Table of Contents

Letter from the Co-Presidents 1
Letter from the Editor 3

I. Symposium: Gender, Migration, and Citizenship
   i. Introduction: Gender, Migration, and Citizenship 5
      Leah Bassel
   ii. Progressive Politics of Exclusion: Dutch Populism, Immigration, and Sexuality 8
      Paul Mepschen, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Justus Uitermark
   iii. Gender and Migration: Immigrant Membership and Constructions of State Responsibility in Political Debates of Honour Killing 12
      Anna C. Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul
   iv. Gender, Migration, and Politics 19
      Katharine M. Donato
      Lisa García Bedolla
   vi. Both Here and There: Gender, Slavery and Migration, Old and New 30
      Laura Brace
   vii. Marriage Migration and the Women’s Movement in South Korea 36
      Daisy Y. Kim
   viii. Pushing the Boundaries of Migrant Rights via Gendered Activism 42
      Nicola Piper

II. Teacher’s Corner 48
   Where Did the Migration Radicals Go? Teaching Ethics of Migration 50
   Patti Tamara Lenard

III. Policy Brief 50
   Helping the Growing Ranks of Poor Immigrants Living in America’s Suburbs
   Els de Graauw, Shannon Gleeson, and Irene Bloemraad

IV. Notes from the Field 53
   Bringing the Bureaucrats Back In 57
   Mireille Paquet

V. Mentorship Corner 57
   “Dear Annie” Revisited: A Help Column for Graduate Students Seeking Mentorship 60
   Hillary Mellinger
   What is Mentorship in Migration and Citizenship Studies? 63
   Joseph Cobetto

VI. Research Institute Profile 60
   The UCLA Program on International Migration 66
   Roger Waldinger

VII. Section News 68
   i. Books 68
   ii. Journal Articles 75
   iii. APSA Section Awards 75
   iv. APSA 2014 75
   v. Member News 75
Letter from the Co-Presidents

It’s been several months since we convened in Chicago as an organized Section for the very first time. That makes this a good time to take stock of the Section’s accomplishments to date as well as ideas for its future. Our Section currently is 350 members strong, well above the 250-member threshold needed to maintain Section status (but please do not forget to renew your Section membership!). With $2,408 in its bank account (after paying the expenses for APSA 2013), the Section is financially healthy. For the 2013 annual meeting, our Section received proposals for 15 panels and an additional 207 individual papers. Although APSA allocated our Section just three panels, program co-chairs Joseph Carens and James Hollifield made it such that ultimately our Section appeared on the APSA program with eight co-sponsored panels and five sponsored poster groups. The panels were well-attended, and at times the meeting rooms didn’t provide enough seating for all audience members. There also was a large turnout at the Section’s first official business meeting and reception. These are signs that our Section is doing well, and we have all of you to thank for that!

There are still other signs that our Section is thriving. Under the editorial leadership of Antje Ellermann, the Section’s past two newsletters included contributions from a range of migration and citizenship scholars, rivaling with journals in both volume and quality of scholarship. Twelve of our colleagues (Erik Bleich, Erin Chung, Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jennifer Hochschild, Audie Klotz, Gallya Lahav, Willem Maas, John Mollenkopf, Ron Schmidt, Rogers Smith, Monica Varsanyi, and Maarten Vink) served on the Section’s four award committees, which collectively received 61 nominations for best book, dissertation, chapter, and article. The Section’s website, developed by Leila Kawar with help from Els de Graauw, gives the Section a strong presence on the Web and contains a growing syllabus bank with 56 undergraduate and graduate syllabi on migration and citizenship courses. Finally, the Section’s listserv and APSA Connect site have seen a steady stream of announcements about conferences, jobs, and funding opportunities for migration and citizenship scholars. Indeed, the Section’s first year has been a good one.

Those of us who study them know that organizations remain vibrant, viable, and relevant only when they involve the active and ongoing participation of their members. Several members are already actively serving the Section, including the 13 members of the Executive Council. Together, we (Els de Graauw and Rogers Smith) share the Section’s presidential work. Leila Kawar serves as Secretary, Tom K. Wong as Treasurer, and Antje Ellermann as Newsletter Editor. The program duties for the 2014 annual meeting are shared by Jane Junn and Willem Maas. Finally, the six members of the Executive Committee round out the officers: Joseph Cobetto, Alexandra Filindra, Gallya Lahav, Hillary Mellinger, John Mollenkopf, and Monica Varsanyi. Together, we share
responsibility for governing the Section and making sure that the Section best represents members’ interests vis-à-vis APSA and beyond.

Beyond these positions, there are many opportunities for members to become involved in Section affairs, and we want to call on all of you to think of ways you can contribute to the Section’s ongoing growth and success. In recent weeks, we have successfully recruited 15 of you to serve on the Section’s award committees for best book, dissertation, chapter, article, and conference paper. In coming weeks, we will also ask some of you to serve on the elections committee to find a new crop of Section officers. We hope you will agree to serve (and we thank Meng-Hsuan Chou, Hillary Mellinger, and Gerasimos Tsourapapas for serving on the elections committee in 2013)! Only when a diverse cross-section of the membership is involved with these important activities will our Section remain strong and healthy!

We also encourage you to approach us with ideas to make the Section more meaningful to you and other members. You can pitch ideas for the Section’s newsletter to Antje Ellermann and for the Section’s website to Leila Kawar. With ideas for how the Section can better serve the interests of specifically graduate students, you can reach out to Joseph Cobetto and Hillary Mellinger, the Section’s two graduate student officers. You can contact the Section’s program co-chairs, Jane Junn and Willem Maas, if you are interested in serving as panel discussant or chair during the 2014 annual meeting. You can share announcements about conferences, jobs, publication opportunities, etc. with other members through the Section’s open listserv (migcitizenship-l@baruch.listserv.cuny.edu). If you have ideas for how we can strengthen the profile of the Section and our collective field of study (e.g., naming awards after pivotal scholars; organizing a pre-APSA short course on migration and citizenship), you can submit a short written proposal to the Section’s Executive Council. Let it be clear: we welcome your suggestions, big and small, to ensure that the Section will continue to reflect its diverse and growing membership! Furthermore, you can help keep the Section strong and competitive by renewing your Section membership and by recruiting new members.

Looking ahead, program co-chairs Jane Junn and Willem Maas are putting together an exciting program for APSA 2014 based on the 15 panel proposals and 171 individual paper proposals they received. Thanks to their remarkable efforts, APSA increased our Section’s panel allocation fivefold, from three to 15, so we’ll have a strong presence in Washington, D.C. We have put together the five award committees, and nomination details and instructions are included elsewhere in this newsletter (and they are also posted on the Section website). Please encourage those whose work you admire to apply; nominations and self-nominations are due March 31.

We look forward to working with you, in whatever capacity you can, to make our Section the best it can be!

Els de Graauw
Baruch College-CUNY
Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu

Rogers M. Smith
University of Pennsylvania
rogerss@sas.upenn.edu
**Letter from the Editor**

I am very excited to introduce our third newsletter issue to you. This issue’s research symposium brings gender squarely into the center of the study of migration and citizenship. Leah Bassel has assembled an excellent collection of articles that focus our attention on the fact that migration processes, integration experiences, and societal and state responses to migrants are deeply gendered. Two of the articles delve into Europe’s struggle to come to terms with its cultural and religious diversity: Paul Mepschen, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Justus Uitermark examine how the notion of native sexual progressiveness is used to portray Muslims as cultural others in the Netherlands. Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul investigate the different ways in which Germany and the Netherlands have responded to honor-based violence.

Katharine Donato and Lisa García Bedolla turn our attention to the gendered nature of U.S. immigration. Donato makes a case for the use of age standardizing when studying the gender composition of immigrant populations over time. Bedolla illustrates the need to consider the interaction of individual and structural level factors in accounting for the gendered nature of Latina/o migration patterns and experiences.

Daisy Kim’s article moves our focus to East Asia where she examines the impact of Korean gender hierarchies and feminist activism on marriage migration from abroad. Laura Brace and Nicola Piper shift our attention to the global arena. Brace grapples with the question of whether we should understand women’s experiences of human trafficking as a new form of slavery. Piper argues that the global migrant rights movement challenges us to rethink our understanding of the rights of domestic and care workers.

Collectively, these authors showcase the emerging political science literature on gender, migration, and citizenship. They make the compelling case that, if we are to fully grasp the realities of migration and integration, we need to firmly embed gender in our analyses.

For the *Teacher’s Corner*, Patti Lenard reflects on her experience of teaching migration ethics. As she confronts the challenge of moving beyond the moral opportunism of her students, we are asked to think about our roles as teachers working in privileged institutions embedded in structures of global injustice. In this issue’s *Policy Brief*, Els de Graauw, Shannon Gleeson, and Irene Bloemraad’s case study of the San Francisco Bay Area examines the trend of rising poverty among immigrants in U.S. suburbs. Do suburbs do as well as big cities in helping poor immigrants?

In their contribution to our *Mentorship Corner*, Hillary Mellinger and Joseph Cobetto share their thoughts on how mentors can help graduate students navigate their way as they seek to bridge the interdisciplinary world of migration studies and the discipline of political science. Finally, I am pleased to announce the creation of a new column that will provide a space for reflection on fieldwork. In this first contribution to *Notes from the Field*, Mireille Paquet shares the findings of her
interview-based study of Canadian provincial and federal policy makers. She concludes that it is time “to bring bureaucrats back” into the study of immigration policy.

This issue’s Research Institute Profile features the Program on International Migration at UCLA. As always, our news section features information on the latest book and journal publications, as well as member news. We have also included the citations for our Section’s best book, best article, best chapter, and best dissertation awards, which were presented at APSA in 2013. Finally, our program co-chairs Jane Junn and Willem Maas explain the panel allocation and selection procedures for the upcoming APSA program.

A very big thank you to everyone who contributed to this issue! As you read through this newsletter, please consider making a contribution to a future issue. I cannot emphasize enough that we rely on you to maintain the impressive quality and range of contributions of these first three issues. Planning for our next (summer) issue is already well underway - it will feature a citizenship symposium organized by Irene Bloemraad. We currently still have open slots for our Teacher’s Corner and the Policy Brief. Please get in touch with me if you would like to contribute.

I wish you all a healthy and productive 2014.

Antje Ellermann
University of British Columbia
antje.ellermann@ubc.ca

**APSA – Migration and Citizenship Section Officers**

| Co-Presidents:     | Els de Graauw, Baruch College-CUNY  
|                    | Rogers Smith, University of Pennsylvania |
| Secretary:         | Leila Kawar, Bowling Green State University |
| Treasurer:         | Tom K. Wong, University of California, San Diego |
| Newsletter Editor: | Antje Ellermann, University of British Columbia |
| Council:           | Joseph Cobetto, University of Missouri, Columbia  
|                    | Alexandra Filindra, University of Illinois, Chicago  
|                    | Gallya Lahav, State University of New York at Stony Brook  
|                    | Hillary Mellinger, George Mason University  
|                    | John Mollenkopf, CUNY Graduate Center  
|                    | Monica Varsanyi, John Jay College-CUNY |
| Program Co-Chairs: | Jane Junn, University of Southern California  
|                    | Willem Maas, Glendon College, York University |
Introduction: Gender, Migration, and Citizenship

Leah Bassel, University of Leicester, lb235@le.ac.uk

For at least the last thirty years, scholars across disciplines have urged us to consider the role of gender in all forms of migration. We are reminded that “birds of passage are also women” (Morokvasic 1984), that engendering the study of forced migration should not entail women occupying “a room of their own” (Indra 1999), and that migration studies is less and less a ‘glass half full’ as gender (rather than just women) plays a greater role, with challenges as well as rewards that vary across disciplines (Donato, Gabaccia et al. 2006; see also Oso and Ribas-Mateos 2013). However, gendering the politics of migration (Piper 2006) has been a relatively recent addition to this interdisciplinary dialogue.

It is my great pleasure to introduce this symposium made up of seven excellent contributions to the emerging political science of gender, migration and citizenship. As Katharine Donato notes in her contribution, “political science has been slower to integrate gender into migration studies...What discoveries are possible if political scientists embed gender into migration scholarship?”

The contributors to this symposium have answered this call. In this brief introduction I focus on some of the key themes the authors address that demonstrate richness and variety of studies that span regions, levels of analysis and time periods, but also the methodological and theoretical insight that adding gender to the equation can provide.

Gendered borders and boundaries
First, embedding gender into migration scholarship provides exciting new insights into the politics of boundaries and borders. Paul Mepschen, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Justus Uitermark connect the politics of gender, migration and sexuality in the Netherlands. They argue that sexuality and sexual progressiveness are used in processes of ‘othering’ that produce migrants and religious minorities, particularly Muslims, as cultural others who are threatening to the progressive Dutch moral order. These framing contests over Islam and the loyalty of Muslims must be understood in the context of an increasingly dominant neoculturalism. Its proponents portray Muslims as “backward, intolerant and incongruous” with European secular modernity and in so doing erase Dutch homophobia and heteronormativity from the national imagination.
Anna Korteweg and Gökçe Yurdakul identify processes of boundary drawing that can result from the different ways honour-based violence is treated in the Netherlands and Germany. The ways in which states approach honour killing can become what they call a “litmus test” of membership. In the Dutch case, fluid, intersectional boundaries were drawn and honour killings were seen as an indigenous rather than foreign problem requiring “Dutch solutions to Dutch problems”. In Germany, in contrast, violence was situated within immigrant communities and politicians were more likely to discuss it in order to place barriers for immigration and to argue for increasingly stringent integration requirements, a clear illustration of rigid boundaries.

**Methodological insights**

Second, contributors are attentive to the methodological challenges that the study of gender, citizenship and migration raises. Katharine Donato argues for “careful thinking” about these issues, which she demonstrates in her own work on the gender composition of U.S. adult immigrant populations since 1850. She argues that age standardizing is essential when examining the gender composition of populations calculated from multiple years of cross-sectional data, owing to higher mortality among foreign born men than women at least until the beginning of the 21st century. A more nuanced and accurate understanding of variation in the gender composition of U.S. immigrants is generated, which has important consequences for the politics of migration and immigration policy.

Lisa García Bedolla further underscores the importance of method, in terms of analysis at multiple levels and across time. She argues that understanding Latina/o migration patterns and experiences in the United States requires a multifaceted approach that considers the interaction of individual and structural level factors: gender (and its intersections with race, class, national origin, and migration status) and the opportunity structures and social network activities present in Latino/a experiences of migration and integration; the gendered nature of immigration policy; and the critical importance of U.S. foreign economic policy. The latter, she suggests, has deeply affected the gender distribution within migrant flows. Considering the intersection of all these factors, and changes among them across time, allows scholars to understand the complexity of Latina/o migration patterns.

Laura Brace also focuses on the challenges of reading gender and migration across time. She analyses the connections between the new slavery discourse, which is primarily about women as victims of human trafficking, and the antislavery writings of the eighteenth century. In both, the slaves are presented as constantly subjected to violence relating to their loss of control over their lives. However, this reading does not leave space for “blurry lines between freedom and coercion”. When it is assumed that the bodies of slaves can call to us across the centuries, the complicated stories that underpin gendered migration get lost and made invisible.

**Beyond victimhood**

Brace’s contribution also speaks to a third theme of the symposium: understanding gender, migration and citizenship beyond a blanket conception of migrant women as victims, potential or actual. Instead she urges us to move beyond the dogma of speechless emissaries to insert a space between slavery and freedom, which allows us to see beyond the victimhood of the enslaved people, and to explore their vulnerability as workers and as migrants.
Daisy Kim brings voices and struggles of migrant women, specifically ‘marriage migrants’, and their advocates in South Korea to the fore. She enlarges the focus from migrant women to consider also the impact on gender hierarchies and feminist politics in the receiving society. Korean feminist and pro-women’s groups have sought to re-energize the broader Korean women’s movement by including the advancement of migrant women’s rights as an integral cause, which also reinvigorates critique of the family as a patriarchal structure. These movements have had some successes but have also been overshadowed by various conservative civic and quasi-governmental actors. Furthermore, the future of genuine transformative change will remain uncertain until more migrant women speak with their own voices within a movement presently dominated by Korean advocates.

Finally, Nicola Piper argues that gendered migrant activism, specifically regional and global collaboration among domestic worker and migrant organisations, pushes the global policy agenda but also forces academics to rethink extant frames of citizenship and human rights. The nascent global migrant rights movement has always taken gender seriously. It has placed issues around transnationally split families, the social costs of migration and domestic/care work, on the agenda of global discussion fora and has demanded recognition of the portability of rights and social welfare. Piper argues that academic understanding of rights (in terms of the “what” and “who”) should be shaped by these struggles and informed by people’s own understanding of that to which they should be justly entitled.

**Conclusion**
These contributions show the exciting possibilities of the emerging political science of gender, migration and citizenship. I hope that Section members will enjoy exploring this excellent work as much as I have and that we can seize upon this opportunity to collectively reflect on how we might embed gender into our work. I would like to conclude by thanking our newsletter editor, Antje Ellermann, for creating this space to consider the role of gender in our studies of citizenship and migration.

**References**
Introduction

In this contribution, we will examine the use of sexual progressiveness as a “discourse of power” (Brown 2008) producing migrants and religious minorities as cultural others and therefore as outsiders in the national community. Movements for cultural protectionism – for the protection of national identity – have proliferated in recent years throughout many parts of the world. In countries as diverse as Cameroon and Belgium, discourses of in- and exclusion have pitted autochthonous communities against outsiders with, allegedly, aberrant morals and devious intentions (cf. Geschiere 2009). In our work (Duyvendak 2011; Mepschen et al. 2010; Uitermark 2012), we investigate the articulation of such discourses in Western Europe, focusing especially on the Netherlands, and the role sexuality plays in processes of “othering”.

We argue that the framing contests over Islam and the loyalty of Muslims in Europe must be understood in the context of an increasingly dominant neoculturalism. Like all forms of cultural protectionism, neoculturalism is grounded in a discourse that represents the world as divided into different, inimical cultures and that frames the ‘national cultures’ of Europe as in need of protection against the effects of globalization and immigration. Proponents of neoculturalism frame migrants as outsiders and argue they must assimilate into or be actively excluded from the Dutch, European or ‘modern’ moral universe. Muslim citizens have become the most conspicuous objects of this neoculturalist discourse. Indeed, the rise of neoculturalism has gone hand in glove with the framing of Muslims as backward, intolerant and incongruous with ‘European’ secular modernity.

Neoculturalism mitigates against Muslims in the name of progress and sexual emancipation. In Dutch debates on gay rights, sexual freedom and the alleged intolerance of Muslim citizens, European identities and nationalisms have become re-imagined as progressive and tolerant while Muslims have become framed as homophobic, sexually backward and stuck in traditional family and religious values (Bracke 2012; Butler 2008; Fassin 2010; Ghorashi 2003; Jusová 2008; Mepschen et al. 2010; Puar 2007; Sabsay 2012; Van der Berg and Schinkel 2009).

1 A more elaborated version of this contribution appears in J.R. Bowen, Ch. Bertossi, J.W. Duyvendak, M.L. Krook (eds.), European States and Their Muslim Citizens. The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions and Boundaries (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Cultural protectionists have thus appropriated feminist achievements and the discourse of sexual progress to frame Muslims as conservative and intolerant and produce them as the ‘constitutive outside’ of secular, modern and ‘progressive’ European national projects (see also contribution by Korteweg and Yurdakul, this symposium). The rise of neoculturalist populism in Western Europe – such as the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands – is often mistakenly perceived as a shift toward conservatism. Instead, we argue that neoculturalists combine the discourse of sexual progress with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration perspectives. This logic has become increasingly hegemonic because it has salience beyond the populist, neo-nationalist right. Liberal and progressive critics of the neo-nationalist right can only show their commitment to progressive values by distancing themselves from Muslims’ alleged sexual conservatism - and as such come to participate in neoculturalist logics.

**The sexual politics of neoculturalism**

Neoculturalists challenge an entrenched liberal tradition of pragmatist policy and moderate language by marshaling and organizing audiences through affect, focusing on a fear of Islam and distaste with mass immigration. In the Netherlands, and in Europe in more general terms, sexual liberties and feminist achievements have come to play increasingly pivotal roles in these dynamics. As Francisco Panizza argues, there can be “no populist leadership unless there is a successful constitution of new identities and of a representative link with those identities” (2005, 11). Neoculturalist and populist leaders in the Netherlands have depended on and have reinforced the proliferation of discourses of sexual progress to constitute new identities, establish a “representative link” with them, and thus make a new kind of populist imagination and politics possible. To come to a closer understanding of this dynamic, we turn our attention to the sexual politics of Dutch neoculturalist populism.

Discourses of feminist and sexual progress have been pivotal to the ascent and growing entrenchment of neoculturalist perspectives in the Netherlands (cf. Bracke 2012; Mepschen et al. 2010). Muslim immigration is delineated as a threat to the stability of the Dutch progressive moral order, and cultural protectionists have set out to guard Dutch cultural and sexual liberties against the dangers allegedly posed by Muslim immigrants (Van der Veer 2006; Verkaaik and Spronk 2011). Gay rights and gender equality have thus offered a vocabulary for the critique of Islam and multiculturalism – an idiom that renders Muslim citizens ‘knowable’ and produces them as objects of critique. The central tropes of this discourse – individualism versus the lack thereof; ‘tolerance’ versus ‘fundamentalism’ – frame an imagined modern self against an imagined traditional (Muslim) other. Such tropes are especially powerful because they put progressives and pragmatists who oppose neoculturalist discourse, but who are on the other hand attached to the achievements of sexual and feminist progressive politics, in a rather serious bind (see contribution by Kim, this symposium, for a contrasting experience of feminist engagement with migrant struggles in Korea). Taking up the defense of lesbian and gay rights comes to be associated with anti-Muslim cultural protectionism, while solidarity with Muslims against Islamophobic rhetoric is represented as trivializing homophobia in and of conservative (Muslim) communities.

The successful, late, populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who emerged on the political scene in 2001, capitalized on the trope of sexual progress as essentially Dutch and managed to ingrain it deeper into the Dutch self-image. Fortuyn was openly and flamboyantly gay, and spoke of Muslims as
backward and rural. In the slipstream of 9/11 and the ascent of the war on terror, he argued that he saw his sexually expressive lifestyle and his liberties and joys as a gay man threatened by backward Muslims. Fortuyn managed to reframe the Dutch political landscape by entangling traditionally ‘new left’ themes - secularism, gender equality and gay liberation - with a neoliberal and anti-immigration, populist agenda. Fortuyn thus successfully entangled antipathy towards Islam with a politics of sexual freedom (Buruma 2006). His party won almost 35 percent of the vote in his hometown of Rotterdam in the March 2002 municipal elections, and 17 percent nationally in May of that year in elections held only days after his assassination. Fortuyn attacked the established political right for not heeding the widespread frustration with refugees and immigrants. He proposed to close the borders to most asylum seekers and promoted a tough approach toward the Muslim community. Unlike Islam, Fortuyn argued, Judaism and Christianity had been transformed by ‘the Enlightenment’, during which essential ‘Western’ values had developed: individual responsibility, the separation of church and state, and the equality of men and women. “I refuse to start all over again with the emancipation of women and gays” (Fortuyn cited in Poorthuis and Wansink 2002).

The propagation of gender and sexual equality has remained central to the politics of framing Muslims after Fortuyn was dramatically shot to death in May 2002. Conservative liberal MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who had a Muslim background, pointed out time and again that Islam constituted a violation of the rights of women, lesbians and gays, and children. Neoculturalist political leader Geert Wilders has repeatedly evoked the number of violent anti-gay incidents in large, multicultural cities in the Netherlands to score points against Dutch-Moroccan young men and cultural diversity. It has become almost impossible to discuss lesbian and gay emancipation without it being associated with Muslim migration and the ‘problem’ of multiculturalism. Indeed, it has become ‘common sense’ to represent homophobia, even homophobic violence, as alien to white Dutch culture and society and as the unique possession of young Dutch-Moroccan men and Muslim citizens in more general terms. Whereas lesbian and gay rights have a rather short history in the Netherlands, they are nonetheless mobilized as exemplary of a Dutch ‘tradition of tolerance’ (Mepschen et al. 2010).

This entwinement of sexual freedom with neoculturalist discourse has deep roots in the structural transformation of Dutch society since the 1960s. The Netherlands changed from one of the most religious societies in the world to one of its most secular. Discourses of sexual freedom have played cardinal roles in these transformations. As shown in surveys, large segments of the Dutch population after the 1960s distanced themselves from important aspects of moral traditionalism (cf. SCP 1998; Uitterhoeve 2000; Arts et al. 2003; Duyvendak 2004; Halman et al. 2005). The percentage of Dutch citizens who now agree with the proposition that ‘homosexuality is normal’ and who support gay marriage exceeds that in other countries (cf. Gerhards 2010). More than most other Europeans (not to mention Americans), the Dutch disagree with conservative propositions such as: ‘women must have children to be happy”; ‘a child should respect its parents'; or ‘we would be better off if we returned to a traditional way of life’. Surveys show that the Dutch are among the most ardent supporters in Europe of freedom of speech and expression, civil rights for sexual minorities and gender equality. When it comes to ideas about sexual freedom and gender equality, the Netherlands are now among the three least polarized countries in Europe (Achterberg 2006, 55). Polarization at the level of cultural values declined as a progressive consensus came into being, in
which people distanced themselves from moral - sexual, family and gender - traditionalism (Duyvendak 2011).

Dutch migrants - especially Muslim migrants - form a tangible, visible “constitutive outside” (Mouffe 2005) of this Dutch majority and as such play a key role in constituting and reinforcing the Dutch self-image of cultural and sexual progressiveness. Moreover, the discourse of Dutch sexual tolerance plays a central role in transposing homophobia upon the migrant and religious other; a transposition that successfully erases the recent homophobic past and the continuous heteronormativity of Dutch society from the national imagination. Recent studies from the Netherlands Institute for Social Research has nonetheless shown that homophobia remains virulent. Young Dutch lesbians and gays struggle, disproportionally, with exclusion, bullying and depression (SCP 2010).

Many Dutch citizens and policy makers now demand that migrants adjust to an official discourse of sexual and moral ‘progressiveness’, as the content of the mandatory citizenship exams show. In this respect, the Netherlands is characteristically similar to Denmark. In other words, when it comes to issues of public morality and personal values, citizens in liberal countries do not always esteem diversity in opinions and cultural repertoires (e.g. Lægaard 2007). Indeed, sexual progressiveness may be employed as a discourse of power, producing migrants and religious minorities as cultural others.

References
Gender and Migration: Immigrant Membership and Constructions of State Responsibility in Political Debates of Honour Killing

Anna C. Korteweg, University of Toronto, anna.korteweg@utoronto.ca
Gökçe Yurdakul, Humboldt University, Berlin, gokce.yurdakul@sowi.hu-berlin.de

Membership: boundary formation and intersectionality

In public debate, honour killing can come to epitomize a stark difference between the values and practices of immigrant groups and those of majority society, with the result that immigrants are placed outside the bounds of membership (Abu-Lughod 2011; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009). This means that approaches to honour killing can become a kind of litmus test for the degree to which immigrants are treated as full members; the extent to which honour killings are seen as an indigenous rather than a foreign problem of the newly diverse European states’ populations indicates the degree to which immigrants have come to belong. Full membership would mean placing violence committed by members of immigrant groups on a par with that

---

1 This essay is based on prior work (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2010, 2011; Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013). In addition, we draw from Korteweg and Triandafilopoulos 2013.
committed by members of majority society, without attributing the acts of individuals to practices of the entire group.

Theories of ethnic boundary formation shed light on the constitution of membership as either a fluid process, which allows for an expression of multiplicity in identity formation, or a rigid one that privileges an imagined "native" subject (Zolberg and Long 1999; Alba 2005, 2010; Wimmer 2008). The latter maps onto the idea of bright boundary formation, where bright boundaries allow only for boundary crossing which entails immigrants’ adoption of majority society attributes, practices, or values, typically sacrificing some elements of their cultural identity in the process. Conversely, a more fluid understanding of membership can lead to blurred boundaries, where being safeguarded from violence does not necessarily entail leaving one’s immigrant community behind. Blurred boundaries enable immigrants to cross into the majority society without relinquishing distinct aspects of their identity. Boundary blurring is facilitated by the majority society’s willingness to change its legal, social, and cultural institutions to enable multiple memberships, including membership in sub-national groups that at times might engage in distinct forms of violence. Finally, articulations of membership can lead to boundary shifting, which can occur in two directions. Boundaries expand when minorities’ practices or beliefs become accepted as variants of practices that also occur in majority society, including forms of violence captured by the label ‘violence against women’; they contract when the range of practices recognized as deserving state-initiated remedies is narrowed to the point where minority beliefs, values and ways of life are deemed unacceptable in toto, rather than in their specificities.

The literature on immigrant integration and boundary formation often understands these boundaries as ethnic (Zolberg and Long 1999; Alba 2005; Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2008). However, as an analysis of Dutch and German approaches to honour-related violence suggests, that is too limited an understanding of the differences that become the salient markers of the “us” versus “them” categories created through articulations of membership. While theories of boundary formation highlight processes involved in structuring the bases for immigrants’ membership, they fall short not only in fully articulating the multiplicity of categories mobilized in group formation, but also in appreciating the interdependent constructed nature of these categories.

In contemporary immigrant receiving states, notions of immigrant membership are often articulated with reference not solely to ethnicity or national origin but increasingly to gender and religion, as well (Bloul 1998; Yuval-Davis 2006, 2007; Kiliç, Saharso and Sauer 2008; Rottmann and Ferree 2008; Kortweg and Yurdakul 2014). Intersectional theory is often applied to understanding the construction of complex identities by arguing that rather than calculating people’s position in social hierarchies by adding up the effects of discrete aspects of their identity, social scientists need to pay attention to the ways in which each difference becomes meaningful in reference to the other differences at play (Glenn 1999; see also Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000; McCall 2005; Davis 2008; Choo and Ferree 2010). In other words, intersectional theory understands difference as constituted by multiple, intersecting markers of identity, which interactively constitute a particular subject and inform experiences of subjectivity (Glenn 1999; Yuval-Davis 2006, 2007; see also contribution by García Bedolla, this symposium). These complexities shape the boundaries articulated through definitions of membership that come to the fore in public debates regarding honour killing and honour-related violence. Immigrants’ capacity to participate in such debates in ways that shape
policy formation and implementation becomes a confirmation of the type of intersectional boundaries these debates draw and the side of the boundaries immigrants fall on.

**Immigrant membership: state responsibility and political participation**

One can read the conditions of national membership from definitions of state responsibility produced in political contestations regarding honour killing. To analyse the degree to which definitions of state responsibility signal membership, we draw on our study of the Dutch and German cases (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009, 2010; Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013). Both the Netherlands and Germany grapple with immigrant-related diversity, and over the past decade, both have addressed honour-related violence and honour-killing in that context.

We treat honour-based violence as a social problem among Muslim immigrant communities that has drawn the attention of both the general public and specific political actors in immigrant-receiving countries in the European context. In the literature on honour killing and honour-related or honour-based violence, definitions of honour killing as a family-initiated, planned response to the perception that a daughter or other female family member has violated the family's honour in the eyes of the community seem to offer an objective and useful way to capture this form of violence (Korteweg, 2013). However, in the contemporary immigration context, these seemingly objectively existing social patterns of violence become highly politicized. Rather than being understood as one of the myriad forms that familial and domestic violence can take, honour killing becomes a sign of immigrant backwardness (Abu-Lughod 2011; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009, 2010; Razack 2008; Terman 2010). In addition, honour killing is often erroneously seen as a particularly “Muslim” problem thereby drawing bright versus fluid boundaries.

In both the Netherlands and Germany, public debate around honour-related violence erupted around the same time, in 2004-5, when specific cases of honour killing occupied the front pages of national newspapers. In both countries, individual Muslim women with an immigrant background advocated for state intervention in Muslim immigrant communities: Dutch parliament member Ayaan Hirsi Ali was a vocal spokesperson while Necla Kelek, a German sociologist of Turkish background, published an influential book on Turkish women's problems in Germany. Both women functioned as privileged interlocutors in public debate, performing the role of “exceptional Muslim”, or the Muslim woman who has liberated herself through her embrace of Western culture and who suggests that the path to membership should unfold similarly for everyone with her background (Haritaworn et al 2008).

Yet, despite their apparently similar beginnings, the ensuing public and political debates had very different outcomes: state responsibility was defined as exclusionary and stigmatizing in Germany and as inclusionary and differentiating in the Dutch context. Where in Germany, a defence of German values informed a limited construction of membership, in the Netherlands, immigrants became Dutch as honour related violence was defined as a Dutch problem, needing Dutch solutions. These divergent approaches were also informed by collective political participation by immigrant organizations. In Germany, such organizations had limited influence on policy development and implementation; the reverse was true in the Netherlands. Policy discussion of honour killing informed the construction of restrictive immigration and integration policies in Germany, with a
focus on keeping new immigrants out, while it led to extensions of social and civil rights to Dutch immigrants.

We start our analysis of the policy approaches to honour-related violence and honour killing by arguing that construing violence against women in immigrant communities as a problem that the state needs to solve can lead to either more or less expansive definitions of membership, resulting from processes of intersectional boundary drawing. When immigrant women are granted the right to be free from violence, they become members of the state by falling within the scope of those having access to both civil and social rights (Marshall 1950). In addition, when collective actors – including immigrant and immigrant women’s organizations – make claims against the state that are then recognized by the state, this recognition of their collective political participation – rather than only their victimhood – becomes itself a sign of full membership (see also contributions from Brace and Kim, this symposium, on moving beyond migrant women’s victimhood).

Conversely, state responsibility can be framed solely towards those already firmly embedded in membership. In this case, discourses that see honour-related violence as threatening to majority society give rise to definitions of state responsibility that leave the problems of immigrants outside the scope of state action. State responsibility is then defined vis-à-vis those seen as already members, in other words non-immigrants, and states refrain from granting social rights to immigrants thus denying them full membership. This exclusion is exacerbated when immigrants face barriers to collective participation that preclude them from influencing policy formation in these areas.

As various political actors call on the state to respond to honour killing, their evocations of state responsibility fall between the following two poles: 1) state responsibility can take the form of an extension of social rights (Marshall 1950) to new citizens or residents, ensuring the capacity to participate in society, in this case, by being free from violence, or 2) state responsibility can be defined as protecting majority society members from dangerous immigrants, where immigrants are problematic subjects who need to be carefully monitored and governed, and ultimately excluded from the population if dangerous to the body politic (through, for example, restrictive immigration laws, specifically deportation). These two outcomes mark one dimension in the range of membership possibilities that develop in honour killing debates and are illustrations of the ways boundaries are inflected by ethnicity, race, gender and legal status.

The second dimension of membership can be read from the involvement of immigrants themselves in the defining of state responsibility. Immigrants face varying avenues for enacting membership through collective political participation, while states variably recognize membership in their responses to immigrants’ collective claims-making. In addition, states can shape collective participation by soliciting immigrants’ input in the policy making process.

Gender plays a key role in the resulting constructions of membership. First, in public debates on immigrant integration, immigrants’ capacity to accept “shared values” of gender equality has become the marker of accepting liberal democratic ideals (Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013). A perception that immigrant communities suffer from deeply entrenched forms of gender inequality, expressed through practices like honour killing, has profoundly shaped understandings of
immigrant membership. Second, through the contrast with “gender-unequal” immigrants, the “native” population seems increasingly liberal (see also contribution by Mepschen, Duyvendak and Uitermark, this symposium). The implicit claim that immigrant-receiving countries like the Netherlands and Germany have achieved gender equality has made it more difficult to address continuing forms of gender inequality in politics and welfare state politics (see also Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014). Indeed, recent research suggests that acts of violence against women are increasingly discussed as gender-neutral phenomena, except when these forms of violence are situated in immigrant communities (Roggeband 2012).

Honour killing and membership: policy development in the Netherlands and Germany

In the Netherlands, state responsibility in this area was defined as the responsibility to prevent violence through community-level social change programs, to protect those vulnerable from direct harm through, for example, the creation of designated shelter spaces, and to prosecute those responsible for these crimes. Dutch solutions were to be found to Dutch problems. The policy approach to honour-related violence in the Netherlands that was developed between 2005 and 2010 focused on three areas: prevention, protection and prosecution. The prevention pillar primarily involves immigrant organizations that fall under the umbrella of the national immigrant organizations. The umbrella organization for Turks in the Netherlands (IOT), the Refugees’ Organizations in the Netherlands (VON) and the Joint Organization of Moroccan Dutch (SMN) jointly developed a multiyear programme entitled On the Right Side of Honour. Working closely with these organizations, local immigrant organizations developed and implemented programmes to make services accessible to victims of honour-related violence and to educate service providers on the particular contexts within which domestic violence, violence against women and honour-related violence occur. In addition, immigrant organizations developed general programmes to make gender equality and gender violence a topic of discussions among a wide variety of immigrant groups. Protection was largely covered by shelters and other professional organizations (including the police), and the public prosecutor. Importantly, the governance component of the Program Against Honour-Related Violence required that all these groups and institutions work together to exchange information and develop strategies.

The programme was funded through 2010; after this point, the expectation was that the police and shelters would have developed the necessary expertise to deal with the issue appropriately, while the prevention policies would have been integrated at the municipal level. Overall, the programme aimed to comprehensively address honour-related violence as a specific form of domestic violence that occurs within communities of immigrant origin. The final statement by the Minister of Justice and Safety indicates that an extensive network of national and local organizations have made an impressive start at developing a comprehensive approach to addressing honour-related violence. This approach incorporates local volunteer organizations, schools, shelters, police, immigrant organizations and women’s organizations. A fluid, intersectional boundary was therefore drawn and immigrants fell on the Dutch side of this boundary.

---

2 See the parliamentary documents under the number 30388 at www.overheid.nl, accessed 21 January 2010; see also Brenninkmeijer, Geerse, and Roggeband (2009).

3 See www.overheid.nl, 30388 nr. 50.
In Germany, definitions of state responsibility took a different turn, and policy approaches were far more limited in their reach. After the newspapers brought the issues of honour killing and forced marriage to the forefront in 2005, both the federal parliament and two state parliaments we studied (Berlin and Baden-Württemberg) began debating honour killing and honour-related violence. Despite newspaper reporting that treated honour killing as a separate issue, politicians tended to see honour-related violence as the result of, or at least related to, forced marriage (or marriage without the consent of one or both partners), situating the violence in Turkish immigrant communities. Consequently, approaches to honour-related violence and honour killing were largely addressed by trying to limit arranged and forced marriages in Turkish families.

Some of the resulting policy proposals failed. One that would have raised the age of marriage for spouses from countries like Turkey was considered unconstitutional, while an effort to extend the residency permit of immigrants living in a forced marriage situation abroad (normally, a residency permit expires six months after leaving Germany) foundered in the absence of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) support. Other proposals to address forced marriage and, by extension, honour-related violence, such as making forced marriage a prosecutable form of coercion and requiring that new brides (and grooms) learn German abroad before gaining an entry visa, were passed by the coalition government of the CDU and Social Democrats that ruled Germany from 2004-9. This, however, was the extent of policy-making during this period, and these highly contentious policies and policy proposals did not result in a comprehensive strategy against honour-related violence or forced marriage. Although parliamentarians and policy makers across the political spectrum maintain that forced marriages and related violence in immigrant (especially Muslim) communities must be stopped, policy development remains limited and fractious. Rather, politicians are more likely to discuss honour-related violence, honour killing, and forced marriage in order to place barriers to immigration and to argue for increasingly stringent integration requirements, a clear illustration of rigid boundaries that aim to exclude immigrant (especially Muslim) communities from national territory as well as public life, at least in this policy arena.

Comparing the two cases, we see that political actors generated different definitions of the state’s role in addressing the problem of honour-related violence; more expansive in the Netherlands than in Germany. It must be noted, however, that policy makers in the Dutch case were able to avoid entangling the discussion of honour killing with restrictions on immigration and integration in part because such restrictive policies had already been passed in prior legislative sessions. As a result, the debate on honour killing could focus on the issues of violence against women (and men) rather than on policies to keep immigrants out. In each country, notions of state responsibility also interacted in complex ways with immigrants’ collective political participation to create openings for immigrants’ full membership. In the Netherlands, immigrant organizations were key actors in generating and implementing policy. In Germany, such actors were either absent or only present to critique existing approaches. Immigrant organizations were not able to insert themselves into the debate in ways that enabled them to alter notions of state responsibility in which they were excluded from state support. In closing, we suggest that effectively analyzing the ways in which immigrants become members requires paying attention to the various differences associated with ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality and religion that become salient in policy responses to immigrant-

---

4 Arguably, exceptions are the Integration Summits and the Islam Conferences in Germany.
related social problems. The resulting constructions of state responsibility indicate how the boundaries of membership are drawn along intersectional lines.

References

Gender, Migration, and Politics
Katharine M. Donato, Vanderbilt University, katharine.donato@vanderbilt.edu

Since the early 1970s, social scientists have brought women’s migration “out of the shadows” (Donato et al. 2006, 4). In the 1980s, the feminization of U.S. migration made headlines after Houstoun et al. (1984) illustrated, using federal government data, a gradual rise in women’s representation among U.S. immigrants. Not only has women’s share of the U.S. immigrant population grown dramatically over the twentieth century (Donato et al. 2011), worldwide, women’s share and absolute number among international migrants has risen (United Nations 2006). The objective of this commentary is to generate discussion and debate in political science scholarship about how gender is central to migration studies. Compared to other disciplines, political science has been slower to integrate gender into migration studies for reasons related to the recent emergence of migration as an important substantive area of study within the discipline, and because privileging men in global international migration processes avoids the theoretical and methodological complexities that may result from including women.

Since the 1990s, scholars from various disciplines have begun to consider how the gender composition of immigrants is related to questions of governance, gender equity in migration policies, and political behavior. Some have pointed out that political regimes are actors in gendered international migration processes (Boyd and Grieco 2003; Oishi 2005). Regimes exert control over gendered processes through policies in destination and origin countries that assume and/or promote dependency and family, rather than market, activities for immigrant women. Policies may also seek immigrant women to work in occupations that are traditionally defined as female and involve some type of care work.

As Pearce, Clifford and Tandon (2011) show, contemporary U.S. immigration policies are not explicitly gendered, for they are no longer based on English common law that only recognized legal identities for men. Yet, to date, all U.S. immigration policies have had gendered consequences (see also contribution by García Bedolla, this symposium). Consider one study that reveals how the process of becoming legal, e.g. receiving Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) amnesty, was stratified by gender. Hagan (1994) found that Maya Guatemalan women in Houston were less likely than men to fulfill the requirements for IRCA’s amnesty program. Women’s decisions to apply for amnesty depended on their jobs, marital status, social networks, and length of residence; those most successful were married and had more access to their husband’s social networks and the information these networks provided. Another study suggests that the shift toward gender balance
among U.S. immigrants in the twentieth century is linked to family reunification policies. Although it is true that approximately 70 percent of visas for legal immigrants are for family members and relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, Lee (2013) shows that policies have protected family unity well before (as well as after) implementation of the current visa system.

Yet, although studies have considered governance issues and the ways in which policies toward migrants are gendered, political scientists have not led these efforts (Piper 2006). In fact, political scientists have penned relatively few studies that privilege both gender and the political aspects of migration. One exception is Jones-Correa (1998), who found that immigrant Latinas were more likely to be politically socialized and engage in political behavior than their immigrant Latino counterparts. Another is Bassel (2012), who found that political debates about Muslim refugee women are framed in particular ways that emphasize gender and culture rather than challenge the politics that underlie how these debates are framed.

Therefore, thinking more broadly, if existing political science scholarship has only begun “to scratch the surface” by showing that migration can “alter political coalitions, disrupt the party system, and transform citizenship and national identity” (Hollifield and Wong 2012/13, 8), what discoveries are possible if political scientists embed gender into migration scholarship? Though unknown at the moment, they are likely to be noteworthy, if not extraordinary contributions to future research. The salience of these contributions will derive from careful thinking about theoretical and methodological issues that emerge as we consider gendered aspects of migration. Consider the following example about shifts in the gender composition of the U.S. immigrant populations.

Drawing from my work with colleagues published in 2011 in the International Migration Review (Donato et al. 2011), Figure 1 shows how women’s and men’s representation among migrants has changed since 1850. It displays two lines: one that summarizes the gender composition of the foreign-born population without age-standardizing, and a second line that represents age-standardized estimates. As I describe below, age standardizing is essential when examining the gender composition of populations calculated from multiple years of cross-sectional data. It accounts for the different age structures of male and female populations and insures that results are not related to higher mortality among aging foreign-born men than among aging foreign-born women. It also facilitates a gendered understanding with a longer view, extending back before the post-World War II era (see also contributions by Garcia Bedolla and Brace, this symposium, on the importance of a longer view).

Figure 1 reveals that age-standardized estimates are more conservative and portray less variation in the gender composition of U.S. adult immigrant populations since 1850. For example, standardized estimates range from 45 to 50 percent female between 1910 and 1970, whereas unstandardized estimates range from 43 to 54 percent across the same period. Yet despite smaller variation, the age-standardized estimates in Figure 1 still reveal important variations in immigrants’ gender composition.
For example, between 1850 and 1910, the gender composition jumped up and down, settling in at a low of 45 percent in 1910. However, consistent with findings from Houstoun et al. (1984), there was also a gradual rise in women's representation. In 1940, standardized estimates describe an immigrant population that was 48 percent female and, over the next 30 years, these estimates shift further upward. Differences between age-standardized and unstandardized estimates also grow during this period, as gender-specific longevity reduced the impact of larger arriving populations of immigrant men relative to comparable women. By 1970, the two estimates were quite different: the former described a gender-balanced immigrant population, while the latter described a female-dominant one. Since then, however, the proportion of women among the foreign born population has declined somewhat and differences in the two estimates again narrowed. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, both sets of estimates began to converge and depict gender balance in the U.S. immigrant population.

These are salient findings for two reasons. First, they document the importance of using age-standardized estimates; they remove the impact of gender differences in longevity, embedded in such an analysis, and while conservative, they still reveal variation in the sex composition of U.S. immigrant populations. Without age standardizing and including a long time-line, we would have generated less accurate estimates over a much shorter period and a more limited understanding about variation in the gender composition of U.S. immigrants.

\[^1\]Women’s large presence among U.S. immigrants in this year was comparable to the high of approximately 55 percent documented in flow data in Houstoun et al. (1984).
Second, the estimates shift in ways that suggest women’s increasing share among the U.S. foreign-born population in the 20th century is associated with shifts in the absolute numbers of foreign-born persons. For example, between 1920 and 1960, women’s share rose as the absolute numbers of immigrants fell. These decades represented a period of change and flux, an era of intense restrictions on immigration from many countries affected by a global depression and periods of intense international strife during two world wars, and the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, on the other hand, after the restrictive national origin quotas were abolished, the number of U.S. immigrants increased and women’s representation rose to 50 percent in 1970. Afterward, even though women’s share dropped somewhat as the overall number of immigrants continued to increase, the slight downward pattern is explained by growth in male-predominant unauthorized migration from Mexico (see Figure 2 in Donato et al. 2011).

Gender and the politics and policies of immigration

The approximately equal share of men and women among adult U.S. migrants is likely to have consequences for the politics of migration and for immigration policy. Large and demographically even-sized populations of foreign-born men and women will affect assimilative processes in destination communities differently than smaller less gender-balanced groups. Settlement processes, especially related to work, marriage, and family formation, will likely vary by whether local communities attract mostly immigrant men, mostly women, or gender-balanced populations. Relatedly, scholars have shown that existing inequalities based on sex and gender are likely to be associated with too many women or too many men in a population (Guttentag and Secord 1983; Hesketh and Xing 2006). For example, some have described negative social consequences for women when young men outnumber women, as they do, for example, in contemporary China (Hudson and van den Boer 2004) or India (Larsen 2011).

Few would dispute that immigration has become a complex political issue in the United States since the late 1980s (Tichenor 2002; Massey Durand and Malone 2003). Embedded in this increasingly political context is an intricate governance system that has become overwhelmingly concerned about legal issues for immigrants at entry rather than for their integration in U.S. society (Donato and Armenta 2011), and led to growth in the unauthorized immigrant population, with large numbers of immigrant men and women who were more likely to be permanent settlers than immigrants in the past (Donato 1993; Massey Durand and Malone 2003). As a result, voices of both men and women have emerged in immigrant rights protests that, since 2006, have been regularly held around the country. One political scientist (Hopkins 2010) describes the significant political opposition that emerges against immigrants, especially in politicized places, such as some new immigrant gateways in the southeast that have recently witnessed dramatic growth in immigration, and where national discourse emphasizes immigrants as threats. Yet, although seemingly gender neutral, such politicized places are likely to be gendered. Consider how some local residents in politicized places promulgate hateful and unsubstantiated gender stereotypes, such as immigrant women and their anchor babies, or immigrant men taking jobs from U.S. natives. To what extent do local politics reflect these stereotypes and what are the consequences of doing so? We do not yet have answers to these questions.

Note, however, that women’s share of the total unauthorized migrant population is not trivial. In 2011, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that women represented 44.7 percent of the approximately 11 million unauthorized persons living in the United States.
We may also want to think about more recent events and their political consequences. For example, earlier this year, immigrant women and others representing them have begun to emphasize migrant women’s rights (see also contributions by Kim and Piper, this symposium, on parallel Korean and global mobilisations respectively). They criticize proposed immigration reform in the U.S. Congress as male-centric and “sexclusionary” because it: 1) includes a citizenship path that mandates proof of work, when often migrant women’s work is temporary and informal; 2) makes it impossible for dependents of visa holders, such as spouses (who are mostly women) of immigrant professional workers, to work; and 3) does not eliminate current visa backlogs, resulting in more women than men waiting for years to be reunited with their U.S. families (because more women seek permanent residency as relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents) (Jayapal 2013). One recent act of political activism designed to rally support for immigration policy reform occurred in September 2013, when more than 100 women were arrested on Capitol Hill for blocking an intersection as they pressured Congressional House Representatives to recognize and eliminate various discriminatory components of proposed immigration reform (Preston 2013). These efforts at political mobilization are fueled, at least in part, by a push to represent rapidly growing populations (both foreign born and Latino) that have and will continue to increasingly represent the U.S. electorate.

In the end, I hope that this comment will fuel more discussion and scholarship in political science about gender and migration. Gender differences in migration have been well documented by sociologists, anthropologists and others employing a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Kanaiaupuni 2000; Cerrutti and Massey 2001; Pessar and Mahler 2001; Curran et al. 2006; Donato Wagner and Patterson 2008), but far less is known about their consequences for citizenship, party identification, and political regimes. As a scholar of gender and migration, I look forward to political scientists taking up the mantle of leadership in this area of research and learning from their efforts.

References
Considering Intersections: Latina/o Gender, Migration, and U.S. Immigration Policy
Lisa García Bedolla, University of California, Berkeley, lgarcia@berkeley.edu

Introduction

Scholars studying Latinas/os in the United States focus a great deal on issues of immigrant integration. Yet, this process is most often conceptualized as an individual act. Immigration is seen as a personal decision made by an individual or family, with little consideration of the macroeconomic context that influences that decision. Similarly, immigrant integration is most often discussed (by and large) as a product of individual drive and personal choices, rather than a process driven in important ways by...
racialized and gendered processes within the host country (Brimelow 1996, Huntington 2005). Yet, groups’ migration histories, their treatment by U.S. immigration policies, and their resulting settlement patterns are all racialized and gendered. Immigrant integration patterns are strongly affected by, at minimum, migrants’ gender, class status, indigenous/racial background, and legal status upon arrival. How immigrants are able to integrate themselves into their new land, then, is a complex process that is the product of social forces both within and outside of their control. Using an intersectional lens helps scholars to unpack these factors in order to draw a more complete picture of the varied opportunities and constraints migrants face in the home country, on their migration journey, and once they settle in the United States. This contribution applies an intersectional lens to the individual level of men and women’s migration histories (Section 1) but also insists on the importance of the meso- and macro-level structures of immigration policy (Section 2), as well as the gender dimensions of U.S. foreign policy (Section 3). I argue that understanding Latina/o migration patterns and experiences requires a multifaceted approach that considers the interaction of individual and structural level factors.

1. Gender and migration
Gender is an important, and under-emphasized factor in Latina/o migration patterns to the United States. Seeing intersectionality – the idea that human beings possess multiple identifications simultaneously and that the intersection of those identities has important implications for their beliefs, attitudes, and experiences – is important for understanding Latina/o migration patterns. An intersectional approach to studying migration requires that scholars consider the intersections of marginalization and privilege that exist within individuals, along the lines of race, class, national origin, and migration status, just to name a few, in order to understand their migration processes (García Bedolla 2007; see also contribution by Korteweg and Yurdakul, this symposium). It also requires that those intersections be situated within the meso- and macro-structural contexts that also affect immigrants’ opportunity structures. For example, Studies have shown that Latino men and women migrate for different reasons, and that women now make up a growing proportion of Latina/o migrant streams. In the early 20th century, Latin American origin migration was quite male-dominated; by the early 21st century, that trend had shifted, with growing numbers of Latin American origin women choosing to come to the United States. Gender ratios among the foreign born vary in important ways by national origin and by legal status. Dominican migrants, for example, are majority female, while Mexican migrants are more male than female. Unauthorized migration flows, in addition, tend to be heavily male and more than three quarters of the United States’ unauthorized migrants come from Mexico and Central America. These gender differences have their roots in social and economic forces within the home countries and in U.S. immigration policies, and have an effect on immigrant integration experiences in the United States. Those forces, in turn, affect the demographic characteristics of each national origin group in the United States, as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 shows differences in the gender distribution across Latina/o national origin groups. In addition to variation in the percent of men and women within each group, there are also significant gender differences among Latina/os with regard to median income, with Latinas aged 25 and older

---

1 For an overview of gender and migration trends in the United States, see Fry 2006.
having total median incomes over 40 percent lower than Latino men over age 25 ($18,765 and $26,497, respectively). These differences, among others, have implications for immigrant integration patterns and opportunities within these communities.

Table 1: Age, Nativity, Income, and Education by Country of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Puerto Rican</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>Dominican</th>
<th>Salvadoran</th>
<th>Guatemalan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION SIZE</td>
<td>33,557,922</td>
<td>4,885,294</td>
<td>1,891,014</td>
<td>1,554,819</td>
<td>1,977,657</td>
<td>1,214,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Female</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Male</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population under 18</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population 65 and over</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIVITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign born</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>NAa</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered U.S. before 1990 (% of foreign born)</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>NAa</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entered U.S. 2000 or later (% of foreign born)</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>NAa</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-citizen (% of foreign born)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>NAb</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income (year round full time workers)</td>
<td>$27,000</td>
<td>$35,100</td>
<td>$33,300</td>
<td>$28,000</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop over 25 with &lt; HS Diploma</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop over 25 with HS Diploma</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop over 25 with college degree or more</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Since Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory, no Puerto Rican is 'foreign-born', although those born on the mainland have a different legal status from those born on the island
b All Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens

One key area of difference in terms of opportunity structures is how males and females are treated by U.S. immigration policy. Studies suggest that immigration policies that, on their face, seem gender neutral, in practice have very different consequences for male and female migrants (Menjívar and Salcido 2013; see also contribution by Donato, this symposium). For example, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) made it easier for male migrants to regularize their status under the terms of the law. This was due to the fact that individuals who received public assistance were automatically excluded, and women were more likely than men to have been on public assistance (Arp, Dantico and Zatz 1990, 29). Similarly, women were overrepresented in the informal labor market, making it more difficult for them to provide the labor documentation that was required to prove eligibility under the IRCA provisions. Finally, IRCA required that applicants show five years of continuous work. Given female migrants were more likely than male migrants to engage in part-time labor and to experience labor interruptions due to childbirth or caregiving responsibilities, this provision made it difficult for women to qualify under IRCA. Considering these biases that existed within what was ostensibly neutral immigration legislation, it is not surprising that many female migrants achieve their status through their husbands or parents. In 2004, 73.2 percent of women applying for employment-based visas did so as a dependent of a visa holder; only 26.8 percent were primary visa holders. Similarly, under family reunification, women often must apply for sponsorship under male family members, requiring long waits before they are allowed to migrate to the United States and making them dependent on male family members for their migration status (see also contribution by Kim, this symposium, on this problem of dependence in Korea). This becomes especially problematic when these women find themselves in abusive relationships with the individuals upon which their migration status depends. All these factors affect female migrants’ abilities to settle and work in the United States.

In response to their particular structural position, female migrants of all backgrounds engage in social network activity differently than male migrants and experience socioeconomic trajectories that vary from those of men (Zavella 2011; Hagan 1998). Hagan (1998) shows that networks operate in gendered ways, resulting in systematically different labor and integration effects for male and female migrants. She finds that the influence of networks vary over time and that work, neighborhood, and voluntary associations create different network structures that had a significant effect on female migrants’ ability to legalize under IRCA (Hagen 1998, 56). Zavella (2011) demonstrates similar trends among Latinas. These differences in terms of labor market structures and network relationships have a direct impact on how Latina migrants are able to engage the political system. Of course, these gender differences are not only present among immigrants; U.S. born Latinas/os also vary in terms of gender roles, social network relationships, and economic opportunity structures. Therefore, it is important to consider the role gender differences play in helping to frame how male and female Latina/os are able to integrate themselves into U.S. society. An intersectional lens helps scholars to unpack the various structural positions and competing social forces that affect foreign and U.S.-born Latinas/os’ experiences in the United States. Using such an approach makes it possible for scholars to recognize the complexity of Latina/o migration and integration experiences.

2. Gender and U.S. immigration policy
Immigrants’ decisions to migrate are rooted in macro-geopolitical processes over which their subjects have little control, such as economic recession or dislocation, war, or natural disaster. Once
immigrants arrive in the United States, they must deal with the meso-level of an immigration bureaucracy, which does not treat them all the same, and that has significant differences in treatment across male and female migrants. As an example, when I was a volunteer for La Raza Centro Legal in San Francisco in the 1980s, one of the cases I worked on was of a 16 year old Salvadoran girl who had fled the country after being gang raped by members of the Salvadoran military. She applied for political asylum in the United States, fearing retribution should she return to El Salvador because she had publicly named her attackers. The judge in the case ruled that, although her experience was an "unfortunate outcome" of living within a context of war, the attack was not "personal," meaning not targeting her, specifically. He then ordered her back to El Salvador. Although it is true that views of rape as acts of war have changed since this time, it is still the case that the types of persecution generally accepted under petitions for political asylum often do not take into consideration the unique types of persecution and repression that migrant women can face. As a result, "gender inequalities seep through the formulation, interpretation, and implementation of [U.S.] immigration laws" (Menjívar and Salcido 2013, 2). The result is that immigrant women are trying to access "a system that simply was not designed to recognize their needs and circumstances" (Menjívar and Salcido 2013, 2).

The country an immigrant comes from, the relationship the U.S. government has with that country at the time of migration, and the degree to which male and female migrants fit U.S. definitions of "good" or "worthy" immigrants, strongly affect how easy or difficult the legal aspects of the migration process are going to be (De Genova 2004, Ngai 2005, Gardner 2009). This meso-level therefore plays out in significant, gendered ways in the daily life and integration trajectories of individuals and communities and expresses the ‘macro’ level of U.S. foreign policy. As I will now explore, not only the immigrants’ legal and economic status upon their arrival, but even their tendency to come from particular countries and their choice to go to particular countries are intimately related with U.S. foreign and economic policy.

3. Gender, U.S. foreign economic policy and Latina/o migration
The United States’ relations with Latin America have been deeply affected by two important U.S. principles: manifest destiny and the Monroe doctrine. The idea of manifest destiny – that the United States was ‘destined’ to be an Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation that stretched from coast to coast – had its roots in colonial political thought. Over time, this idea that it was the U.S.‘ destiny to control a particular geographic sphere would expand beyond the North American continent and extend across the western hemisphere through the Monroe doctrine. The main thrust of the Monroe Doctrine was that, as countries in the Americas were becoming independent from the imperial European powers, the United States did not want Europe to re-colonize the western hemisphere. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt added the ‘Roosevelt corollary’ to the Monroe doctrine, which defined U.S. intervention in Latin American domestic affairs as necessary for U.S. national security. This corollary was used to justify U.S. intervention in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. It was officially reversed in 1934 with the advent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbor’ policy towards Latin America. Yet the principle that the United States’ political and economic interests are intimately related to that of Latin America remained. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States’ economic interests played a central role in the development of Latin American banking, infrastructure, and industry. Similarly, the U.S. government, particularly
after the start of the cold war, continually intervened in Latin American internal governmental and military affairs.

This U.S. involvement is critically important for understanding Latina/o migration flows to the United States, and the gender distribution within those flows (García Bedolla 2014). Many Latin American migrants worked for U.S. companies in their home countries and those employment patterns were often gendered. The Bracero Program, a contract labor program, in place from 1942 to 1964, provided temporary Mexican workers for U.S. agriculture during the Second World War. It is estimated that over 500,000 male Mexican contract workers were imported into the United States through this program (González 2006, 2). When the program ended in 1964, the Mexican government was concerned about the impact it would have on unemployment in Mexico. As a response, the United States and Mexico began the border industrialization program, which established final assembly plants, called maquiladoras, across the U.S.-Mexico border. In practice, U.S. companies preferred to hire Mexican women for these jobs because they were seen as more malleable and less likely to form unions than Mexican men. This preference caused friction within Mexican households, because the men had fewer economic opportunities in the maquila areas than the women, and some argue that this change in the gender dynamics within families has led to increases in violence against women in these border towns. It also has had an impact on Mexican migration patterns from the maquila zones, with women gaining the training and skills necessary to work in the United States, often after being directly recruited by their companies to seek employment north of the border. This is one of the structural changes in Mexico to which scholars attribute the increase in female migrants of Mexican origin over the past two decades (Leach 2008).

The economic development policies pursued by Latin American governments, and therefore the economic opportunities available to their populations, particularly employment, were gendered and were strongly influenced by decisions made by the U.S. financial sector and by the U.S. government. After the advent of the cold war, U.S. strategic concerns and levels of military aid often affected the success or failure of social movements to redistribute wealth in these countries. Thus the way the United States expressed its political and economic interests in the region affected male and female Latin Americans’ economic and political situation on the ground, the facility with which they were able to migrate to the United States, and the legal terms under which they were accepted (or not) under U.S. immigration policy.

**Conclusion**

Considering the intersection of all these factors, and changes among them across time, allows scholars to understand the complexity of Latina/o migration patterns (see also contributions by Donato and Brace, this symposium, on changes over time). Often the intersectional literature focuses mainly on the level of the individual. Yet, to understand immigrant communities, that intersectional lens must be trained also on the meso- and macro-level structures within which the

---

2 Since 1993, more than 400 women and girls have been murdered and more than 70 remain missing in Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua, Mexico. Very few individuals have been prosecuted for these crimes. See Damien Cave, “Wave of Violence Swallows More Women in Juárez,” *New York Times*, 23 June 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/americas/wave-of-violence-swallows-more-women-in-juarez-mexico.html?_r=0 [last accessed 3 Jan 2014].
migration experience is embedded (Anderson and Scott, 2012). Those structures are complex and highly gendered, as is U.S. immigration policy. To understand Latina/o migration experiences in the United States, scholars need to pay attention to how these social forces play out in the day-to-day lives of our nation’s immigrants.

References

Both Here and There: Gender, Slavery and Migration, Old and New

Laura Brace, University of Leicester, lb21@le.ac.uk

David Brion Davis describes slaves as the first “modern” people. Their vulnerability, marginality and incomplete incorporation into the community made them, he argues, “the prototype for the migratory labor and confused identity that have accompanied every phase of human progress” (Davis 1988, 15). In the traditional migration story, it is assumed women are left behind or attached to male migrants as dependants. When they do leave home to migrate on their own behalf, they find themselves in a world
defined by “fraught commitments and fragmented loyalties” (Gardiner Barber 2006, 73). It is this fragmentation that helps to create and reinforce their dependence on their employers, who often act as their sponsors or provide them with work permits (Anderson 2010, 309). Domestic and care work, as well as sex commerce, are coded as women's work and then understood as drudgery. The labour of these women outside their families is not understood to offer them a secure anchor in themselves or to ground their citizenship, and so their vulnerability, marginality and incomplete incorporation are reinforced by gender.

I was struck by the connection Davis makes between ‘old’ slavery and migration, and in particular by what it suggests for how we should think about the vulnerability of migrants, and how it relates to violence, insecurity and belonging. In the process, I want to draw attention to the problems of reading across too readily from ‘old’ to ‘new’ slavery, and to the risks of expecting to understand gender, slavery and migration through embodied pain and suffering (see also contributions by García Bedolla and Donato, this symposium, on understanding gender and migration over time; and Piper, this symposium, on reading across from ‘old’ to ‘new’ struggles). Where the expectation is of shared and timeless legible pain, more complicated stories of labour, precarity and confusion, which underpin gendered migration, get lost and made invisible and, as I will argue, there is no space for the blurry lines between freedom and coercion in which migrants live lives not necessarily defined by violence and powerlessness.

In order to understand the complexities of the relationship between slavery and migration, we need to get beyond the idea that the bodies of slaves can call to us across the centuries, and from a space beyond words, to tell us about their speechless suffering. Rather than focusing on the bodies and wounds of the victims of trafficking-as-slavery, and thus on their passivity, we need to turn instead to the structures of immigration laws and employment markets that keep many people who are subject to severe economic exploitation outside the circles of entitlement and citizenship. We must consider how questions of belonging, honour and self-government play out for vulnerable migrant workers in the space between slavery and freedom (see also contributions by Korteweg and Yurdakul, and Kim to this symposium, on moving beyond migrant women’s victimhood).

Violence and suffering: old and new

The new slavery discourse, which is primarily about women as victims of human trafficking, tends to focus on the intense and interpersonal violence slaves are subjected to as they are beaten with brooms and kitchen tools, and whipped with electric cables until they bleed. In the antislavery writings of both the eighteenth and the twenty-first centuries, the slaves are presented as bleeding bodies, with marks on their backs and chilli pepper or salt rubbed into their wounds (Bales 2000, 2). This constant subjection to violence is understood to have particular effects relating to the slaves’ loss of control over their own lives. For Kevin Bales, when someone becomes a slave they become a consumable item, a thing, treated as livestock, as property, “a docile beast of burden” (Bales 2000, 25, 48, 211). When the meaning of slavery turns on “the trauma of captivity” (Bales 2000, 256), the figure of the trafficked woman comes to stand almost as the paradigmatic chattel. She takes the place of the enslaved black woman in eighteenth-century abolitionist discourse who was depicted as naked, whipped, and hanging from a tree by her arms, reinforcing her status as “woman, victim, and property” (Favret 1998, 34). The violence and truth of slavery were located in a woman’s body. The victim of trafficking has become a symbol of vulnerability, of what Claudia
Aradau calls “raw physical suffering” (Aradau 2004, 262). She is depicted in anti-trafficking campaigns as immobile and trapped, turned into a doll or a marionette (Andrijasevic 2007). Through her experience of suffering and pain, she becomes an anonymous body and a spectacle of need. In this sense, the enslaved African woman of the eighteenth century is the prototype of today’s victim of trafficking.

On Bales’ account, the shift from old to new slavery is a shift from ownership to “control and appropriation” (Bales 2000, 25), but violence remains at the heart of his definition of what makes a slave a slave. People are enslaved by violence and held against their will for the purposes of exploitation (2000, 20). The slaves themselves, he argues, adapt to the horror through resignation, giving in, and fatalism. Charcoal workers in Brazil, brick makers in Pakistan and agricultural workers in India, he argues, have all adapted psychologically to their situation as powerless slaves, subjected to the total power of others. They are “too honest to perceive how they are being entrapped”, caught by codes of honour, pride and reputation that keep them repaying their debts (2000, 137). At the same time, they are treated as subhuman and “have lost their dignity” (2000, 199). In his description of a worker in a Thai brothel, her eyes are flat and dead, her voice is hopeless, and her personality and will to escape are destroyed.

These kinds of descriptions closely echo the eighteenth-century antislavery discourse, with its focus on bleeding hearts and open wounds, and in particular on the plantation slaves’ subjection to the whip as an instrument of discipline and torture (Brace, forthcoming 2014). The abolitionist response to the horrors of ‘old’ slavery emphasised the violence of the slave masters, and the powerlessness of the slaves. In their condemnation of chattel slavery on the plantations, opponents of slavery focused on the “degradation” of the slaves, their debasement and their subjugation. They were tamed like beasts “by the stings of hunger and the lash”, and their treatment depressed their minds and numbed their faculties until it “gave them the appearance of being endued with inferior capacities than the rest of mankind” (Clarkson 1786, 22).

In both these old and new slavery accounts, which I question, the slaves lose something in their subjection to others. Slavery is presented as “the theft of an entire life” (Bales 2000, 7), a death sentence to “a death, infinitely more excruciating” than that from which they were saved (Clarkson 1786, 110). They suffer what Orlando Patterson has termed a “social death”, closely related to what Clarkson described as being “dead in a civil sense; they had neither name nor tribe; were incapable of a judicial process; were in short without appeal” (Clarkson 1786, 17). In Patterson’s more extended analysis of what it means to be a slave, his definition rests on the constituent elements of violence, permanence, natal alienation and dishonour (Patterson 1982). It is difficult to fit the new slaves into this scheme, since as Bales makes clear, the new slavery is not about ownership and is not a hereditable status. He does, however, pick up on several of the elements of social death, the slaveholders’ “permanent access to violence” (Bales 2000, 30), the slaves’ inability “to protect or hold together any family they make” (2000, 111), their isolation, their sense of dishonour and their permanent dependence.

The understanding of slavery that comes out of seeing pain and being affected by it often suggests that “wounds speak louder than words” (Malkki 1996, 384). The campaigners’ approach, both in the eighteenth century and today, is to put cruelty first, marking it as the wilful infliction of physical
pain on a fellow creature and as a supreme evil (Shklar 1982, 17). Granville Sharp depicted the slaves as the victims of a shocking violence that resulted from the “arbitrary, cruel and inhuman spirit of plantation legislators” (Sharp 1769, 63). William Dickson, Thomas Clarkson, Richard Hillier and others all stressed the ways in which the horse whip tore the flesh, drew blood and left scars, which the slaves carried with them to their graves. Their humanity, and the inhumanity of their owners, was confirmed by the bearing and infliction of pain. Bales and others then read the wounds as a story of total power on one side balanced out by total powerlessness on the other. All kinds of slavery, old and new, leach into each other in the idea that a Thai brothel is “like the world of the concentration camp, there are those with total power and those with no power” (Bales 2000, 62).

This focus on intimate, cruel, witnessed violence makes for problematic connections between old and new slavery, and makes it hard to see how slaves can be understood as the prototypes of migrants. As Aradau argues, the focus on the raw physical suffering of the victim of trafficking is there to distinguish her from the categories of migrants, criminals or prostitutes (Aradau 2004, 262). The victim of trafficking’s representation as “woman, victim and property” acts as a warning against migration, an embodiment of the risks of leaving home (Aradau 2004, 263; Andrijasevic 2007, 42). There is no space here for confused identities, for complex, multi-layered stories of mobility and migration, or for the blurriness of the lines between freedom and coercion: they are fixed as victims and understood to be subject to total control. It is tempting, but loaded with risk, to read straight across from old to new slavery, to assume that being subject to total control, being rendered powerless and reduced to the status of victim and property, does not have a specific and complicated history. As Clarkson acknowledged in the eighteenth century, slaves were subjected not only to incessant violence, but also to the “complicated stings” of being deprived of liberty and banished from their homes (Clarkson 1786, 81). Once we give these complicated stings their own history, we can begin to see other, different connections between slavery and migration and move beyond the dogma of speechless emissaries.

Navigating the space between slavery and freedom

The raw suffering model tends to rely on a binary conception of power where those with total power confront the totally powerless. This has serious implications for thinking through and understanding the role of consent and of commodification in slavery relations. It relies on the assumption that people who are enslaved are reduced to the status of objects rather than subjects, things rather than persons. “Women in Thailand”, Bales says, “are things, markers in a male game of status and prestige” (Bales 2000, 48). This is a problematic construction, even for plantation slavery. Slave codes and legislation found that they had to define slaves as persons in order to be able to accuse them of murder and other crimes, and to protect them against murder and grievous bodily harm. In all legal codes, slaves were treated as persons at law (Patterson 1982, 23).

Slave owners did use violence to control their slaves, but they also found that they needed to provide their slaves with their own provisioning grounds and allow them to sell their goods in the markets. Some slaves worked as porters, boatmen and fishermen in the coastal towns of Barbados, for example, and skilled slaves “worked out”, finding employment for themselves as carpenters, locksmiths and watchmakers, giving their owners a weekly return out of their earnings. Some slaves received payment for skilled and industrial labour, and rewards for loyalty or good conduct. Those with particular skills, like enslaved divers and swimmers, were in the ambiguous position of
“privileged exploitation”, and were allowed some respite from fieldwork, some monetary bonuses and permission to drink alcohol. In the complicated hierarchies of slavery, slave owners, rather than exercising total power over powerless victims, found themselves in a "continually negotiated relationship" with their slaves (Dawson 2006, 1353). Provision grounds, trade networks and different forms of waged labour generated differences in status between the slaves and allowed some of them to exercise a degree of control over their labour power, blurring the line between powerlessness and freedom, and taking us further away from the ‘raw suffering model’ for understanding slavery. Living, working, economically active slaves were not definable solely as victim or property, or by their bodily pain. It was not always straightforward to distinguish between slavery and freedom, where some slaves were paid for part of their forced labour, and some free labourers were subject to coercion and discrimination (Bolland 1995, 143). The point here is not to diminish the suffering of the slaves, but to challenge the binaries of power-powerlessness and slavery-freedom that underpin many mainstream conceptions of modern slavery, and then of migration. Recognising that it is not always easy to draw bright lines between freedom and slavery should help us to see the shakiness of the binaries between trafficking and smuggling, and forced and free migration.

In emphasising instead the significance of negotiation, hierarchy and relationship, we can see how it is that Patterson reaches the conclusion that slaves did not become objects of property, even though they were not able to act as the subjects of property. In my reading across from old to new slavery, the insertion of this space between slavery and freedom allows us to see beyond the victimhood of the enslaved people, and to explore their vulnerability as workers and as migrants. Once we break down the opposition between total control and total freedom, it is possible to read the continuities between slavery and servitude, and understand how questions of belonging, honour and self-government play out for migrants who live lives that are not necessarily defined by violence and powerlessness.

The liberal subject who is not a slave is understood to own his or her own labour, and is able to use that labour not only to improve themselves, but to ground their membership in civil society and their citizenship. Their property in their person defines their collective responsibility, their sense of identity and honour, and their economic security. These stable subjects are defined in relation to what others lack (Hall 2000, 230), and part of what is seen as lacking in others is righteous labour and industriousness. Some people, and particularly women, both in the eighteenth century and today, are understood to be idle and listless, and their labour is stigmatised as mere drudgery, as unskilled and unimproving, contributing nothing to the wider collective. This perceived (and constructed) lack of secure attachment to their property in their person and to their own labour was central to the enslavability of some groups who were already marked as vagabonds and vagrants. The link between industriousness and labour and stable subjectivity is broken by mobility. In contrast to the members of highly-skilled elites – the brightest and the best, whose movement is celebrated as cosmopolitan citizenship – those whose labour is stigmatised as inefficient are at the same time constructed as vagrant, marginal and transient. Their labour recalls slave labour because it is somehow not seen as belonging entirely to them, as not securely anchored. People who lack self-control and the inclination to labour are likely to wander, not to stay where they are supposed to be (Pettman 1998, 394).
The precariousness of their work and their status is produced through employment and immigration legislation and reinforced by their deportability. Immigration detainees are often deliberately 'dispersed' to isolated locations, sometimes even permanently separated from their children, bound with manacles, and moved against their will (O'Connell Davidson 2013). This deportability, the possibility of forcible detachment, closely echoes the vulnerability, marginality and incomplete incorporation of the slave. The state, as Robert Miles (1987) argues, uses racism to select and legitimate whose labour counts as rational and improving, and it uses gender as well as race and class to construct hierarchies of acceptability and incorporation. Some are incorporated as citizens and workers, while others are constructed as foreigners and migrants, on the outside, separate from the nation, and in that outsidersness we can read the traces of slavery.

References
Marriage Migration and the Women’s Movement in South Korea
Daisy Y. Kim, Johns Hopkins University, kim.daisy@gmail.com

In countries of East Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (hereafter Korea), marriage migration, or the migration of individuals for the purpose of joining a spouse in another country, accounts for substantial flows of migration by women. In part, marriage migration has been prominent because it is the primary means by which East Asian states permit foreign migrants access to long-term settlement and citizenship. Hence, marriage migrants stand out as exceptions to restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies that attempt to discourage migrants from settlement. Symbolizing the persistence of traditional gender roles and norms, as well as an opportunity for desired upward socioeconomic mobility for some, marriage migration has radically transformed the individual lives of women migrating from developing countries within the Asian region (Freeman 2012; Palriwala and Oberoi 2008; Constable 2005).

Marriage migration has not only impacted women who are migrating, but it has also had a significant impact on shaping gender hierarchies and feminist politics in the receiving society. Korea presents a fascinating case for studying marriage migration. First, marriage migration in Korea has grown at an exceptional rate, transforming entire local communities, especially in the rural areas. Second, the interventionist role of the state in sponsoring, sustaining, and propagating marriage migration as a solution to an impending demographic problem is worth noting. Finally, marriage migration has had a noticeable impact on the Korean women’s movement as grassroots organizations have mobilized to advocate for the rights of migrant women (see also contributions by Donato and Piper, this symposium, on US and global mobilizations respectively).

My research examines how Korean migrant advocacy organizations, especially feminist and pro-women’s groups have sought to re-energize the broader Korean women’s movement by including the advancement of migrant women’s rights as an integral cause of the movement. I first provide a brief historical context of marriage migration, highlighting the role of the state in promoting international marriages. Then, I discuss how grassroots activist organizations and networks have responded to the myriad problems of discrimination, violence, and human rights violations faced by marriage migrants in Korea. Lastly, I contemplate the contributions and limitations of grassroots mobilization on behalf of marriage migrants and the implications for migrant women.

Marriage migration and the state
In the late 1980s, the travails of Korean bachelors residing in the rural areas who were unable to find women willing to marry them began to be sensationalized by the national media through tales of woeful dejection and shame. Concerned with the long-term repercussions of this growing social demographic problem, local government officials and village leaders organized matchmaking events and tours for rural bachelors. Initially, local leaders turned to the sizable community of ethnic Koreans in China who were keen on exploring budding economic opportunities in Korea as a source of potential brides, and thus began the practice of so-called international marriages (Freeman 2012; Constable 2005). After the Korean government passed measures that effectively deregulated the
marriage brokerage agencies in 1998, international marriages between Korean men and foreign women became more prevalent along with the expansion of the commercial brokering industry. Similarly, marriage brokers have been seminal in fostering high rates of marriage migration in neighboring Japan and Taiwan. Through brokers, international marriages in Korea have become so prevalent that in 2005 nearly fourteen percent of all marriages registered that year were international marriages (Lee 2008, 111). Furthermore, international marriages spread to urban areas where men from the cities, often from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, contributed to an upward pressure on the demand for international marriages. With the state’s tacit complicity, these profiteering brokers aggressively recruited clients for their matchmaking services in Korea and in many parts of Southeast, East and Central Asia. While the numbers have plateaued out since their peak in 2005, an annual average of approximately 25,000 international marriages continues to sustain marriage migration and the growing presence of marriage migrants in Korea. Over 250,000 marriage migrants currently reside in Korea, and the overwhelming majority hail from other parts of the Asian continent, including China, Vietnam, and Mongolia (Ministry of Justice 2012).

**Grassroots activism on behalf of marriage migrants**

While Korean political elites have lauded international marriages and the growing presence of multi-ethnic, multicultural families as a solution to the population growth challenges posed by low fertility rates and a rapidly ageing society, Korean feminist and pro-women’s groups have eyed the phenomenon with increasing alarm (Kim 2012).

Grassroots mobilization supporting marriage migrants can be traced back to established networks of activists advocating for migrant workers, who arrived in Korea beginning in the late 1980s due to severe labor shortages in labor intensive sectors. A broad coalition of politically progressive grassroots activists involved in the prior labor movement and pro-democratization struggles from the authoritarian era of the 1970s and 1980s, mobilized to address the multitude of hardships faced by migrant workers, demanding measures to prevent abuse and mistreatment by employers, nonpayment of wages, and to secure workers’ compensation in the aftermath of industrial accidents (Lim 2003; Kim 2003).

However, the experiences of migrant women signaled to Korean activists who were more attuned to gender issues that migrant women faced problems and challenges that substantially differed in kind to those experienced by male migrant workers. In particular, marriage migrants, as the sole foreigners permitted the rights of citizenship, posed an unforeseen challenge by invoking fiery public debates about citizenship and nationality among Korean activists. According to one feminist activist who spent over a decade advocating for marriage migrants:

> One question that the presence of migrant women raises for us, one that has not been raised before within Korean society, is the problem of nationality. In Korea, citizenship and nationality have been equated as the same. But the experiences of migrant women make us realize that we (Koreans) need to treat these women equally, regardless of their nationality. Even though their nationality is different, as residents (jumin in Korean), these people’s rights and responsibilities should be guaranteed. (Interview, October 30, 2012)
The increasing presence of marriage migrant issues signaled to participants in the women’s movement, like this activist, the need for the movement to expand and become more inclusive alongside the broader demographic changes within society. This meant recognition on the part of activists that the nationality question presented an opportunity to bring gender issues into the public debate over citizenship rights, and to shift the emphasis of the discourse away from nationality and toward gender.

Furthermore, the tales of oppression and discrimination faced by migrant women brought to the foreground renewed discussions about the intersections between gender and family, reminding activists of their inability to resolve disagreements within the movement about the role of the family in feminist politics. In 2001, Korean feminist activists founded organizations solely for migrant women such as the Migrant Women Human Rights Center, a nationwide activist network with seven regional offices that provide a variety of support services for migrant women, including educational programs to empower and educate migrant women activists. Rather than ally only with migrant advocacy organizations, these feminist activists established coalitions with larger women’s organizations such as the Korea Women’s Association United, the largest and oldest umbrella organization of women’s groups, and the Women’s Foundation, a nonprofit aimed at funding the activities of grassroots women’s organizations. For some Korean feminists, including marriage migrants as a concern of women’s rights, through broad coalition building and alliances between fledgling pro-migrant activist groups and existing women’s organizations signaled the possibility of reinvigorating a feminist critique of the family as a patriarchal structure that continues to oppress women.

Since their establishment, feminist and pro-women’s groups supporting marriage migrants have channeled their efforts into two main goals. The first is to secure the legal status of migrant women and thereby weaken the excessive dependence of marriage migrants on potentially abusive husbands. Even though marriage migrants qualify for expedited naturalization procedures that encourage them to acquire Korean citizenship after two years of marriage, current immigration policies render the legal status of marriage migrants before naturalization rather precarious because the issuance and annual renewal of the spousal visa depend on the willingness of the Korean husband to guarantee and sponsor his spouse (see also contribution by García Bedolla, this symposium, on this problem of dependence in the United States). Divorce and other marital troubles before securing citizenship mean that marriage migrants, including those with children, face the threat of deportation and the precarious existence of undocumented status. To that end, activist organizations have fought to secure legal status and individual rights for migrant women independent of changes to their marital status.

The second goal of feminist activist organizations has been to provide counseling, shelters, and legal advice for marriage migrants who have become victims of domestic abuse and/or sexual violence. In several tragic cases, marriage migrants have died at the hands of their abusive or mentally ill husbands. In 2010, Thach Thi Hoang Ngoc, a marriage migrant from Vietnam who was twenty years old at the time, was beaten and stabbed to death by her forty-seven year old schizophrenic Korean husband only a week after her arrival in Korea. Feminist organizations have provided legal and psychological counseling, educated migrant women on financial independence and career development, and provided shelters and emergency hotlines for victims of domestic and sexual violence.
abuse. Moreover, they have sought to empower migrant women through education and have encouraged community building by providing spaces where marriage migrants can come together to discuss their problems, seek solace and solicit advice.

Implications

Successes

The most obvious achievement of the movement to support migrant women has been the introduction of greater government regulation over international marriage brokerages. Reported cases of women recruited by brokers who were then subject to forced prostitution and labor upon arrival in Korea brought forth criticism from activists that brokers were engaging in sex and labor trafficking under the pretense of marriage. Activists discovered that marriage brokers often knowingly gave out false information to many of the migrant women about their prospective husbands, for instance, inflating their level of education, income, wealth, and family background. As a result, many migrant women have found themselves ensnared in unhappy marriages to men from more dire circumstances than they had expected.

Following a strong contentious political tradition of engaging in visible street protests, loud public rallies, as well as closed-door negotiations with government officials, activist networks effectively pressured the Korean government to enact legislative reform. Passed by the National Assembly in 2007, the Act on the Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Agencies requires that brokerage agencies comply with the regulations of the foreign countries where they conduct business, and that they provide accurate information for the parties involved. This Act was amended in 2010 to introduce further regulations, including mandatory orientation and education programs for Koreans applying for spousal visas.

Unintended consequences

On the other hand, the successful mobilization of feminist activist networks brought forth unintended consequences whereby a government-civil society partnership has upstaged organizations espousing an overt anti-establishment feminist agenda. In 2006, several years into the mobilization of grassroots efforts, the Korean government, under then President Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008), adopted a series of measures under the heading of Multicultural Society to promote the social integration of marriage migrants and their children (otherwise referred to as multicultural families). Declaring that Korea was no longer an “ethnically homogeneous society” but a multicultural one, President Roh and his administration prioritized providing public support for multicultural families as a concern of national interest. This outpouring of public support has included considerable financial assistance from the central government, a variety of benefits resembling affirmative action programs, and service provisions, including personal development and cultural enrichment programs for multicultural families. While activists generally viewed public assistance favorably, as it enabled a wider outreach to alienated migrants, they were ultimately disappointed that policymakers relied heavily on mainstream women's organizations, who lacked a progressive feminist agenda, to implement these programs. Because policymakers perceived multicultural families as falling within the purview of women's issues, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MoGEF), established in 2001, was entrusted with implementing the majority of these policies. For more progressive feminist organizations, this was an unwelcome
intrusion by the state because the MoGEF has been perceived as a mainstream organization that is incapable of adequately challenging the status quo (Kim and Kim 2011).

Since the adoption of government policies, feminist activist groups discussed in the previous section have been overshadowed by various civic and quasi-governmental actors - including local wives’ organizations, church groups, and socially conservative associations aimed at preserving “healthy” families, or heteronormative patriarchal families. These developments embody the governmental aim of achieving government-civil society cooperation through state funding, coupled with collective civic action. As a nationwide network of over two hundred community centers overseen by the MoGEF and operated by local community organizations, Multicultural Family Support Centers provide a variety of services such as Korean language education, childcare support, and marriage counseling to multicultural families (Kim 2012, 212). Staffed mostly by female language instructors, community leaders, and social workers, these centers, in contrast to feminist organizations, often aim to preserve the patriarchal family structure and existing gender relations by educating migrant women to assume the traditional gender roles of devoted housewife, self-sacrificing mother, and obedient daughter-in-law. Feminist activist organizations, like the Migrant Women Human Rights Center, now compete with other nonprofit organizations that participate in supporting multicultural families but do not share the Center’s feminist agenda to empower migrant women. For activists, the partnership between government and civil society has promoted a peculiar kind of multiculturalism in Korea, one that promotes full cultural and linguistic assimilation in the name of multiculturalism where only families, not individuals, are considered multicultural (Kim 2012). A feminist activist remarked:

I think that they (the government) shouldn’t use the word ‘multicultural’ (damunhwa in Korean). There is nothing multicultural about the policies they adopted. Basically, the policies were formulated to preserve Korea’s patriarchal familial context and it is about forcing migrant women to adhere to this context. (Interview, June 2, 2010)

Meanwhile, a major ongoing concern of pro-migrant feminist activists is the relative lack of migrant women participating in the activist organizations. Initially, activist leaders had hoped that migrant women would eventually advocate on their own behalf. There have been promising signs of migrant women participating in public life: Jasmine Lee, a marriage migrant from the Philippines, made history in 2012 by becoming the first foreign-born legislator in the National Assembly. Other marriage migrants are becoming prominent educators, cultural ambassadors, entrepreneurs, and community leaders in their own right. Yet in reality, Korean women continue to dominate the leadership positions of migrant advocacy organizations. While feminist and pro-women’s organizations have problematized the Korean state and society’s objectification and commodification of migrant women, many individual activists within the movement recognize that their organizations have also been somewhat complicit in this process of depriving migrant women of their agency by treating them as subordinate or as passive recipients of their services (see also contributions to this symposium by Korteweg and Yurdakul, and Brace, on moving beyond migrant women’s victimhood). Perhaps, then, the greatest challenge for the movement supporting marriage migrants is that marriage migrants face a double marginalization within the migrant and women’s movements. In the words of one marriage migrant activist:
Even within the migrant population, marriage migrants are a minority. The dominant discourse on migrants in Korea is centered on the migrant worker population, and marriage migrants are more "fashionable," rather than a substantive issue... So we (marriage migrant activists) are a minority in both movements. It is great that marriage migrant issues are included in the women's movement. But it is still a minority issue. (Interview, June 2, 2010)

Conclusion
As migrants become integrated into local and national communities, they harbor the potential to become a transformative social and political force in the receiving societies. Marriage migrants demand special attention as agents of transformation because, by definition, they are not only members of society, but also members of families with intimate ties to citizens. Yet, whether this transformative potential is reached depends on existing social and political structures, such as gender hierarchies, that may either hinder or foster this potential. This essay has explored how supporting migrants may be perceived as a catalyst for change in the host society through an examination of marriage migration and the women's movement in Korea (see contribution by Mepschen, Duyvendak and Uitermark, this symposium, for a contrasting experience of feminist engagement with migrant and minority struggles in the Netherlands). By bringing migrant women and their support organizations into the fold of the women's movement, Korean activists capitalized on the opportunity to revitalize the women's movement and make it more inclusive; yet, the revitalization has fallen significantly short of dismantling dominant gender hierarchies that are based on sustaining patriarchy through the family. Feminist mobilizations have been unable to achieve a robust consensus over issues related to the family in wider society. Finally, the promise of genuine transformative change rests with the ability of more migrant women to speak with their own voices by carving a space for themselves within a movement presently dominated by Korean advocates who claim to speak on their behalf.

References
Pushing the Boundaries of Migrant Rights via Gendered Activism
Nicola Piper, The University of Sydney, nicola.piper@sydney.edu.au

Contemporary migration increasingly occurs on a short-term, temporary basis, with the result that many migrants are effectively living a transnationalised existence (Glick-Schiller et al. 1999). Many experience transnationally split family life, and ‘absentee parenthood’ is common, especially the absence of mothers in an age of feminised migration (Schmalzbauer 2004; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997) and the spread of temporary contract migration schemes. This essay considers, first, the dimensions of rights issues that result from these transnationally split lives that conventional approaches to migrant rights have not captured and which are not addressed by the existing global discourse and policy agenda. Second, I consider the ways in which gendered global migrant rights activism pushes the boundaries of this agenda. Third, I explore the implications of this activism for reconceiving extant frames of citizenship and human rights with a focus on the lessons of gendered struggles for migrant rights.

1. The challenge: rights in a transnational context

The transnational aspects of contemporary, short-term migration raise new challenges. Migrants more often than before build up social welfare rights in one country but need to access them from another country. Labor disputes can arise at the end of a contract when the worker has to return to his/her country of origin. How to demand redress, such as claiming back unpaid wages from a distance, poses another challenge. In particular, there are two dimensions of rights issues that conventional approaches to migrant rights have not captured.

- Portability of rights

Migrant workers operate and live between the jurisdiction and territory of at least two states (country of origin, country of destination) and, therefore, between different legal or regulatory orders and social protection systems. This transnational state of affairs leads to particular difficulties when it comes to claiming benefits, payments and investments migrants are due or have accrued over time in different places (Tamas 2003). For migrants to access benefits properly, these entitlements need to be ‘portable’ between countries. The concept of ‘portable rights’ has emerged to refer in particular to social welfare entitlements, such as pensions and health insurance payments for the older generation of migrants who need those investments to be transferred to their countries of origin for their retirement. But it can also encompass broader claims that require new kinds of solutions in order to resolve a range of migrant labour disputes. When migrants’ labour rights – to a fixed number of hours per day, a safe and secure working environment, or payment, for example – are violated, there are often legal obstacles in the way of seeking redress in the countries of destination, especially if they are working in an unauthorized manner or if they are made to
return home at the end of a time-limited work contract/work permit (Caron 2005; Smith and Paoletti 2005). In these cases, they need a place where their claims can be resolved outside the country where they work. At the level of organisational support, ‘portable membership’ or a ‘global membership passport’ is also being raised as a way of defending migrants’ rights based on the idea of ‘unions without borders’, a scheme promoted by global unions such as UNI and the Public Services International.

- **Social welfare rights**

Conventional family unification policies tend to reflect the entitlements of skilled or permanent migrants. As such, they are irrelevant to the majority of low-wage migrant workers who are on temporary contracts (even though quite a few end up in a state of being “permanently temporary”). At the very least, therefore, there is a need to re-think what the right to a family life and/or an intimate relationship means in the context of transnationalised families. This is particularly necessary as the rise of female-led migration destabilises established gender norms and gender roles, and also in the context of policies that prohibit the formation of families (such as in Singapore or Malaysia where low-wage migrants are not allowed to marry locals and domestic workers are deported when falling pregnant). It is important here to consider not only the rights of migrant workers to a family life but also the rights of those left behind who are dependent, emotionally and financially, on parents or carers working abroad. The rights of those left behind mean that states that benefit from migration should have an obligation to finance and deliver social policy programmes that compensate and support the families of migrant workers (Piper 2008). In the context of European welfare states, access to child support for migrants whose children are in the country of origin is a key concern. The portability of social security enters in here as well: what happens to childcare benefits when the children live in a different country than the country where their parents earn the family income?

In contrast, the global discourse on international migration that has emerged over the last decade is based on two dominant paradigms and policy concerns: 1. the ‘management of migration’ discourse (through legally controlling the exit and entry of workers and, therefore, their access to employment opportunities); 2. the ‘migration-development nexus’ discourse (with particular focus on alleviation of poverty in resource-poorer countries of origin through migration to typically resource-richer destination countries). These two concerns, that dominate the global agenda, have the same core element in common: a focus on controlling migration through state cooperation and extracting the economic benefits of migration. This is based on temporary and circular migration, which has emerged as the main policy prescription and has found a firm place on the global policy agenda. At the same time, only lip service is paid to the human rights of migrants. This is evident from the under-ratification of migrant rights-specific international standards and the piecemeal process of easing the many hardships experienced by individual migrants resulting from exploitative practices of recruitment agencies and the employer-tied nature of temporary migration schemes.

In this context, the issue of provision of, and access to, rights has emerged as a central concern in which gender plays an important role. Given the feminisation of migration (meant to refer to the increasing role and numbers of women migrating as primary wage earner) in response to gendered ‘demand’ (ageing societies, labour shortages in the global care economy, crumbling public care
services in the Global North) and ‘supply’ structures (primarily lack of employment opportunities), many migrant women end up working as domestic workers. Physical isolation (work in private households) and legal non-recognition (i.e. work in ‘grey’ areas of the care market or as informal workers) leads to political exclusion in terms of labour activism: trade unions have traditionally concerned themselves with formal sectors and the organising of skilled workers. Migrant rights organisations have filled that void. It is in fact domestic workers-turned-activists and their organisations that have played a vital role in addressing legal and political exclusion of migrant domestic workers.

Gender plays an important role in the nascent global migrant rights movement in terms of its key objectives, which include raising awareness of gender differences and the importance of addressing women migrants’ rights issues at times separately from men’s (see also contributions by Donato and Kim, this symposium, on mobilisations in the US and Korea respectively). Last but not least, the nature of political activism is gendered itself. The main focus in this essay is on the latter: the political struggle, particularly by women, and the ways in which this struggle pushes the boundaries of migrant rights politically and conceptually.

2. Pushing the boundaries: gendered global migrant rights activism

As a concept ‘migrants’ rights’ is still historically new and does not meet much acceptance. At this stage it is still primarily down to civil society activists to promote and advance the idea that “migrant rights are human rights” – whilst taking gender seriously.

There are more and more examples emerging of temporary and undocumented migrants voicing their grievances openly, as evident from recent demonstrations staged in the US and by South Asian migrant workers in some Middle Eastern countries as well as Singapore, together with the longstanding weekly demonstrations of (primarily, but not exclusively) domestic workers in Hong Kong. The expanding literature on migrant rights advocacy and political organising has shown that migrants’ rights are increasingly being voiced by way of collective organising across borders and coalition forming between NGOs and unions, across ethnicities (Constable 1997; Law 2002; Piper 2009). The rights claims are thereby directed toward countries of origin and destination with issues spanning from under- or non-payment of wages (“right to be paid” campaign by Tenaganita, Malaysia), one-day off and opposition to impending wage cuts (as in Hong Kong), the regulation of recruitment agencies (in the origin countries), to rights of those left behind (in the Philippines). There are context- and place-specific differences in the size and force of local organisations and national networks (see contribution by Kim, this symposium, on these dynamics in Korea).

Foreign domestic workers’ concerns have been prevalent within regional networks of migrant organisations for quite some time, especially in Asia where the sheer enormity of domestic work is carried out by foreign women, most of whom migrate within the region of Asia as temporary, employer-tied, live-in domestic workers (Piper and Lee 2012). These networks have generated

---

1 Tanya Basok (2009) speaks in this context of migrant rights being “counter-hegemonic”, as opposed to “hegemonic” rights claims. Migrants’ rights are an example of counter-hegemonic human rights as they involve granting and expanding rights to (sometimes undocumented) non-citizens, thereby challenging the norm of sovereignty (ibid, p. 188).

2 Independent, the, ‘Migrants and the Middle East: Welcome to the other side of Dubai, 28 March 2006.
their own activist responses. One such network is the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), headquartered in Manila, which is member of the international network Migrant Rights International (MRI) (based in Geneva). Both MFA and MRI are membership-based organisations, and both are the driving force behind the recently founded Global Coalition on Migration. They thus form the core of the emerging global migrant rights movement. Given the membership of organisations concerned especially with women and the participation of female leaders in these networks, this movement has always taken gender seriously by flagging the particular vulnerability of female migrants in their roles as workers in certain sectors, and as mothers and family members. It is through a gender analysis that this movement has placed issues around transnationally split families, the social costs of migration and domestic/care work, on the agenda of global discussion fora and has therefore demanded recognition of the portability of rights and social welfare in a cross-border context.

As a result of regional and global collaboration among domestic worker and migrant organisations (Hsia 2009; Wee and Sim, 2005), the International Labour Organization (ILO) tabled a new convention on the agenda of its annual congress in 2010, with the result being the adoption of ILO Convention No. 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers. This Convention, which is accompanied by specific recommendations on the protection of (mainly female) migrant workers in the domestic sector, constitutes a major achievement in ensuring the formal recognition of domestic work as formal work, which is highly significant for women in (or from) the Global South. The various organisations involved in the advocacy efforts in the lead-up subsequently founded the International Domestic Worker Network that drew up a list of actions immediately after the formal adoption of ILO Convention No. 189, in order to launch information campaigns to ensure its ratification. To date there are 15 State Parties to this Convention from every region in the world.

3. Pushing the boundaries: reconceiving citizenship and human rights

These emerging struggles push the global policy agenda. I argue, in turn, for the need to rethink migrant rights beyond the extant frames of citizenship and human rights. The latter has typically resulted in a legalistic or individualistic treatment of rights, whereas the former has mainly been applied to the context of individual nation-states and the post-migration stage (‘immigration’) with the view to long-term settlement.

When migration is understood as both a process as well as a relational concept neither of those two conventional frameworks is satisfactory, nor captures the reality and experiences of many migrants, particularly when gender is taken seriously. Migration needs to be understood as a process involving three main stages (pre-migration, overseas stay, return) in which rights issues occur at all stages. It is also relational, meaning migrants are embedded in a broader social context in relation to non-migrants (e.g. at the workplace and in terms of specific sectors within the labour market they predominate in) and to non-migrating family members who remain in the country of origin. Given the increasing feminisation of migration, the primary migrant is more often than before a woman, leaving her spouse or other family members behind. The activists whose struggles I have alluded to above touch upon both these spatial and temporal dimensions and challenge the existing regime to respond to their realities.

The challenge for the migrant rights movement is how to transform temporal and spatial dimensions of transnationalism into political messages on the basis of specific strategies such as
those outlined above. In turn, our understanding of rights (in terms of the “what” and “who”) should be shaped by these actual struggles and informed by people’s own understanding of that to which they should be justly entitled. Our understandings of citizenship, human rights, and ‘migrants rights as human rights’ are thereby challenged and recast accordingly.

Full citizenship has become a less and less important concern for many migrants in the current era of enhanced cross-border movement and sensitive politics around its regulation (Dauvergne 2008). Arguably “human rights in a global world are, increasingly, rights of social and geographical mobility” (Turner 2006, 8). I interpret such claims as pointing to the importance of broader social justice which, for migrant activists whose advocacy is based on the average migrant experience such as the groups discussed above, revolve around safe, secure and fairly-paid work, access to social protection and portable social rights, dignity and respect for migrants in the countries of destination and their countries of origin. Equally crucial are political rights, the right to join and form collective organisations to channel political demands and rights claims.

In order to capture an integrated approach to rights, set within a broader social justice agenda, I therefore choose to use the phrase ‘migrant rights’ to denote that what is at stake here is neither the classical understanding of citizenship nor a liberal, individualistic notion of human rights. The somewhat diffuse-sounding notion of ‘migrant rights’ pertains to broader mobility rights that go beyond national citizenship rights in a post-migration context, as well as to political representation beyond the confines of the nation-state (i.e. citizenship). In today’s globally networked economy and transnationalising labour markets, membership in institutions that operate across borders becomes a kind of proxy citizenship (Gordon 2007). The notion of ‘migrant rights’ is, thus, intricately linked to the repositioning of migration within a transnationalising world of work and the reconfiguration of political organisations that operate within it.

Migrants are often excluded from political processes in the country of destination and, to some extent, from their country of origin. In addition, there are different degrees of exclusion on the spectrum, with domestic workers facing particularly extreme forms on the basis of legal non-recognition and political isolation. It is these multiple exclusions, exacerbated by a gendered division of labour and gender discrimination, which the global migrant rights movement is trying to address through norms expansion as well as organising and mobilising on the transnational and global level.

The notion of ‘migrant rights’ is in this sense linked to a particular understanding of rights in general, not as a ‘given’ or part of a moral order, but as historically contingent (Koskenniemi 2002). Rights are viewed as a product of political struggle and, thus, as a ‘work-in-progress’ phenomenon rather than a final product (cf. VeneKlasen et al. 2004; Stammers 2009).

---

3 I do not address the normative literature on migrant rights here. What I hint at is the notion of “norm entrepreneurs” by IR constructivist scholars, (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

4 To become effective, rights need to be guaranteed by someone, i.e. someone (usually states) must be responsible. This issue has been extensively covered by others (e.g. Kuper 2005). I focus on the activism side of rights in this paper.
A view of migrant rights as struggle allows a parallel to be drawn to women's rights and feminist transformations of the human rights discourse which was, and still is, driven by the question of how the concept of human rights can change to be more responsive to women (see also contribution by Brace, this symposium, on reading across from 'old' to 'new' struggles). By defining a concept as a human rights abuse on the basis of lived experience, publicly and collectively voicing grievances, and translating this into demands, human rights emerges as an evolving, if not expansive, concept. Emancipation and empowerment are part of this struggle. The successes of broader women’s rights movements translate to a marginalised group of women: migrant domestic workers.

Concluding Remarks
The nascent global migrant rights movement has had some profound effects on the understanding of migrant rights, especially in the area of domestic work. This is due to its strategy of forming “networks of networks” (Piper and Rother, forthcoming) not only between migrant associations but also domestic worker organisations, trade unions and concerned academics nationally, regionally and globally. Gendered activism has been key to pushing the boundaries of migrant rights to encompass new, complex realities. Activists have demanded that more attention be paid to the social costs of the migration-development nexus under current policy frameworks, and thus the effects of temporary or undocumented migration on women and their families. The promotion of a rights-based approach to migration that recognizes the need for portable rights and social welfare rights in cross-border contexts has been at the heart of its advocacy efforts. In turn, I have argued that these mobilisations require rethinking migrant rights beyond extant frames of citizenship and human rights, which I have begun to do here, to reconceive migrant rights as struggle drawing on the lessons of gendered activism.

The experiences of the many female migrant domestic workers around the world have informed much of this struggle. The various domestic workers-turned-activists and their organisations have played a vital role in pushing this agenda forward and they will continue to do so in the near future.

References
Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierette and Ernestine Avila (1997). "I'm here, but I'm there': the meanings of Latina transnational motherhood." Gender and Society 11, 548-571.


Piper, Nicola and Stefan Rother (Forthcoming). “Democratising migration governance through migrant rights activism: engaging ASEAN and beyond.” *International Migration*.


---

**Teacher’s Corner:**

**Where Did the Migration Radicals Go? Teaching Ethics of Migration**

*Patti Tamara Lenard, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, plenard@uottawa.ca*

I teach ethics of migration, and sometimes global ethics, to students with an academic focus on “conflict and human rights”. These are students who are motivated by the struggles faced in developing nations, who want to help them in some inchoate way they struggle to define. My job is to direct this energy towards the difficult questions raised by transnational migration. I love it.

My students understand, and believe, that the questions of migration are inextricably tied up with the wealth inequalities that pervade our world, and they are persuaded that these inequalities persist because
of borders. They agree that the enforcement of border control protects these inequalities of wealth, in large part by denying to so many the right to pursue, via migration, quality economic opportunities that are found, in large part, in western democratic states.

Yet, when it comes to the political theory of migration, my students are too often morally opportunist – by this I mean, they resist my entreaties to adopt an internally consistent moral position, and to endeavour to apply it to questions of migration. They prefer instead to grasp at elements of migration theory that suit their pre-existing views, rather than adopt what they view as the right position and apply it, whatever the consequences, to immigration policy as it is presently practiced – they resist the impact of adopting radical views, for fear that their consequences will impact what they believe are their legitimate entitlements.

I struggle to make clear that, if they believe the facts above, about the international order as it is presently constructed, to be true, the following beliefs they resist abandoning support rather than undermine the international order and its attempts to restrict migration, especially of the poor and desperate:

**What is made in Canada belongs to Canadians:** My students believe that poor migrants should be able to access better economic opportunities, but not if they will have to sacrifice something of significance, like tuition subsidies. They display a profound unwillingness to seriously consider the possibility that what we have done to make our state wealthy is not enough to make us entitled to that wealth, thereby generating at least a possibility that we owe those who are less well-off an opportunity to join us.

**Canadians, rich non-students especially, are obligated only to do their fair share:** They believe that refugees should have a place to go for protection, but not that they (or Canadians) should bear more than their fair share of shouldering the burdens of these protections. They are unwilling to consider, for example, that if we *need* immigrants to survive as a state, we might have an obligation to offer our spots to those who need them the most to survive, i.e., to consider that immigration programs that target the best and the brightest are not only morally problematic, but more problematic given our belief that our prosperity relies on people's willingness to migrate. This unwillingness to contemplate picking up the slack stems from the fact that although they recognize that in principle they are among the wealthiest in the world, they believe themselves to be on the bottom of the Canadian economic hierarchy, and as a result of the latter, they do not accept for themselves the obligation to sacrifice what they believe they are owed.

**Migration isn't an effective remedy for global inequality:** My students believe that everyone is of equal moral worth, but that, since migration will not solve global inequality, we are not morally committed to enabling it. After all, they point out, the poorest individuals will often not be able to migrate – since migrating is expensive, so more migration opportunities in fact serve to concentrate rather than distribute wealth. This is convenient, in their view, since the international order's commitment to state sovereignity precludes an open borders view from being a realistic proposal; more worryingly, to me, is that the implications of an open borders view, even as it might be applied to make present-day migration policies towards aiding global inequality, are not ones they are willing to accept. They believe that a better solution to global inequalities is to “export political
“justice”, and here they then whisper quietly, that this is a better solution only insofar as doing so doesn’t violate the state sovereignty of the recipient state. This latter commitment is often defended by reference to development aid literature that suggests inequalities cannot be remedied simply by redistributing material resources – an observation they find to be a relief, because it absolves them of having to confront the tension between the belief that others should have access to better economic opportunities and their worry that providing these opportunities will demand something of them.

As I understand my inability to force my students to confront the tensions between their beliefs – that global inequality is harmful and, moreover, sustained by borders and their aggressive enforcement – and what acting on them would demand of them, it is at least in part a struggle to explain the distinction between real and ideal theorizing in the context of migration. The struggle to understand the importance of identifying the best normative principles, and then how we should then aim to modify migration policies in the “the real world” in light of them, breaks down at one place, where they are asked to make real rather than imagined sacrifices.

I don’t doubt that the above highlights my weaknesses as a teacher of the political theory of migration. And, to be sure, I wouldn’t consider it a victory if my students all concluded, as I have done, that migration opportunities are one important way to resolve the injustices of global inequality, and that opening these opportunities more widely may demand some (even minimal) sacrifice by those of us who are not forced to migrate by poverty or fear for our lives. But the difficulties in persuading my students that there are profound migration-related injustices which they should confront, by considering what if anything they should be required to give up to remedy them, tells me that migration justice in the “real world” is an uphill battle.

---

**Policy Brief:**

*Helping the Growing Ranks of Poor Immigrants Living in America’s Suburbs*

Els de Graauw, Baruch College-CUNY, Els.deGraauw@baruch.cuny.edu
Shannon Gleeson, UC Santa Cruz, sgleeson@ucsc.edu
Irene Bloemraad, UC Berkeley, bloemr@berkeley.edu

Ask Americans to draw a mental map of who lives where, and they will likely say that immigrants and the poor live in large cities such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, while middle-class whites make their homes in the surrounding
suburbs. But these mental maps are often inaccurate. Today, more poor people live in suburbs than in central cities, and more than half of all metropolitan-area immigrants reside in suburbs. Immigration, job growth, and residential choices are making our nation’s suburbs more economically and culturally diverse.

How are suburban leaders responding to disadvantaged immigrants in their communities? Are they doing as much to support immigrant residents as leaders in traditional gateway cities? We explored these issues by tracking flows of public money through four local governments in the San Francisco Bay Area. A key federal government initiative, the Community Development Block Grant program, allocates millions of dollars to help municipalities improve services and support for low and moderate-income residents. When Bay Area municipalities put these funds to use, do big central cities and suburbs do equally well at helping poor immigrants?

Bay area suburbs do less for their immigrant residents

When we tracked the Community Development dollars, we discovered significant disparities.

- In San Francisco, a central city with a long and continuous history of receiving migrants, immigrant organizations got about a third of Community Development funds allocated to community groups – a share close to the percentage of immigrants in the city’s lower-income population.
- In San Jose, a central city whose fast-growing population is fueled by recent immigration, officials did less for immigrant organizations. Although newcomers made up 42 percent of the poor, during the years 2004 to 2007 only 18 to 28 percent of Community Development funds for nonprofits went to organizations serving immigrants.
- Many migrants are also settling in the Silicon Valley suburbs of Fremont and Mountain View – but between 2004 and 2007 those places allocated not a single dollar of Community Development money to immigrant organizations. The overall rate of poverty is lower in these rich suburbs, yet immigrants made up about half of their poor residents, a higher share of the poor than in San Francisco or San Jose. The failure to give money to immigrant organizations is especially striking given that Community Development grants are supposed to make a special effort to help people in disadvantaged households.

Why suburban officials overlook poor immigrants

It is not just ordinary Americans who hold faulty mental maps of where disadvantaged immigrants live. Even in progressive suburbs that pat themselves on the back for openness to diversity, officials fail to perceive the needs of immigrants in their midst.

- **Failing to see which residents really need help.** To some elected and appointed suburban officials, immigrants are completely invisible; to others, immigrants seem too rich or well-organized to be truly in need of public support. In other instances, immigrants may be overlooked, because they are too insular and unorganized to team up with local government in offering social services. Like many other Americans, suburban officials can cling to outdated images of suburban life, and they tend to reach conclusions about immigrants’ needs without direct or extensive dialogue with newcomers.

- **Assuming that neighboring big cities can do the job.** Some suburban officials expect immigrant residents to travel long distances to get services from well-established immigrant organizations in neighboring central cities. This may seem like a good way to stretch limited
suburban resources, but it defies both the letter and spirit of the Community Development grants – which are intended to help the needy residents of specific cities, not entire regions. Suburban officials ignore that population growth (driven in part by immigration) has increased Community Development funds for their suburbs while funds for traditional gateways like San Francisco have stagnated. Tellingly, suburban officials do not take this free-riding approach with other needy residents.

**Key principles for greater inclusion**
How can we build more productive relationships between local officials and the growing population of immigrant and disadvantaged residents living in suburbs and new gateway cities?

- **Build civic organizations in all immigrant communities.** Immigrant residents of traditional gateway cities like San Francisco benefit from a diverse set of organizations with expertise, extensive networks, and a strong belief that they are legitimate stakeholders in city affairs. Similar civic capacities need to be seeded and nurtured in new immigrant locations – a job to be tackled jointly by local governments, nonprofit groups, foundations, and private citizens who want to make a difference.

- **Have municipal officials do active outreach.** In larger cities, public staffers reach out to underserved communities, including immigrants. City employees connect immigrant-serving groups to other officials and teach them how to write grant proposals. Despite budget constraints, key officials in smaller cities need to make similar efforts.

- **Give central city and suburban officials the facts.** Working with immigrant groups, college and university-based scholars should use data mapping to educate officials in all municipalities about the needs of disadvantaged immigrants living in their jurisdictions.


This policy brief was originally published by the Scholars Strategy Network ([http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org](http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org)) in October 2013. The Scholars Strategy Network brings together scholars whose research addresses pressing public challenges at the national, state, and local levels. To become a SSN member and add your policy brief on key migration and citizenship issues to the SSN website, contact Lizzy Ghedi-Ehrlich at eghediehrlich@fas.harvard.edu.
For the last three years, I have been studying the growing immigration-related activism and policy activities of Canadian provinces. While immigration is a formally shared jurisdiction in the 1867 Canadian Constitution, the historical pattern post-Confederation has been one of provincial avoidance of immigration public action. Between 1990 and 2010, every subnational government in Canada broke with this stance in favor of a more active orientation. Provinces developed administrative structures and official immigration strategies, started to deliver more funding for immigrant integration services and created means to attract and select immigrants. During the same period, provincial governments demanded more power and resources from the Canadian federal government over immigration-related matters and tried to increase their input and influence over the direction of the country's national immigration policy. This represents a considerable shift in the governance of immigration in Canada, traditionally dominated by the federal government. My fieldwork has allowed me to discover that bureaucrats played a central role in bringing about this change in Canada. My immersion into empirical materials has convinced me of the importance of looking at the public administration of immigration and the roles played by bureaucrats, beyond implementation.

The growing role of provinces in Canada’s immigration regime has proven hard to explain using insights from immigration studies, public policy or federalism scholarship. While the national government did – idiosyncratically over that 20 year period – promote decentralization for fiscal and political reasons (Banting 2012), the dynamic affecting provinces’ growing interests and actions remained less known. For one thing, this break unfolded in the absence of a strong exogenous shock, or anything resembling a critical juncture. On the contrary, the period during which this change unfolded was one of stability for Canada’s immigration regime; immigrant intake levels grew at a steady and controlled pace, commitments to multiculturalism remained stable and, in general, selection and naturalization policies remained liberal and focused on economic criterions. The fact that every provincial government became increasingly active regarding immigration matters was also somewhat surprising. On the other hand, insight from Canada would lead us to believe that the main driver behind subnational immigration activity in the country is nationalism, as demonstrated by the case of Quebec. On the other, the very irregular distribution of immigrants across provinces

1 Provinces’ roles and responsibilities in the governance of Canada’s immigration regime are also recognized in various inceptions of national immigration laws since 1976 (Dirks 1995, 98-99, Vineberg 1987, 305-6, Kelley and Trebilcock 2010).
Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, combined, received about 74% of permanent migrants annually whereas other provinces received between 14% (Alberta) and less than 1% (e.g.: Prince-Edward Island) of permanent newcomers to the country (Canada 2010) – made it difficult to apply more functional explanations such as new destination thesis (e.g.: Varsanyi 2010, Marrow 2005, Money 1997) or accounts linking the growing concentration of a specific immigrant group and subnational response (e.g.: Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013). In addition, subnational activities regarding immigration in Canada are, when compared to the situation in other federations or other decentralized regimes, characterized by a very strong pro-immigrant stance. Provinces work to attract immigrants to their territory, to promoted their quick incorporation into the labor force and to ensure that they remain on their territory (Tolley et al. 2011). It was thus impossible to link subnational immigration activism and activity in Canada to the presence of strong xenophobic social movements or conservative political parties. Finally, this change could not be easily linked to economic or electoral cycles, or to partisan configurations. All of these varied enormously between provinces during the period of change and could not be linked significantly with any singular outcomes.

Faced with this puzzle, I took an inductive approach that would allow me to observe subnational-level as well as national-level dynamics. Using theory building process-tracing methods (Beach and Pedersen 2012), I developed a research strategy based on case studies of individual provinces. They served to document, in each of the provinces between 1990 and 2010, the dynamics leading to increased provincial activity in immigration. Central to these case studies was a collection of rich empirical material, which included official and archival documents from the provinces and the federal government (official publications, transcripts of parliamentary debates, private records from policy actors and internal documents from provincial and federal public administrations), as well as semi-directed elite interviews with public servants (n= 71), political executives, and community actors.

Elite interviews, when combined with other methods of qualitative data collection (Davies 2001), provide a powerful means to reconstruct less-visible sequences and processes leading to specific outcomes (Tansey 2007). The informants I met shared interesting stories of starting programs from nothing, of years of work trying to convince political actors to pay attention to population decline, and of the impact of cost-cutting measures. More broadly, they spoke to me about how much learning happened throughout these processes. Out of these discussions a clear pattern emerged: in all of the provinces, the process leading to growing immigration activities and activism was steered by public servants. My fieldwork showed that, at the subnational scale, public servants were integral in identifying immigration as an economic, social and demographic resource for the province in which they were employed. They presented political and, to a lesser extent, social actors with data, policy instruments and clear examples to emulate. This elite-driven dynamic – that was not a response to social movements, public opinion or other clear pressures on provincial governments and was not a consequence of changes in government – took the form of a non-determinant social mechanism of state building centered on immigration. Consistently, the initial identification of immigration as a resource was followed by an institutionalization and diffusion of this principle amongst political and social actors within each province. In Canada, the pattern of subnational pro-immigration politics can only be understood via the work of public servants.
The centrality of public servants in bringing about pro-immigration policy change to Canadian provinces between 1990 and 2010 highlights the importance of considering more generally their role(s) in immigration politics. While implementation dynamics and the role of street level bureaucrats (e.g.: border agents) has been considered by scholars of immigration from the standpoint of political science, sociology, anthropology and geography (e.g.: Marrow 2009, Ellermann 2006, Bouchard and Carroll 2002, Mountz 2010), to name a few, the data assembled during my fieldwork convinced me that it is time for migration studies to mobilize more insight from the public administration literature. Three new lines of research have emerged from my fieldwork. They all have to do with the roles policy analysts and high-level bureaucrats play in immigration politics and policy.

First, archival work and interviews demonstrate that in the case of provincial involvement in immigration in Canada, public servants have played a central role as policy entrepreneurs. In several instances, long before political actors became remotely involved, these individuals promoted the use of specific policy instruments, or more generally, the idea of a greater provincial role in immigration. To build on John Kingdon’s (2003) seminal metaphor, once the window opened on the political agenda, these entrepreneurs were able to provide clear solutions to political actors and this, in turn, propelled subnational activism. Future research should look at the role of policy entrepreneurs in different institutional settings. Furthermore, we must also consider the different strategies of policy entrepreneurs when it comes to restrictive and pro-immigration politics alike, as well as the resulting policy responses.

Second, the professional trajectories of public servants proved, in retrospect, to be an interesting predictor of interests and behaviors. I observed three main trajectories in my fieldwork: 1) individuals with a background in community immigrant service provisions; 2) individuals with a background in public administration and in the design of social services and education services and; 3) individuals with a background in economic development, often with previous professional experience in the private sector. Depending on their trajectories, these individuals could rely on various networks to provide them with information and resources about immigration-related topics. They also had various capacities to provide politicians with information on how to appeal to less-traditional sources of support related to immigration, and how to manage different immigrant-issue networks (on this, see: Somerville and Goodman 2010), where they existed. This suggests that more attention should be given to the identities of the individuals making immigration policy, beyond elected officials. Potential correlations between individual background characters and specific policy outcomes should be explored.

Third, the role played by bureaucrats in immigration policy stability cannot be understated. In the case of Canadian provinces, classical bureaucratic dynamics explain in part the self-reinforcing nature of institutions and policies. The central roles played by bureaucrats in the establishment of institutions, as well as the growth in power and resources they experienced as a result (see, for another example: Guiraudon 2003), pushed them to strongly support a continuing provincial role in immigration over time. As part of my fieldwork, it also became clear that even in cases where a newly elected provincial government wished to go back to a more traditional (passive) attitude

---

2 For a general review of the concept, see: (Mintrom and Norman 2009).
toward immigration, their capacity to do so was limited by the public administration. In particular, the technical knowledge of bureaucrats on matters related to the working of Canada's immigration system served as a tool to buffer political attempts to steer policy changes by elected officials between 1990 and 2010. In practice, this means that in the case of subnational immigration politics in Canada, once a province became active in immigration in the 1990s, subsequent government and partisan shifts did not yield policy changes regarding immigration. As such, future research should consider more closely in what instances and under what circumstances public administrations have limited immigration policy changes initiated by elected officials.

While different state configurations imply different degrees of independence, stability, autonomy and capacity for public servants, it seems crucial now – more than ever – to pay attention to these actors when studying immigration politics and policy. Bringing the bureaucrats back in would allow immigration scholars to develop more realistic understandings of policies on the ground, by continuing to attend to policy implementation dynamics as well as the role bureaucrats play in the evolution of national, subnational and local immigration policies and politics. In the case of the Canadian provinces' growing activism and policy activities on immigration issues between 1990 and 2010, bureaucrats were the central piece of the puzzle, not elected officials, social movements, political parties or even immigrants. Now that, since 2012, Canada has entered a new phase of federal-provincial immigration relations, with the Federal government attempting to limit provincial powers, the role that will be played by bureaucrats in the evolution of subnational immigration interests, strategies and actions risks being equally crucial.

Note: the author would like to thank Laura Madokoro, Audrey Lespérance and Phil Triadafilopoulos.

References


---

**Mentorship Corner:**

**Two Graduate Students’ Perspectives on Mentorship**

**“Dear Annie” Revised:**

A Help Column for Graduate Students Seeking Mentorship

*Hillary Mellinger, George Mason University, mellingerh@alumni.beloit.edu*

Although academics have long written on migration and citizenship, it is only recently that political science has recognized this area of scholarship as its own unique subfield within the broader discipline. Scholarship within this realm faces the double-edged sword that confronts any novel subfield: it is interesting but difficult to place in a specific “home”. That is to say, it does not traditionally fit within the realms of comparative politics, political theory, international studies, or American politics. While migration studies certainly contribute to each of these, its novelty has often meant that it has had to make an argument for why it should be allowed in the “in” group. If political science subfields were cliques, migration would be the new kid in school vying for the affection of classmates who have known each other for years.

Graduate students whose research focuses on migration and citizenship find themselves at a unique crossroads where they have much to contribute to political science as a discipline but are unsure of how to go about doing so. While migration scholars may exist at various universities, it is rare to find a department or center that boasts of migration. While newly minted masters and PhDs may
Mentors can assist graduate student members of the Migration and Citizenship section by helping us to navigate our way through graduate programs and – should we survive unscathed – the journey towards our first professorial posts in search of the illusive Kingdom of Tenure. It is rare and deeply appreciated to find a professor who is readily approachable and eager to recommend conferences where students can network and present nascent scholarship. Also esteemed are those academics who can recommend to students areas of scholarship that might be particularly fruitful for research or applicable to other subfields within political science. Many graduate students may be unaware of how their choices and decisions during their masters and doctoral programs affect their options later down the line, so simple information sessions on the kinds of pedigrees and experience that universities look for when selecting a professor can also be useful.

In short, graduate student members of the Migration and Citizenship section are eager to profit from the lived experiences of professors and scholars within the field. Some of the questions we may ask of you include, “If you could go back in time, what would you say to yourself when applying for PhDs, when working on your thesis, and when applying for jobs? What would you do the same, and what would you do differently? How can graduate students be competitive and appealing to universities that may not have other migration scholars, or that may be more traditional in their approach to political science? What conferences may be particularly profitable in terms of learning experiences and connections, and what journals may be good starting points for publication?”

The graduate student members of the Migration and Citizenship section are extremely enthusiastic and deeply appreciative of any guidance that junior and senior scholars may be able to provide to us as we commence our own journeys towards professorial posts. We look forward to learning from you, and we applaud you for your time and service in mentoring us. Thank you!

What is Mentorship in Migration and Citizenship Studies?
Joseph Cobetto, University of Missouri, jcxr6@mail.missouri.edu

Much has been stated about what mentoring is and means in the academic profession. It may be easier to begin such a discussion by performing a process of definitional elimination: mentoring is not merely the offering of kind words by mentors to mentees, and its connection with its usual professional benefits (e.g. letters of recommendation) are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of the concept itself. Mentoring, at best, can be described as a dynamic dyad where one person brings experience and expertise and a second person brings energy and excitement (this is not to say that the experienced person cannot be exciting). In this academic dyad, one person understands the profession and their place within it while the other is still something like an unmodeled piece of clay, still learning where they fit within the profession’s
wider jigsaw puzzle. For mentors and mentees within certain fields of political science (e.g. American Political Institutions), the pieces’ shapes are less unique and binding to one section of the puzzle or another.

For those planning to study questions pertaining to emigration, immigration or citizenship studies, one’s figurative puzzle piece has the potential of being curtailed and cosigned as merely a boutique area of scholarship, one of intense interest and investigation to a few, a curiosity to many more, though a must to none. For those seeking to be mentors of prospective scholars of these topical areas, one need not necessarily be experts within them. While many persons may assert that these topics can be narrow in scope and therefore narrow in interest, it seems the opposite can often be true. These topic points can offer mentor scholars a wide variety of political science scholarship that is approachable for them. This will aid, rather than hinder the process of making it broad to both aid the mentee as well as establish sufficient scholarly relevance for various elements and factions within political science to have cause for interest.

The examples are sufficiently abundant: those studying Comparative Politics can nourish their student’s interest by focusing attention on cross-national studies of citizenship; American and Public Policy scholars can focus attention on U.S. immigration policy, whether from the policy making perspective, or through congressional or public opinion studies of the politics of immigration; and International scholars can focus on questions pertaining to transnational citizenship and bilateral relations. By no means should one think that clean tie-ins between varying areas of political science and the study of citizenship and migration will always prove self-evident. However, these examples help to offer both parties in a mentoring relationship a rudimentary starting point to work from in order to find that more nuanced, and arguably more tailored line of research agenda that complements what each party brings to the working relationship.

Moving beyond the questions of scholarly topics, the general principles of mentorship are equally applicable here as in other areas of the academic discipline in order for mentors to learn from their mentees, with special concern for those research questions that most motivate them, in order for bonds of mutual trust between them, for mentees to trust their mentors when they ask mentees to take risks and even travel down intellectually new and uncomfortable paths that can help the student expand his or her horizons, and to have each person find some degree of comity between each other during this process. There is nothing alchemical or magical about this process, like much of the knowledge that we as political scientists produce, the trick is to be able to demonstrate our ideas in the empirically observable world and to show their real world applications to the wider society. Like research, mentoring requires a constant commitment of time and attention for both parties. Mentors need to focus their efforts on making sure their mentees are avoiding unnecessary and time consuming pitfalls (e.g. taking on too many projects and involvements), which take away from helping the students learn how to apply the knowledge gained from classwork and independent study to effective, scholarly uses. Mentees need to focus their time and effort on ensuring they learn as much as possible from their mentor in terms of both practical research process and substantive knowledge.

The academic enterprise in some measure is as much skill as it is science. More than anything else, the mentee seeks to learn the practice of academia as much as, if not, more than its substance and
theory. It is the mentor’s experience in the figurative academic trenches that makes the relationship so desirable from the mentee’s perspective. If a right balance of time, effort and assessment of a mentee’s current and possible academic talents are well considered, the chances of a good, long-lasting and productive relationship are high. Underlining all of these considerations is the role of time spent with and time spent thinking about the mentee. It is a considerable time investment on the mentor’s part; an investment the mentor will usually think to be both relatively short in relation to their other tasks and part of that sense of vocation that attaches itself to our chosen discipline. However, the mentee needs to establish both a clear desire to work with the mentor and some compelling set of reasons why such a relationship would prove mutually beneficial for both parties. Neither party can, nor should feel taken advantage of during this process. Bearing these thoughts in mind will lend one’s self capable of being productive within this relationship, whether mentor or mentee.

Research Institute Profile:
The UCLA Program on International Migration
http://web.international.ucla.edu/migration/home

Roger Waldinger, University of California, Los Angeles, waldinge@soc.ucla.edu

The UCLA Program on International Migration is a bottom-up, faculty and graduate student-driven interdisciplinary activity, with the flat structure of a network. Ever since its inception in the 2005-6 academic year, the program has connected with an increasingly broad campus base. Currently, it counts 27 faculty affiliates from across campus and over 20 graduate students from a broad set of programs. An interdisciplinary coordinating committee (Ruben Hernandez-Leon, Sociology; Hiroshi Motomura, Law; Marjorie Faulstich Orellana, GSEIS; Roger Waldinger, Sociology) organizes a biweekly speaker series, featuring talks from across the disciplines, which consistently attract an audience that packs the seminar room. Over the past several years, we have had presentations from across the social sciences, including anthropology, history, political science, psychology, sociology, as well as education, medicine, law, and public health. Though the typical seminar is a research talk, we have had guests from the policy and advocacy worlds. Day-long or multi-day conferences and workshops focusing on a broad array of issues regularly supplement the speaker series.

An international focus is one of the distinguishing institutional features of our program, as we regularly invite speakers from abroad and are developing research and instructional relationships with universities and research centers in Mexico and Europe. We have affiliated with the Seminario
permanente sobre la migración internacional (http://www.colef.net/sepmig/), a multi-site migration seminar involving a number of Mexican research centers as well as one in Spain. We are now working with the Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF) in Tijuana, Mexico, to develop a variety of joint pedagogical and research efforts. “COLEF day at UCLA,” an all-day bilingual conference, was held on November 22, 2013, attracting a crowd of over 60. The following day, we held an all-day bilingual graduate class and symposium, involving co-instruction by UCLA and COLEF faculty and research presentations by graduate students from both institutions.

We have also built connections to European partners. In March 2012, we ran an international, interdisciplinary graduate student conference on Migration, Ethnicity, and Urban Change, organized in conjunction with the UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies, the Department of Sociology and associated research centers at Sciences Po (Paris) and the Berlin Graduate School for Social Science. The conference brought together UCLA faculty and students along with ten graduate students from elsewhere in the United States, two Canadian graduate students as well as nine graduate students and six faculty from Sciences Po and the BGSS. A follow-up conference, organized by the Department of Sociology at Sciences Po, will be held in Paris on June 19-20, 2014.

As another example of our international orientation and interdisciplinary sweep, in spring 2013 we organized a two-part international conference on immigration history, bringing together an interdisciplinary group of French and U.S. researchers, with the first day focusing on transnationalism over the past century and the second on recent trends in immigration history. The conferences included five participants from France, each of whom delivered an original paper, as well as historians and sociologists from a variety of U.S. universities.

As part of our effort to disseminate scholarship by our faculty affiliates, we maintain a working paper series (http://web.international.ucla.edu/migration/papers). As of December 2013, the series included 32 working papers (all posted since the series was initiated in July 2011), including submissions from faculty, post-doctoral fellows and graduate students in Anthropology, Education, Law, Psychiatry, Public Health, and Sociology. The website has recorded a total of 5,111 requests in the 29 months since the series was initiated. Of the working papers, the most requested is Ingrid Eagly’s paper on “Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070,” http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3ks295cx, with over 700 hits.

We also engage in interdisciplinary instruction. A two-quarter graduate course on international migration has been the vehicle for several efforts in team teaching, involving faculty from geography, political science, sociology and law; the most recent such effort, in fall 2013, involved 24 students from a broad variety of units, including Applied Linguistics, Education, Ethnomusicology, Law, Sociology, and Public Health. In addition, we seek to run a monthly research seminar for advanced graduate students and post-docs, directed each quarter by a different interdisciplinary faculty duo on a purely voluntary basis. Several times a year, our invited speakers hold an add-on afternoon, didactic workshop to supplement the mid-day research talk. They are also involved in exchange with graduate students outside the seminar room: graduate students take speakers to lunch following the talks, and often have subsequent one-on-one meetings. Participation in the seminar series and engagement with the speakers has become a regular component of graduate education in migration across a number of disciplines.
The program also connects with undergraduates. Several faculty members teach a regularly scheduled course on migration; a selected handful of students from these courses frequently attend our speaker series. In addition, honors sections as well as special, one unit courses designed for first year undergraduates, have been held in conjunction with the speaker series.

As migration and health is a topic of growing interest and importance, we are working to develop connections to researchers in the health sciences. The program’s affiliates currently include two faculty from Public Health, one from Medicine, and one from Nursing; two of our affiliates have begun an interdisciplinary research project on immigrant children’s involvement in family health - this work is underway. Our classes attract a growing number of students from public health, even as the number of social science students working at the migration and health nexus increases. We are currently planning a workshop on migration and health, to be held in late fall 2014.

Although the program is resolutely academic, there are a variety of links to the policy world. Speakers from the policy and advocacy communities regularly address our seminar series. Faculty affiliated with the program themselves engage in the policy debate in ways that generate significant impact. For example, Hiroshi Motomura was an outside advisor to the Obama-Biden transition team on immigration matters, and played an important role in the development of the Obama administration’s policy towards the “Dreamers”. Marjorie Orellana also blogs for the Huffington Post, writing on immigration matters, and Rubén Hernandez-Leon writes a weekly column on immigration for the Spanish-language newspaper La Opinion.

We successfully work in harness with other on-campus entities. For example, the “COLEF at UCLA” conference was co-sponsored by the Center for Mexican Studies and the Blum Center on Latin American Health. The international graduate student conference, described above, was organized in tandem with the Center for European and Eurasian Studies. In addition, we participate in the annual UC-wide immigration conference. Last year’s conference was held at UCLA, and was designed as a conversation across disciplines, schools, and between the university and the Los Angeles community about issues facing immigrant children and families. Presenters included faculty and graduate students from virtually all of the UC campuses as well as community members such as Cindy Harding, the Deputy Director of Public Health for the County of Los Angeles.

Looking further ahead, we hope to undertake a number of initiatives oriented towards institutionalizing our program and strengthening the linkages to teaching, graduate training, and research:

- **Undergraduate Minor:** Given the undergraduate interest in migration (the two-quarter Sociology courses in migration regularly enroll 150 students, in addition to smaller numbers enrolling in migration-focused honors sections), this is a promising field for a successful minor. The minor would rest on three core courses regularly offered by instructors in sociology and geography and would also include roughly 10 other additional recommended courses in a number of different departments. A preliminary proposal has been written.

- **Graduate Minor:** This certificate program would provide a way of institutionalizing and recognizing coursework done in migration across a range of disciplines and also would ensure that students working in this field have exposure to at least some set of common concerns and approaches.
• **Interdisciplinary research:** While we have often discussed a variety of interdisciplinary research possibilities, launching interdisciplinary research has proved more difficult than we had anticipated: careers are made in the disciplines; departmental demands for us are very greedy; and, as ours is a group of successful scholars, everyone is very, very busy. However, we have now developed a preliminary proposal and are hoping to soon launch a project on citizenship.

---

**Section News:**

**May - December 2013 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, APSA, Member News**

### Books


Carens, Joseph (see Member News)


Francis, Angus and Rowena Maguire (Eds.). (2013). *Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Asia Pacific Region*. Ashgate.


Gonzales, Alfonso (see Member News)


Klotz, Audie (see Member News)


Maas, Willem (see Member News)


Mezzadra, Sandro and Brett Neilson (2013). *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Duke University Press.


Naujoks, Daniel (see Member News)


Triadafilopoulos, Phil (see Member News)


**Journal Articles**

**Electoral Studies**

**Journal of Common Market Studies**

**Journal of Politics**

**Law and Society Review**

**Political Geography**

**Political Research Quarterly**

---

1 A note on methodology. Journals were selected from the list of 90 political science journals included in Michael Giles and James Garand’s article “Ranking Political Science Journals: Reputational and Citational Approaches” (*PS*, October 2007, 741-751). We selected those that included at least 3 migration and citizenship related articles over the past decade (using the search terms “migration,” “citizenship,” “multiculturalism”). We only included articles written in English. We apologize for any oversight. For feedback and suggestions, please contact the editor.

Political Studies

Public Opinion Quarterly

Third World Quarterly

World Politics
• Ellermann, Antje (see Member News)
APSA Section Awards

Section Awards 2013

In 2013, the Section issued awards in four categories—for best book, dissertation, chapter, and article—to the following individuals (listed in alphabetical order). We salute these winners!

**Best Book:**


**Best Dissertation:**


  *Honorable Mention:*


**Best Chapter:**


**Best Article:**


  *Honorable Mentions:*


We want to thank the following members for serving on the Section’s awards committees: Erik Bleich, Erin Chung, Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jennifer Hochschild, Audie Klotz, Gallya Lahav, Willem Maas, John Mollenkopf, Ron Schmidt, Rogers Smith, Monica Varsanyi, and Maarten Vink.
Best Book
Rogers Smith (Chair), University of Pennsylvania
Gallya Lahav, Stony Brook University
John Mollenkopf, CUNY-Graduate Center

The selection committee consisted of Gallya Lahav, Associate Professor, State University of New York-Stony Brook; John Mollenkopf, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Sociology and Director of the Center for Urban Research at the CUNY-Graduate Center; and Rogers M. Smith, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Chair of the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism. The committee reviewed 24 books nominated by the publishers, all worthy of serious consideration. The criteria were:
1) Is the book centrally concerned with migration or citizenship, or both?
2) Does it offer information and/or make arguments that are both new and important?
3) Are the evidence and analysis rigorous, and is it well-written?

Two books met these criteria so fully the committee could not choose between them and so announced co-winners. They were:

Jonathan Laurence is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston College; Diane Sainsbury is Professor Emerita of Political Science at the University of Stockholm in Sweden, where she has spent the bulk of her career. Though she was born in Seattle and educated as an undergraduate at the University of Washington, she is an immigrant and permanent resident of Sweden. Thus, these books represent the work of younger and more senior scholars, working in the U.S. and Europe, and they are in interesting ways different but complementary in their primary methods and their substantive arguments.

Jonathan Laurence uses in-depth interviews with government officials and religious leaders along with primary government documents in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, Morocco and Turkey in order to show that traditionally, European governments excluded the Islamic communities in their midst from recognition by and participation in many domestic governing institutions. Instead, they actively invited foreign governments in primarily Islamic nations—Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Turkey—to supervise the practice of Islam in these communities. However, since the 1990s, a range of European governments have created Islamic councils and other institutions as a means to incorporate these communities more fully into their societies—in ways that have had more success than many have recognized in limiting the alienation of European Islamic leaders despite the rise of anti-Islamic immigrant sentiments in many countries. The book is a beautifully
Diane Sainsbury's magisterial work asks a novel question—not the more familiar one of how are immigrants affecting welfare states in Europe, but instead, how are changing welfare states affecting immigrants’ social rights, economic welfare, and their inclusion in European societies? To answer, she develops a typology of welfare states and engages in extraordinarily broad-ranging and comprehensive data collection and analysis on welfare policies and their impacts on immigration in the U.S. as well as the UK, Germany, France, Sweden and Denmark from the early postwar period almost to the present. Part I documents how extensive immigrant rights are in various regimes, especially in regard to programs involving transfer payments, and Part II analyzes the politics through which welfare states and immigrant benefits in different countries and eras have been contested and established. That sounds like a tremendous amount to do in one book, and the truly remarkable thing is that Sainsbury does it, combining this astonishing breadth with empirical and analytical rigor throughout.

Though Laurence’s focus might be seen as more concerned with cultural issues and Sainsbury with economic ones, both attend to each dimension and their interplay throughout, and both do a superb job of theorizing and documenting the politics that have generated the patterns of state-mosque relationships and of immigration welfare rights that we see. The committee decided these two books together exemplify virtually everything it sought to applaud and encourage in contemporary scholarship on migration and citizenship, and that is why they were designated the co-winners of the first Migration and Citizenship Book Award.

Best Dissertation
Erin Aeran Chung (Chair), Johns Hopkins University
Willem Maas, York University
Jennifer Hochschild, Harvard University

As committee members, Erin Aeran Chung, Jennifer Hochschild and Willem Maas, we are delighted to announce the winner of the Award for Best Dissertation on Migration and/or Citizenship accepted in 2012. We want to first congratulate all of the 15 nominees for their accomplishments. Although we were impressed by the excellent dissertations we received, we agreed that one in particular stood out for its depth of research, original analysis, and wide-ranging contribution to the study of citizenship, immigration, racial politics, and American Political Development.

American Republic,” submitted to the George Washington University and directed by Teresa Murphy, examines how the everyday practices of citizenship among immigrants shaped the development of national citizenship in the early republic of the United States. Drawing on an impressive array of government documents - newspapers, missionary accounts of foreign migrants, and migrants’ own letters and diaries - this dissertation argues that citizens’ rights were carved out of alien legal penalties, and more specifically, that migrant struggles to preserve their rights and resist the penalties imposed upon them influenced the formation of national citizenship as a legal category and as an idea in itself.

It is with great pleasure that we present the 2012 Award for Best Dissertation to John O'Keefe.

We want to acknowledge another nominee whose dissertation makes a highly original contribution to debates on immigrant rights through a multi-method analysis of the process by which proposals for noncitizen enfranchisement are introduced, debated, decided, extended, or reintroduced. As her advisors, Rainer Bauböck and Rainer Baumann describe, this dissertation stands out for its breadth of engagement with a wide range of scholarship, the depth of its empirical research, and its methodological sophistication. Honorable Mention goes to Luicy Pedroza for her dissertation, “Citizenship before Nationality: How Democracies Redefine Citizenship by Debating the Extension of Voting Rights to Settled Migrants,” submitted to the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) at the Universität Bremen.

Best Chapter
Audie Klotz (Chair), Syracuse University
Maarten Vink, Maastricht University
Ron Schmidt, California State University, Long Beach

For this inaugural year, the committee sought to articulate general guidelines for selecting a recipient, in addition to reading the submissions on their own terms. We agree that the Best Chapter Award should honor a contribution to scholarship on citizenship and/or migration that merits attention beyond its role within the original collection, and indeed might be at risk of getting overlooked by a wider audience precisely because it is part of an edited book. That broader contribution could be conceptual (e.g., developing a novel perspective, synthesizing to offer an innovative framework) or empirical (e.g., terrific new field work, a methodological point). The chapter need not span citizenship and migration, nor cover more than one location. Yet something about the piece should engage a significant swath of the section's diverse membership.

With these criteria in mind, the committee unanimously selected Ayelet Shachar’s chapter on
"Citizenship," in the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law* as the first recipient. Her chapter provides not only a highly readable synthesis of the state-of-the-art on citizenship, but more importantly gives a critical and convincing account of the multidimensional nature of the concept of citizenship. Shachar deals particularly with the membership side of citizenship, discussing access to the status via birthright or naturalization, yet also takes into account the gradual disconnection between rights and status, through such innovations as European Union citizenship and the extension of voting rights to resident non-citizens and non-resident citizens. However, crucially, she avoids falling in the cosmopolitan trap of seeing these developments as a linear process towards some form of post-nationalism. Rather, she concludes that “it is too early to bid citizenship farewell”. Citizenship may be changing in scope and scale, yet remains a crucial emancipatory instrument, “one of the finest institutions, to date, that we have created to justly govern our collective affairs and individual freedoms”.

**Best Article**

*Monica Varsanyi (Chair), John Jay College of Criminal Justice-CUNY*

*Erik Bleich, Middlebury College*

*Elizabeth Cohen, Syracuse University*

The winner of the best article award goes to **Matthew Wright and Irene Bloemraad** for their Perspectives on Politics article "Is There a Trade-off between Multiculturalism and Socio-Political Integration? Policy Regimes and Immigrant Incorporation in Comparative Perspective".

This article brings data to bear on the heated political question of whether multicultural policies in liberal democracies diminish immigrants' socio-political engagement. They find no evidence that it does. Moreover, they suggest that countries that move away from multicultural policies in an attempt to foster integration may in fact undermine the relatively high levels of integration among immigrants within their borders.

The article tackles a big theoretical and political question, utilizes concepts and data from a wide range of sources, and brings in a comparison of the US and Canada to debates that are typically limited to European countries. In these ways, it is a novel and exciting piece. We're happy to see this article rewarded for these merits.

Honorable mentions go to **Sarah Wallace Goodman** for her article in *World Politics*, "Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Integration in Western Europe", and to **Rebecca Hamlin** for her article in *Law & Social Inquiry*, "International Law and Administrative Insulation: A Comparison of Refugee Status Determination Regimes in the United States, Canada, and Australia".
APSA Award Committees 2014

**Book Award**
Award for best book on migration and/or citizenship published (i.e., printed) in the previous calendar year. Publishers or other nominators should send one **hard copy** of a book published (i.e., printed) in 2013 to each committee member by **March 31, 2014**. Edited volumes are **not** eligible for the book award.

Best Book Award Selection Committee 2014:

**Martin Heisler (Chair)**
Department of Government & Politics
University of Maryland
10 Morningview Circle
Lake Oswego, OR 97035-8840
mheisler@umd.edu

**Pei-te Lien**
Department of Political Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
MC 9420
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9420
plein@polsci.ucsb.edu

**Daniel Tichenor**
Department of Political Science
1284 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1284
tichenor@uoregon.edu

**Dissertation Award**
Award for best dissertation on migration and/or citizenship accepted in the previous calendar year. Send one **electronic copy** of a dissertation accepted in 2013 **AND** a dissertation abstract to each committee member. Nominees should also request their advisor to send an **electronic** letter of recommendation to the award committee chair. All materials are due **March 31, 2014**.

Best Dissertation Award Selection Committee 2014:

**David Plotke (Chair)**
New School for Social Research
PlotkeD@newschool.edu

**Kristi Andersen**
Syracuse University
andersen@maxwell.syr.edu

**Ayelet Shachar**
University of Toronto
ayelet.shachar@utoronto.ca
**Chapter Award**
Award for best chapter on migration and/or citizenship published (i.e., printed) in the previous calendar year. Send one electronic copy of a chapter published (i.e., printed) in 2013 to each committee member by **March 31, 2014**.

Best Chapter Award Selection Committee 2014:

- **Lisa García Bedolla (Chair)**
  University of California, Berkeley
  lgariab@berkeley.edu

- **Yasmeen Abu-Laban**
  University of Alberta
  yasmeen@ualberta.ca

- **Julie Mostov**
  Drexel University
  mostovj@drexel.edu

**Article Award**
Award for best article on migration and/or citizenship published (i.e., printed) in the previous calendar year. Send one electronic copy (pls. send a hard copy only to the chair) of an article published (i.e., printed) in 2013 to each committee member by **March 31, 2014**.

Best Article Award Selection Committee 2014:

- **Jackie Stevens (Chair)**
  Political Science Department
  Northwestern University
  601 University Place
  Evanston, IL 60208

- **Joel Fetzer**
  Pepperdine University
  joel.fetzer@pepperdine.edu

- **Phil Triadafilopoulos**
  University of Toronto
  t.triadafilopoulos@utoronto.ca

**Paper Award**
Award for best paper on migration and/or citizenship presented at the previous APSA annual meeting (either as part of a panel or poster session). Send one electronic copy of a paper presented at APSA 2013 to each committee member by **March 31, 2014**.

Best Paper Award Selection Committee 2014:

- **Janelle Wong (Chair)**
  University of Maryland
  janellew@umd.edu
APSA 2014

As program co-chairs for the upcoming 2014 Annual Meeting in Washington DC, we plan to follow the tradition set by last year's program co-chairs Joe Carens and Jim Hollifield by writing a memo to explain the issues we faced and the principles we used in selecting papers, to help those whose proposals aren’t accepted understand why. That memo can’t yet be written because the selection work is ongoing, but we can say now that we are using the same principles as last year: co-sponsorship, intellectual quality, balance of academic interests and approaches, diversity of ages and backgrounds, and encouraging new directions in the field. More in the next newsletter.

Our panel allocation has increased from 3 slots to 15. At the same time, our submission rate has declined somewhat. Last year, the first time this APSA opportunity was available to migration and citizenship scholars, there were 15 panel proposals and 207 individual paper proposals for very few panels. Unfortunately, many fine proposals had to be rejected. This year there are 15 panel proposals and 171 individual paper proposals. The combination of more panels and fewer submissions (but especially the large increase in the number of panels) means that we will have a much higher acceptance rate. But the submission rate does affect the number of panels that we receive, so it would be good to increase that at the 2015 meeting.

Jane Junn and Willem Maas

Member News

Leah Bassel (Sociology, University of Leicester)
- Principal investigator of grant for "The UK citizenship Process: understanding immigrants' experiences", Economic and Social Research Council (£439K), 2013-2016.

Joseph H. Carens (Political Science, University of Toronto)
- Published The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford University Press.

Antje Ellermann (Political Science, University of British Columbia)
Alexandra Filindra (Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago)
- Was awarded grants from the Pew Center for the States - to develop a database of state-level immigration bills and laws ($72,000), and the Office of Social Science Research - to conduct experiments related to racial attitudes and policy ($8,500).

Alfonso Gonzales (Political Science, Lehman College-CUNY)

Els de Graauw (Political Science, Baruch College-CUNY)
- Published with Irene Bloemraad and Shannon Gleeson "Funding Immigrant Organizations: Suburban Free Riding and Local Civic Presence.” American Journal of Sociology 119(1), 75-130; and “Helping the Growing Ranks of Poor Immigrants Living in America’s Suburbs.” Scholars Strategy Network (http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org).
- Was awarded the Whiting Fellowship for Excellence in Teaching, Baruch College-CUNY.

Audie Klotz (Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University)

Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)
- Published “Immigrant Integration, Gender, and Citizenship in the Dutch Republic.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 1(4), 390-401.

Ana Margheritis (Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton)
- New position as Reader in International Relations at the University of Southampton, UK, where she co-leads the working group on Migration and the Politics and Policies of Membership within the Centre for Citizenship, Globalization, and Governance.

Helen B. Marrow (Sociology, Tufts University)
- Published with Tomás R. Jiménez “Mexican American Mobility: Assimilation Fears Should Not Hinder Immigration Reform.” Los Angeles Times, July 2.

Rahsaan Maxwell (Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
• Moved from position as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst to Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Liza M. Mügge (Political Science, University of Amsterdam)
• Published with Sara de Jong “Intersectionalizing European Politics: Bridging Gender and Ethnicity.” *Politics, Groups and Identities* 1(3), 380-9.

Daniel Naujoks (United Nations Development Program)
• Published *Migration, Citizenship and Development*. *Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States*. Oxford University Press.

Doris Marie Provine (School of Justice and Social Inquiry, Arizona State University)
• Published with Irene Bloemraad “Immigrants and Civil Rights in Cross-National Perspective: Lessons from North America.” *Journal of Comparative Migration Studies* 1(1), 45-68.

Christine Thurlow Brenner (John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston)

Phil Triadafilopoulos (School of Public Policy & Governance, University of Toronto)
• Published with Anna Korteweg “Gender, Religion and Ethnicity: Intersections and Boundaries in Immigrant Integration Debates.” *Social Politics* 20(1), 109-136.
• Published an edited book *Wanted and Welcome? Policies for Highly Skilled Immigration in Comparative Perspective*. Springer.
• Published a co-authored chapter with Inder Marwah and Steve White “Immigration, Citizenship and Canada’s New Conservative Party.” In: *Conservatism in Canada*. David Rayside and James Farney (Eds.). University of Toronto Press.
Sara Wallace Goodman (School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine)
- Was awarded Best Article by the APSA European Politics & Society section and received honourable mention for Best Article by the APSA Migration & Citizenship section for “Fortifying Citizenship: Policy Strategies for Civic Engagement in Western Europe.” *World Politics* 64(4), 659-698.
- Was awarded the University of California Irvine Social Science Assistant Professor Research Award, the University of California Hellman Fellowship Award and Israel Institute Faculty Development Grant.

Joseph Yi (Political Science, Hanyang University)
- Published “Atomized Terror and Democratic Engagement.” *Political Quarterly* 84(3), 388-394.

---

**How to become a Section member?**

2. Click on “Membership”
3. Click on “Join or Renew NOW!”
4. Log in if you already are an APSA member (or create a new account and then log in if you are a new APSA member)
5. Go to the “Membership” section:
   a. If you already are an APSA member: click on “Your Section Membership” and then find “43. Migration & Citizenship”
   b. If you are a new APSA member: fill out both the general membership and section membership information
6. Click “Continue” – Section membership is only $8 for faculty, $3 for grad students

Tada, you are a now Section member and will automatically receive the next newsletter!