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Beyond Bearing Witness: Scholarship as Active Citizenship

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No sooner than a week after Donald Trump’s Inauguration did he issue his Executive Order on immigration and national security, known colloquially as the Muslim Travel Ban. In the year since, we have witnessed repeated iterations of this ban battled in courts across the country. We have witnessed mayors establishing cities as sanctuaries for undocumented migrants as deportation raids increase, a strategy pioneered by the recently-deceased former San Francisco mayor Ed Lee. We have witnessed nativism rise up against minorities, immigrants, and vulnerable populations; but also civil society take to the streets in protest: at airports, borders, court houses, and city halls. And this is just the United States.

Around the world, immigration has already shown to be among the most important subjects of our lifetime. Looking to Europe, it centrally defines contemporary politics and inter-state relations, from Brexit to the Refugee Crisis to the populist national resurgences. Looking to Myanmar, it challenges the contours of contemporary liberal ethics in terms of what the international community is willing to endure or overlook. And as the influence of migration—as well as the process itself—is unlikely to abate, it will continue to shape international, national, and local politics forevermore.

But we are not just witnesses to this change. Yes, in one sense, our job is to document it. Yet, as social scientists, we play a key role as knowledge-creators, marshalling facts to speak truth to power. Our community of colleagues are producing vital knowledge in service to understand both determinants and effects of immigration policy, from diversity lotteries to employment access for asylees to DACA recipients. These contributions are receiving increased attention in newspapers, parliamentary reports, congressional hearings, national debates, and amicus briefs. Therefore, the first idea or argument we want to present is that scholars might start seeing ‘policy relevant’ work not as a bonus of research but a central objective. Just as we work actively to maintain the standards of political science through rigorous research and peer review, we might also think of our work as ensuring good policy. Science and policy clearly coincide, yet when distrust
expertise is on the rise, it is more imperative than ever that our results are both visible and unimpeachable.

The second way in which our professional duties and identities dovetail to active citizenship is through membership in this section—our community of experts and advocates. As a section, we present a loud voice that immigration and citizenship studies is an interdisciplinary priority—at the intersections of each subfield. Specifically, we are comprised of 25% Americanists, 40% comparativists, 17% IR; 8% theory, with others identifying primarily in public law, methodology, and public policy.¹ This affirms the thematic centrality of migration and citizenship studies, while simultaneously underscoring the comparative advantage of our cross-subfield network. We continue to grow in diversity and size, tackling important issues without prejudice to subfield or method. This cross-cutting network is not merely a resource for our own research but a wellspring of innovative and timely work that we can—in turn—take back to amplify within our subfields, universities, and other research networks.

Finally, as nativism, political extremism, and anti-global politics push our worlds inward, another dimension of active citizenship is offsetting that centripetal force. We should encourage vigorous research that not only explains our immediate world, but one that looks beyond North American and Europe. Europe hosts a refugee population that pales in size to that of Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda and Ethiopia—to name but a few. New and interesting world is being created by our section members that tackle the Global south as more than a series of sending states, but as part of the complex interdependence of the global political economy and international order. As this section cultivates cross-subfield and cross-institutional networks, we might also work to identify opportunities to establish cross-rank connections, recognizing that more and more graduate students and junior faculty seek to tackle the important questions of migration and citizenship.

Our section is diverse as the themes it covers. We are a community of scholars, operating in a much larger world that has shown to be hostile to some of the ideas and conclusions we produce. But we hope this call serves as a friendly reminder that we are not powerless. Our power is our work. And our work is our civic voice.

¹ With the exception of overrepresentation of the comparative subfield, these figures closely comfort to the distribution of subfield membership to APSA itself (American: 26.81%; Comparative 24.31%; IR 21.29%; Political Philosophy and Theory 13.71%). http://www.apsanet.org/RESOURCES/Data-on-the-Profession/Dashboard/Membership.

To contact the Co-Presidents, email Sara Wallace Goodman (s.goodman@uci.edu) and Alexandra Filindra (aleka@uic.edu).
Happy New Year, everyone! If 2017 showed us anything, it is that migration and citizenship concerns continue to be of concern globally and locally. The United States ended the year by pulling out of the United Nations Global Compact on Migration; net migration to the United Kingdom plummeted post-Brexit; more than 600,000 Rohingya, born and raised in Myanmar, were forcibly displaced from their homeland; and over a million people were internally displaced due to natural disaster in the Philippines. Add to these figures the tens of thousands of new displacements that were recorded in Syria alone just for the month of December and it becomes clear that issues of belonging, forced migration, citizenship policy and the like are not going to go away. As scholars of Migration and Citizenship Studies, we already know this. But do we know how to translate our research into accessible information so that everyday folk, policymakers, lawyers, students (at all levels), and other change agents can actually use our research? Our challenge in 2018 must be to write that one piece, engage with that one organization, be there for that one person that takes outside of the comfortable boundaries of how we have been doing what we have been doing for years. 2018 demands the kind of thinking differently that will lead us to do differently that might just move the world to be different(ly).

In parting, we hope that you enjoy this issue of our newsletter as much as we did in putting it together and that you will also join us in giving a heartfelt thanks to Kamal Sadiq, whose co-Presidency of our Section finished last year, for his unwavering service. Please also join us in welcoming Sara Wallace Goodman to the co-Presidency position and to all of our other new Council Members. As a Section, we are all as strong as you are and thank you for your continued support.

Kristy and Marc

To contact the Newsletter Co-Editors, email Kristy A. Belton (kbelton@isanet.org) and Marc Helbling (marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de).
Symposium: Political Representation of Immigrants

Introduction

Symposium Coordinator & Introductory Essay Author, Maria Sobolewska, University of Manchester

As the vast majority of immigrants arrive in their host countries with severely limited political rights, it is quite natural that their political representation is usually the last area of interest for migration scholars. So many obstacles meet immigrants in their inclusion into host country politics that they are naturally studied first: access to citizenship, voting rights, electoral registration and turnout, acquisition of new civic and political identities and partisanship, non-electoral forms of engagement and organization. It is thus the last frontier to turn to immigrants as full political actors seeking to enter the proverbial corridors of power: becoming candidates and winning elections; and even further down the line to their actions as legislators and the broader meaning of their presence. Research on this issue is therefore newer, scarcer, but growing fast, and increasingly moving on from the mere accounting and description to deep and critical theoretical engagement with related literatures and slowly developing its own vocabulary of theory and empirical inquiry. This symposium showcases the main areas of growth, controversy and the future directions of travel for this promising area and these can be organized into three main groups:

1. Looking beyond numbers at substantive and symbolic representation
2. Tackling of related paradigms in the field of representation: particularly of race, ethnicity and gender
3. International comparison

Looking beyond numbers

Many of the contributions in this symposium delve more deeply into what immigrant representation means, what benefits it carries, and how it relates to many normative arguments developed to advocate it, primarily the link between descriptive and substantive representation (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999). The many possible approaches to operationalizing and measuring the multidimensional and contentious concept of substantive representation form the basis of Rebecca McKee’s article. Unlike most studies in this
area, McKee has utilized at least three different methods of inquiry to probe the concept of substantive representation and improve our understanding of how to assess the actions of political actors of immigrant-origin backgrounds. By examining not only legislative behavior in parliamentary debates, but also experimentally testing representatives’ responsiveness to their constituents and investigating their representational attitudes, McKee’s work provides a strong empirical base for the normatively developed mechanisms of substantive representation. However as McKee points out, mirroring the literature of gender representation, the very diverse nature of these groups remains a challenge for both conceptualization of immigrant minorities’ interests and measurement of their representation.

The second big area of growth in research that looks beyond numbers is the issue of the role of political parties and particularly the earlier, often ignored stages of representation: namely becoming a candidate. Contributions from Karen Bird and Roos van der Zwan on Canada and from Rafaela Dancygier on Western Europe showcase their new research that moves beyond considering representation from the moment when elected representatives take their seats and to earlier stages in the pathway to elected office. They both also bring to the table the incentives for parties to nominate immigrant-origin candidates, and they both consider the broader meaning that these candidates bring.

In the past, the treatment of political parties as strategic agents in the typically New Institutionalist accounts of representation was rare (Bloemraad 2013); it is now obvious that this lacuna is filling fast. Dancygier’s contribution especially makes a strong case for considering the political parties’ goal-orientations in our assessment of the type and thus ultimately the quality of representation of immigrants. The often unquestioned assumption that the descriptive group is the only driver and beneficiary of descriptive representation needs questioning and we are well on the way to start this process. Bird and van der Zwan show that political parties may benefit from increased support from minority voters not just from placing visible candidates in areas where immigrant-origin visible minorities cluster, but also in general. Ethnic make-up of the political party’s elites clearly has the potential to inform voters’ image of this party, and can be strategically used to fulfill the party’s electoral goals. Diverse sets of candidates send a powerful signal to its fellow minorities, but also, as Dancygier argues to the majority, non-immigrant origin, population. Although she provides persuasive evidence for this claim, testing of the micro-mechanisms for this phenomenon presents itself as a fascinating future research agenda.

Related paradigms

A number of contributors to this symposium grapple with related paradigms more or less explicitly: how does the study of representation of immigrants relate to the wider field of representation? The first striking feature of the unavoidable overlap of the literature on immigrant representation with others lies in the definition of the groups of interests. This symposium is illustrative of the vast majority of the literature on this topic, as it focuses
predominantly on immigrant and immigrant-origin groups that are visibly distinct, predominantly based on ethnic, ethno-national and racial grounds. The definitions of who is an immigrant, and also what happens to immigrants' offspring, and how long they remain a part of a distinct minority of immigrant origin, are thus to some extent present in all the contributions indirectly. These questions are far from normatively neutral and empirically inconsequential. In Britain, Canada and Australia, the discussion centers on ethnic and visible minorities of immigrant origin, the descendants of the original migrants remain members of the groups of interest indefinitely.

In Europe, on the other hand, the specter of the Second World War means that the word race, and any concepts that are deemed related, like skin color, are still taboo. As a result, European scholarship represented here by Lucas Geese and Thomas Saalfeld's work, talks of immigrants and their immediate descendants. However, while it is easy to ignore the still-small third generation in most European countries, this will become an issue. As I argued elsewhere, this problem might lead European scholars to use similarly problematic definitional criteria to the controversial “skin color,” either by labeling grand-children of immigrants as still immigrants, with its resulting stigma of exclusion, or using indirect criteria of visibility (Sobolewska 2017). Using the religious origin as a criterion of visibility, by researching exclusively Muslim groups, will inevitably create a risk that research will overlook other immigrant-origin groups that may suffer under-representation.

The piece by Akwugo Emejulu and Liza Mügge tackles the relationship with other paradigms and literatures head on with their focus on intersectionality. For the researchers of immigrants' representation, the question of whether they can “do” intersectionality without including race or Black women, who originated this research agenda and thus the concept, is a contentious issue. Emejulu and Mügge highlight some of the normative risks of obscuring the history of the concept, but advocate the praxis of intersectionality in immigration studies and showcase the examples where it has been successfully imported.
Comparative perspectives

Finally, perhaps reflecting the relative novelty of the topic, the majority of research on political representation of immigrants is based on single country case studies and rarely exceeds two (a notable exception is Ruedin 2013). Thus, research highlighted in this symposium by Dancygier who looks at five European democracies, Pietsch who compares three counties, and finally Geese and Saalfed who describe the study covering eight European states, is a welcome development moving the collection of in depth case studies into an area of generalizable findings and theories. As this symposium will showcase, we are also moving on from the traditional immigrant-societies such as US, Canada or Australia, and focusing increasingly on Europe, where the much more recent post-Second World War immigration reverberates ever more loudly through the old continents’ politics.

The comparative work serves two principal purposes. Firstly, to understand more deeply the causal mechanisms observed in an outlier case, which is the case in Juliet Pietsch’s piece. She sheds light on how Australia, a country superficially similar to many other settler societies such as Canada, and with an immigrant-integration approach seemingly also similar to Canada, lags so significantly behind in its representation of immigrant-origin, non-European minorities. Analyzing structural inequalities and levels of discrimination at both elite level and general public opinion, she draws important comparisons and points of departure for the three countries.

Secondly, comparative studies can be used to test general theoretical mechanisms on a larger number of cases, as in Dancygier’s work, or the Pathways project described by Geese and Saalfeld. Geese and Saalfeld describe the eight country Pathways study, which collected large quantities of data on legislators since the 1990s, including whether they were of immigrant origin, and equally large amounts of data on contextual factors that are usually presented as explanatory factors in determining the levels of representation of immigrants and minorities. Although we will have to wait for Pathways’ results, an interesting taster is included in Geese and Saalfed’s contribution.

I hope that the originality and depth of all the work presented here will be the best argument in favor of Juliet Pietsch’s conclusion for her piece in this symposium: that the issue of representation of immigrants reflects so strongly on the broader questions of party politics, cohesion of our societies and finally the legitimacy of our institutions, that it sits squarely at the heart of the study of politics.

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References


Ruedin, Didier. 2013. Why aren't they there?: the political representation of women, ethnic groups and issue positions in legislatures. Colchester: ECPR Press.


Please direct inquiries about the Symposium’s Introductory article to Maria Sobolewska (maria.sobolewska@manchester.ac.uk).
Most of the existing literature on substantive representation concerns women. This is at least partly pragmatic as there are now sufficient female members of legislatures in many countries to study their actions empirically. This foundation has proven highly useful for those of us researching ethnic minority representation, or BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) representation (Htun 2004), as we can build on the relevant normative theories, including but not exclusive to, the link between descriptive and substantive representation. BME in the UK is a term used to describe people from a non-white ethnic and racial background, and thus differs from the terminology most commonly used in the US. Although not a homogenous group the term is commonly used across the UK as a standardized term to describe the immigrant origin population including the groups from the Census, Black African, Black Caribbean, Asian, Chinese, Arab and Mixed ethnic groups which make up around 14 percent of the population in the UK.

“BME (Black and Minority Ethnic)… in the UK is a term used to describe people from a non-white ethnic and racial background, and thus differs from the terminology most commonly used in the US”

Until recently, there was little on the substantive representation of BME communities. But this is changing, and Britain, where the number of members of parliament (MPs) has been rising steeply from 17 in 2005 Parliament to 52 in 2017, is a good example of this. These increases are, at least in part, because the Conservative Party has sought to select more BME candidates in winnable, “white” seats in an explicit attempt to boost levels of descriptive representation in parliament (Sobolewska 2013). This offers a unique opportunity to study substantive representation. We have the chance to test the ideological and electoral incentives to represent, which can be studied in the UK, unlike the US where there is less variety in the parties and seats of non-white representatives.

With larger numbers, and a larger diversity in the UK, there is scope to conduct empirical analysis on these representatives’ attitudes, behavior and motivations to represent that was not possible in the past. The methods I outline here are designed to take advantage of this. Measuring substantive representation has proved challenging, although we have a wealth of normative theories explaining what we might expect to see, operationalizing this has not been easy and the measurement of substantive representa-
tion has itself received much coverage (Celis et al. 2008). To study substantive representation, we need to open up our research to include multiple potential actors, sites, forums and outcomes. Below I discuss some of the methods that we can use to overcome these challenges.

**Ways of measuring substantive representation empirically**

How can we know that substantive representation has been achieved or, indeed, what it looks like? One can look at policy outcomes (Weldon 2002, Bratton and Haynie 1999), such as the enactment of measures designed to promote the interests of ethnic minorities, such as those to tackle racial prejudice, although this approach has been criticized. There are many factors that contribute to successful policy outcomes and this is a high threshold for representation as failure to implement a policy doesn’t mean that minority interests have been rejected. Some, especially in the USA, have looked at voting records by politicians (Hutchings 1998, Grose 2005), but this falls short of capturing the many other things that representatives do. Nor is it possible in the UK, which has a stronger system of party discipline. It is very difficult to vote against one’s party. Another approach involves looking in detail at parliamentary processes, exploring how interests are placed on the agenda, by analyzing parliamentary questions or debates.

Substantive representation is a journey. It isn’t static or unidimensional so it can’t be evaluated using one time-point and one method alone. What we can do is attempt to understand it by means of different sources of data, different methods, and with different normative assumptions. This is what I have attempted to do in my PhD, recently completed at the University of Manchester. I have used four different approaches to explore how substantive representation of minorities happened in Britain: including what interventions MPs make in debates critical to minorities, how responsive MPs are to their constituents, what are the attitudes held by MPs, and what motivates them to act for ethnic minorities. Together these approaches can begin to provide a comprehensive assessment of substantive representation, collectively they present a broad-ranging, and deep, fine-grained picture that improves our understanding of representation of ethnic minorities.

**Parliamentary speech**

Analyzing representatives’ actions within the legislative chamber is a classic way to capture substantive representation. Measuring it through parliamentary speech is a useful way of revealing who is intervening and what aspects they introduce to the legislature. It also requires a substantially lower threshold for action that policy outcomes or legislative
changes. Analyzing these interventions can reveal whether MPs bring ethnic minorities onto the agenda and whether they are promoting their interests.

I analyzed speech of BME and White MPs from the Anti-Terrorism debates in the period from 2001 to 2015. Successive anti-terror legislation has dealt with offences relating to the growing threat of terrorism in the UK. Since the first permanent anti-terrorism legislation (2000) there has been a consistent escalation and expansion of police powers. The legislation has been heavily criticized because of the disproportionate impact of these powers on ethnic minorities, especially but not exclusively the British Muslim and Black communities\(^2\) making it a relevant forum to explore the representation of BME views.

I used keywords, using corpus linguistic software to analyze the transcription of speeches… allows you to look not only at who speaks but also analyze what they are saying” debates from the Hansard Records, directly comparing the speech of BME and White MPs. In these debates, relating to six bills from 2001 to 2015, 36 BME MPs held seats, but only 15 (42%) spoke at any point during, only three spoke over the passage of more than one bill. All of these, except two, were backbench MPs when they spoke. The majority of words spoken by BME MPs was during the last three bills, since 2008. However, this is not driven by the new intake of MPs as only two of the 18 newly elected BME MPs in 2010 spoke during the passage of the 2011 or 2015 bills.

This method allows you to look not only at who speaks but also analyze what they are saying. BME MPs were more likely than non-BME MPs to talk about communities, indeed almost entirely focused, including the disproportionate effect on them. Comparing the two sets of speech reveals a difference how the Muslim community are framed. BME MPs predominately speak about the Muslim community within the context of the wider BME community. This sits in opposition to the discourse of othering, or exceptionalism of the Muslim community that we often see (Baker et al. 2013). In comparison, in the speech of non-BME MPs, this community was largely framed in opposition to the rest of society and to the state, and was explicitly framed as external to others.

Analyzing MP’s interventions in debates reveals more about who is involved in representation and the topics that they bring into the political arena and reveals subtler nuances that can be hard to get at otherwise.

\(^2\) See The Equality and Human Rights Commission report “The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities”. Specific examples include but are not limited to indefinite detention, stop and search, and TPIMS (Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures).  

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Responsiveness

The second study in my PhD looked at representation in a setting that has so far received little attention, constituency case work. Responding to constituents’ enquiries forms a regular part of an MP’s constituency work, providing a direct link between the constituent and the MP. It provides a means by which representatives can act “in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them.”

One way of “getting at” responsiveness as representation uses experimental methods. In the lead up the 2015 General Election I conducted such an experiment (McKee 2017), inspired by research in the US (Butler and Broockman 2011). I emailed 468 MPs, dividing them at random into two groups, sending them an email from someone claiming to be a constituent, named Robert Davies (white British) or Emmanuel Kwambe (Black African, Nigerian). The constituent stated that they were new to the area and asked how they could register to vote. This experiment took place at a time when a change to the Electoral Register raised concerns that many, including ethnic minorities would be dropped from the register. This is against a background of low voter registration of BME constituents, especially among Black Africans in the UK. The response rate was surprisingly high, at 88.5 percent, but the response rate to the Black African constituent was 3.4 percent lower than to the white constituent.

However, beyond the crude response rates, what really stood out was the more nuanced aspects of responses to the Black African constituent. The Black African constituent received fewer helpful responses, i.e. those that would be most likely to enable successful registration. Only 58.3 percent of responses guided Emmanuel directly to one of the main websites (e.g. about my vote) compared to 63.3 percent of the time for Robert. Initial non responses were defined as situations where the email was simply forwarded with no further response or where the writer received an email asking to confirm that they were a constituent. In these cases, I took no further action but 25.7 percent of Emmanuel’s emails were subsequently followed up, compared with 29.6 percent of Robert’s. I also looked at the language used in the responses. The starkest differences were in the welcomes that each received, bearing in mind that both stated that they were new to the constituency. The white British constituent received almost double the number of responses welcoming him and more than double the number of responses that contained an exclamation mark, a standard indication of enthusiasm, friendliness in this context.

“The starkest differences were in the welcomes that each received…The white British constituent received almost double the number of responses welcoming him”
Table 1. Response statistics: information given on where to register to vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main website</th>
<th>Telephone or email for local council/electoral office</th>
<th>Website for local council/electoral office</th>
<th>No contact information</th>
<th>No response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=406

Table 2. Response Statistics: cordiality markers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Emmanuel</th>
<th>Robert</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welcome</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=468

Note: Percentages calculated as number of responses which contained a cordial maker divided by total responses.

There is huge potential for these types of experimental studies in the area of political representation. They have often been used to reveal discrimination in housing and employment, but done carefully, with due consideration to the ethical issues and the burden placed on representatives, they offer a useful measure of substantive representation. This method captures the actions of MPs, their engagement with constituents in a forum that is usually excluded from empirical research on political representation.

Motivations

New data sources offer a means to look not only at how substantive representation happens, but also why and what motivations underpin what we see. Using the Representative Audit of Britain (RAB) 2015 survey of parliamentary candidates, we examined intrinsic and extrinsic mechanisms, proposed as motivating representatives to act for ethnic minorities (Sobolewska et al. 2017). The RAB survey included 1,798 of a total 3,174 candidates who stood for election, a response rate of 56.6 percent. The data allows us to look at attitudes and motivations amongst those who are potential representatives, and whom one would reasonably expect or hope to be elected representatives in the near future. It is a valuable resource for those interested in the representation of specific minority groups who contribute few elected representatives.
We examined the intrinsic mechanisms of shared experience, a sense that prejudice and discrimination hold back ethnic minorities, and that representatives have a responsibility to represent ethnic minorities. We also examined the extrinsic mechanism of electoral incentives, the role that the concentration of minority populations in a potential MP’s constituency plays in their motivation to represent ethnic minorities.

One of the proposed intrinsic mechanisms is the sense of shared experience that minority representatives have with ethnic minorities in the population. This figure shows responses to a question asking whether ethnic minorities in the UK are held back by prejudice and discrimination. The responses confirm that BME representatives feel this sense more strongly than white representatives. But what is particularly interesting is the difference within parties. In each party as we move from left to right on the political spectrum representatives become more skeptical of this sense, but the pattern of BME representatives agreeing more strongly remains present.

Figure 1. Responses to “how much do you agree that ethnic minorities are held back by prejudice and discrimination.”

This analysis makes an important contribution to our understanding of the motivations of representatives, which are posited as underpinning their actions to substantive represent. It was only by using the survey of candidates, with a far larger number of ethnic minority respondents that we are able to produce this picture.
Attitudes

In 1987 the first post war BME MPs were elected to the House of Commons, this was against the backdrop of heightened racial tension including race riots of the 1980s in London. After this ground-breaking election, all MPs were sent letters asking questions about race and representation as part of a project to improve transparency of race issues in parliament and to indicate where MPs stood on race issues. 4 These letters were then analyzed by myself and Dr. Maria Sobolewska, University of Manchester. The responses to the letter are a rare historical insight into the attitudes of elected representatives at a time of heightened racial discrimination and violence. By looking at representative’s attitudes we can get a sense of the extent to which they acknowledged, understood and were willing to represent the issues of BME constituents and therefore a sense of substantive representation in this forum.

Table 3. Responses to letters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did respond</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not respond</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N total 650; Did respond 169; Did not respond 481.

The table above shows the response rates to the letter. The Conservatives were the party of government so we might expect a lower response rate, it’s hard to imagine that this explains the huge disparity here. In the 1987 election it was only the Labour party who gained BME MPs. The table below shows the responses to the question “is racism in your view a major problem in Britain today?”. It shows the stark difference in the type of response from representatives of these two parties. Over two thirds of Labour MPs responded that it was a major problem, whilst less than 6 percent of Conservative MPs who responded felt that this was so.

4 Letters were sent in 1987 by Anthony Lishak and kindly donated to Dr Maria Sobolewska at the University of Manchester for research purposes.
Table 4. Responses to “is racism in your view a major problem in Britain today?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t answer</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n Conservative 70; Labour 84

The content of the letters is even more revealing. One example which highlights the low appetite for dealing with racial issues in the 1980s is from one MP who states “There is a great danger of creating racism where none need exist” in response to being asked about racism in the UK. This echoed some views at the time that those looking to highlight racism were agitating the system. This study is not yet complete, myself and the PI Dr. Maria Sobolewska will be asking similar questions to MPs now, to see, 30 years on, how attitudes have changed and how the language of race relations has changed. Both of these are indicators of how minority interests are represented in parliament.

“It is only by finding new ways of exploring existing, or creating new data that we can get a fuller picture of how substantive representation happens, and begin to bridge the gap between the normative literature and empirical evidence”

Moving forward

Going forward, it is clear that we are now able to get at more aspects of representation than before, looking to forums of representation that were not previously accessible and using new forms of data that allow us to move beyond the issue of low numbers of BME representatives in the UK. Those who advocate for descriptive representation, or the “politics of presence” (Phillips 1995) do so for intrinsic reasons of fairness, justice, legitimacy, and inclusion but they also do so to promote the further substantive representation of those who are politically marginalized (Mansbridge 1999). It is only by finding new ways of exploring existing, or creating new data that we can get a fuller picture of how substantive representation happens, and begin to bridge the gap between the normative literature and empirical evidence.
References


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Visible minority candidates and vote choice: The view from Canada

With its multicultural approach to minorities, Canada is different from most Western countries. A strong anti-immigrant party is (still) absent, and immigration and integration are generally uncontroversial topics in national political debates—controversies around “reasonable accommodation” of religious symbols in Quebec notwithstanding. In 2015, Canada also installed its most diverse federal parliament so far, including record numbers of visible minority and Indigenous members.¹ This is, however, not a new phenomenon. Visible minorities are relatively well represented in most Canadian parties, especially in comparison to other countries.² This has been documented by a large body of literature on visible minority candidates and MPs, going back to the 1980s (Black 2009, 2013; Pelletier 1991; Tossutti and Najem 2002; Tolley 2015). In this essay we touch upon the effects of this descriptive representation, and address if and how visible minority candidates affect vote choice.

“Visible minorities are relatively well represented in most Canadian parties, especially in comparison to other countries”

To understand the vital role of visible minority voters and candidates in Canadian electoral politics, it is necessary to first appreciate the dynamics of the federal party system. Unlike the social cleavage model that underlies party politics in the US and most European countries, Canada’s party system serves a “brokerage” function (Carty and Cross 2010). Rather than mobilizing distinctive communities and articulating conflicting claims rooted in their interests, Canadian federal parties operate as principal agents of

¹ The 2015 election brought 47 visible minority (i.e., non-white and non-Aboriginal Canadian) Members of Parliament to the 338 seat House of Commons, while another 10 MPs were Indigenous. The election also saw record numbers of religious minorities enter Parliament, including 17 Sikhs and 11 Muslims.

² For example, the US has worse representational diversity than Canada. Overall, non-whites (including blacks, Hispanics, Asians/Pacific Islanders and Native Americans) comprised 19 percent of the 115th US Congress, compared to 38 percent of the population; in contrast, visible minority and Indigenous members made up 17 percent of the Canadian House of Commons, compared to their population share of 27 percent.
national accommodation of difference. It is as brokerage parties that they approach the large and growing visible minority population. Mobilized by electoral pragmatism and the need to win the seat-rich urban and suburban centers where visible minorities and newcomers are a significant population group, federal parties of all stripes have sought to improve their standing by increasing the number of visible minority candidates.

A further characteristic of the Canadian brokerage party system that advances minority candidacies is the “franchise style” of organization (Carty 2002), in which the party center dominates policy, strategy and communication, while individual party members come together in the local districts to find candidates, organize constituency campaigns and harvest electoral support. That visible minority voters are electorally available to parties across the left-right spectrum is also somewhat unique to Canada, and partly a function of the relatively strong social, economic and political integration of newcomers, combined with highly selective immigration policies (Ibbitson 2014; Marwah et al. 2013). It also helps that visible minority candidates in Canada appear to suffer no penalty at the hand of the non-minority electorate (Murakami 2014), which is quite distinctive from the pattern of findings in the US and Europe (e.g., Dancygier 2017; Fisher et al. 2014; Hajnal 2007; Valentino and Hutchings 2004). Traditionally, immigrants and visible minorities have been strong supporters of the Liberal Party (Blais 2005). However, a late 20th century transformation of Canada’s federal party system, and the ascendance in 2004 of Stephen Harper’s “new” Conservative Party of Canada to minority government status, marked renewed competition for the so-called “ethnic vote” across key electoral districts. The various strategies that parties embark upon to court these voters have been widely remarked in the Canadian media (e.g., Ibbitson 2005; LeBlanc 2007; Delacourt 2014; Adams and Griffith 2015). Running visible minority candidates is clearly one of them. As Figure 1 shows, descriptive representation of visible minorities among candidate slates has strongly increased between 1988 and 2015.

3 In the most recent 2015 federal election, 110 of the country’s 338 voting districts had populations that were 20 percent or more visible minority, and among these, 33 had visible minority populations of 50 percent or higher. Most of those ridings are centred around the country’s two biggest cities, Toronto and Vancouver, where visible minorities are now the largest population group (49.1 and 51.8 percent, respectively, according to 2016 census figures), outnumbering the non-minority, non-Aboriginal component.
Figure 1. Visible minority candidates by party

![Figure 1](https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/)

Source: Black 2013; Griffith 2016; Pelletier 1991; Tossutti and Najem 2002; own data.

**Ethnic affinity voting**

What impact do these increasingly diverse candidate slates have on visible minorities’ vote choice? In the US, there is abundant evidence that voters prefer same-ethnic candidates, however the social and racial cleavages that underlie the American party system make it difficult to disentangle racial affinity effects from partisan preferences. While their impact in actual elections is debated (e.g., Citrin et al. 1990; Highton 2004; Kaufmann 2004; Pettigrew, 1976), racial affinity effects tend to be quite strong in experimental studies that present subjects with fictionalized white or minority candidates, while controlling for other factors (e.g., Barreto 2007; Bejarano and Segura 2007; McConnaughy et al. 2010; Philpot and Walton 2007). Racial affinities in vote choice may be the result of both cognitive and social identity mechanisms. Voters could, for example, expect that same ethnic candidates will share similar experiences, and thus be better at representing their interests. Or the presence of visible minority candidates may increase feelings of group identification and solidarity, which in turn assume heightened salience as a basis for candidate choice. Some studies have also found that perceptions of group threat can increase ethnic affinity voting.

In Canada, as well, it is often assumed that voters prefer candidates with a shared ethnic background. It is therefore no surprise that federal parties are more likely to nominate diverse candidates in the most diverse ridings. Among the 197 visible minority candidates who ran for one of the three major parties across the past two elections, 83 of
them (42 percent) competed in the 119 (18 percent) most diverse ridings, defined as those where at least 35 percent of the population are members of a visible minority group. Stated differently, 69 percent of Canada’s most diverse ridings had visible minority candidates, compared to only 22 percent of the less diverse ridings (see Figure 2).

Despite federal parties’ strategy to nominate diverse candidates to diverse ridings, there is little empirical evidence that ethnic affinities are a decisive factor in voter choice in Canadian federal elections. As in the US, studies that employ experimental designs to artificially isolate voter and candidate ethnic characteristics from other factors have found support for the ethnic affinity voting thesis, especially among minorities who identify more strongly with their ethnic group (Besco 2017; Goodyear-Grant and Tolley 2017). Evidence for ethnic affinity voting has also been found in the Toronto municipal elections (Bird et al. 2016; McGregor et al. 2017). In Toronto, as in most Canadian municipalities, elections are formally non-partisan. In a context where important voter cues such as partisan information are absent, voters do seem to rely on candidates’ ethnic background either as an information short-cut or identity prompt.

“voters do seem to rely on candidates’ ethnic background either as an information short-cut or identity prompt”

Canadian research studying the individual-level effects of candidate ethnicity in real federal elections remains scarce.4 One exception is Murakami (2014), who examined the effects of candidates’ ethnic background on individuals’ vote choice by linking Canadian Election Study survey data to information on the candidates in respondents’ ridings. He found that any effects were washed away once partisanship was controlled for. The only exception was a very small set of voters who demonstrated an a priori strong negative affect towards ethnic minorities and opposed policies benefiting ethnic minorities. Murakami (2014: 127) concludes that the influence of candidates’ ethnicity on vote choice in Canadian federal elections is “negligibly small or extremely limited to only a small set of voters.” While there are debates about how heavily local candidates’ characteristics and performance, versus parties and party leaders, factor into Canadians’ vote choice (Cunningham 1971; Roy and Alcantara 2015), it is reasonable to presume that candidate ethnicity probably matters less than in the US.

Does a visible minority in Canada vote for the Liberal Party because he or she prefers this party, because of the visible minority candidate in their riding, or maybe because of both? The Canadian political system makes it difficult to disentangle candidate and party effects. Furthermore, the competitive dynamics of elections within Canada’s

4 There are several studies that have looked at riding demographics and found a relationship between the share of visible minorities in a riding and support for visible minority candidates (e.g., Black and Erickson 2006; Gerber, 2006; Landa et al. 1995). The problem with such studies is that aggregated data cannot tell us anything about individual behavior.
more diverse ridings makes it empirically difficult to identify ethnic affinity effects. For example, if the Liberal Party nominates a visible minority candidate in a highly competitive riding, this may attract visible minority voters. However, this visible minority candidate effect disappears as soon as another party also nominates a visible minority candidate in that riding. Figure 2 shows the percentage of ridings with 0, 1, or 2 or more visible minority candidates, differentiating between more and less diverse riding populations. Indeed, in 45 percent of the ridings with a large visible minority population, two or more visible minority candidates were nominated. Stated differently, among Canada’s more diverse ridings, there were only 24 percent (29 of 119, cumulated over the past two elections) that included a single visible minority candidate, whereas the remainder offered either multiple or no such candidates. This means that most visible minority voters in Canada will experience no incongruence between supporting a visible minority candidate and voting for their preferred party, thus making ethnic affinity effects quite difficult to detect. Finally, the causal direction of effects is hard to establish: are visible minority voters more likely to support a party when it nominates a minority candidate, or are minority candidates becoming more plentiful because of personal support among the growing minority population in the riding?

Figure 2. Number of visible minority candidates (VMC) in ridings by visible minority population

Visible minority candidates vs. visible minority representation

Even if having one or more local visible minority candidates does not affect how minorities decide to cast their ballot, visible minority representation at the party level might still influence their vote choice. In a new study, we took a different approach to examining determinants of visible minorities’ voting preferences. Whereas previous Canadian studies have focused mainly on individual level explanations of vote choice, we test to what extent party characteristics that might be relevant to visible minority voters affect their voting decision. More specifically, we studied whether substantive representation—party standpoints on issues that might matter to minorities—and descriptive representation—the presence of visible minority candidates at the party level—affect visible minorities’ vote choice.

The Canadian Election Study (CES) was used to answer our research question. Nine waves, from 1988 to 2015, were pooled in order to examine a sufficient number of visible minority voters (N=1047). Across these surveys, minorities were asked about which party they would vote for, their socio-demographic background and opinions on economic, social and minority issues. Party standpoints on parallel economic and social issues were gathered from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). Further information about the number of visible minority candidates by party was assembled from existing studies. Using a conditional logistic regression analysis, we were able to test whether visible minorities’ vote choice was conditional on parties’ substantive and descriptive representation. In concrete terms, our analysis allows us to see whether visible minority respondents are more likely to support a party, when that party represents them substantively by holding issue positions that are consistent with theirs.

“our results suggest that individual socio-demographic factors do not have a large influence on visible minorities’ vote choice. Surprisingly, the results also show that parties’ positions on economic and social issues do not affect minorities’ vote choice”

In line with previous studies in Canada, and with the “brokerage party” thesis, our results suggest that individual socio-demographic factors do not have a large influence on visible minorities' vote choice. Surprisingly, the results also show that parties’ positions on economic and social issues do not affect minorities’ vote choice. This indicates that the issues political parties represent that could be important to visible minorities do not seem to play a role in their vote choice. However, parties with a higher share of visible minority candidates are more popular among visible minorities. This finding persists even

5 Unfortunately, the Comparative Manifesto Project does not include data from party platforms on multiculturalism or ethnic minority issues. In future research, we intend to apply the CMP approach to explore differences in Canadian parties’ positions on these issues, and test whether such differences correspond with visible minorities’ vote choice.

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after voter socio-demographics and party identification are taken into account. Hence, although there is no ethnic affinity effect at the individual level, the presence of visible minority candidates within a party seems to matter.

While we can only speculate as to the causal mechanisms involved, it may be that running a larger share of minority candidates is a symbolic gesture that appeals to minority voters, even if the party’s candidate in their own riding is either not a visible minority, or is not distinguishable on that basis from the candidates of other parties. If symbolic representation is a factor, then it is likely that we need to consider not only the share of candidates in each party that are visible minorities, but also the prominence and public image of those candidates and elected members. This could be an especially fertile line of inquiry in Canada’s next federal election, when Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (along with the visibly diverse and highly prominent set of MPs who comprise his cabinet) squares off against the New Democratic Party’s newly elected leader Jagmeet Singh—Canada’s first ever visible minority to head a federal party.

References


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Europe has experienced large-scale immigration for many decades now, generating significant levels of ethnic diversity. Though neighborhoods, work places, and schools have diversified substantially, especially in cities, the same cannot be said for political parties. In many European countries, immigrants remain severely underrepresented in city halls and national parliaments. This persistent and systematic marginalization undermines the democratic legitimacy of political systems (Mansbridge 1999; Urbinati and Warren 2008). It can also lead to feelings of alienation, leading immigrants to withdraw from the political system or to turn to anti-state violence (Dancygier 2010).

In recent years, a growing literature has addressed the causes of underrepresentation (e.g., Bird et al. 2011; Bloemraad 2013; Dancygier et al. 2015). Though parity ratios—the share of immigrants in parliaments divided by their share in the population—tend to be below one, they differ substantially across and within countries. To explain this variation, existing work has pointed out that political institutions (e.g., electoral rules, citizenship regimes) matter. It has also highlighted the role of prejudice and discrimination on the part of party gatekeepers and voters (Bird et al. 2011; Dancygier 2014; Dancygier et al. 2015; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Discriminatory decisions by party elites are especially visible in party-list systems, where we can observe whether party leaders place immigrant candidates on desirable list positions that are sure to be seat winners or on uncompetitive spots that guarantee electoral defeat. Though evidence of discrimination appears widespread, immigrant candidates are also frequently placed in competitive positions that lead to seats in parliament. One consistent finding is that the electoral clout of immigrant voters (relative to their detractors) plays a key role in how well they fare in the nomination and list placement process (Dancygier 2017; Eelbode 2013).

“While research has thus made progress in explaining why the extent of descriptive representation of immigrants varies, it has paid less attention to its nature and consequences. This is a serious omission”
In this essay, I will argue that to understand some of the consequences of minority representation we have to first pay attention to the goals that parties have in mind when they contemplate nominating minority candidates. I focus on two such goals: (i) attracting the majority vote, and (ii) attracting the minority vote. Knowing which of these two goals has priority in determining nomination decisions allows us to make predictions about the types of minority candidates that emerge, and it will shed light on a set of likely consequences that minority representation will generate.

In making these arguments, I draw on my recent book, *Dilemmas of Inclusion: Muslims in European Politics* (Dancygier 2017). The book explains the causes and nature of Muslim political representation in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Great Britain, and it also addresses how differences in the type of descriptive representation produce distinct repercussions for minority integration, political parties and the party system as a whole. Though the empirical focus is on European Muslims, the book’s theoretical framework applies more widely to minority representation in party-based elections.

**Inclusion Types**

When parties confront questions of minority inclusion, they do not only think about whether or not to incorporate minority candidates; they also have to consider what goals they want minority representation to achieve. Different inclusion goals in turn produce different candidate types. In addition to simple exclusion (i.e., nominating no minority candidates), I argue that parties have two main options at their disposal: *symbolic inclusion* and *vote-based inclusion*.

“When parties confront questions of minority inclusion, they do not only think about whether or not to incorporate minority candidates; they also have to consider what goals they want minority representation to achieve”

In many ethnically diverse advanced democracies, matters of minority inclusion and equal treatment are quite salient, requiring parties to take a stand on these issues. Selecting minority candidates is one way of doing so. Parties pursue symbolic inclusion to convey that they support diversity and minority integration, and that they accept and recognize the relevant minority group in question. Symbolic inclusion is a tool to shape the party’s image, not a means to engineer pro-minority policy concessions. Accordingly, minority populations might reject symbolic candidates as mere tokens that cannot relate to minority constituents or bring about tangible benefits for the group.
Party leaders nominate symbolic candidates when they do not want to appear exclusionary. Running elections on an all-native, all-white slate can make parties seem out of touch with demographic and social realities at best, and racist at worst. Exclusion can therefore alienate both minority voters and progressive segments of the majority electorate. In fact, I argue that when parties engage in symbolic inclusion, they do not only want to reach minority voters; rather, one key objective is to capture the socially-liberal, cosmopolitan vote. Seeing that a party fields members of underrepresented groups, these cosmopolitan voters (and some minority voters) understand inclusion as “a public acknowledgment of equal value” (Phillips 1995: 40). Parties thus have two audiences in mind when they include symbolically, but it is possible that only the majority electorate recognizes and accepts symbolic candidates as valid representatives of the minority group.

“Symbolic inclusion is likely when parties operate in ethnically diverse democratic settings, but when they do not (yet) rely on the minority vote to win elections”

Symbolic inclusion is likely when parties operate in ethnically diverse democratic settings, but when they do not (yet) rely on the minority vote to win elections. In such settings, they select a small number of symbolic candidates to mold their brand and to appeal to majority voters. For example, social democratic parties can garner a greater share of the urban, cosmopolitan electorate that frequently votes for green parties by nominating minority candidates. Similarly, center-right parties have used symbolic candidates to win back high-income voters whose socially-liberal values have pushed them to the Left.¹

Summing up, parties opt for symbolic inclusion when they intend to court parts of the majority electorate that do not feel comfortable voting for exclusionary parties, and when minority voters are not pivotal.

By contrast, parties engage in vote-based inclusion when winning elections requires a sizable minority vote share. Parties put up a significant number of minority candidates in order to maximize minority votes. Unlike symbolic inclusion efforts, vote-based inclusion is not meant to send a signal to the majority electorate. Rather, the primary audience is the minority electorate.

Vote-based inclusion occurs when minorities constitute a sizable and influential share of the electorate. Given immigrant and ethnic minority settlement patterns, this

¹ Sometimes parties employ symbolic minority candidates to compensate for their drift towards anti-minority stances in other domains. Minority candidates can provide some cover for such parties. For instance, French President Sarkozy’s selection of several women of North African descent to high-profile cabinet positions can be seen in this light. Likewise, when the German Social Democrats failed to expel a prominent member (Thilo Sarrazin) who had written a highly publicized anti-Muslim book, it vowed to include more minority candidates in their midst.

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means that we are most likely to observe vote-based inclusion in urban areas during subnational elections. In countries where electoral districts for national parliaments are relatively small (such as in the UK), vote-based inclusion can also unfold during national elections. Symbolic inclusion is frequently practiced during national or regional contests, but it also takes place during local elections when minorities aren’t sufficiently sizable to wield substantial electoral power.

When parties pursue vote-based inclusion, they will nominate a much larger number of minority candidates than when they include symbolically. Parity ratios will consequently be significantly higher in the case of vote-based inclusion when compared to symbolic inclusion. These different inclusion types not only have implications for the degree of representation; they also matter because they lead to a different type of representation.

Candidate Types

When parties include for symbolic reasons, their main goal is to appeal to majority voters. Symbolic candidates are fielded when parties cannot expect large electoral returns from minorities. These candidates therefore cannot alienate majority voters. Parties will consequently try to pick candidates whose preferences and values are compatible with those of the party and its electorate. This preference fit becomes especially critical with respect to issues that are salient in debates about minority integration. If a minority group is associated with positions on politicized issues that are far removed from those of the median party supporter, the party will make sure to select a minority candidate who takes a more moderate stance on this issue and, furthermore, who can easily and credibly signal that this is the case.

When it comes to vote-based inclusion, preference fit with the majority electorate is a secondary concern. Instead, parties will prioritize candidates who are best equipped to turn out the minority vote. These are typically candidates who are prominent and enjoy high social standing within the minority electorate. They have deep and broad links with in-group members that they can tap into during elections.

Implications for Descriptive Representation and its Consequences

What are the implications of these different inclusion types for the nature and consequences of minority descriptive representation? First, note an interesting insight: One function that political theorists often ascribe to descriptive representation is its ability to serve as a symbol for minority groups, indicating that the political process acknowledges

2 This statement is likely to hold true when comparing parity ratios across subnational elections, but not necessarily when comparing subnational with national parity ratios. In national elections, parity ratios can sometimes be near or above 1 even when parties include symbolically. This can occur when the minority electorate and the number of national parliamentarians are both small, in which case it may only take one or two minority candidates to achieve parity.
minorities and is attentive to their interests. Yet, when electoral considerations compel parties to nominate symbolic (vs. vote-based) candidates, descriptive representation frequently will not be able to fulfill this symbolic function. Having to satisfy the preferences of majority voters, parties that include symbolically will often discount the preferences of minority voters. In fact, it is actually when parties are not interested in sending symbolic messages, but when they are in the business of winning minority votes, that minority groups will be more likely to consider the selected candidates as “one of their own.”

If we want to understand whether descriptive representation is likely to serve the minority electorate we should first find out what actors are in charge of candidate selection and what goals they want minority representation to achieve.

“It is actually when parties are not interested in sending symbolic messages, but when they are in the business of winning minority votes, that minority groups will be more likely to consider the selected candidates as ‘one of their own’”

Second, different candidate types are associated with different social groups within the minority electorate. Minority groups are not monolithic entities. Just like the ethnic majority population, they consist of a diverse set of voters who differ along class, gender, regional, religious and other lines. Descriptive candidates will represent some subgroups better than others. When judged on normative grounds, some theorists maintain that it is especially important that descriptive representatives have strong links to the more disadvantaged members of the group (e.g., Dovi 2002).

Taking European Muslims as an example, we can make predictions about what candidates are likely to emerge under the different inclusion types. Recall that symbolic candidates have to adopt mainstream positions on issues that have been politicized in debates about minority integration, and they have to be able to signal these positions easily and credibly to both candidate selectors and to voters. Among European Muslims, strict adherence to Islam (and potentially religious extremism) and support for patriarchal values are sources of suspicion and hostility. As a result, parties that include symbolically will want to convey that their candidate is secular and progressive, especially if one of their objectives is to appeal to the socially liberal, secular portion of the majority electorate. An easy way of signaling secularism and progressivism among Muslim candidates is their gender: Simply by virtue of running for office, a female Muslim candidate can signal that she is not constrained by norms of purdah, and that she can easily interact with men outside her kin group.³ This signal is strengthened if she does not wear a headscarf. Though a Muslim male candidate may have an identical belief system, he cannot convey his beliefs as costlessly and credibly as can a Muslim woman. In *Dilemmas of Inclusion,*

³ On the relative cost and credibility of different candidate signals, see Chandra (2004).
I demonstrate how this logic generates a disproportionately high number of female Muslim candidates when parties include symbolically.

“If descriptive representatives are meant to reach the most stigmatized members of a minority group, symbolic inclusion will not be up for the task”

Symbolic inclusion will therefore produce candidates that are commonly out of touch with the more traditional and religious members of Muslim communities. If descriptive representatives are meant to reach the most stigmatized members of a minority group, symbolic inclusion will not be up for the task. However, symbolic candidates might be more successful in changing majority views about the minority group in a more positive (if not necessarily accurate) direction. Vote-based inclusion yields different results. Vote-based candidates are well-known and deeply embedded in minority enclaves. Among European Muslims (as is common among other religious minority groups), these concentrated communities tend to feature electorates that are more religious and more socially conservative when compared to the average minority voter. Vote-based Muslim candidates consequently have strong ties to conservative networks and religious institutions, and, as I show in *Dilemmas of Inclusion*, they are almost always men. Vote-based candidates thus meet the criterion of connectedness to disadvantaged subgroups only halfway: They do have links to the least assimilated and most stigmatized segments of the minority population. But within those segments, they might not be willing or able to speak for Muslim women who some consider to be most in need of representation.

As the electoral importance of European Muslim communities grows, scholars of minority representation should watch for the tensions and tradeoffs that are inherent in the politics of minority representation. More broadly, scholars of minority representation should go beyond numbers and begin to consider how differences in party goals interact with minority and majority preferences to generate a set of distinct inclusion outcomes and consequences.

References


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Analyzing the Representation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in Eight Contemporary European Democracies

Most societies in Western Europe have experienced several waves of immigration since the final years of the Second World War. These developments are well-researched in most of their historical, economic, social, cultural and political facets (Castles et al. 2014; Messina 2007). It is equally well-established that European societies differed starkly in the way they integrated immigrants and promoted immigrants to become new citizens, although the reasons for these differences are contested (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999; Koopmans et al. 2012). Despite a significant amount of convergence between European nation states (Entzinger 2000) and a gradual increase in the social and political rights of immigrants (Howard 2009; Soysal 1994), there are considerable differences in the extent to which citizens of immigrant origin are “present” and “active” in representative assemblies across Europe.

Empirical Deficits

Despite a great deal of progress, comparative scholarship on the political integration of immigrants and their descendants in Europe has suffered from a number of shortcomings so far. Beyond the most general notions of “incorporation regimes” (Entzinger 2000) or “political opportunity structures” (Bird et al. 2010), the influence of institutional, socio-demographic and attitudinal variables have remained understudied. Little systematic knowledge has been generated on the practices of political parties as organizations to promote citizens of immigrant origin as their candidates.

One of the key obstacles to the rigorous comparative study of representation has been the lack of comparable data. Authors attempting comparisons often had to rely on the secondary analysis of highly aggregated data that were rarely collected on the basis of common definitions even of the “target population,” citizens and representatives of immigrant origin (Alba and Foner 2015; Castles et al. 2014; Messina 2007). The situation
was even worse when it came to important contextual information such as the number of different types of immigrants and their descendants. Different national statistics based on different definitions presented obstacles to comparative work. While information on the number of citizens of immigrant origin, their ethnic breakdown or the number of representatives of immigrant origin in national and regional legislatures was patchy at best, our understanding of the effect of political institutions, policies or public opinion on the representation of citizens of immigrant origin is even more limited. Some information on the “presence” of representatives of immigrant origin in legislatures notwithstanding, there has been even less cross-national evidence on their behavior as representatives.

The PATHWAYS Project and Approach

“Pathways to Power: The Political Representation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in Eight European Countries” (PATHWAYS) is a three-year research project funded by the research funding councils of France (ANR), Great Britain (ESRC), Germany (DFG) and the Netherlands (NWO) between 2014 and 2017 (principal investigators: Manlio Cinalli, Laura Morales, Thomas Saalfeld and Jean Tillie) (www.pathways.eu). Initially the project covered seven European democracies (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) from 1990 to approximately 2015 (depending on the country), but was joined in 2015 by a Belgian sister project coordinated by Jean-Benoît Pilet and funded by Université catholique de Louvain, Université libre de Bruxelles, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Belgian Fund of Scientific Research (FNRS). In each country except Greece, the data collected at the national level cover the entire period from 1990 to the most recently completed legislative term of the respective national legislature. It also includes information on the most recent legislative terms of a selection of regional assemblies.¹

The choice of countries was informed by an attempt to compare societies with a long history of post-war immigration (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) with others that have faced lower levels of immigration at a later stage (e.g., Greece, Italy and Spain). Given the importance of electoral systems for the process of representation, the PATHWAYS projects seeks to include countries with various types of proportional and majoritarian representation as well as countries with varying incentives for parties and legislators to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), ranging from plurality voting in single-member districts (UK) on one end of the spectrum to highly proportional systems with fixed national party lists (The Netherlands) on the other. The inclusion of mixed-member proportional systems (Germany, Italy) allows to compare within-country variation in district magnitude and ballot structure, two factors influencing MPs’

¹ In the Belgian, German and UK cases, the data collection on the regional level includes the most recently completed legislative term in all regional assemblies (around 2015), in France, Greece, Italy and Spain we collected data for a sample of regions.

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incentives to cultivate a personal vote and the parties’ incentives to tolerate individual vote-seeking behavior. The sample also ensures institutional variation at the parliamen-
tary level by including legislatures with different institutional rules protecting individual legislators’ access to the floor, government and partisan control over the legislative agenda and the strength of committees (Keh 2015; Sieberer 2011).

**Defining Immigrant Origin**

There is considerable variation in the way “immigrant origin” is conceptualized in the eight PATHWAYS countries and beyond. In some national traditions and official statistics they are treated as “immigrants” (often distinguishing between “first,” “second” and further im-
migrant “generations”); in others there is a stronger focus on “ethnic minorities” (Saggar 2000; Sobolewska 2013). Seeking to use comparable indicators across all eight coun-
tries, PATHWAYS defines citizens as being of immigrant origin, if they were born in a country other than their country of residence, with a nationality at birth other than the one of their country of residence, or if they are the immediate descendants of at least one immigrant parent with such a migratory biography. Recognizing the potential heterogene-
ity of this population, further information was included on the country of origin and the “visibility” of immigrant origin based on attributes such as name recognition or skin color. Indigenous ethnic and linguistic minorities without an immigrant background are not in-
cluded in this definition.

**Defining, Describing and Explaining Representation**

The PATHWAYS project covers both “descriptive” and “substantive” representation. In line with Pitkin’s (1967) magisterial study, descriptive representation of citizens of immi-
grant origin will be defined as “standing for” this group of citizens as a member of that very group. Substantive representation will be understood as “acting in the interest” of such citizens in national and state legislatures, in as much as they have distinctive inter-
ests or preferences. Since substantive representation could also be performed by legis-
lators without immigrant origin, biographical and contextual information on all legislators was collected irrespective of their national origin or ethnic background. This also ensures that comparisons with the most appropriate reference group can be carried out. One of the perennial questions in this context is whether the presence of representatives of im-
migrant origin is largely “symbolic,” or whether there is a link between descriptive and substantive representation, whether representatives of immigrant origin are also more active in articulating the political desires and aspirations of citizens and residents of immi-
gnant origin than their colleagues in the reference group.

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2 For example, a sophisticated taxonomy developed for the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) in Germany tracks immigrant origin back for 3.5 generations (Olczyk et al. 2016).
Given the dearth of comparative data, one important aim of PATHWAYS has been descriptive in nature. A large number of indicators were developed to track the personal background and political careers of national and regional legislators. The data allow a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal methods. In relation to legislators’ activities on the floor (substantive representation), the PATHWAYS project uses parliamentary questions for written answers (“written questions”) and committee memberships in national parliaments as the main indicators. The choice of written questions was driven by the observation that control over the tabling of such questions is less constrained by party leaders than other individual activities in legislatures (Keh 2015), that most legislators submit at least one question and, on aggregate, the questions cover a broad spectrum of policy areas in each country.

Figure 1. The “PATHWAYS Framework”

However, the PATHWAYS data collection effort extends beyond describing descriptive and substantive representation and assessing the covariations between these two central outcome variables. Information is provided to researchers on the link between representation on the one hand and constituency demographics, the institutional and policy context (especially legislation relating to discrimination) and trends in public opinion on immigration on the other. Following Key’s (1964) classic distinction, information on the
distribution of vote choices ("party-in-the-electorate"), opportunities within extra-parliamentary party organizations ("party-as-organization") and in parliamentary party groups ("party-in-government") as well as party-system features (such as presence of strong anti-immigrant parties in the legislature) is available to model the crucial intermediary role of political parties. The most important bundles of variables are summarized in Figure 1.

First Results

Descriptive and explanatory results will be published in 2018 in two edited books. The first volume (Morales and Saalfeld 2018) will describe the datasets; provide country-specific contextual information on the representation of citizens of immigrant origin in the eight countries; and produce some first comparative findings. The second volume (Morales et al. 2018) will be based on a series of comparative studies seeking to explain cross-national and diachronic patterns in descriptive and substantive representation.

Table 1. Levels of descriptive representation in Eight European parliaments, ca. 2007-2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (legislative term)</th>
<th>Legislators of immigrant origin</th>
<th>Share of foreign-born population (2011)</th>
<th>Representative-ness ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2010-12)</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (2010-15)</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2010-14)</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2007-12)</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2009-13)</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2015)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2008-13)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2011-15)</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from PATHWAYS Work Packages 1 and 3.1 (www.pathways.eu for further explanations)

Table 1 lists the countries included in the PATHWAYS sample and provides information on the share of legislators of immigrant origin in the most recent parliament covered (in brackets), the percentage of the foreign-born population ("first-generation" immigrants) during the relevant period and a "representativeness ratio" based on these two variables, namely the share of legislators of immigrant origin divided by the share of foreign-born persons in the country. The table demonstrates (for the most recent period available) a strong North-South differential between The Netherlands and the UK at the top and the Southern European countries at the bottom of the distribution.
What institutional variables affect the chances of citizens of immigrant origin to get elected to the legislature? Figure 2 presents some first findings on the institutional sources of these variations between and within countries. The question here is: to what extent do features of the electoral system affect the responsiveness of systems of proportional representation. Specifically, the figure examines the influence of district magnitude in systems of proportional representation, i.e., the number of candidates elected in a district. The intuition is that the larger the number of candidates elected, the easier will it be for parties to engage in “ticket balancing” and to include candidates of immigrant origin. Both panels present predicted probabilities (with 95 percent confidence intervals) calculated from the estimates of zero-inflated beta regression models. The dependent variable is the share of elected legislators of immigrant origin per multi-member district (single-member districts were excluded).

Figure 2. Impact of district magnitude on descriptive representation in eight European parliaments, ca. 2005-2015.

Sources: PATHWAYS Work Packages 1 and 3.1 (for further explanations see www.pathways.eu)

The panel on the left shows the chances of zero candidates of immigrant origin getting elected as a function of the share of the foreign-born population. It demonstrates that this responsiveness to district demographics depends on the district magnitude; the panel on the right shows how the share of legislators of immigrant-origin changes depending on these quantities. The findings are analogous. Both specifications suggest that the size of
the foreign-born population in a district has a systematic effect on the election of representatives of immigrant origin, if the district magnitude is large (we selected a logged value of 20).

*Figure 3. Predictors of parliamentary activity in eight European parliaments, ca. 2007-2015.*

Sources: PATHWAYS Work Packages 1 and 2 (for further explanations see www.pathways.eu).

To what extent does immigrant origin matter for legislative behavior? A very basic indicator is the number of written questions asked by legislators during a specified period controlling for country-fixed effects (to account for institutional and other unobserved differences), party family, government or opposition status, leadership position ("Megaseat") and seniority ("rookie" as a fixed effect for first-time legislators). We fitted a negative-binomial regression model and report incidence rate ratios and 95 percent confidence intervals (Nagelkerke’s $R^2 = 0.377$). The dependent variable is the monthly average of parliamentary questions tabled per legislator serving in the legislative periods under study ($N=3,673$). Our data suggest that legislators of immigrant origin are more active in relation to written questions than their colleagues even after holding a large number of relevant controls constant. Since written questions often take up constituency matters and are an important tool for holding governments accountable in parliamentary systems of government, they cover two key dimensions of representation.
Future Use and Acknowledgements

These illustrations constitute a small sample of the type of analyses currently being carried out. The data will be released to the academic community via Harvard Dataverse by the beginning of 2019. Further information on the variables can be obtained from www.pathways.eu.

References


https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/

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Who is Seen and Heard in Politics? Intersectionality and Political Representation

Akwugo Emejulu, University of Warwick
Liza Mügge, University of Amsterdam

“There is no such thing as a single issue struggle because we do not live single issue lives” – Audre Lorde (1984: 138)

Introduction: Intersectionality and its roots

Political equality is the cornerstone of a representative democracy. Yet, in politics some voices are louder than others and some bodies are more visible than others. Such unequal representation is the result of complex mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization. Over the last thirty years, the politics of gender scholarship has shown how political representation is gendered, while migration and citizenship studies pointed to exclusion on the basis of citizenship or ethnicity (Bassel 2010; Emejulu 2013; Joly and Wadia 2017; Mügge and De Jong 2013). While the first field tends to focus on “women” (read: white) as a group, the second focuses on “minorities” (read: male). This is particularly a case in migration studies because men oftentimes migrate first and women are constructed as adjuncts to men’s actions. This is problematic as categories based on gender, race and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive; they are co-constitutive or “intersectional.”

“[I]ntersectionality…is born out of Black feminist emancipatory politics

Since the African American legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, coined the term in 1989, intersectionality has travelled across disciplines and has become one of the key concepts in feminist and critical race studies. By “intersectionality” we seek to name how “race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive categories but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities” (Hill Collins 2015: 2). Intersectionality is both an analytical framework and a public politics for understanding and combating power imbalances and inequality.

The demand for equal political representation has been a key organizing force in the origins of intersectionality. The earliest recorded use of intersectionality dates from 1851 when Sojourner Truth, the formerly enslaved Black abolitionist and suffragist, gave
her iconic speech, “Ain’t I A Woman?” at a women’s suffrage event in Ohio. Truth demanded the recognition of Black women as women and demonstrated how being positioned at the intersection of race and gender constitutes a double jeopardy which undermines Black women's claims to justice and equality. Although this genealogy often gets lost in the current scramble to use and claim intersectionality, the concept is born out of Black feminist emancipatory politics (e.g. Hill Collins 2000; Hooks 1984).

“there is an ongoing debate about the meaning and purpose of intersectionality and whether a scholar can “do” intersectionality without analyzing race”

Currently, there is an ongoing debate about the meaning and purpose of intersectionality and whether a scholar can “do” intersectionality without analyzing race (for example, substituting or eschewing race for ethnicity or national origin) or including Black women (Alexander-Floyd 2012; Bilge 2013; Carbin and Edenheim 2013; Hancock 2016; Hill Collins and Bilge 2016). This is not simply an internecine feminist battle about the ownership and legacy of intersectionality, but a deeply consequential debate about whose knowledge counts in and beyond the academy (Cho et al. 2013; Dotson 2014).

Intersectionality has increasingly gained ground in political science (for an overview see Erzeel and Mügge 2016). But what does intersectionality offer for political scientists working on migration, citizenship and political representation? To answer this question, we explore how intersectionality is applied in two areas of political representation: grassroots activism and electoral politics.

Intersectionality at the grassroots

Intersectionality is a praxis: it is both an analytical framework for understanding complex inequalities and a politics for social change. The public politics of women of color at the grassroots shapes the contemporary forms of intersectionality and, in turn, informs theorizing about intersectionality within the academy. Intersectionality names, specifically, the perspectives and experiences of Black women and other women of color. By “doing intersectionality,” women of color grassroots activists make visible that which is typically erased or misrecognized: women of color’s humanity and agency. The now famous title of the edited collection captures the promise of intersectional struggles: “All the women were white, all the Blacks were men, but some of us are brave” (Hull et al. 1982). Black women fall (but are oftentimes pushed) between the hegemonic constructions of the structural categories of “gender,” “race” and “class” and are thus ignored—or assumed to be irrelevant to conversations about equality, justice and collective action. Intersectionality at the grassroots demands the centering of Black women and women of color to spot-
light not only their complex inequalities, but also their knowledge production and innovative activism. As the Combahee River Collective (1978: 4) argues: “We realize that the only people who care enough about us to work consistently for our liberation are us.”

“We realize that the only people who care enough about us to work consistently for our liberation are us”

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries in America, Black feminist pioneers such as Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells-Barnett and Claudia Jones, were demanding racial, gender and economic justice through the abolition of the American apartheid system of Jim Crow, universal women’s suffrage and, for Jones in particular, the overthrow of capitalism. This is important to note about intersectionality in Black women’s social movements: racial and gender politics are always informed by—but not limited to—class politics (Boyce Davies 2008). Cooper, Wells-Barnett and Jones are pioneering activists for their counter-hegemonic analyses about white supremacy, patriarchy and racial capitalism (many of which hold true today) and for their daring and dangerous campaigning work for equality and justice (because of death threats, Wells-Barnett went into hiding and travelled under an alias for her investigative journalism into lynching in the American South whilst Jones was deported to Britain because of her leadership in the Communist Party).

By the late 20th and early 21st century, intersectional grassroots struggles are informed by and extend the pattern of the preceding campaigns. Echoing Truth’s insights about the erasure of Black women in feminist movements, we see a clustering of studies from the 1970s to the 1990s which highlight and reclaim the histories of Black women’s and women of color’s struggles for recognition, voice and leadership within radical social movements such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Panthers and the women’s liberation movement (Cleaver 1999; Davis 1981; Giddings 1996; Ransby 2003). This work highlights the particular ways in which women of color organize and mobilize: group-centered leadership, non-hierarchical organizational structures and transforming private mothering and care work into public politics (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Springer 2005).

From the coinage of intersectionality in 1989, we see a flourishing of work exploring: 1. How activists apply intersectionality and use it as a resource in grassroots campaigns for social citizenship such as migrants’ rights, reproductive justice and mass incarceration 2. How intersectionality facilitates and/or problematizes political solidarity among different kinds of feminist and racial justice activists and 3. How intersectionality might support the building of alliances and coalitions that cross categories of race, class, gender, sexuality and legal status (Yuval-

What all this work on intersectionality in grassroots activism has in common is the goal of bridging the yawning gaps between race, class and gender to authorize and legitimize women of color as political agents who are the lynchpin for radical and transformative politics for equality and justice.

Electoral representation: intersectionality as an analytical tool

Intersectionality is applied as an analytical tool to reveal inequalities in electoral representation that remain invisible in inquiries that focus on a single category (e.g. women or racial minorities). Similar to the study of grassroots politics, early studies of electoral representation and intersectionality are based on the experience of exclusion and discrimination of Black women in the US (e.g. Smooth 2006). Recently, intersectionality has been adopted by European scholars who have used it as a lens to understand parliamentary representation of citizens who have been historically disadvantaged due to the legacies of slavery, colonialism and/or migration.

In a joint reading of the literature we can distinguish two opposing hypotheses regarding racism and discrimination of historically disadvantaged groups in the representational process: intersectionality as a double jeopardy or double advantage.

“we can distinguish two opposing hypotheses regarding racism and discrimination of historically disadvantaged groups in the representational process: intersectionality as a double jeopardy or double advantage”

Contrary to the “double jeopardy” hypothesis, scholars argue that multiple social inequalities do not always “add up” in elected office, but sometimes also lead to multiple advantages. For instance, among Latino elected officials in the US, women have made greater inroads than men (Bejarno 2013; Fraga et al. 2008). Similarly, European work concludes that women with immigrant backgrounds are represented in higher numbers in some elected assemblies than their male counterparts (Celis et al. 2014). Due to their double ascribed identity they face less negative racial stereotyping in the political process than men with a similar background. Women with immigrant backgrounds also have more
opportunities to form strategic coalitions within parties, most importantly with (white) women’s organizations (Mügge and Damstra 2013). Finally, minority women candidates are a strategic choice for selectors of progressive parties who aim to appeal to a broad electorate, killing two birds with one stone (Celis et al. 2015).

“An intersectional lens…shows us the dynamic and contextual character of representation”

More recent work argues that the “double jeopardy” or “multiple advantage” position in electoral politics is not static, but contextual: what appears to be an advantage in one context does not automatically produce a similar advantage in another context (Mügge and Erzeel 2016). Three examples that focus on different axes of ascribed identities illustrate the dynamic character of intersectionality. In a diachronic study Mügge (2016) finds that the multiple advantage of ethnic minority women in the Netherlands is not structural, but dynamic and influenced by the political context. The two key factors are 1) which parties are in power and how these incorporate gender and ethnic diversity and 2) a group’s political starting position. In an analysis of older women in local politics Randall (2016) notes that they are both advantaged and disadvantaged. They are advantaged in the sense that they are present in local politics, whereas older men are not. They are exposed to resources that younger politicians do not have: time, money and experience. At the same time, these women face marginalization and discrimination by younger party members. In a comparative study of the representation of women in the US congress and the UK Parliament Evans (2016) finds that the efforts of party and nonpartisan women’s groups to increase the number of women only affects specific women. General activities of these groups do not reach younger, older, disabled and LGBT women. Hence, these women remain underrepresented.

An intersectional lens highlights unexpected inequalities in electoral politics. Not only does intersectionality challenge scholars to be attentive to differences between and within groups, it also shows us the dynamic and contextual character of representation.

Conclusion and challenges for future research

Two challenges lay ahead of scholars in the emerging field of the politics of intersectionality. First, because of intersectionality’s popularity in the social sciences, its Black feminist genealogy and its centering on Black women’s and women of color’s experiences and perspectives are slowly being obscured. Taking seriously the intellectual history of intersectionality is important because it has very real consequences for how scholars, practitioners and activists conceive of and apply the concept in their work. For the migration and citizenship field, scholars are immediately confronted with the challenge of operationalizing intersectionality to study different kinds of migrants. Not only to study the effects of ethnicity and national identity but that of whiteness itself and how hegemonic
constructions of whiteness are reshaped through migration. Intersectionality offers a real opportunity to examine the intersectional politics of border regimes and migration processes. Second, intersectionality challenges us to rethink essentialist group categories. This requires new methodological approaches for data collection in both quantitative and qualitative research (Bassel and Emejulu 2017; Celis and Mügge 2017). Tackling these challenges will be no easy task.

Intersectionality offers an indispensable normative theory and a range of methodologies for studying complex inequalities and group representation. Political representation at the grassroots and in electoral politics is both determined by and a consequence of a group’s positioning along particular axes of difference. Intersectionality is a lens through which to explore the interlocking structures of race, class, gender, sexuality and legal status that determine political inclusion and exclusion. This approach is particularly useful for migration and citizenship scholars trying to grasp the dynamic processes of political representation of who is being heard and seen in politics and why.

References


Please direct inquiries about “Who is Seen and Heard in Politics?” to Liza Mügge (*l.m.mugge@uva.nl*) and Akwugo Emejulu (*a.emejulu@warwick.ac.uk*).
In my forthcoming book, *Race, Ethnicity and the Participation Gap: Understanding Australia’s Political Complexion* (University of Toronto Press), I begin with the normative argument that political institutions in settler and culturally diverse societies such as Australia, Canada and the United States ought to mirror their culturally diverse populations. However, compared to Canada and the United States, Australia has very low rates of immigrant and ethnic minority political representation in the Commonwealth Parliament, particularly in the House of Representatives, which is essentially an “all-White” assembly. One has to ask the question whether an “all-White” assembly can seriously claim to be truly representative when those it represents are so much more ethnically diverse than the assembly representing them (Phillips 1995: 6). The overall existence of racial hierarchies within formal political institutions represents an inconsistency with the democratic ideals of representation and accountability in pluralist societies.

“The research in my book draws on findings from Canada and the United States on political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities and adds for the first time, a detailed empirical study of Australia, which to date is under-researched in comparative scholarship on the political participation and representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Historically speaking, as a member of the Commonwealth with similar multicultural policies to Canada, Australia should be on par with Canada, particularly in terms of the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities regularly elected to parliament, relative to their numbers in the general population. However, this is not the case. Indeed, Australia lags behind other settler countries, not only in terms of the actual numbers of immigrant and ethnic minority representatives in national-level politics, but also in terms of opportunities for political representation. In fact, my research shows that the political representation gaps in Australia are significant when compared to Canada and the United States, altogether revealing a democratic deficit. As a country with a similar immigrant history to other settler countries—particularly in terms of Asian migration, which is the fastest growing pan-ethnic group in all three-settler countries—the book examines when and why Australia took a different path to other settler countries. In addressing these questions,
the book also examines the impact of this alternative path on the political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

My research is grounded in the theoretical framework of descriptive and substantive representation. Pivotal to normative studies of representation is the distinction between descriptive and substantive representation in national parliaments (Mansbridge 1999, 2011; Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1967; Williams 1998). The normative argument for descriptive representation comes from the idea that political institutions should reflect the social composition of the populations they serve. In other words, legislatures in Western democracies should aim as close as possible to mirror the social characteristics of their electorates. Substantive representation, however, demands that the policy preferences of the electorate be translated into legislative behavior.

“the political representation gaps in Australia are significant when compared to Canada and the United States, altogether revealing a democratic deficit”

The two concepts of descriptive and substantive representation are often intertwined. For example, Phillips (1995) has argued for the importance of a “politics of presence” where the parliamentary presence of minority groups such as “non-white” immigrants and ethnic minorities enhances the quality of democracy. The “politics of presence” argument suggests that there is a link between descriptive and substantive representation. This is because elected minorities are best equipped to deal with the issues affecting minority groups.

Other researchers internationally have similarly demonstrated the importance of minority group presence in national parliaments for democracy. For example, a significant amount of research has shown how the election of members from traditionally under-represented groups has a positive impact on policy making and overall feelings of trust in the political system (Banducci et al. 2004; Bratton 2006; Crisp et al. 2016; Juenke and Preuhs 2012; King and Marian 2012; Minta 2009; Pande 2003; Saalfeld and Bischof 2012; Saalfeld et al. 2011).

By contrast, the lack of representation can increase feelings of alienation among minority groups (Jones-Correa 1998; Pantoja and Segura 2003).

In recent decades, scholarly debate has paid increasing attention to the political representation of “visible minority” and/or “non-white” immigrant and ethnic minority groups in politics (Bilodeau 2016; Bird 2016; Bird et al. 2011; Black 2016; Jones-Correa 2016; 2009; Morales et al. 2018; Morales and Pilati 2011; Morales 2009; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Saggar 2016; Van Heelsum et al. 2016). Much of the literature stems from the observation that “non-white” immigrants are under-represented in formal political institutions despite having a long presence in the country. In ethnically diverse settler societies such as Australia, Canada and the United States, integration is unlikely...
to succeed without adequate representation of “non-white” immigrants and ethnic minorities and their diverse interests. As Jones-Correa (1998: 35) observes, immigrants’ political marginalization undermines the process of democratic representation and accountability and perpetuates the view of immigrants and their descendants as outsiders. Their feelings of exclusion may have an impact on their successful social and economic integration. This is because their lack of presence in the political system may result in the policy process not addressing their needs. Therefore, achieving political representation has important implications for the overall quality of democracy, and indeed is an expected outcome of pluralist models of democracy.

The book uses a multi-level exploratory approach, which recognizes the importance of historical and institutional context, individual and group characteristics, as well as behavioral and attitudinal factors in explaining political participation and representation. Using evidence from historical records, census data, cross-national surveys, and interviews with political elites, the research builds a narrative to explore why Australia’s national parliament mainly consists of those from British and Southern European origins, even though more than 17 percent of Australia’s population come from non-British and/or European origins.

A major task of the book is to find out about the party-political barriers that limit opportunities for immigrant and ethnic minorities to enter mainstream politics. This was achieved through qualitative interviews, which were conducted with members of parliament (MPs). The aim of the qualitative interviews was to find out from MPs what they felt were some of the main party-political barriers to political representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Australia. To complement the qualitative interviews, survey research was used to investigate the political attitudes and behaviors of the Australian population more broadly and sub-groups of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The questions analyzed were modelled on similar questions used in the Canadian Election Study, the American National Election Study and the National Survey of Asian Americans (NAAS) to draw meaningful cross-national comparisons.

The findings in the book showed that while there are a number of historical, electoral and party-political barriers, the strongest determinant of the political under-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities is an underlying low-level of pervasive discrimination which blocks the entry of non-white immigrants and ethnic minorities into national-level politics. This type of discrimination rarely surfaces in the form of race riots or community violence. However, it is well understood in public debates and media commentary
and is enough to raise doubt in the minds of party representatives involved in candidate selection and recruitment.

Overall, the existence of structural and social inequalities, related to widespread discrimination facilitates the maintenance of racial and ethnic hierarchies, as well as various forms of social and political closure. The findings raise many questions for reflection in terms of the overall representativeness, responsiveness and accountability of democratic institutions in immigrant societies such as Australia, and more broadly Canada and the United States. The participation gap in each country, especially in Australia, undermines the future of representative democracy at a time when confidence in national institutions in established democracies is declining. As such, the issue of immigrant and ethnic minority representation requires significant attention in the field of comparative politics, as well as in future legislation and policy-making.

References


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Research Institute Profile
The Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT)

“The goal of GLOBALCIT is to provide this knowledge to research and policy communities through open access databases, analyses, indicators, and online debates”

Through their laws on citizenship and electoral rights, states determine who belongs to the people in whose name political and governmental power is organized and exercised and for whom they assume responsibility vis-à-vis other states. Citizenship is thus a fundamental feature of the international state system and is frequently contested in domestic and international politics. GLOBALCIT is a research program and online observatory committed to fact-based and non-partisan analysis of citizenship laws and policies around the globe.

Citizenship laws are often regarded as core feature of state sovereignty. However, international migration flows, supranational regional integration and the spread of governance norms in contexts of globalization have meant that citizenship policies of states are no longer purely domestic affairs. States increasingly emulate other states and impact on other states when determining who their citizens are and which rights they will enjoy. Comparative research on citizenship must therefore go beyond isolated case studies and build on global knowledge of state policies and practices. The goal of GLOBALCIT is to provide this knowledge to research and policy communities through open access databases, analyses, indicators, and online debates.

GLOBALCIT brings together the expertise of the European University Institute’s Global Governance Programme (GGP), the University of Edinburgh and the Maastricht Center for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE). These partners with their permanent research teams form the core of GLOBALCIT. They are represented by the three co-directors of the observatory, Rainer Bauböck, Jo Shaw and Maarten Vink. GLOBALCIT is coordinated by the EUI Research Fellow Jelena Džankić.
Our research relies on a large international network of country experts who write country reports, collect legal documents and provide input for our comparative databases. Currently our network includes 172 country experts, as well as 137 other authors, who have contributed to our citizenship blog and forum debates or collaborated on our research activities.

Institutionally, in January 2017, GLOBALCIT has become a research area within the Global Governance Programme (GGP) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. This institutional integration marked the transition away from EUDO Citizenship Observatory, our predecessor. EUDO Citizenship was set up nearly a decade ago with an initial focus on citizenship laws in the European Union Member States. It has gradually expanded its thematic and geographic scope. The new name reflects our transition towards worldwide coverage of citizenship and electoral rights.

The EUDO Citizenship emerged from the 2004–2006 NATAC project funded by the EU 6th Framework Programme and directed by Rainer Bauböck. NATAC developed a systematic methodology for comparing citizenship laws in the EU-15 states and resulted in 2 influential volumes with country reports and comparative analyses. Out of this work then grew a separate volume on the 2004 accession states.

Traditional dissemination of research results through books and articles has not always provided the outcomes needed due to higher volatility of citizenship policies not to mention our plans for continuous expansion. When Rainer Bauböck moved to the EUI in 2007, there was an opportunity to continue and expand the comparative research by switching from print to online publication. In 2008, the EUDO Citizenship Observatory was established as one of four European Union Democracy Observatories, whose goal was to assess democratic practices and institutions within the EU. In its initial years, EUDO Citizenship received funding from the EU Commission for its EUCITAC project that laid the foundations for what has since become the most comprehensive comparative database on modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship globally.

In conjunction with ‘The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia’ (CITSEE) project, an ERC-funded initiative at the University of Edinburgh, directed by Jo Shaw, we have expanded our geographic scope to include developments in citizenship legislation in the Southern and Eastern European neighborhood.
Having covered 41 European states by 2013, the Observatory received further funding from the European Commission for the ‘Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration’ (ACIT) project. Under this project, we developed for the first time a series of quantitative indicators comparing how European states regulate the acquisition of citizenship and the impact of citizenship on the socio-economic and political participation of immigrants. The CITLAW indicators emerging from this project are now the most refined indicators on acquisition and loss of citizenship in terms of methodology and the information used for coding. We currently provide data for 2011 and 2016 for 42 European states and will publish global indicators on ius sanguinis and ius soli acquisition in early 2018.

“Unlike other databases on voting rights, we cover not only national elections, but also local, regional and supranational ones”

In the following years, we worked on the ‘Franchise and Electoral Participation of Third Country Citizens Residing in the European Union and of European Citizens Residing in Third Countries’ (FRACIT) project, commissioned by the European Parliament, which permitted thematic expansion towards coverage of access to electoral rights. These constitute the core rights attaching to citizenship in democratic societies. Seeking to provide rigorous comparative tools for analyzing access to the franchise, the Observatory developed the qualitative Conditions for Electoral Rights database, and the quantitative ELECLAW indicators on access to the franchise. Unlike other databases on voting rights, we cover not only national elections, but also local, regional and supranational ones, and we provide information on electoral rights not only for resident citizens, but also for non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents. With our geographic expansion since 2015, our electoral rights databases and indicators now include also North and South American states and Oceania.

Aside from winning research grants from the European Commission and the European Parliament, we have been supported since 2009 by the British Academy. Alongside the three permanent institutional partners EUI, Maastricht and Edinburgh University, we have had strong collaborations with partners such as the University College Dublin, the Migration Policy Group, Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, UNHCR, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, European Citizen Action Service and Malmö University. GLOBALCIT has also benefited significantly from two European Commission funded fellowships which have allowed the consortium member Olivier Vonk to expand our databases on modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship, first, to the Americas and, more recently, to Asia. In our coverage of the African states we have benefited greatly from the comparative work done by Bronwen Manby.
Our main outlet is the new GLOBALCIT website, featuring databases, analyses, indicators, debates, blogs and news on citizenship status and electoral rights. It contains over 300 publications including country reports on citizenship and electoral laws and their implementation, comparative analyses of citizenship-related issues in different areas of the world, forum debates on controversial topics and working papers. All our databases are open access and our user-friendly interactive tools enable comparing data across countries and over time. Our webpages are visited by an average of 4,000 people each month and by now have seen over 300,000 new users with 1.2 million unique page views since the launch of EUDO Citizenship in 2009.

In addition to scholarly publications, we engage in communicating our research through academic dissemination platforms such as Academia.edu and Research Gate, as well as Facebook (@globalcitEUI) and Twitter (@_GlobalCIT). At the EUI, which hosts our Observatory, we frequently organize events open to the Institute’s academic community.

In 2015, our key event was the EUDO Annual Conference on ‘Spreading Citizenship: Dynamic of Norm Diffusion in Europe and the Americas’, which gathered over 70 scholars from around the world to engage in academic conversations of how the rules of inclusion and exclusion change across countries and over time. In 2016, we organized three GLOBALCIT dialogues with distinguished scholars. Peter Spiro, Patti Lenard and Derek Hutcheson shared their thoughts on dual citizenship, citizenship deprivation, and electoral rights respectively. This year, we have built on these formats of academic exchange and explored new avenues for disseminating our work. In 2017, together with the EUI Cinema Club, we organised the screening of the movie “The Citizen” (Az Allampogar), whose plot revolves around the quest of an African refugee for Hungarian citizenship, followed by the discussion with the director and lead actress of the movie. Our one-day international conference, “Non-universal franchise? Eligibility and access to voting rights in transnational contexts,” explored contemporary challenges arising in the relationships between citizenship, electoral rights and democratic legitimacy; while our major conference of the year “Varieties of Citizenship in a Globalised World” explored topics such as patterns of variation and clustering among countries with regard to their citizenship regimes; global trends in citizenship reform and diffusion processes of citizenship policies; and opportunities and challenges that new emerging technologies create to existing frameworks of citizenship. Under the umbrella of this conference, Jo Shaw delivered a keynote speech on “The citizenship consequences of the Brexit.”

In the future, GLOBALCIT will continue to address the need to understand the plethora of citizenship laws and policies in a globalized world. Expanding further to full
global coverage, we will seek to provide reliable and comparative data on the content, causes and consequences of the laws that govern the acquisition and loss of citizenship and the franchise. The thematic studies, projects and international collaborations that we have planned for the coming years will enable scholars, policy-makers, and the general public to critically analyze how citizenship connects people across international borders.

Please direct inquiries about the GLOBALCIT Research Institute Profile to Jelena Dzankic (jelena.dzankic@eui.eu), Rainer Bauböck (rainer.baubock@eui.eu), Jo Shaw (jo.shaw@ed.ac.uk) and/or Maarten Vink (m.vink@maastrichtuniversity.nl).
Mentoring Matters
IMISCOE PhD Network

By Cathrine Talleraas
PhD Representative,
IMISCOE PhD Network

The IMISCOE PhD Network is the PhD organization of the IMISCOE Network. “IMISCOE” is the abbreviation for “International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion,” and it is Europe’s largest network of scholars in the area of migration and integration. IMISCOE involves institutes and scholars from all over Europe, and focuses on comparative research, publications, the organization of events, PhD training and awards and communication.

“IMISCOE… is Europe’s largest network of scholars in the area of migration and integration”

As part of the PhD training activities, the IMISCOE PhD Network aims to strengthen research and network opportunities for doctoral researchers in the field of migration. The Network has several dedicated working groups, each with active members who plan and carry out activities relevant for PhD migration scholars. There are currently more than 20 actively engaged PhDs in the Network and there are approximately 950 PhD students registered in IMISCOE’s Database.

The PhD Representative coordinates the work carried out by the working groups, and functions as the contact point between the PhD Network and the IMISCOE Network. The current PhD Representative is Cathrine Talleraas. While she works fulltime on her PhD on Transnational Mobility and the Welfare State, she spends about half a day every week to coordinate the Network. Although it can be time-consuming to coordinate the Network’s activities across borders and over time, the work of the PhD Representative is rewarding at the same time. First of all it’s nice because the group of people working in the PhD Network is energetic, interesting and engaged. Also, the PhD Representative gets to travel to conferences and attend the IMISCOE Board of Directors meetings, which is highly interesting and stimulating. It is also a rewarding task to organise activities that other PhDs can gain from, to help them learn new skills, get feedback, and expand their networks and ambitions. The former PhD representative, Carmen C. Draghici, wrote a blog-post about her time as a representative. She underscored the many benefits from her involvement in the Network, which included the ability to “develop or acquire valuable skills—very useful for an academic career.”
The Working Groups

There are four working groups in the PhD Network. These are the Workshop Committee, the Blog Team, the Teaching Reflections Team, and the Nexus Team. Each working group has a coordinator and several actively engaged members. In addition to the working groups, there’s a team responsible for social media platforms, and an advisory team made up of former members. Together, the working groups, the teams, and the representative make up the PhD Soundboard—which functions as the board of the IMISCOE PhD Network.

Workshop Committee

The aim of the workshop committee is to provide helpful advice, insight and inspiration for PhDs in the field of international migration, integration and social cohesion. Advice and insights from the IMISCOE workshops may prove useful in PhDs projects, and beyond. Each year, at the IMISCOE Annual conference, there are two workshops specifically designed for PhD students. Regarding the upcoming conference in Barcelona, in July 2018, the workshop committee is actively engaged with the planning of the content of the workshop programmes. The current members in the Workshop Committee include: Elisa Palma Alves, Sandra Muller, Gabriela Petre, Eva Zschirnt.

Blog Team – PhD Insights

The IMISCOE PhD blog forms a platform to share insights from the field of migration research, and is completely run and written by PhD students from the Network. The content varies from interviews with scholars, reports on the latest conferences and meetings and theoretical contributions from our members. If you are up for an interesting read, you can check out some of the Network members’ blog posts and reflections on their PhD activities during the conference in Rotterdam in June. The current members in the Blog Team are: Ilona van Breugel, Sue Coccaro, Jolien Klok, Yvonne Siemann, Stephan Simon, Ugur Yildiz.

Teaching Reflections Team

Several PhDs are or will be engaged in teaching activities, although they have little opportunity to reflect on this part of their academic lives. This is particularly in interdisciplinary or international contexts. The Teaching Reflections group is therefore established to think about ways PhDs can exchange, learn, inspire and motivate each other to do better teaching in the future. The group focuses particularly on, but is not restricted to, teaching that deals with migration and integration issues. The group currently consists of: Dorina Dedgjoni, Sherene Ozyurek, Raktim Ray, Amanda da Silva.
Nexus Team - Networking inside IMISCOE

The Nexus Team aims at connecting all PhD students who work on the broader themes of migration, beyond the annual IMISCOE conference. The Nexus Teams wants PhDs to collectively support each other, exchange our experiences and widen our networks on migration studies. One of the activities the team works on is what is called “The Intergeneration Feedback” (IF). During the annual IMISCOE conference, the IF bridges PhD students with experienced scholars according to their common interests. During the session, they receive constructive critique in an interdisciplinary and international context. The current members of the Nexus Team include: Byeongsun Ahn, Carmen Draghici, Eddy Bruno Esien, Giulia Mezzetti, Carolin Schütze.

Social Media

The PhD Network has an active Facebook group and a fairly new Twitter account. We welcome all interested PhDs in becoming members of the Facebook group, and of course, to follow us on Twitter. We post news that is relevant to IMISCOE, migration research and PhD life in general. Those that currently run the Network’s social media platforms are: Sue Coccaro and Samuel Schimd.

The history of the PhD Network

In order to understand what the PhD Network is all about, it’s useful to have an insight into how the Network came to be. It all started when IMISCOE was landed in Rotterdam in 2013, and when the official launch was presented at Hotel New York in Rotterdam, some PhDs asked themselves: why isn’t there a PhD network? This question resulted in a small workshop in the IMISCOE conference in Madrid in 2014. Many scholars attended and the initial urgency of creating a PhD Network was widely shared. It evolved into new proposals in Florence, and finally a launch of the PhD Network at the Geneva conference in 2015.

The PhDs who were involved in this process shared the experience that they worked on their own, but that they did not work isolated from each other. PhD scholars share professional, ethical and personal concerns about research, teaching, and future careers. Therefore, collaboration within the broad, diverse and lively PhD community in IMISCOE had a huge potential. From the start, the creation of a PhD Network was largely stimulated by senior members of the IMISCOE network while PhD scholars were actively engaged in the creation process. The seniors made space for the juniors to create and develop an organization that they, as a PhD community, thought would be useful for future doctoral researchers in the field of migration.

The current activities of the PhD Network stem from that initial urge of a few PhDs at Hotel New York, in Rotterdam 2013. Hotel New York, which originally was the point of
departure for thousands of migrants going from Europe to the United States, thus became the point of departure for the PhD Network—the community for PhDs in the field of migration.

Hotel New York, Rotterdam. © Rene Mensen/flickr.com

“There is always room for more engaged members to help with the further development of the Network”

Do you want to get engaged in the PhD Network?

As a PhD member of IMISCOE, or as a PhD registered in the IMISCOE PhD Database, you receive PhD news and the bi-annual newsletters. Information on future and past events are included in the newsletters. You can also take up an active role in the PhD Network, and become a member of the Soundboard. There is always room for more engaged members to help with the further development of the Network. The annual uptake of new active members follows the IMISCOE Annual Conference. If you want to get engaged in the PhD Network, send an email to the PhD Representative or get in touch during our events or at the IMISCOE conferences.

Contact us!
Email: phdnetwork@imiscoe.org
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/IMISCOEphdNETWORK/?fref=ts
Blog: https://imiscoephdblog.wordpress.com/
Twitter: @IMISCOEphd

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Teachers’ Corner
Teaching migration and citizenship studies – a comparative analysis of 100 interdisciplinary syllabi

Migration and citizenship issues are at the forefront of public debates, the media discourse and public policies in all corners of the world. Refugees are fleeing and are received; immigrant men and women are selected, arrive, integrate, become citizens, are ostracized as irregular migrants and remain transnationally active; emigrants leave, remit and return; and a host of public policies are being debated and designed to govern human mobility and citizenship and to regulate refugees and migrants’ access to political representation, employment, healthcare, education, and other services.

“in 2013, the American Political Science Association’s organized section on Migration & Citizenship established a syllabus bank”

From the initial 44 syllabi, by fall 2017, the collection had grown to 97 teaching resources, reflecting a diverse set of courses being taught at the graduate and undergraduate level. While the open-access syllabus bank posts syllabi of non-section members in any discipline, at the time of writing political scientists contributed the majority of collected resources.

In this essay, we provide a comparative analysis of the close to 100 syllabi in the database that aims at promoting further scholarly exchanges and highlighting where we see gaps and missing elements. We used a standardized coding methodology that often relied on keywords but that also provided space for qualitative aspects of the resources. The syllabi in the collection have been submitted by instructors who received the section’s calls or who found the syllabus bank online and decided to submit their course plan. While this is not a random sample of syllabi that allows us to make generalizations for all migration-related courses, we believe that the analysis of 100 current syllabi provides a snapshot of key issues in today’s teaching landscape and enables instructors to learn from specific course designs, lesson plans and assignments.

Daniel Naujoks, Columbia University | The New School

Kelsey Norman, Postdoctoral Fellow, Sié Chéou-Kang Center
Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
In the remainder of this essay, we provide a short description of the sample we analyzed and proceed then to our analysis of issues that might be particularly relevant for teaching migration and citizenship studies. This includes whether syllabi are explicitly interdisciplinary and if they highlight the securitization of migration, gender, migrants' human rights, or issues on ethnic or religious identity. In addition, we also explore select modalities of assignments, particularly on the incorporation of current news, as well as the adoption of technology.

The selection of these issues is based on a three-pronged strategy that combined empirical, applicability and normative elements. First, preliminary coding of a random subsample revealed categories as key elements in a range of syllabi. Second, the categories analyzed across all syllabi needed to be issues that are transversally applicable to a range of migration and citizenship questions. Lastly, we applied normative considerations on why certain aspects matter for discussing migration and citizenship. In each section, we briefly outline the relevance of the chosen categories for the field as a whole. Needless to say that this is not an exhaustive list of relevant aspects of migration and citizenship syllabi. Despite our best efforts, we recognize that the selection reflects our own preferences.

The migration and citizenship syllabus bank

The APSA migration and citizenship bank contains 97 syllabi for courses that were taught between 2008 and 2017. The average and median year was 2014 and a third of the course plans (32%) were from 2015 and later. There was a fairly equal gender balance in terms of instruction, with 51% of syllabi developed and taught by female instructors and 49% by male instructors. The bulk of courses were taught at the undergraduate level (65%), while a fifth of the sample represent graduate courses (21%) and 5% are open to both, graduate and undergraduate students. In terms of discipline, 63% of syllabi are from political science, 15% are from sociology, 8% are from law, 3% are from international affairs/public policy, and 11% are from other disciplines, including history and philosophy. As to geographic origin, 80% of syllabi were taught at US universities, 7% in Canada, 7% in Europe, 5% in Asia, 1% in Oceania, and none in Latin America or Africa. Two courses were held online and one as a hybrid class.

The syllabi in the bank are grouped according to their main focus. As such, 72% are on migration, 20% on citizenship and ethics of migration, and 4% each, on refugees and other issues.
focused exclusively on migrants, 5% focused exclusively on refugees or forced migration, while 57% focused on both groups, even though in many cases the focus on refugees was not revealed in course name. 5% did not focus on either. Whereas the majority of syllabi addressed both categories, the balance within syllabi was heavily tilted toward immigrants and migrants, usually with only one week addressing refugees and forced displacement. While overall migration is larger in scale than refugee flows and to some extent encompasses issues pertaining to those forcibly displaced—as is also recognized by the literature on mixed migration—the political and media focus on refugees, the specific legal and moral arguments, and students’ interest in the topic may call for an increase in courses that focus specifically on refugees and forced displacement.

Figure 1: Syllabi by discipline

An interdisciplinary approach promotes a holistic understanding of mobility

While migration research has not yet fully developed as a social science in its own right (Brettell and Hollifield 2015), we believe that insights from different disciplines are necessary to understand the complex realities of migration and citizenship. Thus, courses might rely on concepts and readings from sociology, history, economics, demography, human geography, anthropology, political science, public administration, gender studies, media studies, social psychology, philosophy, and law, to name only the most prominent disciplines. To assess the extent to which courses are explicitly inter- or multidisciplinary, we coded whether a course self-categorizes as such in the course description or enumerates several disciplines that it draws on. This means that courses that are de facto interdisciplinary by using texts from multiple disciplines without highlighting this in the description are not coded as such. Based on this methodology, we found that less than a quarter of
the courses (23%) adopted an explicit interdisciplinary approach, while the remaining three quarters (77%) did not.

Securitization matters to understand policies on human mobility

What is the relationship between migration and security, and when is migration a securitized issue? In the current US and global political climate, these are questions of the utmost importance. For 33% of syllabi in our sample, the issue of security was either a major part of the overall course or was the topic for at least one week of instruction. Some syllabi asked whether migration represented a threat to national security, while others focused on the issues of borders or internal policing. Many US-focused syllabi critically examined the border between the US and Mexico, while others focused on the potential security threat posed by the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. One syllabus asked students to consider what approaches exist to “de-securitize” forced migration topics, as well as what changes when we consider “human security.” Since only about one third of the syllabi included security as a major topic, this is one area that instructors might consider further in future classes.

Teaching migration should emphasize the role of gender – though it rarely does

Migration is a highly gendered process. Gender affects who migrates and the effects, risks and opportunities for men, women and their respective gender roles. For this reason it is paramount to highlight gender as a key lens to assess migrant experiences, policy discussions, laws, migrant-specific needs and representations. In our analysis, we counted syllabi as having a gender-focus when they had a specific session on migration & gender or if they contained readings in at least three sessions that had an explicit gender focus, using the search terms gender, women, male, sex, and feminist. Surprisingly, less than a quarter of the sample (23%) meets the gender criterion. This includes two courses that are specifically dedicated to migration and gender. When divided by discipline, political science courses are least likely to include a gender focus (15%), followed by sociology (21%) and law classes (38%). While all courses taught at public policy and international affairs departments had a gender focus, there were only three such classes, taught by two instructors. With 28%, graduate courses had a slightly higher share of syllabi with a gender focus, compared to 19% among undergraduate classes.
While a third of all female instructors included a gender focus (33%), this was only the case for 13% of male instructors. In recent years, scholarship on migration has made progress to address the invisibility of women and gender in international migration scholarship (Pessar and Mahler 2003; Donato and Gabaccia 2015). Given the considerable importance of understanding the gendered dimensions of migration, our analysis suggests that course instructors take note of these advances and help students to address these questions more explicitly.

**Migrant rights can be addressed through individual or group rights**

The “rights paradox” facing migrants and refugees was identified most prominently by Hannah Arendt. If human existence is defined by political belonging, and the assurance of rights exists only within this construct, to whom can the non-citizen appeal for protection of rights? This question posed more than fifty years ago is still highly applicable today, and many syllabi in our sample address this issue. A focus on migrants as rights-bearers also emphasizes their agency, the normative dimension of migration, and shifts the discussion away from victimizations.

“We found that just over half (57%) the syllabi explicitly addressed migrants’ rights”

We found that just over half (57%) the syllabi explicitly addressed migrants’ rights. This needed to be either a substantial focus of the course overall, or had at least one week devoted to the issue. Some syllabi assessed the range of rights granted to migrants or refugees: access to legal status, employment, social services, or protection against deportation. Some instead focused on group rights, such as cultural and religious rights or anti-discrimination measures. Others looked internationally, examining rights granted under the global refugee regime, or looked at the relationship between human rights and migrant rights from a gendered perspective. One syllabus examined the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the rights of trafficked persons.
Understanding ethnic identity

Though migrants and refugees leave their home countries, they may retain their national identification, assimilate into the culture of their host state, or adopt a transnational or diasporic identity. Just over one third (37%) of syllabi addressed issues of identity, meaning that the syllabus explicitly mentions ethnic, racial or religious identity in the course description, the learning outcomes, or it was a focus of a session. References to national identity, in the sense of the identity of a particular nation-state, were not considered. Of those syllabi including a discussion of identity, prominent topics included: cultural belonging, the politics of identity, and identification with a particular ethnic group, particularly in the US context. Other topics mentioned less frequently were: ethnic competition theory, gendered ethnicity, transnational identities, and the religious identities of migrants and refugees.

Creating links to current affairs: integrating news and media

There are few current topics that are as present in today’s print and online media as migration and citizenship (Bleich, Bloemraad, and de Graauw 2015). The visibility of these issues highlights the relevance to students and makes it easy for course instructors to show that the course contents are applicable to real world phenomena that students are confronted with on a daily basis. We coded three levels of incorporating current media. Almost half of the courses did not have any explicit mention of news and media (48%). A fifth (20%) encourage students to follow the news but do not contain a special assignment or weekly platform to discuss news items. Finally, a third of the sample (32%) – including one course specifically dedicated to migration and the media – contain a specific assignment or weekly news discussion.

“Almost half of the courses did not have any explicit mention of news and media (48%). A fifth (20%) encourage students to follow the news but do not contain a special assignment or weekly platform to discuss news items”

Specific assignments range from reserving the last ten minutes of each class for discussions on current news that can be suggested by students or the instructor, requiring students to follow specific immigration blogs, short student presentations on linking news to weekly readings, to group research that involves media analysis. In one course, students select contemporary media pieces (print, visual, audio) and then write a media journal entry about the pieces in response to a specific question.
Few courses make use of technology

Technology provides opportunities for instructors to engage students and to enhance learning outcomes in different ways. As only 12% of syllabi include a technology element this area can be taken further advantage of, especially given the many options for use of technology in the classroom today. Those syllabi that already include a technology component do so in numerous and varied ways. One syllabus asks students to conduct a data analysis using publically available data to assess a specific stock and flow of migrants, the effect of their presence in host countries, and the effect of their departure on sending communities, and to practice presenting these data to support an argument. But not all uses of technology involve quantitative analysis. Several syllabi ask students to volunteer to post to a class blog. Students are encouraged (but not necessarily required) to post their thoughts in text or to post any links to current events or other online resources related to the topics covered in the course. One syllabus incorporates podcasts as required "readings," and yet another course encourages students to use an app to upload short videos with key take-away points after each class that the app automatically aggregates into a joint class-video.

**Figure 2: Share of syllabi with specific thematic elements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>No focus</th>
<th>Only encouraged to follow news</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdisciplinary</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants' rights</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current news</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusions: Towards a comprehensive teaching agenda**

This brief analysis represents a first attempt to take stock of the teaching being done in the field of migration and citizenship. The collection of almost 100 syllabi is a useful resource for novice and seasoned instructors alike to formulate ideas for the design of entire courses, specific sessions, or to compare assignments and key readings. To further improve its usefulness the analysis suggests that the syllabus bank should increase by size and breadth. In particular, it would be advantageous to include further syllabi from other disciplines outside of political science, including sociology, anthropology, human geography, and economics. This is also true for topics such as diaspora studies and emigration.
that are thus far underrepresented. This might also promote the interdisciplinary character of courses. At current, the syllabus bank is also heavily skewed toward US institutions, so recruiting further syllabi from other geographic regions would help us better understand how instructors are approaching migration and citizenship globally.

The analysis of the collected syllabi reveals that future syllabi can do more to include a focus on gender, adopt an explicit interdisciplinary approach, highlight migrants' rights, the meanings of ethnic identities, and securitization issues, as well as incorporate current news in a meaningful manner— all of which seems to be of particular relevance for a comprehensive understanding of human mobility and citizenship.

Lastly, there is room for further creativity in terms of assignments and student engagement beyond the classroom. One notable assignment asked students to give "TED Talks" on a migration topic of their choosing. Another syllabus featured an optional community service learning component, and a third asked students to submit two short papers describing their "participation beyond the course material outside of class and its readings—that is, by attending campus lectures, presentations, conferences, films, or other activities." Finally, one syllabus required students to hold a "migration and citizenship mini-conference" as part of the coursework. Given the myriad ways that migration and citizenship-related topics intimately affect our campuses and communities, there is ample opportunity to think about facilitating student engagement with these themes in interesting and new ways.

APSA Migration and Citizenship Syllabus bank: https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/syllabus-bank/

References


Please direct inquiries about this Teachers’ Corner article to Daniel Naujoks (daniel.naujoks@columbia.edu) and Kelsey Norman (kpnorman@gmail.com).
Section News
Section Awards 2017

Best Book

Co-Winners:


Selection Committee:

Michael Jones-Correa (University of Pennsylvania), Christine Thurlow Brenner (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Erin Aeran Chung (Johns Hopkins University)

Committee’s Commentary:

(de Graauw)

“*Making Immigrant Rights Real* explores how domestic policy coalitions at the local level can implement pro-immigrant policies. The book focuses on San Francisco—where the APSA was so appropriately held this year—and in particular in the role of non-profit organizations in the passage of three distinct programs: language access, minimum wage increases and the provision of municipal ID cards. The language rights chapter argues that while non-profits organizations (NPOs) are legally constrained from contributing directly to political campaigns, from mobilizing voters, or from lobbying legislators, they can engage in a kind of administrative advocacy, leveraging their specialized expertise and the access they already have to elected officials and city agencies to press for changes in the implementation of federal, state and local laws. The workplace rights chapter highlights the tradeoffs in the advocacy coalitions NPOs enter into with labor unions which, while these may share many of the ideological leanings of NPOs, may have a very different set of interests and preferred strategies, and because of their greater resources and mobilizing capacity giving them greater clout in electoral politics, have the ability to impose these preferences on their coalition partners. The chapter argues that despite their limited ability to shape electoral or even legislative outcomes, NPOs’ relative advantage lies in shaping the longer-term implementation of legislative and administrative policies. Finally Els uses her third case study of the passage and implementation of municipal IDs in San Francisco to argue that NPOs succeed best
when they are able to tailor the framing of an issue to appeal to the widest audience and to withstand legal and other challenges. This book makes a major contribution to the scholarship on immigrant incorporation, local politics, civil society, and organizations. De Graauw's meticulous examination of immigrant-serving nonprofits in San Francisco offers rich comparative insights into how immigrant policies and rights are negotiated and implemented at the local level that can be applied to cases well beyond the United States. It is an exemplary study of immigration politics at the meso-level."

(Garip)

“In On the Move, Garip asks a deceptively simple question: who migrates and why? There is a proliferation of theories on why people migrate. Each has been used as a universal explanation for migration—neoclassical migration theory, for instance, or migration decisions using family as the unit of analysis. Garip's contribution is to suggest that distinct migration theories explain the decisions people make in particular contexts at particular times. Using Mexican Migration Project data from 1982-2013, and an additional in-depth interviews with 139 Mexican migrants, Filiz Garip makes the case that there is no single migration theory that explains the decisions people make to immigrate. Instead she argues that the four waves of migration from Mexico to the United States over the last 50 years—male-dominated rural migration in the 1960s and 70s; young men from more well-off families in the 1980s, the migration of women joining their spouses in the 1980s and 90s; and a migration of more educated, urban migrants in the late 1990s and early 2000s—each had their own reasons for migrating, and each illustrate a different migration theory: circular migration, migration responding to economic dislocation; family migration; and urban migration in response to NAFTA. This is a beautifully written, theoretically rich, and methodologically sophisticated book that offers a sweeping study of Mexican migration to the United States since 1965, demonstrating the wide variety of migration patterns and identifying the mechanisms that give rise to variation across cases. The book's elegant simplicity is a testimony to Garip's ability to make sense of complexity. It also provides a much-needed update to Douglas Massey's seminal work on theories of migration. It will undoubtedly be required reading for students of migration.”

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Best Dissertation

Winner:


Selection Committee:

Kathleen Arnold (DePaul University), Ron Hayduk (San Francisco State University), Anthony M. Messina (Trinity College)

Committee’s Commentary:

“Shin’s contribution to the existing literature is at least three-fold: expanding the data-set for Europe and conducting original research to that end; expanding the literature on autocracies using existing data sets and measures; and testing democracies on firm influence as well as analyzing the effects of natural resources and Dutch Disease on both autocracies and democracies. In particular, what is very interesting about this research is his claim that trade openness doesn’t always have the effect that researchers predict. Related to this line of inquiry, while most researchers evaluate anti-immigrant sentiments in terms of conservatism in parties or in civil society groups, Shin has found that firms exert quite a lot of influence apart from these factors. With regard to firm influence, Shin states on page 89 that, “Immigration policy is for sale and is often sold to the highest political bidder in these countries.” As a whole (to quote one of the committee members), the dissertation is “an ambitious, big picture project.” His central argument—that ‘natural resource wealth has differential effects on immigration policy under different political institutions’—is thought-provoking and unambiguously original. If judged exclusively on the measures of ambition, originality, and methodological sophistication Shin’s dissertation, in my view, deserves the prize hands down.”

Best Article

Winner:


https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Selection Committee:

Irene Bloemraad (University of California, Berkeley), Sara Wallace Goodman (University of California, Irvine), Jay McCann (Purdue University)

Committee’s commentary:

“In this article, Saskia Bonjour closely examines decades of debate over family migration policy in Germany, analyzing the relative importance and progressive orientation of the courts and the judicial process for immigration law. She argues, in contrast to many accounts that portray courts as a liberalizing force against the exclusionary tendencies of electoral politics and the legislative process, that courts in Germany have been reluctant to impinge on democratic sovereignty. Yet she also argues that appeals to courts, the law and selective readings of court decisions are a powerful political resource called upon by politicians and civil society actors. The article thus argues that scholars have simultaneously overestimated and underestimated the impact of the judiciary on immigration policies.”

Honorable Mentions:


Best Chapter

Winners:


Selection Committee:

David Leal (University of Texas, Austin), Anna Boucher (University of Sydney), Barbara Buckinx (Princeton University)

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Committee’s Commentary:

“The life course perspective has proven its value in other academic fields, and in this chapter, the authors describe its application to migration, particularly how naturalization may shape socio-economic integration. The authors indicate that current research on this relationship is ambiguous, but the sociological life-course paradigm can bridge the divergent findings. It provides a comprehensive theoretical perspective that goes beyond basic cost-benefit models by encompassing the role of institutional context and the macro and micro aspects of naturalization decisions. The chapter discusses the applicability of several aspects of life course research—linked lives, life stage, accentuation, and agency. Methodologically, the chapter highlights the importance of longitudinal data to understanding naturalization decisions. It also provides an admirable overview of the extant literature, and as such is invaluable for scholars who wish to know more about the topic. The authors conclude that the reality of the life course complicates our understanding of whether naturalization and citizenship shape socio-economic status. This may even be the wrong question to ask, as they argue that "the literature would benefit by focusing more on identifying to whom and under which conditions citizenship is important. Doing so requires the development of a more comprehensive theoretical framework and, in this regard, we see a life-course approach to immigrant naturalization and socio-economic integration as the most promising step."

Best Paper

Winners:


Selection Committee:

Linda Bosniak (Rutgers University), Phil Triadafilopoulos (University of Toronto), Leila Kawar (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

Committee’s Commentary:

“Charlotte and Jeremy's paper has many virtues. It tackles an original, substantively interesting question and seeks to answer it through the application of innovative methods, featuring a compelling combination of spatial analysis and process tracing. It also neatly combines insights on immigration, the welfare state and voting (especially as regards support for far-right parties). It offers an original theoretical contribution and has the virtue of modesty, in that it recognizes that not all of the thought-provoking questions it raises
have been answered. Last but certainly not least, Charlotte and Jeremy’s paper is elegantly written and truly a pleasure to read.”

Deadline for nominations for all awards (Best Article, Best Book, Best Chapter, Best Dissertation and Best Paper) is March 16, 2018.

See http://www.apsanet.org/section43 for further information.

https://connect.apsanet.org/s43/
Member Achievements

Fiona B. Adamson (SOAS)
- Organized with Mathilde Zederman (SOAS) and Gerasimos Tsouraparas (Birmingham) the workshop “Authoritarianism from Afar: Diaspora Engagement and the Transnationalization of State Repression” at CERI-Sciences Po on 7 July 2017.
- Has been a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for European Global Studies at the University of Basel in Switzerland 1 October – 31 December.

Jean Beaman (Purdue University)

Kristy A. Belton (International Studies Association)

Irene Bloemraad (University of California Berkeley)

Rafaela M. Dancygier (Princeton University)

Antje Ellermann (University of British Columbia)
- New position: Director of UBC Institute for European Studies.
- Received new grant: $100,000 for the establishment of a Migration Research Excellence Cluster by the UBC Research Excellence Cluster Initiative.

Alexandra Filindra (University of Illinois at Chicago)
- Was promoted to Associate professor of Political Science and Psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago in August 2017.

Els de Graauw (Baruch College, City University of New York):
- Was awarded a Howard J. Samuels State and City Policy Center research grant for project on “The Empire Welcome: How NY State, Counties, and Cities Integrate Immigrants.”

Kelly M. Greenhill (Tufts University)
• Published with Ben Oppenheim, “Rumor Has It: The Adoption of Unverified Information in Conflict Zones,” International Studies Quarterly 61(3).
• Received the 2018 ISSS Emerging Scholar Award
• New Position: Director of International Relations, Tufts University.

Marc Morjé Howard (Georgetown University)

Calvert W. Jones (University of Maryland)

Konrad Kalicki (National University of Singapore)
• Started as Assistant Professor in the Department of Japanese Studies and Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore.

Serdar Kaya (University of Queensland)

Rana B. Khoury (Northwestern University)

Willem Maas (Glendon College, York University)

Daniel Naujoks (Columbia University)

Michael A. Paarlberg (University of Pennsylvania)
• Began a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania, Center for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Immigration in the Department of Political Science in August.
Kamal Sadiq (University of California Irvine)
- Continues to serve his 3-year term (2016-2019) on the Nominations Committee of the International Studies Association (ISA). He was appointed by the then President of the International Studies Association.

Michael Orlando Sharpe (York College, City University of New York)
- Was appointed Adjunct Associate Research Scholar, Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia University, fall 2017-spring 2018.

Shyam K. Sriram (University of California Santa Barbara)
- Received a $4,000 University of California Critical Refugee Studies Grant for his project, “Where There is Breath There is Hope: Exploring the Political Lives of Bhutanese Refugees in America.”

Dietrich Thränhardt (Berlin)

Gerasimos Tsourapas (University of Birmingham)
- Published “Migration Diplomacy in the Global South: Cooperation, Coercion and Issue Linkage in Gaddafi’s Libya,” Third World Quarterly 38 (10), 2017: 2367-2385

Inés Valdez (Princeton University)
- Awarded the Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellowship at the Princeton University for Human Values during the academic year 2017-2018.

NOTE: Please send Member News for the next Newsletter to Marc at marc.helbling@uni-bamberg.de by May 15, 2018 with the subject “Member News” in the heading of the email.

Member news includes new publications, jobs, conferences organized (not attended), grants received, etc. since publication of the previous newsletter. Please use the following format: Name, affiliation in parentheses and then bullet points for each news item.
Recent Books and Articles

Books

Citizenship Studies


Climate Change


Gender


Globalization

Health

Human Rights
(Im)Migration


Language/Linguistics


Pluralism


Refugees


Religion


Urban Studies


Articles

American Behavioral Scientist


Wang, Leslie K. 2017. “‘Leftover Women’ and ‘Kings of the Candy Shop’: Gendering Chinese American Ancestral Homeland Migration to

American Journal of Political Science


British Journal of Political Science


Ethnopolitics


European Journal of Political Research


Government and Opposition


International Organization


Journal of Conflict Resolution


Journal of European Integration


Law and Society Review


Middle East Law and Governance


Muslim World Journal of Human Rights


Political Research Quarterly


PS: Political Science and Politics


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