and a foreword by Joseph Carens, while the journal special issue (published a few months earlier) includes only the five pieces that deal most closely with the European Union, *EJML*’s subject area. (Unlike many dual-publication models, in which the same piece is simply reprinted, the book and article versions also differ.) Dual publication is growing. For example, special issues of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (which is owned by Taylor & Francis and publishes 12 issues per year) are now being published as books by Routledge, also owned by Taylor & Francis.

As organizer of the workshop and editor of the resulting publications, I’m happy with the results, which challenge the normal way of thinking about free movement by identifying the tensions between the formal ideals that governments, laws, and constitutions expound and actual practices. But I do wonder about the suggestion (quixotic, of course; but worthwhile as a thought experiment) that academics would benefit from having a publication quota. If, instead of being pressured to write more and more, we were limited to a certain number of publications, quality might rise as quantity...
diminished. Because there would also be less to read, any one publication might be read and debated by more people.

Arguably even more pernicious than publication norms are challenges to higher education more broadly, particularly the lamentable job market and the related question of where citizenship studies fits within political science. I teach in a small department at a liberal arts college that is part of a large research university, the sole comparativist in an undergraduate department of five faculty members. Because the wider university is huge (Canada’s third-largest), with a concomitantly large graduate student population, I also participate in four graduate programs. Tenure and promotion are handled within my small department, so I have considerably more intellectual freedom than someone who needs to convince subfield peers of the relevance of his or her research. Questions such as “is this comparative enough?” or “doesn’t this fall under IR or domestic politics or theory?” haven’t affected me because my departmental colleagues accept the importance of what I do and are comfortable with the resulting citizenship and migration focus of our comparative politics offerings.

As I noted in the first issue of this newsletter, creating an APSA Section raises the professional stature of citizenship and migration studies within political science. But this may be a case of a growing slice of a shrinking pie: the burning issue is the stagnant or declining number of faculty positions. To take my liberal arts college as example: twenty years ago there were 125 tenured or tenure-track faculty for a student population of some 1400 students. Today the student population has doubled (alongside the number of programs, increasing administrative workload), but the number of TT faculty declined to under 90, with most teaching done by adjuncts who have little time for research. That’s probably an extreme: Ontario has the lowest per-student funding in Canada, and the university’s resources have been diverted to new medical and engineering schools, and possibly an entire new campus. But the general point is that prospective scholars of citizenship don’t have the luxury of debating the nuances of (sub)disciplinary conventions if they can’t first find secure employment.

To conclude this section on publication norms and career prospects, it’s worth asking how we should respond to the withering critique that, in light of “growing economic inequality, reactionary rollback, unaccountable political power, and potentially catastrophic environmental crises, the predominant intellectual product in political science remains bereft of any critical approach to society’s compelling issues. Not everything written by mainstream political scientists serves the powers that be, but very little of their scholarly output challenges such powers” (Parenti 2006, 504). Citizenship is central politically, but does challenging (sub)disciplinary conventions help speak truth to power?

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1 For more along these lines see the Chronicle of Higher Education article “The Research Bust” and the underlying report (Bauerlein 2011), which argues that the rising demand for publication output puts research agendas on a hasty schedule, so that projects that don’t fit tight deadlines or have uncertain publication prospects are avoided, making research less exploratory and more aligned with prevailing trends and interests—which obviously discourages the risky business of questioning disciplinary conventions.
Future prospects
Prediction is a tricky business, particularly (as the quip has it) about the future. But let me venture to predict that citizenship studies within political science will increasingly be more comparative and will also consider not only contemporary but also historical cases. One of the rewards of taking a historical approach is to show similarities and differences with the present.

Keeping with the invitation to highlight one’s own research, let me briefly describe my article on migration and citizenship in the Dutch Republic (Maas 2013d), published in Politics, Groups, and Identities—a new journal which, incidentally, promises to be an excellent venue for citizenship-related research. Arguing that the Dutch Republic was what may be termed the first migration state, the article contends that attracting and retaining the best immigrants was central to the transformation of the Netherlands during the seventeenth century, the Dutch Golden Age. The relative tolerance for religious and other minorities, the protection of individual rights against the state, and the relative freedom of women in the labor market were crucial in attracting immigrants who helped turn the country from a mostly rural backwater into a dominant international power. For poor young immigrant men, including those from the southern Netherlands, marrying the daughter of a citizen was the simplest way to acquire social rights; while young immigrant women had less chance because of a surplus of marriage-aged women, the daughters of Amsterdam citizens had a kind of dowry in the form of citizenship for their bridegrooms, a privilege worth the equivalent of two months’ wages. The article shows how many citizenship-related policies that some may assume are recent inventions—citizenship-by-purchase or investor citizenship, denaturalization for undesirable behavior, tax and citizenship incentives for high-skilled migrants, and citizenship as a policy tool for both inclusion and exclusion—have historical precursors.

Within the subfield of domestic politics—American politics in the US, Canadian politics in Canada, Dutch politics in the Netherlands (Maas 2014a), etc.—citizenship studies should and probably will become more comparative. No country—not even the United States, with its peculiarly large undocumented migrant population—exists in isolation. Europe has been the main site for comparative citizenship studies, but it’s questionable how long this can continue in light of increasing Europeanization exemplified by the rise of an overarching EU legal order. My book Creating European Citizens (Maas 2007) and subsequent work ponder postwar political leaders who argued that “We hope to reach again a Europe...in which men will be proud to say ‘I am a European.’
We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think as much of being a European as of belonging to their native land. And wherever they go in this wide domain they will truly feel ‘Here I am at home’,”—a quotation not from some leftist intellectual safely ensconced in the ivory tower, but from Winston Churchill (cited in Maas 2014b). Does the rise of EU citizenship mean the demise of member state citizenship, in much the same way that Bavarian or Bremen citizenship still exists but has little meaning compared to the overarching German citizenship (Maas 2014c)?

Conclusion
One of my favorite quotations about citizenship comes from Aristotle: “The first thing that must be sought is the citizen; for the city is a certain multitude of citizens. Thus who ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen is must be investigated.” Aristotle is often held up as one of the first scholars of comparative politics, among other things, and his observation still rings true: political analysis depends on defining who is or should be a member of the polity and what this means. There
may be many reasons to keep field and sub-field walls, but the burgeoning interest in citizenship studies suggests that a return to wider concerns may be warranted.

In parallel with what I’ve argued elsewhere (Maas 2010), events and transformations in the real world will likely account for many if not most new developments in citizenship studies. There is a tendency for events to surprise scholars but, in retrospect, such surprise may itself be surprising. The currently evolving situation in Crimea is illustrative, as the theme of surprise and unexpectedness characterizes press reports—and also underscores the centrality of citizenship. As early as September 2008 “Ukraine’s foreign minister charged that Moscow was providing Russian citizenship documents to inhabitants of Crimea. He expressed fears that Russia could use the presence of Russian citizens in Ukraine to justify military intervention in the future, as it did in Georgia” (Woehrel 2009, 9). In direct parallel, Russia reportedly started encouraging the adoption of Russian passports by residents of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2002 so that, when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 it could claim that it needed to protect the many residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia who were Russian citizens. In our vocation of describing and understanding reality, scholars of citizenship should aim to recognize patterns, past and present.

References
How to Avoid “National Models Thinking” Without Losing Sight of History?
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The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed a theoretical and empirical shift in the area of comparative migration studies. In the 1990s, it had become commonplace to distinguish between different ideal-types of nationhood citizenship. In the early 2000s, the adequacy and usefulness of this so-called “national-models-thinking” was increasingly challenged. Using both quantitative and “quantifiable” qualitative data, comparative political scientists started to develop citizenship and immigrant integration indicators that reposition countries along variables such as liberal/restrictive integration barriers, individual equality/cultural differences, or thin/thick national identity (for an overview and debate on immigration policy indexes, see contributions to Helbling et al. 2013). There is much to be said in favour of highly standardized and large N quantitative studies that prevent established theories from turning into self-fulfilling prophecies. But I wonder how we can avoid “national models thinking” without losing sight of historically grown social contexts that impact the meaning and form of (changing) citizenship boundaries in different countries?

Given the objective of this symposium, let me situate myself within the disciplinary panorama of citizenship studies: I am a sociologist working at the intersection of political sociology, normative theory and comparative politics; for my empirical work I use a variety of qualitative methodologies. Having obtained my primary sociological formation in the area of inter-ethnic relations, I have previously concentrated on nation-building and multiculturalism, and I have only slowly come to integrate migration and citizenship status into my studies of collective identities, boundary work and logics of inclusion/exclusion. Processes of citizenship acquisition and loss have been largely neglected by the sociological canon—pace my sociologist colleagues who do fabulous work on citizenship issues, but who, I assume, do not feel particularly mainstream in their discipline either. Thus, I never felt restricted by my discipline—although I may still be bound by ingrained conventions and disciplinary blinders.

In what follows, I will briefly review the development of the scholarship that I am conversing with most frequently and sketch out two potential answers to the question raised above.

The distinction between different types of nationhood can be traced back to the writings of Friedrich Meinecke (1922), Hans Kohn (1955), and Louis Dumont (1991). The importance of “national models” for contemporary debates on immigrant integration and citizenship was, however, restated into prominence by sociologist Rogers Brubaker, who, in 1992, argued that today’s politics of immigration and citizenship can be explained by countries’ deeply seated styles of national self-understanding. Specifically, he claimed that “France and Germany have been constructing, elaborating, and furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of nationhood and self-understanding” (1992, 1).
Although Brubaker did not use the term “model” systematically (Finotelli and Michalowski 2012, 233), in the wake of his ground breaking work, it became common to distinguish between two distinct ideal-types of nationhood, citizenship and immigrant integration. Germany with its long-standing tradition of blood-based citizenship (ius sanguinis) came to be known as both the prototype of the “ethnic nation” and the “exclusionary model” of citizenship as it excluded long-term permanent residents and their children (born on German soil but not of German descent) from naturalization. France, where the acquisition of citizenship by birth on the national territory (ius soli) is common, was increasingly depicted the closest possible incarnation of the ideal-type of the “civic nation” and/or the “republican model” of citizenship due to its emphasis on immigrant assimilation.

While the ethnic/civic dichotomy was the most widely discussed framework in the study of the ways states deal with ethnic and cultural diversity, a number of scholars have added a third “model”, namely that of the “pluralistic-civic nation” which encourages multiculturalism, that is the maintenance and public expression of ethnic group identities in addition to a shared national identity (Castles 1995). The countries that have come to stand for this type of citizenship tradition are Canada and Australia, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Sweden.

In the subsequent years, scholars tended to design their studies in ways that provided evidence in favour of the existing models (Rodal 1991; Ignatieff 1994) and/or the assumption of path dependency, i.e. emphasizing continuity in the area of citizenship legislation by interpreting current policies as (more or less unavoidable) outcomes of historical processes of institution building and national identity. Alternatively and increasingly, they used empirical data to argue that the conceptual models might exist in some laws and policies but not in others, and even less in migrants’ lived experiences (Woehrling 2000; Seymour, Couture, and Nielsen 1998; Schnapper 1998).

In the first decade of the new century, the utility of these ideal-types has come under intense scrutiny. Important policy changes kick-started a new wave of scholarship and debate.

On the one hand, in 1999, Germany introduced conditional citizenship rights based on birth on its national territory (ius soli) and non-discretionary naturalization. This invited debate about the extent to which it had left its previously assumed “path” of perpetuating a citizenship regime that was based on the “model” of ethnic nationhood.

On the other hand, scholars observed a retreat from multicultural policies (Joppke 2007), which in the late 1990s started to emerge in the Netherlands, and then spread throughout Europe in the years after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (for a critical appraisal, see Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Both developments made it imperative to rethink the existence of nationally specific and fairly path-dependent “models” of dealing with immigrant integration and citizenship. Even with respect to the United States and Canada, past scholarship may have overestimated these countries’ pluralist traditions of nation-building (Bloemraad forthcoming).
The national models approach first came under attack because some scholars observed a weakening with respect to national distinctiveness. Christian Joppke (2007, 1) pointedly argued that “Western European states’ policies on immigrant integration are increasingly converging”. Searching for explanations, scholars have pointed to the impact of a globally shared normative context (Triadafilopoulos 2012), a global flow of knowledge and “best practices” (for an example of “best practices” being spread, see Entzinger 2004), and the influence of party politics and ideologies upon shaping political responses (Gerdes and Faist 2006). Others have remained critical towards the “convergence thesis” (Jacobs and Rea 2007; Michalowski 2011; Mouritsen 2012).

A second set of commentators criticizes the epistemological and methodological value of using a “national models” approach (Duyvendak and Scholten 2011; Finotelli and Michalowski 2012). They are particularly concerned that scholars seem, mistakenly, to take ideal-types at face value, and shape their analyses in a way that either confirms or contradicts the national “model” (see contributions to a forum debate in Council for European Studies 2010).

As a consequence of these critiques, a third group of scholars set out to develop alternatives to the national models approach. In recent years, we have seen a number of cross-country analyses involving fine-grained citizenship and immigrant integration indicators. These studies go beyond comparing national ideologies and citizenship acquisition rules in law and in practice. They are either based on large N studies and/or develop indexes by taking into consideration requirements such as legal residence, language skills, and citizenship tests (Howard 2009; Goodman 2010; Huddleston and Niessen 2011; see also the constructive and critical contributions to Helbling and Vink 2013).

While these studies allow for fairly accurate assessments and country comparisons, the very nature of these studies often prevents a more detailed analysis of the specific meanings and inherent challenges of the rules and instruments associated with citizenship acquisition and citizenship loss in a given context. Take, for example, the case of naturalization instruments, such as legal residence requirements, citizenship/language courses (or similar prerequisites), citizenship tests, and citizenship ceremonies. These generic instruments have often spread as “best practices” from country to country, and they can now be found in most Western immigrant-receiving states.

How these instruments are implemented, however, varies considerably (see, for example, Paquet 2012 for a comparison of the British and Canadian citizenship tests). While the mandatory duration of legal residence and the success rates of citizenship tests can certainly be measured, these instruments acquire specific meanings—and hence have very distinctive impacts—that can only be understood in relation to the national context in which they were implemented.

What does it mean, for example, that, since 2009, newcomers at Canadian citizenship ceremonies are no longer handed out a copy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but rather a picture of Queen Elizabeth II (Griffith 2013; see also Winter 2014a)? Is this a restrictive measure, an affront against multiculturalism, or a sign of the weakening power of Québécois nationalism? Or is it merely Conservative propaganda and political avoidance of a Canadian institution that is widely associated with Liberal politician Pierre Trudeau? How can we measure and compare the presence of the
picture of Queen Elizabeth II at Canadian citizenship ceremonies to that at citizenship ceremonies in the United Kingdom?

In sum, quite often, the significance of citizenship instruments can only be assessed adequately with reference to the past. That is why Bauböck et al.’s (2006a, b) individual country case studies remain particularly insightful. But not all of us can publish two compendiums of roughly 500 pages each. Hence the question, specifically for those working within the framework of qualitative studies: how to avoid the trap of “national models” without being condemned to collecting snapshots without historical context or conducting extremely narrow case studies which rarely allow extrapolation to the national level?

I do not pretend to have found a satisfying solution to this conundrum, but in the interest of stimulating the debate, I will attempt two answers:

First, in my own work, I tend to circumvent the term “traditions” of nationhood, and rather use the notion of national “trajectories”. This is because, as Mouritsen (2012, 89) rightly puts it, “reactions to crises (i.e. perceived deficiencies of citizenship) are significantly shaped [...] by what has gone before, and political actors do the shaping in ways that reflect the shifting balances of left and right” (2012, 89). In a recent paper (Winter 2014b), I conclude that political actors in Germany and Canada share common concerns about legislating “good citizenship” in times of globalization, but their responses vary because their countries’ respective trajectories and contemporary circumstances.

These countries’ trajectories, while not path-dependent in a deterministic sense, provide a cognitive and discursive matrix into which policy changes and their justifications need to be inserted. Compromises between established groups have particular power effects. They limit the field of legitimate arguments. Hence, changes to citizenship legislation (as well as other policy changes) need to adopt a particular and at least partially predefined discourse. This is because “any way of making sense of the social world that does not at least connect to the prevailing cultural compromise is not understood and quickly marginalized in public debates” (Wimmer 2002, 37).

I’ve used a similar language and approach for comparing the “trajectories” of multiculturalism in Germany, Canada and the Netherlands (Winter 2010), and for studying the evolution of Canadian citizenship legislation (Winter 2013).

Second, I would like to remind us that, when we are thinking of the differences between “ethnic”, “civic” and “multicultural” nations, we are, in fact, dealing with ideal types and not “models”. While I do agree that these specific ideal types have largely lost their usefulness due to important policy changes, we must not forget that they are theoretical and abstract constructs, which are NOT to be found in the empirical reality.

For Max Weber (1949, 90) an ideal type is formed “by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view, and by the synthesis of a great many [...] concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged accordingly to those one-sidedly emphasized view points into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically
anywhere in reality. It is a utopia” (emphasis in original). The term “utopia” by contrast, should be treated with care: an ideal type “has no connection at all with value-judgments, and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one” (1949, 99). Hence, Weber warns us not to confound ideal types and models.

The sociological tradition of constructing typologies (Schnapper 2005) allows us to organize the “chaotic reality” and see the world in a clearer, more schematic way. Ideal types are analytical concepts against which empirical findings can then be measured. This approach avoids, at least in principle, the trap of “national models thinking” and theory as self-fulfilling prophecy. A caveat: by definition, this approach tends to emphasize extremes: its aim is to “bundle” empirical phenomena and to associate them with one ideal type or the other. Hence, if the researcher does not pay attention, grey zones and similarities can easily become overlooked.

In my own work, I have used this approach to examine the Canadian case (inductively, to establish a typology of discourses on multiculturalism in Winter 2011 Chapter 9, and deductively to analyze recent changes in Canada’s citizenship policy in Winter and Sauvageau forthcoming). The ideal typical approach also lends itself well for cross-country comparisons.

I do not pretend to have found the philosopher’s stone to solving the question of how to go beyond national model approaches and retain a sense of historical legacy. These two tentative answers—or “reminders” as I prefer to call them—are merely first steps to rethinking “sociology +” approaches to citizenship (i.e. those who borrow elements from other disciplines), and maybe they can also serve scholars working within other disciplines. Indeed, reviewing the scholarship for this contribution, it felt awkward to “brand” scholars according to a single discipline. Hence, we may agree that “discipline +” approaches are indeed necessary in order to develop stronger scholarship on citizenship.

Acknowledgement
This contribution expands on aspects that were first presented in Winter (2014b). Many thanks to Irene Bloemraad for inviting me to this symposium and for helpful comments.

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Citizenship Studies: Interdisciplinary and Comparative

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Citizenship is an elusive phenomenon; what it means to be a citizen is essentially contested (Van Gunsteren 1978; cf. Gallie 1956) and how citizenship is practiced is contingent on the context in which it is situated. As a result, studying citizenship asks versatility from the analyst in two important ways: while interdisciplinarity is required to capture the multi-dimensionality of the concept of citizenship, a comparative approach is essential to capture its contingency.

My own approach has been to wholeheartedly embrace both interdisciplinarity and comparison, though within an approach to citizenship which some might see as relatively narrow (or even ideologically-biased, if you want). This approach revolves around a conception of citizenship as essentially a legal status and a relationship between an individual and a state that entails specific rights and duties (see the Citizenship Glossary on the EUDO Citizenship Observatory). My research focus has been primarily on a formalistic conception of citizenship (often termed “nationality” in international law and in many national jurisdictions). I have mostly left aside the study of what, from a neo-republican perspective, may be termed the “praxis” of citizenship. Such an approach would focus on the virtues and, especially, the competences of individuals to act as responsible and autonomous members of a public community (see the work of Benjamin Barber [e.g. Barber 1984] and of my former PhD supervisor Herman van Gunsteren, in particular his 1994 book A Theory of Citizenship). While I recognize that citizenship is more than having a passport, my own research agenda has focused less on the substance of citizenship (what it means to be a citizen) and more on the nominal side of citizenship (who is a citizen?), drawing on the terminology of Rainer Bauböck (1994).

Citizenship, however, is more than a legal status and empirically we often see that the question of who is (or: can be) a citizen is expressed and decided in identity debates. A political analysis of nominal citizenship thus also involves studying the politics of citizenship and immigrant integration, such as related to issues of racial equality, multiculturalism, dual citizenship and political participation. Such debates about who belongs to the political community and what it means to belong reflect historically evolving (and thus contingent) conceptions of civic identity, as
demonstrated by Rogers Smith's (1997) account of US citizenship. In other words, if one aims to understand differences in the way in which political communities attribute membership, one needs to bring in broader debates about membership and belonging.

Of course, as emphasized both by proponents of postnational citizenship (see e.g. Soysal 1994), as well as their critics (see e.g. Schuck 1998), the nominal side of citizenship (that is, legal status) and the substantive side of citizenship (rights/obligations and participation) cannot be seen apart from each other. After all, without substance, there would be no point in discussing membership. In a strict legal sense, one could thus argue that the fewer rights exclusive to citizens, the more citizenship as a status is devalued. In a broader sense, this also relates to citizenship conceived as identity: would one still expect citizens to have a strong feeling of being part of the nation or to participate in civic activities if the relevant locus of politics has shifted to other (regional, global) levels? While the precise nexus between status and substance can be debated, such controversy is precisely why I would argue that research on citizenship as a status necessarily needs to take into account citizenship as substance; in the end, status, identity, rights and participation are all inherently related. In my own research on citizenship as a status this is reflected, for example, in taking into account the added value of citizenship for immigrants; my research interest there is to analyze why the so-called “naturalization premium” is perceived differently by various immigrant groups, taking into account individual characteristics, as well as contextual factors at the origin and destination country level (Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers 2013).

Within research on citizenship as a status, academic disciplines provide seemingly self-evident different starting points and perspectives. Legal scholars focus on citizenship law (or nationality law), describing and assessing national laws in light of constitutional and international law standards and, when engaging in comparison, categorizing the differences between legal systems. Political scientists focus on the politics behind citizenship law. Historians focus on the development of citizenship laws and debates in (usually) one national context. Political theorists concentrate on the arguments in favor and against certain aspects of citizenship laws (and of the notion of citizenship as such). Finally, sociologists and anthropologists examine the experience of citizenship and the motivations to acquire it while economists instead evaluate the added value of citizenship (e.g. in terms of labour market performance). This may seem like a neat academic distribution of labour and, in my view, largely captures how citizenship studies are organized professionally. Yet this concise listing is also a misleading one in the sense that much of the work that is produced actually cuts across these academic disciplines.

My own citizenship research fits such an interdisciplinary approach, though not always in the strict sense of the word. Indeed, I have covered most of disciplinary approaches listed above in the past 15 years, though to a large extent through distinct projects. I have done work that fits mostly in political science/international relations (on the Europeanization of citizenship policy in the Netherlands, Vink 2001), in history (on the history of the concept of citizenship in the context of the Netherlands, Vink 2002), in comparative law (on the trends and regulations in citizenship policies in Europe, Vink and De Groot 2010; De Groot and Vink 2010 and on protection against statelessness, Vonk, Vink and De Groot 2013), in sociology (on determinants of naturalization among immigrants in Europe, Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers 2013), in economics/sociology (on the relation between naturalization and employment status, Prokic-
Breuer, Dronkers and Vink 2014; Vink and Schmeets 2014) and in political science/political sociology (on citizenship configurations in Europe, Vink and Bauböck 2013; Vink, Bauböck and Dumbrava 2014, or on the link between naturalization and integration policies in Europe, Huddleston and Vink 2013).

So in some ways my citizenship work is perhaps better described as multi-disciplinary, which has made it easier to fit in with different disciplinary conventions, but also challenging in that it requires versatility in different methodologies and different theoretical vocabularies. To state the obvious, writing a comparative legal analysis of citizenship laws requires a fundamentally different approach than a statistical analysis of the determinants of immigrant naturalization rates. Without co-authors with strong backgrounds in law, sociology, economics and political theory, it would have been impossible to cover the same range of disciplinary approaches within one body of work. Talking from personal experience, such co-authorships underline how fruitful it can be to collaborate with scholars from different academic disciplines, especially because there is a strong potential for positive spillover from such collaborations. For example, while some of the work I have done with my colleagues from law may seem more descriptive to a political scientist, for me such work provided a systematic understanding of citizenship laws, including jurisprudence, which in turn allowed me to better understand the political functionalities of the different aspects of citizenship laws. Thus, while from a narrower understanding of what a political science approach to citizenship should be it might not make sense to engage in a legal categorization exercise, for me such a view would be shortsighted and miss the point that citizenship studies is a field par excellence where such collaborations should be encouraged; understanding the bigger picture requires insights from these various disciplines.

My work within the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory (http://eudo-citizenship.eu, co-directed by Rainer Bauböck, Jo Shaw and myself) in particular has helped me enormously not only to understand the legal intricacies of the various ways in which citizenship can be acquired and lost in different states, but also how a systematic knowledge of citizenship law is required for a good understanding of citizenship politics. Our comparative typology on acquisition (Vink, Vonk and Honohan 2013a) distinguishes 27 ways in which citizenship can be acquired and the typology on loss (Vink, Vonk and Honohan 2013b) distinguishes 15 ways in which it can be lost. While most of the work on collecting and interpreting data from more than 45 European states draws on comparative law—and draws on the help of a large network of experts—once these data became available, they open significant new avenues of research. For example, not only does a comparative typology help understand the peculiarities of specific countries, but moreover large datasets such as the ‘Citizenship Law Indicators’ (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/indicators/eudo-citizenship-law-indicators) allow for testing hypotheses about cross-national differences in citizenship traditions, about the impact of legal differences on social outcomes (e.g., naturalization rates or integration outcomes), or about the relation between citizenship policies and related policies (such as integration policies, electoral policies, etc.). Comparative law arguably also benefits from social science approaches, particularly in terms of adding comparative rigor to a field that was traditionally dominated by country-by-country descriptions, rather than true comparison. The strong connection between EUDO CITIZENSHIP and the European Commission, especially the Directorate-Generals on Home Affairs and on Justice (through the ad-hoc funding of specific projects on immigration integration and EU citizenship), as well as the Council of Europe, among others,
evidence that this comparative work can be both academically interesting and relevant to policymakers.

Finally, how to bridge not only disciplinary divides, but also geographic divides, first of all between Europe and North America, but arguably more challenging, between the developed world and the rest of the world? Much of the comparative literature on citizenship is still regionally focused or, at best, covers the situation in developed economies of Europe, North America and Oceania. These limits are partly understandable due to constraints in resources (e.g. data collection) and expertise (e.g. the interpretation of citizenship laws in a democratizing or even authoritarian context requires a different perspective). While on the one hand this bias provides a relatively manageable and relatively homogenous context (in the sense of economically developed democratic states) against which to analyze the diversity of citizenship issues, on the other hand this implies that there is hardly any work where findings from Europe and North America (for example, on the politics of citizenship laws or immigrant naturalization) are extended to Africa, Asia or Latin America.

For this reason my own research focus is—gradually—extending to a global level. For example, I have recently coordinated the construction of a new Global Dual Citizenship Database, which covers rules on the loss of citizenship after the voluntary acquisition of another country, in 200 countries since 1960 (Vink, de Groot and Chun 2013). Apart from the possibilities to explore traditional research questions on dual citizenship in a new global perspective, with a large temporal scope, what was encouraging for my colleagues and I was that we found the step from Europe to the world relatively manageable, based on the comparative typologies we had previously tried and tested in the European context. We are now also preparing a global expansion of the comprehensive typology of all modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship within EUDO CITIZENSHIP. In a first expansion phase of 2014 and 2015, we foresee the addition of around 30 countries in North America, South America and the Caribbean; in subsequent expansion rounds we hope to add Africa, Asia and Oceania. In parallel to the geographic extension of the existing databases, EUDO CITIZENSHIP also plans to gradually add a longer time dimension, allowing users to test hypotheses on convergence, securitization and other notable trends in citizenship. Finally, we plan to achieve the same geographical and temporal expansion for the recently launched database on electoral rights (http://eudo-citizenship.eu/electoral-rights).

Needless to say such an ambitious research agenda provides work for a number of years and its implementation will depend on continuing institutional support, external funding and the willingness of country experts and consortium partners to contribute to the citizenship observatory; however, if successful, these efforts will facilitate the study of questions on the politics of acquisition and loss of citizenship, as well as the practice of political citizenship rights, truly comparatively.

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We came of academic age under the mentorship of scholars who encouraged us to look for answers to our questions beyond our own disciplinary village of sociology. And we have indeed learned from our friends in kindred disciplines like political science, history, economics, and anthropology. The subjects that captivated our attention—states, migration, ethnicity, and nationality—called out for a diversity of approaches. Our respective biographies as people who grew up in Latin America and the Middle East while maintaining ties to the United States likely made these approaches resonant with our experiences. We each completed multi-sited fieldwork early in our careers that showed how political outcomes for the people with whom we engaged were linked to other times and places (FitzGerald 2009; Cook-Martín 2013). Along the way, we each crossed disciplinary boundaries with the same fluidity with which we had crossed borders growing up, gaining encouragement and new insights from scholars in other disciplines.

In the course of our respective scholarly journeys, we have become deeply interested in how what happens at one point in time affects subsequent developments, how to avoid national constraints on our understanding of the political world, and a keen awareness of how inattention to scope conditions undermines theories of migration and citizenship policy. Whether induced by disciplinary convention and/or by ideological assumptions about nation-states and modes of governance like democracy, these scope conditions can lead to mistaken conclusions about the determinants of immigration and nationality law. To illustrate the possibilities of cross-disciplinary dialogue, we discuss an approach based in such a conversation and developed in the course of an eight-year research project that examines the determinants of immigration and nationality policy patterns in 22 countries in the Western Hemisphere since 1790 (FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014).

What explains the rise and relative decline of ethnically selective laws?
Our study shows that every country in the Americas has a history of explicitly selecting immigrants according to ethnic criteria. The United States introduced a white racial prerequisite to naturalization in 1790, immigration provisions restricting blacks in 1803, and later restrictions on other groups. Every other country then adopted its own restrictions. The United States and Canada were late to follow undemocratic countries in Latin America in moving away from such policies in the late 1930s and 1940s. These patterns are surprising in different ways to conventional and critical race perspectives.
The received wisdom is that the historical presence of racism and liberal democracy is an anomaly that was worked out over time (Joppke 2005). Critical race theorists counter that racism was part and parcel of liberalism (Omi and Winant 1994). Both explanations fall short substantively and empirically, in large part due to the methodological consequences of taking a short time horizon and neglecting interactions between causal factors in the domestic and international domains. We take a longer view of policy development that pays close attention to how decisions at one point in time affect subsequent policy patterns, as well as to the intersection of national and international politics and their impact on immigration and nationality law.

The temporal plane
Drawing on the longue durée school of history's approach, our study of more than two centuries of policy reveals that processes unfolding slowly—such as the end of slavery and decolonization—are as decisive as relatively more discrete events like World War II. Building on institutionalist perspectives from sociology and political science, we study path dependence, diffusion, and the sequence of events. Unlike mainstream economics, we seek to determine the source of political actors' preferences and interests rather than taking them for granted. Cuban employers' insertion of a provision in the 1906 immigration law to attract temporary workers from Sweden and Norway to cut sugarcane, for instance, is a preference that demands historical explanation, rather than an inherent interest to be assumed.

Path dependence
New institutionalists stress that current preferences are sharply constrained by past decisions and taken-for-granted norms about realistic or appropriate options. We seek to identify the turning points when major change does occur as well as explain how a particular policy remains in place even as the historical context shifts. Understanding which paths are reinforced has been made needlessly difficult in sociology and political science by a tendency to conflate organizations and norms under the umbrella of "institutions". We examine how organizations such as the UN reinforce or challenge norms about legitimate grounds for selecting immigrants.

Diffusion
Policy diffusion is the process by which the adoption of ethnically selective policies by one country affects the probability of adoption by other countries (Strang 1991). Taking a long and comparative view of immigration and nationality law, we map the convergence of policies on a racially selective pattern, and explain the diffusion of that pattern as a result of distinct mechanisms of emulation, strategic adjustment, and leverage. A subsequent wave of deracialization took place beginning in the 1930s. Over time, countries with very different levels of immigration, ethnic composition, political systems, labor markets, and sizes converged on similar policies (cf. Weyland 2005, 275). It is only by analyzing the interactions of different policies on a global political field that the policies of each country can be understood (FitzGerald 2012).

Sequence
The sequence of events behind the rise and demise of ethnic selection is also important. The role of liberal democracy in promoting ethnically selective policies could not be understood by simply correlating these policies with regime type in a regression. Democratic polities, particularly the United States, but also the self-governing colonies that became Canada and Australia, led the way in
modeling laws of racial discrimination. Undemocratic governments in Latin America eventually copied their policies, primarily through a mechanism of adjusting to the perceived consequences of those policies. Similar policies that were developed at different times had slightly different causes, because late adopters learned from the experience of pioneers. Comparative-historical sociology and qualitative approaches in political science, such as American Political Development, are far more attuned to the role of sequence than standard accounts relying on quantitative evidence alone.

The sequencing of policy is also necessary to explain why norms endure. The current norm against selecting immigrants by origin is strong in part because the de-ethnicization of policy eventually changed the political structure. The demise of ethnic selection is self-reinforcing, because the admission and political incorporation of ethnic minorities enables the establishment of domestic ethnic lobbies. While ethnic lobbies in the 1940s to 1960s were minimally important in ending ethnic selection in the United States and all but irrelevant in Canada, in both cases, the presence of lobbies is now an important reason that the norm against negative ethnic selection of immigrants is sustained.

The domestic plane
We take a pluralist view of class interest and politics derived from Robert Dahl, but also stress the construction of interests and preferences from an institutionalist perspective. Class-based perspectives on ethnic selection focus on the competition between capital and labor. In general, capital has supported more ethnically expansive policies, while labor has supported more ethnically restrictive policies. Capitalists seek to expand the supply of labor, and thus cheapen it, by encouraging immigration. They drive down labor costs further by recruiting ethnic outsiders who are willing to work for lower wages and under worse conditions than natives would tolerate. Businesses have also used ethnic outsiders as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy to break strikes and prevent the development of labor solidarity. Labor, on the other hand, typically seeks to restrict immigration to tighten labor markets and drive up wages. Native workers feel particularly threatened by immigrants from racialized groups.

Some analysts argue that it was not racism, but racialism that shaped immigration law. Racism is an ideology that posits the natural superiority of some groups over others; racialism recognizes human differences but does not organize people in a hierarchy. Economist James Foreman-Peck, in his study of the determinants of immigration law in the United States and South Africa from 1815 to 1915, maintains that interest groups engaged in racialism when they used race as a proxy for skill levels to exclude Chinese workers and prevent wage decline. In this view, labor market competition is enough to understand the racial selection of immigrants. In their study of immigration policy in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and Canada between 1860 and 1930, Timmer and Williamson (1996, 96) argue, “There is no compelling evidence that xenophobia or racism was at work in these economies, once underlying economic variables are given their due”.

Class conflict is indeed an important explanation for patterns of ethnic selection. It is, however, insufficient. Taking a historical and long-term institutionalist view shows that ideas of who makes a good worker are the product of shifting racial ideologies about the inherent characteristics of particular groups. These claims reflect employers’ biases, job segregation, and the structural conditions of origin and destination economies rather than innate characteristics of the workers.
Racial categories were not proxies for skill levels; they were ideological rationales for creating different levels of skill.

Strictly class-based accounts also struggle to explain the malleability of class preferences over time in the same countries. Policymakers’ rankings of different European groups have varied. Workers’ preferences have also varied by political ideology and changed over time. Class-based groups supported overtly racist policies against Asians, Jews, and blacks even in the absence of economic incentives to discriminate. Business owners followed ideological as well as instrumental economic motivations in selecting employees, and when selecting potential neighbors and fellow citizens, employers have been more likely to follow non-economic logics.

The “scientific racism” of the late nineteenth century gave academic legitimacy to the idea of a hierarchy of biological groups. By the turn of the century, political elites across the ideological spectrum subscribed to the premise that eugenics could improve the biological constitution of national populations. The eugenicist language of selection and improvement easily translated into immigration policy. Lamarckism, the notion that environmental factors could alter genetic transmission, especially influenced Latin American eugenicists. Combined with an infusion of white immigrants and the creation of state-led modernization programs, Latin American elites hoped to whiten and improve their countries’ genetic stock.

A long view, however, also suggests that while racism has played an important causal role in the development of immigration law, it does not explain why racialized policies that were the norm throughout the Americas have been replaced by laws that are not overtly discriminatory and that often include explicit anti-racist provisions. Critical perspectives on race counter that in the reaction against Nazism, racism was transformed from an ideology of biological difference to one of cultural difference. Even when overtly racist policies are dismantled, discrimination continues through other means, such as institutional racism and the differential application by race of policies that are neutral on their face. One corollary of this perspective is that the formal law does not matter as much as the law in practice and its effects (Omi and Winant 1994; Fan 1997).

There is no question that institutional racism endures in social life and policy throughout the hemisphere. In immigration policy, there is evidence that public debate and enforcement disproportionately target particular ethnic groups in some countries, such as Latinos in the United States (Hing 2004). Even where laws are written in ethnically neutral terms, their enforcement sometimes targets particular groups. The claim that racial discrimination is simply achieving the same racist ends by subterfuge, however, does not explain the transformational shift away from Europe in the sources of immigration to North America. The U.S. and Canadian governments radically transformed their ethnic selection policies in the 1960s in ways that quickly led to large flows of groups that were formerly restricted. While there is a historical debate about the extent to which U.S. policymakers in the 1960s anticipated the full consequences of policy changes, the effects on immigrant origins quickly become clear. Yet there has been no serious effort to roll policies back to the era dominated by European-centric selection.

In contrast to the strictly pluralist view of policymaking that emphasizes economic, ethnic, and other interest groups, institutionalists locate the causes for changing patterns of ethnic selection in
the entrenched ideologies and practices of politics. For example, the onset of anti-Chinese restrictions in the United States and Canada in the late nineteenth century reflected the ability of Sinophobic labor groups on the distant Pacific coast to use democratic channels of elections and parliamentary representation to make their demands heard in their respective federal capitals in the east. Democracies are not the only form of government that facilitates ethnic selection. Democratic, totalitarian, and corporatist states all share high levels of “societal inclusiveness”, even if they vary dramatically in the degree to which they permit political debate and the contestation of policies (Dahl 1971). Given the historical propensity of organized labor, in particular, to demand the restriction of immigration along ethnic lines, any political system providing institutional avenues for demands from below is more likely to promote restrictive policies. Indeed, populist regimes as well as liberal democracies have encouraged ethnic selection.

**The intersection of the national and international**

A third dimension to our analysis takes into account a determinant of immigration policy that is neglected in many sociological accounts: the politics and processes that happen at the intersection of the domestic and the international. Stripping off national blinders that *a priori* categorize interest groups as “domestic” when they actually span national borders exposes the links between the horizontal and vertical dimensions in the mechanism of diffusion by emulation, which refers to policymakers in one country modeling their policies on those of another country or institution, either as an example of what to do or of what not to do. Networks organized around eugenics, labor, and nativism illustrate how actors that are usually thought of as domestic were agents of international diffusion in both the racialization and deracialization phases of immigrant selection.

Historians and political scientists have called attention to the international dimension of immigration policy primarily by stressing security interests, but also the softer, ideological politics of the international political field. The hard power politics of security was a decisive factor in immigrant selection in the colonial period and early years of state formation, and its importance reemerged during the world wars and the Cold War. Highlighting the security motives of immigration policy draws fresh attention to the interactions between states that are competing with each other by using immigration and emigration as a policy tool.

Migration policies are dramaturgical acts aimed at national and world audiences (e.g. Andreas 2001). Policies are a way to build a country's international brand, such as the image that Argentina is an oasis of European civilization, Brazil is a racial democracy, and Canada is a beacon of international humanitarianism (see van Ham 2008). Branding is a form of what Joseph Nye calls “soft power”, in which governments seek to expand their prestige through language, images, and symbolically-important gestures. Thus, in the 1960s, the U.S. and Canadian governments abandoned their national-origins systems for selecting immigrants as a symbolic global statement of openness meant to support hard geopolitical goals in the Cold War. Self-interested diplomacy reinforced the growing norm of racial egalitarianism.

The questions we have asked and the answers divined would have been impoverished by taking either of the more conventional approaches common in our discipline: 1) exclusively examining processes within one country or 2) comparing policies in multiple countries and explaining variation among them without attending to the effects of interactions among the countries or the
several ways that time shapes outcomes. Attention to time helps uncover the sources of ethnic preferences, identifies factors that reinforced or changed the paths of immigration policies, recognizes long-term processes of convergence in policy across cases that can then be explained by attention to policy diffusion, and examines how the sequence of policies within a particular country, and across cases, explains why they developed and the prospects for future change. A three-dimensional analytic approach suggests the promise of crossing disciplinary boundaries by borrowing from the constructivism of international relations, pluralism of political science, the longue durée school of history, and new institutionalism of sociology and political science.

References

Citizenship and International Relations
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Porque la salud es un derecho,
tu Gobierno te asiste en el lugar donde te encuentres.

Casa Ecuatoriana, New York City

“Because health is a right, your government assists you wherever you may be.” This is how the Casa Ecuatoriana, a subset of the Ecuadorian Consulate, advertises the health services it provides to Ecuadorian citizens in New York. In addition to traditional consular services offered by the Ecuadorian government such as documentation, legal assistance or support with relocation to

1 I thank Irene Bloemraad and Nando Sigona for their comments, and Jackie Vimo for her research assistance.
Ecuador, representatives of the Ecuadorian government consider their responsibilities to the migrant community now also to include helping them integrate into their host country. This commitment is manifested through the promotion of health services such as diagnostic tests, information sessions and training, or education services that include English language courses, certificate programs and citizenship classes. Many of these programs are offered by the Ecuadorian government in collaboration with a variety of institutions in the United States, from non-profit groups to hospitals and public schools.

Though normally such tasks would fall solely under host state’s responsibility as part of the process of supporting migrants’ integration and ultimately their acquisition of citizenship, in the past two decades, Ecuador, Mexico, and other countries of origin of migrants in the United States have been increasingly taking part in these activities, changing traditional interpretations of territorial sovereignty and principles such as non-intervention. Put in the larger context of diaspora engagement policies, which are more and more popular around the world, these practices—directed at establishing closer ties between the home country and the emigrant population—are one of the clearest manifestations of the reconceptualization of the boundaries of citizenship and the rights and obligations that come with it, beyond the territorial limits of the state. Traditional notions of states, nations, and sovereignty, central to the discipline of International Relations, are being reconfigured in a more mobile and interconnected world, requiring new empirical and theoretical approaches.

Existing work on transnationalism has firmly established that the increasing connections between migrants and their home countries are changing practices of citizenship and stretching the boundaries of sovereignty and territory. Although IR theorists engaged with the concept of transnationalism in the 1970s, particularly through Keohane and Nye’s theory of interdependence (1971), their work did not directly address issues of migration or identity. Migration traditionally has not been a central concern for International Relations, except as it relates to security concerns. In general, the changing boundaries of citizenship and national identity are considered a domestic concern and therefore not a subject of interest for mainstream International Relations. Critical and constructivist theorists have more recently engaged with questions about national identity, the changing boundaries of the state and the practice of sovereignty (Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Varadarajan 2010). But just as citizenship studies have generally not included an IR perspective (Ragazzi 2009), with noteworthy exceptions (Brand 2006), there is very limited work in International Relations theory on questions of citizenship. What can an IR focus contribute to debates about citizenship? How can IR engage with other disciplines to reframe its concepts and understand how actors that matter in IR—from the state to diasporas or international organizations—are changing?

I propose three areas in which an IR focus can contribute to understanding the changes in the conceptualization and practice of citizenship. First, I focus on the extension of citizenship to the population living outside the state’s territorial borders and its implications for bilateral and regional relations, particularly focusing on dual citizenship and external voting rights. Second, I examine the role of international norms and global governance in shaping diaspora policies with implications for conceptions and practice of citizenship. Third, I discuss the impact of the extension of the boundaries of citizenship through diaspora engagement practices and its impact in consular and
diplomatic practices. Throughout this analysis I also highlight areas in which IR scholars would benefit from a deeper engagement with other disciplines.

I. Dual citizenship in a bilateral and regional context

A key question in the burgeoning literature on state-diaspora relations is why states decide to extend citizenship rights to the population living outside its borders. Clearly, this decision responds to domestic interests (economic and political) and serves as a tool for nation-building and identity construction (Varadarajan 2010; Collyer 2013). Its main implications are at the national level—particularly in the case of external voting rights or special representation for citizens living abroad. However, as is clear from Waterbury’s (2010) work, the extension of citizenship to the population living outside the state’s borders is not just about reframing narratives of nationhood for domestic purposes; it is also a strategic calculation influenced by changes in external conditions, including interstate relations, international or regional norms and host-state policies. This external context constrains or expands origin states’ opportunities to engage the population living in another state. As such, the extension of voting rights, dual nationality or other benefits can be a response to discrimination against the emigrant population in a host state. It can also be used as a way to legitimize a regime vis-à-vis a regional or international body or as a tactic of aggression against the host state.

The question of citizenship is not just about the relationship between the migrant, the state of origin and the state of residence, which is the usual triad in transnational studies, but it also involves regional players. For example, in the case of the European Union, the question of kin-state engagement with its ethnic population in another state (e.g. Hungary’s nationality law) and the extension of rights have created tension between member states and raised concerns about the regional integration project (Waterbury 2010). In this sense, external actors provide incentives and disincentives for compliance with certain norms and expectations regarding transnational practices, including the extension of rights to citizens living in another state.

Although there is generally a positive view of such developments, in some cases, the extension of the bond of citizenship to citizens of another state is still seen as a violation of sovereignty (see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Comparative work on dual citizenship policies is needed to understand state interests in promoting such initiatives and whether they are in fact pointing toward the spread of liberalism or rather represent a response to strategic security or sovereignty concerns (Fitzgerald 2006; Staeheli et al. 2012; Brand 2014). But in order to fully understand state interests with regard to the extension of rights for citizens living outside its territory, or state reactions to other governments extending rights to populations within its territory, it is necessary to go beyond the state-centric perspective in IR to consider the internal, transnational, and global context in which these policies are designed and implemented and the ways in which various actors involved—including citizens and non-citizens, within and outside the territorial boundaries of the state—respond to, contest or disrupt existing legal, political and social frameworks of citizenship (McNevin 2011).

Recent work focusing on citizenship as lived experience and a process, and not just as a legal institution (Isin and Turner 2007; Bauder 2014; Staeheli et al. 2012; Neveu et al. 2011), also pushes researchers to consider the various spaces, scales and contexts in which multiple citizenship is
practiced and enacted, beyond the formal granting of dual citizenship or external voting. This is an agenda that pushes mainstream International Relations literature to move beyond fixed interpretations of state and nation, both structurally and spatially, and to engage with research by geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists who have already begun to remap this terrain beyond legal and territorial boundaries focused solely on sovereign power.

II. Citizenship, international norms and global governance
A growing number of states are adopting very similar policies to extend citizenship rights to their populations abroad and creating dedicated institutions to support related programs (Agunias 2009; Gamlen 2006; Collyer and Vathi 2007; Ragazzi 2014). Save for a few exceptions (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2006; Waterbury 2010; Délo 2011; Gamlen et al. 2013) most studies do not take into account the role of bilateral relations between the home and host countries, or of regional or multilateral forums as factors that influence the timing and form of policies to extend rights to populations living outside the state’s territory and the convergence of policies in this regard.

Theories of norm diffusion in International Relations and policy transfer in Political Geography are useful frameworks to understand how and why the extension of economic and political rights to citizens living abroad has become widespread and which “best practices” are being followed (Iskander 2010; Délo 2014). For example, a constructivist approach emphasizes that shared ideologies, perceived similarities among countries and sociocultural linkages are key in explaining how and why certain policies are transferred or emulated (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007). However, tracing the processes through which “learning” takes place also pushes us to look outside formal sites of governance and focus on the “multi-layered patchwork” of formal and informal institutions and practices at below, above, and across the nation-state level” (Gamlen 2011, 266), which constitute the rich and fragmented tapestry of global migration governance (Betts 2011). As Iskander’s (2010) work has shown, this also allows us to see the state as a site of creativity where ambiguity can lead to innovation in the context of a dialogue with citizens (within or outside the state’s territorial borders). This is significant for the discussion about the intersections between International Relations and citizenship studies because it shows the adaptability of the state (and the nation) in the face of challenges to its central tenets of sovereignty, citizenship and territory.

Much more work needs to be done in order to establish why international organizations are promoting the extension of links between the state of origin and its citizens living abroad, if they in fact play a role in why states or diasporas are adopting them, and how this is changing interactions between states, international organizations and individuals or groups at the international level. Is there in fact a normative consensus on the extension of citizenship rights? Are states also responding to incentives to improve their image with multilateral or regional bodies or obtain assistance in support of these or other programs—particularly those focused on development (de Haas 2006)? These are key questions where IR scholars can contribute to understand the role of international organizations and international norms in debates and practices of citizenship.

III. Diplomacy and the extension of citizenship
Although the engagement between states and their citizens abroad is becoming a common practice and is increasingly accepted, particularly when framed in the context of the migration-development nexus, in some cases both sending states and receiving states are cautious with regard to how these
policies may be seen as an affront to sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. In the case of Mexico, for example, in reaction to restrictionist immigration policies and anti-immigrant discourse in the U.S. there has been a significant move toward increasing the range of services and programs available to emigrants in the United States, with a view toward promoting their integration and their empowerment, increasing consular protection, as well as responding to U.S. immigration and border control policies through diplomatic channels. Mexico’s active engagement with a population that until recently it had neglected represents, among other shifts in national discourse and politics, a reinterpretation of its traditional policy of non-intervention (Délano 2011). Although there are still reactions within certain groups and government officials in the U.S. that see Mexico’s activism in relation to its population in the country as a violation of sovereignty, the cost of these reactions no longer outweighs Mexico’s calculations of the benefits of engaging its citizens abroad, both in terms of legitimacy and potential economic and political benefits in the long term.

In addition to concerns about non-intervention, the focus on reactions to these policies from the host country has so far mostly been about whether stronger linkages between migrants and their home country will hinder their process of integration or their loyalty (Huntington 2004; see DeSipio 2006). Most studies conclude that immigrant incorporation and enduring transnational processes such as participation in migrant organizations or absentee voting are not contradictory and may even complement and reinforce each other by transferring skills, experience and networks to their activities in the host country (Jones-Correa 2001; Portes et al. 2008; Somerville et al. 2008). However, the Mexican case and the earlier example cited here from the Casa Ecuatoriana, draw attention to an underexplored area in studies of integration and citizenship, namely, how the sending state may play a role in the process of integration (Délano 2010).

As states like Mexico and Ecuador become active promoters of health, education, financial and other services that connect migrants with the institutions of the host state, it is important to go beyond the receiving context to examine the processes of integration and civic participation. In the U.S., sending states, mainly from Latin American countries but in some cases also from other regions (i.e. the Philippines), have become significant partners of host state institutions to promote better conditions for their citizens in their country of residence. The significance of this connection between migrants and host state institutions through their home country’s consulates in some migrants’ path towards civic participation and citizenship acquisition in the host country makes it necessary to incorporate the sending state as a potentially significant actor in the process of integration.

From the perspective of global migration governance, this may also be a potential site of international collaboration between host and home countries (not just governments but also civil society) both in relation to development in the home country and in relation to integration in the host state as a shared responsibility (Délano 2010; Délano 2014; Ho 2011). These issues and related questions, such as the changes in diplomacy, particularly with regard to consular practices as a result of the expanded definition of rights of citizens living outside of the country’s territory, are key areas that need to be explored.
Conclusion

Bauböck (2010) and Levitt and Jaworsky (2007) suggest that in order to move the debate forward, the study of transnational and diasporic phenomena is not just about asking different questions about different social spaces, but may require replenishing our “methodological toolboxes” with new instruments and blurring disciplinary academic boundaries. First of all, studies of transnationalism have established that research that explores this type of connections needs to be multi-layered and multi-sited, including a variety of national and transnational contexts (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; see also Bloemraad 2013; Ho 2011). In the case of diaspora policies, multiple actors participate in shaping and implementing these policies (states, diasporas, international organizations, the media and NGOs) and at multiple levels (local, national, transnational, regional and global). These practices are changing the relationship between territory and identity (Adamson and Demetriou 2007) and creating new “shades of citizenship”, both legally and symbolically (Barabantseva and Sutherland 2011).

Identity, borders and orders (or citizenship, territorial lines and power structures) can no longer be studied by a single discipline as they are defined and discussed in relation to each other (Lapid 2001). An interdisciplinary dialogue that includes an international and global perspective can help understand the new spaces, practices and policies that emerge through the reappropriation, rearticulation and reconfiguration of states, nations, territory and citizenship, and their global implications.

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In recent decades, we have witnessed a surge in comparative studies of citizenship, immigration, and race in the social sciences. Contemporary research has provided us with new ways of thinking about citizenship that extend significantly beyond a strict national definition. As Irene Bloemraad notes in her introduction to this symposium, the bulk of scholarship on this topic tends toward the examination of European and North American countries. As traditional immigrant-sending societies, East Asian industrial democracies are rarely included in comparative studies of immigration and citizenship. When they do appear, they are usually categorized as models of exclusionary citizenship regimes based on their descent-based citizenship policies that link nationality with ethnocultural identity.

Comparative, interdisciplinary research on citizenship in East Asia opens up opportunities to explore immigration politics in countries that do not acknowledge the presence of immigrants, to examine racist discourses that circumvent direct references to race, and to probe citizenship practices undertaken by those who are excluded from formal membership in the state. Expanding the boundaries of how and where we study citizenship, immigration, and racial politics broadens our comparative lens to consider recurrent patterns of social, political, and cultural conflict not only in long-deemed multiracial societies or traditional countries of immigration, but also in societies assumed to be racially and ethnically homogenous.

This essay examines the challenges and possibilities of comparative, interdisciplinary scholarship on citizenship that concentrates on East Asian democracies. The following section provides a selective overview of developments in comparative citizenship studies. I identify three key areas: 1) civic and ethnic citizenship models; 2) comparative scholarship that examines the intersection of citizenship, immigration, and racial politics; and 3) a framework of “contingent citizenship”. I then highlight how comparative studies of citizenship and its multiple layers in East Asia allow us to grapple with how migration flows interact with existing social hierarchies to shape the institution of citizenship, debates on national identity, and practices of democratic inclusion and social exclusion. Rather than dichotomize a system of democratic citizenship for citizens and undemocratic non-citizenship for foreigners, or assume models of citizenship regimes based on the ethnic-civic divide, I treat citizenship as a contested institution and set of practices that creates hierarchies of citizens and noncitizens.

The multiple layers of citizenship
Rogers Brubaker's (1992) comparative historical work on citizenship policies in France and Germany is one of the most influential studies of comparative citizenship that has emerged in the last few decades. Brubaker illuminates how contrasting definitions of citizenship in the two countries—one expansive and assimilationist and the other restrictive and differentialist—have been shaped by distinct national traditions rooted in each nation-state's political and cultural
development. Since the publication of his work, much of the literature on comparative citizenship has divided citizenship policies roughly into civic/inclusionary and ethnic/exclusionary regimes, focusing primarily on North America, Western Europe, and Australia. Although this classification is based on a country’s citizenship attribution requirements as well as the symbolic significance of national citizenship, it has increasingly become shorthand for citizenship policies based on the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*) or birthright citizenship (*jus soli*). Differences between citizenship attribution policies have, in turn, become the basis for developing models of immigrant incorporation, which are divided broadly into assimilationist (e.g., France), ethnic or exclusionary (Germany), and multicultural (Sweden) (Castles and Miller 2009).

Whereas political, economic, and technological changes have transformed the outer limits of citizenship, international migration has intensified the significance of race as a global phenomenon. The conventional approach to the study of race, immigration, and citizenship has tended to treat these overlapping phenomena as discrete categories, often leading to scholarship that isolates one phenomenon—racism, for instance—from another, such as immigration (see Givens 2012/2013).

Although the Political Science scholarship in these areas remains relatively modest in size, scholarship in Comparative Politics has made significant advances in bridging both interdisciplinary and regional divides. Comparative studies of a wide range of countries, including the United States, South Africa, Brazil, Cuba, France, and Britain, have examined the nexus of race and citizenship (Bleich 2003; Hanchard 1999; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000; Sawyer 2006) and the politics of immigration and democratic inclusion and exclusion (Hollifield 1992; Kastoryano 2002; Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006).

What ties these works together is their focus on the long-term exclusion of a significant fraction of the population from citizenship. Indeed, citizenship—as a concept, institution, and practice—provides a distinctive lens through which we can analyze the interaction between new developments, in areas such as immigration, labor, and state building, with entrenched ideologies and prejudices in processes of incorporation, exclusion, and marginalization that are both new and old as well as local and transnational (Hanchard and Chung 2004). Instead of a “sharp distinction between citizen and non-citizen”, postwar immigration to industrial democracies has contributed to the development of “a continuum of rights attached to membership of a state”, as Zig Layton-Henry (1990, 118) noted in a seminal essay. Far from the ideal of universal citizenship, however, this understanding of citizenship encompasses multiple memberships among citizens and noncitizens with specific rights associated with different levels of membership. While full citizenship rights—including voting rights, the right to run for political office, and entry and exit rights—are usually associated exclusively with formal citizenship status, formal citizenship status alone does not necessarily guarantee full citizenship rights, especially for naturalized citizens, women, and minorities (Chung 2009; Shklar 1991; Smith 1997).

Likewise, formal citizenship status is not a precondition for the Marshallian (1950) trilogy of civil, social, and political rights. Select groups of immigrants and their descendants—such as EU member country nationals, co-ethnic immigrants, marriage migrants, and former colonial subjects—may hold quasi-dual citizenship rights while permanent residents, long-term residents, and some high-skilled immigrants have access to many, if not all, of the social services and benefits granted to
national citizens in Western Europe and Japan. In contrast, the rights of temporary immigrants, such as migrant workers, vary between and even within countries depending on the immigrant’s legal status, country of origin, gender, or employer, among other things. While some migrant workers may be eligible for the same benefits given to native workers, undocumented immigrants have neither citizenship rights nor access to citizenship in their country of residence. Finally, stateless persons, such as refugees, are noncitizens in the most literal sense: they are not citizens of any state and, thus, do not have citizenship rights in any country.

Applying a theoretical framework of what I call “contingent citizenship”, I argue that citizenship and non-citizenship operate on a continuum of contingencies that creates hierarchies of citizens and noncitizens (Chung forthcoming). First, the procedural requirements of citizenship acquisition and verification are generally met through the documentation process in which individuals must submit material verification, or “paperwork”, of their claim to citizenship in the areas of residency, household registration, descent, marital status, language and/or historical knowledge, employment status, and so forth. Kamal Sadiq (2009) refers to this process as “documentary citizenship” and argues further that the documents in these cases may or may not be legal. Second, substantive contingencies refer to the particularistic categories that states and societies use to define membership as well as the terms of membership and non-membership. These overlapping categories range from race, ethnicity, class, religion, gender, and sexuality to geographical origin (both within and outside of the country of residence), lineage, and political affiliations. Substantive contingencies not only shape definitions of who qualifies for citizenship, but they also inform the practice of not acknowledging the full citizenship of marginalized citizen groups (Gotanda 2001). Finally, political exigencies that enable states to strip particular populations of their citizenship represent the outermost form of contingent citizenship. Forcible de-nationalization by the state reminds us that citizenship rights and citizenship status itself are not inviolable; they are contingent upon historical circumstances as Hannah Arendt (1951) warned over half a century ago. Together, these contingencies shape hierarchies of citizens and noncitizens that encompass multiple memberships, with specific rights associated with different levels of membership regardless of formal citizenship.

Contingent citizenship in East Asian democracies

Contemporary citizenship regimes in East Asia—which for the purposes here include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China—are relatively recent state constructions used to carry out the goals of modernization and rapid industrialization. In each country, economic development and security considerations preceded any deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. Among East Asian late developers, every citizen was called to contribute to the project of national development by making individual sacrifices for collectivist goals and giving up political liberties for political stability. In stark contrast to the progression of universal citizenship rights that T.H. Marshall claims mitigated the economic inequality of social class in England, this form of “developmental citizenship” (Chang 2012) created hierarchies of citizens, and eventually noncitizens, whose access to citizenship rights were contingent on class, descent, gender, and political passivity or patriotism in relation to their value to the developmental mission (Chung forthcoming). Formal citizenship status in East Asia, therefore, does not guarantee access to civil protections, social welfare benefits, or democratic representation.
The emerging interdisciplinary scholarship on citizenship in East Asia fills a critical gap between micro and macro approaches to citizenship and immigration studies that have concentrated primarily on North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Studies of immigrant political incorporation in countries with birthright citizenship policies often limit their analyses to naturalization rates with the assumption that naturalization is the primary indicator of political incorporation. State-centered approaches that compare immigration politics in Europe concentrate on entitlements granted by the state and the symbolic role of immigrants. Examining immigrant political incorporation in countries with descent-based citizenship policies forces us to take a more nuanced approach to understanding political incorporation. Because citizenship acquisition is neither procedural nor automatic at birth, these countries tend to have relatively low rates of naturalization among their populations of foreign residents and necessarily produce native-born generations of foreign residents, which provide insights into political incorporation across generations.

The largest concentration of comparative scholarship on citizenship in East Asian democracies emerging in the past two decades highlights how legal citizenship status is not always a requirement for citizenship rights and practices. By examining the gap between national state policies that exclude immigrants and local-level practices that have helped foreign residents gain access to numerous services and institutionalized citizenship rights in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, this scholarship challenges key assumptions about the relationship between citizenship policies and noncitizen political behavior, which state that liberal citizenship policies encourage noncitizen political engagement while restrictive policies prohibit participation. Rather than focus solely on structural factors at the level of the state or psychological factors at the level of the individual, these works consider contextual factors and intermediate organizations, focusing on partnerships between state and civil society actors in formulating immigrant policies at both the national and local levels (Cheng 2002; Chung 2010b; Kim 2008; Milly 2014; Shipper 2008).

Others examine how foreign residents themselves mobilize democratic ideals, international norms, and/or local pressures to negotiate the terms of their political incorporation, often using citizenship as a tool (Chung 2010a; Gurowitz 1999; Lim 2003). Examining citizenship as a tool for gaining social and political visibility among highly assimilated, phenotypically indistinguishable minority groups is especially useful for understanding the intersection of race, immigration, and citizenship in East Asia, where nationality is closely related to ethnic, racial, and national identity. If phenotypical difference is the central marker for minority status in North American and European societies, then alienage is increasingly the basis for how immigrants relate to the state, mobilize themselves, and voice their collective interests in East Asia. Rather than quests for citizenship acquisition, noncitizen movements in East Asia may be viewed as ongoing citizenship practices that challenge dominant ideologies of ethnocultural homogeneity (Chung 2010a).

Thus, a growing body of scholarship focuses on so-called marriage migrants in East Asia, who are recruited by public officials and private actors in East Asian countries for their populations of unmarried, largely rural, native adult males and have become among the most significant immigrant groups in East Asian democracies over the last few decades. These works explore how marriage migration and the subsequent emergence of so-called multicultural families (foreign spouses and their bicultural children) have disrupted existing understandings of nationhood, citizenship, and
race and ethnicity that have long been associated with the family unit in putatively homogenous societies (Chung and Kim 2012; Freeman 2011; Friedman 2010; Hsia 2009; Lee 2008; Suzuki 2010). The findings of these works challenge conventional understandings of citizenship, which would lead us to assume that noncitizen political activities are aimed at citizenship acquisition alone and that citizenship acquisition is always politically empowering.

Hierarchies of citizenship and non-citizenship in East Asia and beyond

Shifting the lens of analysis from the dichotomies of civic and ethnic citizenship regimes and citizens and noncitizens to the contingencies of citizenship forces us to examine the gray areas, to better understand how political incorporation is institutionalized at different levels of membership regardless of legal status. Citizenship, viewed in this way, is more than a formal set of rights and privileges granted by the state; it is also a cluster of practices negotiated by state and non-state actors as well as citizens and non-citizens. These gray areas of citizenship help us to better understand gaps between policies and outcomes, racial politics coded in nonracial terms, and hierarchies of citizenship and non-citizenship.

References


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**Teacher’s Corner:**

**Teaching the International... Domestically. Visually.**

Migration’s newest data map at [www.CrossoradsOfMigration.com](http://www.CrossoradsOfMigration.com)

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“Does this course focus on the United States?” one student will inevitably ask on the first day of an Immigration Politics course at Harvard University.
“No”, the instructor always says, “While we will emphasize the United States as a convenient point of reference, we will consider immigration politics in a variety of countries around the world.”

Such a question would be unheard on the first day of other courses about other transnational phenomena, such as environmental politics, trade, capitalism or human rights. Will our study of environmentalism be limited to climate change in the United States? Rarely.

However, students sense what instructors implicitly know. Immigration is a topic typically studied at the national level using one or a few case studies—typically keeping students and researchers in their national “comfort zones”. So students in Australia inquire about Australia, while students in Germany wonder if they will focus on Germany. On the one hand, this is also a product of circumstances. Immigration is governed almost exclusively at the level of the state. Although governance trends are increasingly devolving regulatory authority to the sub-national level as much as the supra-national level, most countries still boast unique histories of immigration and attract people from unique combinations of origins to their destination neighborhoods. At the same time, this is still no different from other transnational phenomena. Each state has different varieties of capitalism, distinct environmental laws, unique trade partners, and speckled histories of human rights struggles.

We have trouble teaching immigration politics comparatively in a systematic way, because we have trouble studying immigration politics comparatively in a systematic way. This demonstrates how developments in our research will have an immediate impact on the execution and breadth of our teaching.

It is precisely this challenge that has motivated projects such as the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Database, which examines the laws and policies governing immigration across OECD states, and also our Crossroads of Migration project.

Crossroads of Migration; A Global Approach to National Differences is a co-authored research monograph by the authors of this Teacher’s Corner. It maps immigration outcomes in 51 OECD and non-OECD countries across a series of key dimensions of immigration and settlement policy in a systematic and standardized way. The primary goal of this endeavor is to map the spectrum of different immigration demographic outcomes that states pursue, and to determine what drives the trends we identify.

Pedagogically, this monograph will serve as a teaching aid for undergraduate and postgraduate courses on immigration. Both authors have designed courses on immigration at our respective institutions, where we employ material from the book project into our teaching. One is taught at the graduate level (“Comparative Migration Policy” as part of the Masters in Public Policy at the University of Sydney) and one at the undergraduate level (“Immigration Politics” at Harvard University). We have also engaged in methods of reflective teaching, whereby feedback and queries from our students have informed the curriculum design (Kolb and Kolb 2005, 193). Not only does this improve our teaching, it also encourages active and independent learning by students, as they are encouraged to develop their own worldview on the key issues raised, rather than one simply imposed by the instructor (Trigwell et al 1999). Student feedback takes the form of in-class
questions and clarifications, as well as formal feedback at the end of the teaching term. Finally, we have engaged in peer-feedback and review of our teaching by exchanging and co-developing our teaching architecture (slides, notes, unit outlines and reading material) across institutions, as well as responding to the student feedback from our respective institutions.

To enhance our data collection and its analysis as reference points in teaching, we are also producing new interactive maps that allow students, scholars and the public to visualize the way their world is changing—both demographically and politically. We are introducing the first such interactive map at our website: www.crossroadsofmigration.com

In cooperation with Harvard's Center for Geographical Analysis and based on standardized data from the United Nations Population Division, this first map allows visitors to visualize total migrant stock in every country in the world. Users simply select a destination country and receive a graphic display of lines symbolizing immigration stock originating from all source countries. Line thickness corresponds to the number of immigrants from different origin countries—a measure of what we call “source diversity”. Users may obtain information about the absolute amount of immigrants from a given country of origin, and also proportions relative to total population size, by hovering over any particular stream.

A forthcoming second map will allow users to select multiple demographic variables, a number of countries, and then run an algorithm to determine how country outcomes relate. The result will be “clusters” linking countries that are statistically similar, thereby allowing the user to generate a typology of immigration countries.

The field of graphic design has for a long time employed interactive graphs (“information graphics”) to present complex information, including socio-political information, in a straight-forward, digestible form. However, information graphics has experienced a renaissance within graphic design over the last decade, and is now used with increasing regularity, including by design teams within major media and information outlets such as the Guardian, the New York Times and Bloomberg Businessweek (Porter 2010; Esterson 2011).

As Max Gadney (2010: 100), former Head of Online Design at the BBC notes “[t]he world is changing rapidly [...]. Nowadays, the stuff to be designed is often raw data, unintelligible to many clients”. As graphic design must grapple with new ways to present increasingly complex data, so too within political science, we must develop new means to convey challenging, multi-dimensional information to our students. Increased use of visual stimuli, married with traditional methods of statistical analysis, is one such means. Further, such an approach is likely to bring pedagogical dividends: within the education scholarship, experts also emphasise the utility of unconventional forms of teaching modes to promote individual accountability and critical thinking, and to foster interactive learning—rather than limit their exposure to one teacher’s lectures (Kumar and Lightner, 2007).

We envision these maps to be central products for consumption by policymakers, researchers and students alike. The maps will allow the instructor to consider different countries in a more systematic fashion than before, and to communicate to students in a succinct, straightforward visual
manner. It will also allow students to interact with immigration data in an intuitive fashion, through the self-generation of maps. As a result, we hope that students (and researchers) will feel more comfortable studying immigration cross-nationally.

References

Policy Brief:

**Ius Pecuniae: Wealth-Based Citizenship Policies in Europe**¹

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In its most basic sense, national citizenship denotes formal state membership. Customarily, access to it has been conceptualized as governed by two distinct principles: *ius soli* (right of soil) and *ius sanguinis* (right of blood). Whereas in the former case citizenship is determined by birth in a state’s territory (an example being Canada), in the latter case it is acquired through descent, regardless of place of birth (an example being Japan). In practice, states’ citizenship laws tend to integrate, to various extents, these two principles. They are also often supplemented by other conditions, such as the residency principle (*ius domicilii*) and/or marriage to a citizen (*iure matrimonii*). Currently, however, quite a new trend of citizenship acquisition has been emerging in Europe, which in keeping with the Latin terminology may be referred to as *ius pecuniae*: right of wealth.

The most recent and explicit example is Malta. Its citizenship law is based primarily on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, although prior to mid-1989 *ius soli* was the basis of the law. Towards the end of 2013, however, social democrats from the Labour Party adopted a new scheme for selling national

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¹ An earlier version of this policy brief appeared in Japanese in the June 2014 (170: 20-21) issue of Migrants Network, a newsletter of the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ).
citizenship. According to the Individual Investor Programme, a foreign applicant 18 or older with no criminal record is entitled to obtain a Maltese passport in exchange for 1.15 million euros (nearly 1.6 million US dollars), including 650,000 euros payable towards a new economic development fund (much lower amounts apply to spouses and dependents) and 500,000 euros in property and investments, such as government bonds. This operation confers on the investor full citizenship status for life. Admittedly, the program is motivated by economic stress. For one, it is expected to bring much needed revenues for the government, estimated at 1 billion euros in the next five years; moreover, as the program’s title indicates, it is believed to be a way to attract new foreign investments. Interestingly, the scheme is managed by Henley & Partners, a private British company specializing in immigration and citizenship planning, mostly for “wealthy individuals and families”. Consequently, the company has announced that the program will be “aimed at ultra-high net worth individuals and families worldwide” and restricted to “highly respectable clients”.

Not surprisingly, the scheme has been roundly criticized both in Malta and abroad. Domestically, it was vigorously opposed by the conservative Nationalist Party, the country’s official opposition. Likewise, some commentators condemned the privileged treatment of the well-off, which contrasts sharply with the handling of African refugees reaching Malta’s shores. The biggest pressure, however, came from the European Commission. This is because a European Union (EU) member state’s passport entitles its holder to a de facto EU citizenship, with all the extensive rights guaranteed under EU law. Although each democratic member state is solely responsible for its citizenship laws, early this year the government of Malta bowed to this criticism from Brussels, agreeing to amend the initial proposal. The main change is the introduction of a minimum residency requirement of 12 months prior to issuing the certificate of naturalisation. Nonetheless, Malta retains freedom to decide on the number of foreigners allowed to become Maltese (and hence EU) citizens under the new rules, and its government is already considering raising the cap beyond the initially announced limit of 1,800 applicants.

Malta is not the only European state that, in effect, puts its citizenship up for sale, although until recently the practice was largely limited to the so-called tax havens, particularly small Caribbean states such as Saint Kitts & Nevis. Until Malta’s proposal, Austria had been seen as most permissive, offering citizenship “in the event of extraordinary merit”. In practice, an Austrian passport can be issued, at the discretion of state authorities, in exchange for donation to a charity (reportedly, a minimum of 2 million euros). It can also be obtained through various investment schemes that contribute to creating jobs, bringing new technologies or generating new export sales (passive investments, such as government bonds, do not qualify). Likewise, Cyprus offers several monetary options, including investments, donations and bank deposits. Indeed, its government recently lowered financial requirements, and at present most options require a capital outlay of 5 million euros, but, in some cases, even the lesser amount of 2.5 million euros is enough to make one eligible for citizenship. Montenegro has similar provisions in its citizenship law, although the program was suspended towards the end of 2010. Prior to that, however, a number of wealthy individuals, including Thaksin Shinawatra, former Prime Minister of Thailand, who is wanted in his home country on corruption charges, had managed to take advantage of these provisions.

Furthermore, a number of other European states have adopted more limited wealth-based measures. In exchange for sizable investments, countries such as Belgium, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Bulgaria, the UK and the Netherlands, offer residency permits leading potentially to citizenship. For example, according to Portugal’s new “Golden Visa” scheme, foreigners purchasing property worth more than 500,000 euros qualify for a five-year visa, after which they can apply for permanent residency and citizenship. Another option is to make an investment exceeding 1 million euros or generating 10 new jobs in the country. Reportedly, the program has been overwhelmingly popular among Chinese clients.

Putting national citizenship on the market is sometimes referred to as “economic citizenship”. However, this usage conflates two distinct aspects of citizenship discourse: the manner in which one acquires formal state membership and the degree to which economic status influences one’s rights as a citizen. The term *ius pecuniae* is more accurate here, as it denotes only the former, and hence its use should be encouraged. In any case, it will be interesting to watch whether this practice remains relatively rare or whether European states backpedal. With the current economic slowdown continuing, however, the trend may well become widely accepted throughout Europe (and elsewhere). In a bid to lure investment and strengthen battered economies, states may assert the principle of *ius pecuniae* as a standard and common means of supplementing their citizenship acquisition policies.

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**Notes from the Field:**

**Researching Emigration in Post-2011 Egypt**

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Since last July, I have been based in Cairo, where I have been researching the effects of Egyptian emigration on regime durability in the 1952–2011 period. My thesis examines the interplay between emigration and regime ideology, the state’s domestic political economy, and its foreign policy objectives. I combine archival research from the records of the Egyptian Ministries of Manpower and Migration, Education, and Foreign Affairs with content analysis of the coverage of emigration in the three main, semi-governmental Egyptian newspapers (*al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriyya*) in the same period. I have also conducted a number of interviews with Egyptian elites and experts (N=31), based on the snowball method for the purposes of triangulation. This article aims to discuss some of the main obstacles I have encountered in pursuing migration-related fieldwork in sensitive research situations, and a few of the strategies I have used to overcome them.
Fieldwork in societies undergoing lengthy socio-political transitions, such as post-2011 Egypt, entails specific pre-planning and on-site considerations that are different from the preparation one would make for research in more ordinary times. I realized the necessity of maintaining a flexible fieldwork schedule during the events of Summer 2013, particularly once the Egyptian army had violently dispersed the largely pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters in al-Nahda Square and the al-Rabaa Mosque, on August 14th. Almost immediately, the military re-imposed a state of emergency and strict evening curfews in 14 Egyptian Governorates that were not lifted until November. Practically, this meant that greater Cairo's over 15 million residents were confined to their homes from 7pm until 6am each day—a policy that the state enforced strictly at first, but gradually relaxed over the following months. While infrastructural problems traditionally abound in Egypt, the new situation on the ground put additional constraints on fieldwork. Research centers, for instance, held erratic working hours, if any. The curfew limited the window for interviews dramatically, making it no longer possible to meet subjects outside central Cairo, as I had to conclude all meetings in time to beat the heavy afternoon traffic and be home on time. And, even when I was able to overcome interviewees' reluctance to schedule meetings, they would be quite short. Egyptian interviewees, who are generally generous with their time (once their interest is piqued), were now understandably reticent and pressed-for-time.

Renewed caution and a heightened sense of awareness have become imperative because of the changing security circumstances. While, so far, foreigners in general have not been targets, either for protesters or for the Egyptian military, foreign journalists have not had it so easy. Thus, I avoid carrying a camera in public, in part to reduce the chances of being mistaken for a member of the press, and I follow the usual advice for people in potentially hostile environments, such as maintaining a low profile, and keeping clear of demonstrations and areas of conflict. In order to keep abreast of developments on the ground, besides following local and international news reports, I recommend registering with one's embassy or consulate, and maintaining a research affiliation. At one point last year in the late summer, I was getting multiple text messages each day from the American and Greek embassies, as well as frequent emails from the American University of Cairo, alerting me to the situation on the ground, not to mention constant updates from news websites, and anxious friends and relatives abroad. In these situations, the importance of a network of friends that is not related to one's research becomes clear, giving one some sense of perspective, distinct from official panic.

In a city of roadblocks and military checkpoints, protests and counter-protests, fieldwork flexibility is key: an extra battery pack (or two) when conducting archival research proved invaluable in the face of frequent Cairo-wide power cuts. I had to postpone research both at Cairo University, which is adjacent to the protest site of al-Nahda Square, and in neighborhoods that play host to large migrant communities, such as Madinat Nasr, because they were targeted by the state as Muslim Brotherhood strongholds. Avoiding such areas was not only crucial for my personal safety, but also for my interviewees, whose own safety could be jeopardized if they were accused of consorting with foreigners. I needed to plan out archival research at the American University of Cairo carefully, given that its campus is more than an hour's drive from central Cairo and the university administration's habit of closing its facilities in anticipation of further protests (its late summer classes had been cancelled entirely). Cairo University is still recovering from recent bombing attacks in early April, while certain university faculties, such as the Dar al-Ulum Faculty at Cairo University,
or al-Azhar University, which historically attract pro-Muslim Brotherhood students, have been transformed into both long-term protest centers against military rule, and sites of police violence.

Furthermore, researchers need to be aware of the loss of data that frequently occurs in conflict zones. In Egypt, this has become painfully evident with the bombing of part of the National Library and Archives of Egypt, the Dar al-Kutub wa’l-Watha’iq al-Qawmiyya, on January 24, 2014, which has put a halt to all research activities in that building, while staff continues to repair the extensive damage caused. This came only two years after the complete destruction of Cairo’s Institute of Egypt. Only 30,000 of the Institute’s books, from a collection of over 190,000 volumes survived a devastating fire. There is very little a researcher can do to prepare for such occurrences.

In terms of my fieldwork, I decided to resort to smaller collections of archival material, located within Individual Ministries, once I had built an initial network of contacts across the Egyptian bureaucracy. There are advantages and drawbacks to this solution: Ministerial sources tend to contain more recent (going back to the 1970s) and more detailed emigration-related data; sometimes they also (accidentally) contain material that would not have made its way to the National Archives due to its sensitive nature. Having said that, such collections lack the comprehensiveness of the National Archives. Access to them invariably entails tactical difficulties, such as obtaining official sanctions at the ministerial levels. At the same time, I have had to resort to non-Egyptian archival sources for pre-1970 material, such as the National Archives and the LSE Archives and Special Collections in London, as well as the Middle East Centre at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, which has further lengthened my fieldwork time.

Loss of access to necessary data also occurred in terms of scheduled interviews. As the situation on the ground grew more unpredictable, a sense of urgency developed. The speed with which the Muslim Brotherhood was ousted from power, for example, implied that any elite interviews had to be scheduled fast, if one were to be fortunate enough to secure a discussion with a high-ranking member of the Brotherhood’s Justice & Development Party. More often than not, my calls went unanswered; Egyptian friends I have made over the years have, since July, been incarcerated due to their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. But it is not only the Brothers that have been caught in this. One of the most poignant moments of my fieldwork came after an interview in Dokki, an upper-middle class Cairo neighborhood, in October 2013. My interviewee and I had been

1 & 2 © National Library of Egypt
discussing the emigration of Egypt’s Coptic Christian population, reported to be fleeing the country due to heightened tensions with Muslims. As I came out on the street, the first thing I saw was the shell of a local Coptic church, burned by arsonists. It quickly became clear that the linkages between migration and the political, which my thesis attempts to track in the 1952–2011 period, persisted in the post-Mubarak era.

These linkages became even more clear through the perceived national security implications of my research, which further complicated fieldwork data collection. One of the primary issues I have encountered is the view that emigration constitutes a ‘security issue’ for the Egyptian state. This is not a novel phenomenon in the literature—in Egypt, the tendency to obscure data on migration can be traced back to the early 1970s, when the complete de-regulation of emigration processes under President Sadat signaled the total retreat of the state from any attempt to keep track of Egyptians abroad. Similar processes have been observed elsewhere in the region, such as in the Gulf states. Yet, in the post–2011 period, new waves of politically minded, Egyptian population movements have reinforced that view. There has been a reported increase in the stream of Egyptian Copts seeking refuge in Europe and North America since the toppling of President Mubarak in 2011. At the same time, in the aftermath of President Morsi’s ousting and the institution of military rule last summer, Muslim Brothers have been abandoning Egypt for Qatar, Tunisia, and Turkey, to avoid imprisonment and persecution. Egypt is also experiencing a growing influx of Syrian refugees, while the political and economic elite that had risen during President Mubarak’s 30-year reign (1981–2011) has been fleeing the country.

Practically, for the purposes of fieldwork, this contributes to my interlocutors’ tendency to treat research in this matter as, somehow, suspicious. Researchers not accustomed to such an environment should not be surprised to encounter, firstly, the surprise of their interviewees at an ostensibly ‘odd’ choice of research subject and, following that, a degree of hesitation in revealing raw information. This became obvious in a number of ways. Elite interviewees would ask for extended explanation of my research’s purposes. Others would bypass such initial probing, and focus instead on the rationale behind my questions. A rookie mistake is putting forth questions on Egypt’s diaspora policy, for instance. These would invariably provoke a lengthy response not on the policy itself, but on how the use of the word ‘diaspora’ (al-shatât) should be avoided because of its association with the creation of the state of Israel.

Given the importance of establishing a rapport with my interviewees, I attempted to overcome such obstacles in a number of ways. I took extra care in building a relationship with various ‘gatekeepers’, i.e. Egyptians who have worked on such issues in the past, and were able to recommend my work and vouch for my integrity to some extent. A research affiliation proved very useful in that respect, as well. In Egypt, I have also found that the value of education is high—being a doctoral candidate endows one with seriousness and respect, even if it comes with some baggage (as when I was asked to translate my interviewee’s work into English!). I find myself repeating the fact that I am not a journalist; this has helped in setting my subjects at ease, even if this comes at the price of not being able to employ a voice recorder. I also developed specific responses to various introductory questions I expected to be asked, which aimed at gauging my identity or personal politics. While I never misrepresented my motives, I was conscious of the fact that interview research in Egypt has often meant that I am being interviewed by my subjects as much as I
interview them; discussions of the current political situation led up to ‘Why are you interested in
this topic?’ or, invariably, ‘Where are you from?’ While warm-up conversations are customary and
expected, I was unprepared for the extent to which my nationality mattered in my interlocutors’
decision to be interviewed, and have since made a note of mentioning this early on in any contact
with potential subjects. Were I British, American or, worse still, Israeli, rather than Greek, I expect I
would have been met with a different reception. The question of one’s gender also bears
reflection—my position as a male researcher allowed access to specific groups of Egyptians (and
arguably hindered access to others); a female doctoral student working on such topics would have a
completely different take on the challenges of fieldwork in the Egyptian setting.

Over and beyond these issues, arguably the most important lesson learned during my fieldwork is
the tremendous attention one needs to pay in approaching certain processes and population
movements. Officials would refuse to characterize the movement abroad of select groups of
Egyptians (such as the exodus of the Egyptian Jews, in the 1950s and 1960s) as emigration, or
discuss state involvement in such movements. One of the characteristics of Egyptian emigration
policy is its bifurcation into permanent and temporary. These two different sets of policies have
been developed over the past forty years to cater to the needs of Egyptians emigrating to the Arab
world (characterized as working ‘temporarily’ abroad) and those who emigrate to Australia,
Europe, and North America (which are, for the Egyptian state, considered ‘permanent’ emigrants).
While this dichotomy has empirically been disproven (many Egyptians have, for instance, been
living in the Gulf for over thirty years), it remains nonetheless embedded in state policy-making, and
in emigrants themselves, for many of whom the expectation of return home is always present. Any
assertion to the contrary, however accidental, can elicit emotional responses. One question I posed
to a former Minister about the various mechanisms the Egyptian state has developed to connect
with its emigrants in the Arab world, for instance, provoked an angry response that these Egyptians
are not emigrants, but merely working abroad temporarily.

Ultimately, these are only a few examples of the ways in which fieldwork highlights tensions and
contradictions in one’s research, and encourages a sense of humility and sensitivity for local
sensibilities. Over and beyond issues of methods, strategies, or techniques, the ways researchers
respond to such fieldwork challenges depend on their epistemological affinities. In my case,
realizing that such challenges constitute a source of knowledge does not imply romanticizing
fieldwork, or abandoning one’s analytic sovereignty. If anything, fieldwork provides a deeper
appreciation for how subjects understand social reality, and enables researchers to better integrate
such understandings into their own register. It is this aspect that makes fieldwork so imperative for
comprehending core issues of political science.
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From around 1989 on, roughly a quarter of my graduate advisees have done projects that fall substantially under the headings of migration and/or citizenship. The “before and after” in my title refers to the fact that during the first decade, many of the projects did not trumpet these themes, because migration and citizenship were not hot topics in political science. Students said their subjects were “political participation” or “political socialization” or “political incorporation” or “multiculturalism and liberalism”, or variants thereof. They did engage with scholars of migration and citizenship, both in writing and at professional meetings. But often those meetings were small, interdisciplinary affairs, because immigration, in particular, was a topic pursued at the margins of many disciplines (history, sociology, anthropology, geography, political science), without being central in any of them.

Then, after controversies over immigrants, authorized and unauthorized, mushroomed in both Europe and the United States during the 1990s, and after concerns about Islamic immigrant terrorists skyrocketed after the 2001 attacks, migration and, to a lesser degree, citizenship became much hotter in political science and throughout the academy. Interest has never been higher than today, as the very existence of the new “Migration and Citizenship” section of the APSA proves. In a job market still reeling from the Great Recession and affected by still more serious long-term shifts away from traditional tenure-track employment opportunities, the great scholarly interest in these topics does not automatically translate into great job prospects. But it does mean that mentoring doctoral students interested in migration and citizenship today is, in important ways, different than it was more than two decades ago. For one thing, we can now say we’re doing migration and citizenship!

Despite these shifts, the fundamentals of mentoring, at least as I see them, have not altered. It is the specific content through which those fundamentals are fulfilled that has changed. Here I list five fundamentals of mentoring, specifying what I think they require today, in contrast to the past.

1) **Help students say what the students want to say**, which requires, of course, helping students to figure out what that is. For me, as for my graduate mentor, Judith Shklar, this has always been the most fundamental of mentoring fundamentals. A good graduate adviser does not tell students what they should say, or assign them a task that essentially represents giving support to an argument that is part of the adviser’s own research agenda. Instead, early on an adviser listens hard to the student and reads closely what the student writes, in order to get a sense of what is exciting and important...
to the student. Then, the mentor suggests different ways those interests might be framed as claims, tested, and defended. The adviser can and should always push hard against what seems misguided in the student’s thinking, but only in order to insure that the student ends up saying what the student wants to say, as well as it can be said.

In the “before” period of the early 1990s, this meant pushing very hard to insure that the student really was interested in topics of migration and citizenship, since even if done well, these might be hard to market. Today this fundamental means pushing hard to see if the student is really dissatisfied with prevailing claims made in the existing and fast-growing pertinent literature, or instead is simply unfamiliar with it. But before and after the burgeoning of scholarly interest in these topics, the task remains to help the student figure out what she is really interested in saying, after she understands what has already been said.

2) **Construct a work schedule that works.** This has been one of the things I’ve had to learn to do better over the years, for two reasons. The first is that “do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is a good guide here only at a very high level of abstraction. As a graduate student I did not feel a need for frequent discussions with my graduate adviser, much less close monitoring of my progress, but I did want fairly rapid and detailed feedback when I had something substantial for her to read. This worked for us, and for years I treated my graduate students the same way. But for better or worse, many people aren’t like me. Some graduate students thrive best with regularly scheduled monthly, bi-monthly, or weekly meetings; many benefit from regular e- or personal inquiries. The mentor and the student have to find the schedule and modes of interaction that work best for both of them, especially the student, whom we mentors are paid to help.

Having made that demanding statement, let me acknowledge that I find it hard to live up to today. Where there were once only a few students who wanted to work with me on these topics, the explosion of interest in migration and citizenship means that there are now many more, including students at other universities. So I have become more aware that work schedules must indeed work for mentors too, and this sometimes means my students do not get all the attention they want, sometimes—I fear—not all they need, though most overcome my limitations. This only highlights, however, that finding a structure of work that actually works is a fundamental task of mentoring.

3) **Push young scholars to present work in progress to different audiences.** This is a fundamental that applies while students are doing dissertations, while they are on the job market, and while they are continuing to develop as scholars in later years, right up until retirement or death. Because there is so much we don’t know, there is a very real sense in which we are always young scholars, or at least should see ourselves that way. But especially when scholars are new to academia, many tend either not to show their work to anyone until it’s “ready”—which can mean never—or they show it only to those most like-minded. This is transparently bad for scholarship in general, but it has always been a particular pitfall of migration and citizenship scholarship.

Early on, it meant that young political scientists working on these topics often did not present their work to political scientists who weren’t doing so, and then they struggled to articulate why other political scientists should be interested in what they were doing. Today, the opposite danger looms: political scientists may fail to present their work in venues outside the discipline, to the many
scholars in other fields who are traversing, or have long traversed, the same ground the political scientists are exploring, turning up evidence and making arguments from which we political scientists should learn. There is no way to know either how scholarly arguments communicate (or don’t), or what they do and do not add, unless they are exposed to the admittedly often painful misunderstandings and sharp corrections that occur when we try them out, more than once, before different listeners and readers.

4) Help students identify how their arguments can be made to speak most effectively to political scientists. If the preceding fundamental largely calls for the mentor to put pressure on the student to get the work out there before multiple audiences multiple times, this fourth point puts pressure on the mentor. After mentors encourage students to figure out just what they want to say, after they push them to test whether that message can really be defended, the mentor also has the responsibility to help decide how the student’s core claims should be framed, what elements should be emphasized, so that most political scientists will see the work as important for understanding politics. Of course, this is also the student’s assignment, but the mentor has more experience with how different flavors of political scientists think and what they regard as significant. The mentor should therefore make suggestions about what and how to highlight in the student’s research, in order to have the best chance of gaining the interest and favor of search committees and journal and press reviewers.

In the “before” period, this task often meant suggesting how migration and citizenship mattered for topics like, for example, political participation, political socialization, and political incorporation. Today, this means that the mentor bears the burden of being current enough with migration and citizenship research to be able to suggest how the student can claim to be adjudicating disputed points decisively, or to be raising genuinely fresh and substantial concerns and arguments.

5) Write lots and lots of letters. Mentors must write for graduate research grants, and travel grants; for pre-doctoral fellowships, for post-doctoral fellowships, for real jobs; for junior faculty research grants, and travel grants, and conference grants; for other jobs; for further grants, and further jobs. They must write like the wind, on through the weeks, the weekends, the months and the years. Hey, it has to be done, and done by writing letters as positive as bedrock standards of intellectual honesty allow. Otherwise, deserving younger scholars won’t flourish long enough to become once-deserving older scholars who are now mentors. Just how long, in fact, does this aspect of mentoring last? As far as I can judge, right up to the point of retirement or death—whichever comes first, for the mentor or the mentee!

This is the most tedious, least satisfying, most purely and merely necessary aspect of mentoring, so I will say no more of it. And since my theme has been the fundamentals of mentoring, not its extraordinary satisfactions, I will finish here. But lest we end on a wearying note, let me close by saying that I have lived to see many of those I have sought to help become leading scholars of, among other topics, migration and citizenship. And the pleasures of seeing them discover their voices and find their paths, enriching their knowledge and mine as they go on to successes as scholars and teachers from which many, many have benefited—those experiences make writing every line in every letter over all the years seem a very small price to pay.
In March of 2014, The New School for Social Research launched the Zolberg Center on Global Migration. Named for Ary Zolberg (1931-2013), the Center seeks to provide a space for research and debate on migration and mobility, building on Ary's legacy and the foundations of the International Center for Migration, Ethnicity and Citizenship, which he established in the 1990s.

The Zolberg Center aims to produce high-quality research and bring together scholars from many disciplines to engage with contentious political and cultural questions of mobility and immobility, justice and inequality, belonging and exclusion, and open a space for scholarly, activist and artistic voices on the issue of the political, economic, and cultural consequences of migration. Most importantly, the Center provides a space to think about how migrants and migration are changing the political landscape—how they open up new political possibilities, wittingly or unwittingly. Using migration as a lens, the Center studies various types of transformation, shifting from a focus on nation-states and their borders to new forms of global knowledge and action, activated by and for migrants. The Center focuses on three main areas: migration and mobility within the Global South; intersections of global migration and new forms of media and technology; and the transnational relationships between emigrants and their countries of origin.

Starting in the Fall, our public events will be organized thematically according to these areas in order to allow for an extended dialogue, as well as the possibility to address these issues through different methodologies and mediums. Our premise is the need for new vocabularies with which to think about mobility, migration, borders, inequality and globalization, including not just an interdisciplinary dialogue among the social sciences and humanities, but also perspectives from artists, designers, filmmakers, journalists, advocates, practitioners, and migrants themselves. The Center tries to provide a space for such a dialogue, where we can identify new ways of thinking and talking about issues related to migration and mobility, and contribute to alternative ways of thinking about social justice.

In this upcoming launch year, the Center will support faculty and student research across the university through a model of working groups. These groups will be focused around a specific topic
or method, and participants will collaborate to conduct research, organize workshops and events, and curate film series or other joint ventures. This past year, as we were re-envisioning the Center, one of the main projects associated with it was focused on memory, migration and materiality. The main goal of the project has been to bring memory studies and migration studies into conversation. Through contributions of cultural theorists, political scientists, historians, designers, artists and forensic anthropologists working at the intersection of migration and social memory, we hope to enrich our understanding of the migrant experience and of the politics behind immigration, and to use migration in turn to rethink research on social or collective memory. The working group organized a series of events, including a lecture by Michael Rothberg and Yasemin Yildiz on citizenship and transnational migration, and a workshop that featured presentations by museum designers and curators, architects, and scholars from various countries, as well as a documentary film. Their work focused on issues such as the border wall, migrant objects, the identification and burial of migrant bodies, migration museums, and the ways in which refugees’ memories are shaped by the process of seeking asylum.

As we continue to shape an institution that we hope will be at the center of new research agendas and public debate, we look forward to a dialogue with Migration and Citizenship section members, and to welcoming you at The New School.

Section News:
December 2013-May 2014 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, APSA, Member News

Books


**Journal Articles¹**

**American Behavioral Scientist**


**Ethnopolitics**


¹ A note on methodology. Journals were selected from the list of 90 political science journals included in Michael Giles and James Garand’s article “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and Citational Approaches” (PS, October 2007, 741-751). We selected those that included at least 3 migration and citizenship related articles over the past decade (using the search terms “migration,” “citizenship,” “multiculturalism”). We only included articles written in English. We apologize for any oversight. For feedback and suggestions, please contact the editor.
International Studies Quarterly

Journal of Common Market Studies

Law & Society Review

Political Geography

Review of International Political Economy

Third World Quarterly

World Politics
**APSA 2014**

We are delighted to report that the Migration and Citizenship section will be listed on the program as a full or a co-sponsor of 23 panels at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the APSA. In selecting panels and proposals, we followed the precedent set by last year’s program co-chairs Joe Carens and Jim Hollifield of assessing the submissions based on scholarly quality, balance of academic interests and approaches, diversity of ages and backgrounds, and encouraging new directions in the field. We attempted to include a diverse mix of papers from all subfields relevant to the politics of migration and citizenship.

The larger number of panels overall was the result of an increase in the section’s panel allocation from 3 slots to 15 (thanks to the persuasive and persistent efforts of section leadership). In an effort to maximize the number of acceptances, we found it necessary to occasionally create panels including six papers. The result of this strategy is a double-edged sword inasmuch as panels will feel more crowded than usual (though many other sections also load panels in this way) but also that we were able to accept more proposals on the program than is typical—we saw maximizing opportunities for attendance as a prime goal for our section. While we were unsuccessful in persuading this year’s APSA program co-chairs to accept our "theme" panel proposals, we did pursue co-sponsorships both with other sections and related groups and hence increased to 23 the number of panels officially related to our section. We hope that those of you able to make it to Washington enjoy the results. Please do remember that panel attendance will have a large impact on our section’s panel allocation for next year—so please make an extra effort to attend Migration & Citizenship panels.

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Program Co-Chairs

**Member News**

**Lucie Cerna** (OECD)
- Published with Meng-Hsuan Chou "'The Regional Dimension in the Global Competition for Talent: Lessons from Framing the European Scientific Visa and Blue Card." *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(1), 76-95.

**Els de Graauw** (Political Science, Baruch College-CUNY)
- With Shannon Gleeson, co-principal investigator of National Science Foundation grant (SES-1354115) for “Collaborative Research: Variation in Rights Mobilization by Local Context” to study the implementation of DACA in three U.S. metro regions ($307,314 for 2014-2016).
- Principle investigator of PSC-CUNY 45 Research Award for “City Immigrant Affairs Offices and the Local Politics of Immigrant Integration in the United States” ($4,248 for 2014).

**Justin Gest** (Department of Government, Harvard University)
- Appointed as an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University's School of Public Policy, beginning in August.
- With Anna Boucher, released a new data visualization map, as part of their “Crossroads of Migration” research monograph project (see *Teacher’s Corner*).
Terri Givens (Government Department, University of Texas at Austin)

Leila Kawar (Political Science, Bowling Green State University)

Audie Klotz (Political Science, Syracuse University)
- With Cecelia Lynch, was awarded the International Studies Association’s J. Ann Tickner Award for “pursuing high-quality, pioneering scholarship that pushes the boundaries of the discipline with a deep commitment to service, especially teaching and mentoring”.

Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)

Helen B. Marrow (Sociology, Tufts University)

Pete Mohanty (Government Department, University of Texas at Austin)
- Was appointed as a Thinking Matters Fellow at Stanford University for 2014-15.

Liza Mügge (Political Science, University of Amsterdam)
- Published with Karen Celis, Silvia M. Erzeel, and Alyt Damstra “Quota and Intersectionality: Ethnicity and Gender in Candidate Selection." *International Political Science Review* 35(2014), 41-54.

Harris Mylonas (Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University)

Dvora Yanow (Organisational Studies, Keele University)
- With Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, organized the Symposium “Field Research and US Institutional Review Board Policy” held at the University of Utah on March 20-21, 2014. (Section field researchers are invited to share their IRB stories or questions at the APSA 2014 Methods Café, or to participate in the APSA Short Course on "Ethical Questions IRBs Don’t [and Can’t] Address").
How to become a Section member?

1. Go to the APSA website: http://www.apsanet.org/
2. Click on “Membership”
3. Click on “Join or Renew NOW!”
4. Log in if you already are an APSA member (or create a new account and then log in if you are a new APSA member)
5. Go to the “Membership” section:
   a. If you already are an APSA member: click on “Your Section Membership” and then find “43. Migration & Citizenship”
   b. If you are a new APSA member: fill out both the general membership and section membership information
6. Click “Continue” – Section membership is only $8 for faculty, $3 for grad students

Tada, you are a now Section member and will automatically receive the next newsletter!