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### FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Welcome to a new academic year from the editorial board of the *APSA-CD* newsletter! This issue is co-edited by guest-editor Dan Pemstein and editorial board-member Brigitte Zimmermann. I really welcome initiatives for participation from APSA-CD members as guest editors. While we have an excellent and growing team on the board, I am well aware that we cannot possibly cover all aspects of our dynamic field. On that note, please join me in

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## INFORMATION, DISCLOSURE AND REGIME STABILITY

**James R. Hollyer**, *University of Minnesota*



Governments, whether autocratic or democratic, depend on at least a minimal level of consent from their populace to survive in office. Should large masses of citizens turn out in protest or revolt against their leaders, regimes of any type will rapidly find the polity ungovernable. Yet such demonstrations are collective acts—to be successful they require the participation of large numbers of citizens. In circumstances where citizens lack common knowledge of others' intent to protest, how can such coordination take place? What is the effect of the broader informational environment on such coordination? How then does the informational environment affect the survival of autocratic and democratic regimes? Given these implications, when and why do governments tolerate an open informational environment? In several recent articles and working papers, and in an on-going book project, I—along with Peter Rosendorff and Jim Vreeland—examine precisely these questions.<sup>1</sup>

1. These published and working papers consist of: James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James R. Vreeland, “Democracy and Transparency,” *Journal of Politics* 73 (October 2011): 1–15; James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Measuring Transparency,” *Political Analysis* 22 (Autumn 2014): 413–434; James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability,” *American Political Science Review* 109 (Forthcoming 2015); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland, “Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability” (unpublished manuscript); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and  
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## ONLINE CENSORSHIP AND RESPONSIVENESS IN CHINA

**Jennifer Pan**, *Stanford University*



There is ongoing debate over whether authoritarian regimes can retain control over the creation and dissemination of information in spite of the rise of new information communication technologies (ICTs). Some argue that new technologies disrupt the ability of authoritarian regimes to control information, and ultimately to maintain political survival. According to this view, technologies like social media allow any individual to act as a broadcaster, making information production incredibly diffuse and improving coordination of collective action against authoritarian regimes. However, others refute this perspective and point to the use of technology as well as and more traditional forms of repression by authoritarian regimes to retain control over information.

While speculation that new information technologies spell doom for authoritarian regimes may be premature, it is inevitable that technological advances, such as the Internet and mobile communications, which fundamentally alter interactions among individuals and organizations, will also affect political dynamics. How have authoritarian regimes, where information has traditionally been heavily controlled and manipulated, reacted to these

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## THE LOGIC OF CONTAGIOUS CONTENTION IN AUTOCRACIES: A NOVEL PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATION UNDER LIMITED INFORMATION

Navid Hassanpour, *Columbia University*



Collective action is often a product of coordination, and coordination is facilitated by information. However, in response to the introduction of personalized media, a revived debate on the role of information in collective political behavior strives to provide explanations for novel forms of political mobilization in societies with limited access to information:<sup>1</sup> namely that some of the most spectacular acts of political contention under autocracies were utter surprises, did not bear the marks of clear leadership, and proceeded with tremendous speed. In the following I argue that, in the discussion of clandestine contention, explanations based on coordination via selective incentives, focal points, common ideologies, and routine repertoires of action do not fully capture the properties of collective political behavior that only recently have become more visible in the mirror of new social media. To fully understand the dynamics of such *connective* acts of contention, it is necessary to emphasize temporal dynamics instead of statistical averages, interpersonal connections instead of total population parameters, and marginal network effects as much as centrally situated political activity. My goal in the following is to outline a logic that can provide explanations where a coordination-based logic of collective action cannot, and to enumerate a few methodological procedures for empirically testing the paradigm I propose.<sup>2</sup> To summarize, public information and unifying informational elements such as ideology, focal points, repertoires of action, and selective incentives do not fully answer

1. For early work see Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Revolution," *Public Choice* 61 (April 1989): 41-74 and Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Elements of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991): 7-48. This work builds on Mark S. Granovetter, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," *The American Journal of Sociology* 83 (May 1978): 1420-1443. Also see a recent report in Marc Lynch, "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State," *Perspectives on Politics* 9 (June 2011): 301-310. On collective action and incentives to censor in a limited information environment see Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," *American Political Science Review* 107 (May 2013): 326-343.

2. See W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, *The Logic of Connective Action, Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for more discussion of the term and Donatella della Porta, *Clandestine Political Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for a treatment of clandestine collective action. I present the arguments discussed here in full in a forthcoming monograph, for details see Navid Hassanpour, *Leading from the Periphery: The Network Dynamics of Decentralized Collective Action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 2016).

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## THE ARAB MEDIA AFTER THE UPRISINGS

Marc Lynch, *George Washington University*



There is now a significant literature on the role of the media during the Arab uprisings of 2011: changing the distribution of information, empowering societal actors against the state, facilitating the organization and mobilization of protest movements.<sup>1</sup> The focus on the democratizing and mobilizational force of the new media only captures part of the story, however. Almost all of those attempted democratic transitions failed, and the social movements which drove them have suffered severe setbacks. The failings of the Arab media after the uprisings offer a cautionary tale about the potential for a plural public sphere following transitions from authoritarian rule.<sup>2</sup> The impact of new media on the *failure* of post-uprising transitional politics in the Arab world has thus far received surprisingly little attention.

To build a theoretically coherent account of the media's effects on politics, it is useful to approach the media's impact on the post-transition failures through the same specific causal mechanisms which have been highlighted in the literature on mobilization. Some of these mechanisms are: the failure to reform state media, the intense fear triggered by radical institutional uncertainty and deep conflicts over the identity and power structures of transitional states, and the prevalence of highly partisan and intensely polarized media.

First, both national and transnational media proved susceptible to *political capture* by states, political movements, or by old elites. State media sectors largely resisted meaningful reforms in the aftermath of the uprisings, leaving widely viewed state television as a potent weapon in the hands of the security state and the old regime. Most new television stations and other mass media were owned by wealthy, politically ambitious businessmen or by political movements, and tailored their coverage accordingly. Transnational satellite television stations such

1. This essay is adapted from Marc Lynch, "Trashing Transitions: The Arab Media after the Uprisings" *Journal of Democracy* 26 (October 2015): 90-99. For a broader examination of these issues, see Marc Lynch, *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today* (New York: Columbia University Press 2006); Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: PublicAffairs 2012); and Marc Lynch, "Media, Old and New" in Marc Lynch, ed., *The Arab Uprisings Explained* (New York: Columbia University Press 2014).

2. Katrin Voltmer, *The Media in Transitional Democracies* (New York: Polity Press, 2013): 6; also see Marc F. Plattner, "Media and Democracy: The Long View," *Journal of Democracy* 23 (October 2012): 62-73.

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# FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD, CONTINUED

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welcoming our new editorial board members. Kyle Marquardt holds a PhD from U of Wisconsin-Madison and Anna Lührmann who holds a PhD from Humbolt University. Both are presently postdoc's here at the V-Dem Institute, at the University of Gothenburg and make terrific additions to the team.

This issue's focus is on media control and the editors write in more detail on that below. The remaining issues of our two-year tenure will feature conversations on opposition parties in authoritarian regimes (January), and democratization and civil conflict (June). As indicated at the last business meeting, however, we already have additional issues in the pipeline debating democracy support, the role of linguistic-ethnic divides in regime change, and the relationship between democracy and economic-human development, should we be asked to continue for another term.

On that note, let me hand it over to the editors of the present issue!

Staffan I. Lindberg  
Executive Editor

## **From this issue's editors:**

We chose to focus this issue on media control in non-democracies and transitional regimes. Media is rapidly changing form and function, forcing political leaders to quickly adapt their media use and information control strategies to the modern information environment. This issue presents recent findings on information manipulation and control, highlights some gaps in the current literature, and suggests avenues for future research.

The authors in this issue represent the forefront of research on media control, and, together, their pieces highlight several critical outstanding questions. First, James Hollyer focuses on the role of vertical information transfer, from governments to citizens, in facilitating regime change. He argues that improving the informational environment constitutes a "risky gamble" for authoritarian leaders. Greater transparency may insulate the regime from internal threats but may also raise the risk of mass protest and democratization. For democracies, on the other hand, information transparency plays a legitimizing role, encouraging regime survival.

Continuing the thread of exploration about the dual power and threat of information, Jennifer Pan considers whether authoritarian regimes will be able to continue their control over horizontal information transfer between citizens, while simultaneously encouraging the use of information technology by business. Examining China, she highlights a tension between stability and economic growth, arguing that information technology undermines stability but fosters growth. She argues that, to date, the Chinese regime has been largely successful at bringing the state censorship apparatus to bear to undermine the coordination of collective action through social media. Yet, she leaves us with a compelling research agenda to investigate: how far can the repressive approach scale, and could horizontal information transfer, and regime responsiveness, perhaps serve as an alternative pressure valve for discontent, thereby reducing the likelihood of larger scale

collective action.

In his piece, Navid Hassanpour also explores horizontal information transfer, arguing that the effect of information is increasingly contingent on structure of interpersonal connections. He advocates for a shift away from coordination-based logic of collective action towards analysis that considers network dynamics, degree of centralization, and hierarchical structure, and even offers suggestions to the discipline about how to collect data on these phenomena. Moreover, his works shows that, under some circumstances, limiting access to information can, paradoxically, stimulate collective action.

While the preceding authors focus largely on the role that information plays in fomenting collective action, Marc Lynch offers a cautionary tale about the potentially destabilizing effect of the modern information environment on transitional regimes. Examining the impact of new media on post-uprising politics in the Arab world, he concludes that many of the characteristics of the media environment that facilitated the Arab Spring may undermine the consolidation of the new regimes.

Finally, Maria Petrova offers a broad review of what we know about media control in non-democracies, focusing largely on a literature in economics that may not be well known to our readership. Synthesizing research from around the world, she discusses the commonly employed methods of, conditions for, and effects of authoritarian media capture.

Taken together, these pieces describe some of the most compelling outstanding questions in the literature on media control in non-democracies. We hope you enjoy this issue and that your fall semesters are productive!

*On behalf of the Editorial Committee,*

*Dan Pemstein and Brigitte Zimmerman*

## MEDIA CAPTURE OUTSIDE ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES

Maria Petrova, *Barcelona Institute for Political Economy and Governance*



In most countries, people get information about politics from mass media. As a result, politicians have incentives to control, or capture, the media, and, sometimes, engage in propaganda, especially in countries with weak democratic institutions. The goal of this article is to overview recent literature about the determinants and consequences of media control outside advanced democracies: i.e., in autocracies, hybrid regimes, and new democracies, with a focus on economic literature on the topic. I'll talk about evidence of media capture, the political impact of captured media, the presence of alternative sources of information, like independent and social media, and the limits to propaganda.

Some formal theoretical literature suggests that mass media can increase political accountability by monitoring public officials and publishing stories about politicians' misbehavior. To avoid this possibility, corrupt governments can exert control over mass media through a variety of channels, including direct ownership, provision of financial resources, and media regulation. Theoretically, competition between outlets can force even controlled media to reveal some information, although not to the same extent as independent sources.<sup>1</sup> It is an open question whether controlled media can nonetheless promote accountability. In what follows, I first review the empirical evidence on media control in various countries, then discuss what are known determinants of media capture, then talk about the influence of controlled media, and, finally, sketch some emerging evidence on the role of social media in countries where traditional media is controlled.

### What Are the Methods of Media Capture?

Governments can use different forms of media control. Bribing media managers or journalists is an obvious method. McMillan and Zoido (2004) provide evidence of direct bribery of media firms. They study Fujimori's Peru, where the head of secret police, Vladimir Montesinos, collected the records of bribes he paid on behalf of the government to different actors. Essentially, the paper shows that directors of TV channels were getting higher payments than were politicians or judges. In total, Montesinos paid 100 times more in bribes to media outlets than to all judges and politicians combined. This suggests that media was viewed as a significant force in the Peruvian political system. Another popular method of media control is to ensure that the "right" politicians get the most broadcast time, while others almost never appear on radio or TV. For example, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that the amount of time devoted to pro-government politicians in Russia in 1999 was disproportionately high on the state-controlled channels. For Berlusconi's Italy, Durante and Knight (2012) find that politicians from the Berlusconi party had a higher chance to speak on public TV when Berlusconi was in power. Adena et al. (2015) show that Nazi politicians had almost no access to German radio before 1933, but were given disproportionate access to radio in 1933, after Hitler was appointed the Chancellor.<sup>2</sup>

Provision of governments' advertising money is another method to ensure that media is favorable to incumbent politicians. Di Tella and Franceschelli (2012), for example, look at the content of the front pages and of advertising section for four main newspapers in Argentina in 1998-2007. They find that newspapers with government advertising are less likely to talk about government corruption, and these results are robust to controlling for newspaper-president and corruption scandal fixed effects. Similarly, governments use media regulation to avoid critical media coverage. For Mexico, Stanig (2015) shows that defamation laws are important determinants of media coverage of corruption, and local newspapers reported less corruption in 2001 in states in which defamation laws were stricter. This is consistent with the idea that government regulation of media markets, and especially defamation laws, is one of the ways to control mass media. Starr (2004) arrives at similar conclusions from his historical overview of media development and media regulation in different countries.<sup>3</sup>

In recent years, with the advancement of new technologies, censorship has taken on new forms. When governments cannot perfectly control blogs or online news aggregators, they may engage in selective deletion of information. King et al. (2013) study selective deletion on content in modern China, trying to understand which types of online content are likely to get censored. They make snapshots of

1. David Strömberg, "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (February 2004): 189-221; David Strömberg, "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy," *Review of Economic Studies* 71 (January 2004): 265-284; Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? The Role of the Media in Political Accountability," *American Economic Review* 96 (June 2006): 720-736; Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, "Competition and Truth in the Market for News," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22 (Spring 2008): 133-154; Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin, "Government Control of the Media," *Journal of Public Economics* 118 (October 2014): 163-171.

2. John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (Fall 2004): 69-92; Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence From Russia," *American Economic Review* 111 (December 2011): 3253-3285; Ruben Durante and Brian Knight, "Partisan Control, Media Bias, and Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi's Italy," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10 (June 2012): 451-481; Maja Adena, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130 (Forthcoming 2015).

3. Rafael Di Tella and Ignacio Franceschelli, "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3 (October 2011): 119-51; Piero Stanig, "Regulation of Speech and Media Coverage of Corruption: An Empirical Analysis of the Mexican Press," *American Political Science Review* 59 (January 2015): 175-193; Paul Starr, *The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

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## HOLLYER, CONTINUED

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Before one can determine the relevance of the informational environment to regime survival, one first must specify the type of information of theoretical relevance. When dealing with anti-regime protest, the relevant concern is whether any one citizen can infer that others are willing to take part in demonstrations against the sitting leadership. Since small protests are likely to fail—at high cost to participants—while large protests may succeed in upending the regime, each citizen is only likely to protest if she believes enough of her fellows will also participate. The willingness of others to turn out in the streets might be termed the distribution of discontent. Under autocratic rule, this distribution is unlikely to be common knowledge. However dissatisfied any one citizen is with the government's rule, she is unlikely to be certain of the number of her fellow citizens who are similarly dissatisfied. Moreover, she is likely to be aware that other citizens cannot infer her level of dissatisfaction. That is, she is unlikely to be able to refine her *higher order* beliefs—her beliefs about the beliefs held by others—regarding willingness to participate in protest.

Certain types of information, however, may help to overcome this problem. Information may play this role if it is publicly observed (and known to be publicly observed), pertinent to government performance along dimensions of concern to many citizens, and credible. Since the issue in this instance is with discontent with the current government, information must credibly reflect that government's performance in office. Similarly, this information must be relevant to a large swath of the citizenry—hence, information that reflects the aggregated experiences of many citizens is more

likely to be relevant than information only pertinent to a select few.

Equally critical is the extent to which information is publicly observed. If a given citizen observes a bit of such information, she may naturally update her assessment of the government's performance. But, she also knows that *others* are observing the same information and conducting the same updating process. Hence public information enables citizens to refine their higher order beliefs about the distribution of discontent. If a piece of damning news is publicly observed, each citizen knows that others have also received this news and that they cannot have too high an opinion of the incumbent government as a result. Conversely, publicly observed good news will cause each citizen to realize that others are updating their beliefs about the government in a positive manner, and hence cannot hold too negative an opinion of their rulers. Since all citizens are able to update their understanding about the beliefs of others, and can similarly deduce that others are engaged in the same updating process, public information facilitates the formation of a common understanding of the distribution of discontent. Public information therefore facilitates the formation of a shared understanding of when protest is likely to take place, enabling coordinated demonstrations by individual citizens.

In the forthcoming *APSR* piece referenced above, my co-authors and I explore a formal model with just such intuitions. Unsurprisingly, the model reveals that autocratic survival becomes more strongly conditioned on government behavior as the informational environment becomes increasingly rich. As more information becomes available, it becomes more likely that under-performing autocrats

are revealed as such, and that these autocrats inspire protest by the public. Perhaps more surprisingly, a richer informational environment will unconditionally destabilize an autocratic regime so long as protest is 'hard'—i.e., the consequences for participating in a failed protest are sufficiently dire and/or the numbers required to successfully unseat the leadership are sufficiently high. The reason for this is as follows: If protest is hard, citizens must be confident that demonstrating will be a successful tactic before they are willing to turn out in the streets. In an environment where public information is scant, this level of confidence is unlikely to ever be attained. Hence, regardless of their performance, autocratic leaders are unlikely to face much threat from the public. As the informational environment improves, under-performing leaders face greater risk of protest, while the risks faced by those autocrats who deliver economic growth and public goods are largely unchanged. Thus, the overall probability of regime collapse rises as greater public information becomes available.<sup>2</sup> Hence, a rich informational environment serves to destabilize autocratic regimes against threats from their publics.

The informational environment plays a radically different role under democratic rule. This is because free and fair elections generate public information. Election returns, participation in election rallies, and public statements by candidates and citizens surrounding elections all serve as public signals to the citizenry of the distribution of discontent. It is for this reason that James Fearon argues that democracy is self-enforcing—should an incumbent fail to heed electoral results, any given citizen is likely to be

2. In the unlikely circumstance that protest is easy, the predisposition of the public is reversed—citizens will tend to take to the streets even if highly uncertain of a protest's likelihood of success. In these circumstances, greater information may actually serve to decrease risks to the regime.

James Raymond Vreeland, "Why do Autocrats Dislose?" (unpublished manuscript).

aware that many others are willing to protest this behavior and demand the incumbent's ouster.<sup>3</sup>

In the presence of free and fair elections, therefore, the broader informational environment is likely to play little role in facilitating protest. The distribution of discontent is already likely to be common knowledge due to the electoral process, and other forms of information are likely to play at most a marginal role in updating beliefs about this distribution. Public information about government performance is instead likely to shape the behavior of citizens at the polling booth. Such information plays two roles: First, it ensures that any individual citizen's voting decision is more likely to be in line with the government's performance. Voters are more likely to support governments that perform well and vote against governments that perform badly as they grow more informed. Second, the greater availability of public information ensures that any given voter is more likely to believe her fellow citizens are well-informed, and hence voting in a rational manner.

Both of these effects ensure that a richer informational environment legitimates democratic rule. A richer informational environment implies that voters are more likely to view their fellows as behaving in an informed and rational manner, vesting the democratic process with greater procedural legitimacy. As more information is made publicly available, it grows less feasible for anti-democratic forces to rally sub-groups of citizens against democratic institutions by claiming that others' votes were ill-informed and illegitimate. Moreover, the greater availability of information

3. James D. Fearon, "Self-Enforcing Democracy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126 (November 2011): 1661-1708. On this point, also see Andrew T. Little, Tom LaGatta, and Joshua A. Tucker, "Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power," *Journal of Politics* 77 (October 2015).

ensures that democratic institutions better resolve problems of political agency. As citizens' votes align more closely with incumbents' performance, elections work better—whether this is defined in terms of selecting "good" types of politicians or inducing "bad" types to act in the public interest. As the democratic process better serves its intended role, political institutions are vested with greater outcome legitimacy. Both of these legitimating effects point in the same direction with regard to democratic survival: Democracies are more likely to survive, and less likely to revert to autocracy, as public information becomes more readily available.

My co-authors and I empirically test the claims that a rich informational environment, respectively, destabilizes autocracies and stabilizes democracies. To do this, we rely on a measure of informational environment (which we term transparency) of our own construction.<sup>4</sup> This measure is based on the presence/missingness of data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) data series. To construct it, we fit a scaling model to a dataset capturing the presence/absence of each of 240 indicators from the WDI for 125 countries from 1980-2010. Transparency is captured as a latent term that predicts reporting of these 240 variables. Hence, our measure reflects the availability of economic information of great relevance to citizens' level of discontent with the current leadership. It reflects the availability of credible information, insofar as disclosed data are subject to quality review by the World Bank. And it proxies for publicly available information, as the WDI are


4. See Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability," and Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability," on autocratic instability and democratic stability, respectively. We introduce our measure in Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Measuring Transparency."

currently freely available and have long been made accessible to researchers and the press. While we do not expect citizens to directly access such data, we do expect that the availability of credible economic information to the World Bank proxies for the availability of credible information on the performance of the economy more broadly.

Across these two papers, we find that transparency is robustly associated with regime-type transition. We find that a one standard deviation increase in transparency in our sample of autocratic states is associated with a 39 percent increase in the hazard of transition to democracy (with a 95 percent confidence interval running from a 8 to an 78 percent increase), when growth is at its sample average. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of transparency in a sample of democratic states is associated with a 74 percent decline in the hazard of democratic collapse (with a 95 percent confidence interval running from a 91 to a 29 percent decrease), when growth is at its sample average.<sup>5</sup> We plot graphs of these marginal effects on the estimated hazard of regime-type transition (based on Cox proportional hazards regressions) in Figure 1. These results include controls for GDP *per capita*, past experiences of transition, and economic growth—some of the most robust predictors of regime transition. We further demonstrate that

5. Our measure of democracy is from José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited" *Public Choice* 143 (April 2010): 67-101. Estimated hazards of transition are based off a Cox proportional hazards model, including controls for economic growth rates, GDP per capita, and experience of past transitions. Models also include an interaction between transparency and growth. The marginal effect of transparency in both models is slightly reduced as growth increases. We explore the robustness of these results to a host of additional controls in both Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Transparency, Protest and Autocratic Instability" and Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Transparency, Protest and Democratic Stability."

FIGURE 1: HAZARD OF TRANSITION, AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES



Hazard rate of regime type transition for autocracies and democracies, respectively. Regime type is defined according to the *DD* dataset. Estimates from a sample of autocratic states are to the left, those from democratic states are to the right. (Both graphs are based on sub-samples that have not experienced prior regime-type reversals.) Dark lines depict estimates when transparency is at its mean value in the respective samples. Dashed lines depict estimates when transparency is at one standard deviation above the mean. Results are from Cox proportional hazard models with additional controls. Note that the axes are *not* to the same scale across the two figures.

transparent autocratic regimes are more likely to fall via mass unrest or transition to democracy, using the Milan Svobik's definition of an autocratic regime: the continuous succession of politically affiliated dictators.<sup>6</sup> However, the informational environment is not predictive of other forms of autocratic weakness—and, indeed, is negatively correlated with the frequency of coups. Similarly, transparent autocracies experience more frequent strikes and demonstrations, but are no more likely to experience other forms of unrest (assassinations, guerrilla movements) than their opaque counterparts.

Improvements in the informational environment are therefore valuable contributors to democracy and democratic consolidation. Transparency—here measured by the availability of credible economic information—is associated both with hastened transitions to democracy and with more stable democratic rule. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that

6. Milan W. Svobik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

democracies—particularly high income democracies—tend to have richer informational environments than their autocratic counterparts. Not only are citizens given greater opportunity to demand the collection and disclosure of information by the government under democratic rule, but such disclosure serves to reinforce the institution of democracy.

Why, however, would an autocratic regime ever tolerate transparency, given the threat a rich informational environment poses for the continued stability of the regime? In a recent working paper, my co-authors and I explore precisely this question.<sup>7</sup> We contend that the answer lies in the interplay between mass and elite politics in autocratic regimes.

Autocratic leaders face two threats to their survival in office. One is the threat of collective protest by (portions) of the citizenry aimed at upending the regime.

7. Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, "Why Do Autocrats Dislose?"

This might be termed the threat from below. The other threat is posed by regime elites, who might use violence or administrative maneuvers to replace the sitting leadership. This is the threat from within.

These two threats are interrelated. Actions by members of the elite against autocratic leaders may be difficult or impossible to disguise, and may signal to the public the fractured and weak state of the regime. Such actions at the elite-level may thus provide a spark for mass protest and the potential displacement of the regime as a whole. Before attempting to discipline their leaders, therefore, autocratic elites must consider the implications of their actions for their own continued survival in privileged positions.<sup>8</sup>

8. Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu, "Making Autocracy Work," Development Economics Discussion Paper Series (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007) available at [sticerd.lse.ac.uk](http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk) and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).

Elites may then be cowed into quiescence when they perceive that the mass public is particularly capable of mobilization.<sup>9</sup> Increased transparency, and other liberalizing reforms, may therefore reduce the threat autocratic leaders face from within the regime, even as it increases the threat from below. This argument is consistent with the results from our APSR paper, that

9. Note that this refers to the mobilization potential of the public. The strategic incentives of regime elites differ greatly when citizens are already out in the streets and the regime is already at high risk of toppling see Brett Allen Casper and Scott A. Tyson, "Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d'état" *Journal of Politics* 76(April 2014): 548–564 and Milan W. Svolik, "Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(October 2013): 765–794.

transparency increases the likelihood of democratization or regime collapse due to mass unrest even as it reduces the risk of coup. It also suggests that autocratic leaders will tend to increase transparency when the threats from within the regime are particularly great—i.e., when legitimacy is vested in institutions rather than the personality of the particular leader, or when the leader is new to office. We find that, indeed, transparency rises when autocratic leaders are new to office and is lower in personalistic regimes as compared to other autocracies.

For autocrats, therefore, improving the informational environment constitutes

a risky gamble. On the one hand, greater transparency may insulate leaders against internal threats. But, on the other, it raises the risk of mass protest and democratization. For democracies, a rich informational environment is an unambiguous good. Greater information complements democratic institutions and renders them more robust, reducing the threat of transition to autocracy.

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## PAN, CONTINUED

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new technologies? Here, the experience of China's single-party regime presents an interesting paradox: a regime that has aggressively embraced these technological advances yet exerts great effort to manage the content produced and disseminated via these technologies.

What we can learn from the Chinese experience is that technologies like the Internet and social media are viewed as indispensable by the regime in its pursuit of economic growth, but at the same time, these technologies are also viewed as inherently dangerous because of their ability to propagate collective action and threaten stability. To balance this double-edged sword, the regime engages in censorship to prevent the spread of real-world collective action and promotes responsiveness to prevent discontent from fomenting real world action. While these efforts have been, in many ways, successful, a thin line separates the failure and success of these tactics in allowing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain its pursuit of stability and growth.

### Pursuing Stability and Growth

In 1989, Deng Xiaoping said, "To China's problems, the overwhelming priority is stability. Without a stable environment, nothing can be achieved, and what has been achieved will be lost." These words, and the concept that stability trumps all, have been repeated countless times in CCP documents and the speeches of China's top leaders, and this pursuit of stability is reflected in China's institutions and governing structure. However, stability is not the sole priority of the CCP. Indeed, Deng pursued stability because it formed a necessary precondition to achieving his vision of an economically powerful China.<sup>1</sup> This focus on stability and

1. According to Deng, stability is the first condition for the "three steps" economic development strategy of doubling gross national product (GNP) from 1981 to 1990, of quadrupling the 1980 GNP by the end of

growth continues to this day, and the current president, Xi Jinping, has repeated emphasized the importance of economic development and stability.

For the CCP, stability at the most fundamental level refers to political stability or the continuation of CCP rule, but also refers to a society where protest, collective action, and lawlessness will not obstruct economic development and prosperity. In order to achieve this expansive type of stability, the regime needs to mitigate threats to its power such as cross-class mobilization but needs also to deter smaller-scale collective action such as labor protests from hindering the attractiveness of the Chinese market. However, stability is not sufficient to produce growth. Economic development also requires human capital that can engage in innovation and market competition.

### The Paradox of Information Technologies

Economic growth is not possible without the flow of information between businesses, markets, suppliers, and customers. The type of information flow essential to innovation and business competition—what scholars refer to as horizontal information—is generated by, and shared among, societal actors. Horizontal flows of information contrast with vertical flows of information, where information generated by societal actors is gathered by the regime.<sup>2</sup> Vertical information is the 20th century, and of increasing per capita GNP to the level of medium-developed countries by 2050.

2. See Peter Lorentzen, *China's Controlled Burn: Information Management and State-Society Relations under Authoritarianism* (unpublished manuscript, 2015). A third type of information flow is information transmitted to citizens by the regime, including objective information about the regime (transparency) or information aimed at persuasion (propaganda). I do not include this type of information in either horizontal or vertical information flows where societal actors are the source of information. The tension between horizontal and vertical information flows exists because the regime benefits from information from citizens but does not benefit when this same information is disseminated

flows are highly valued and desired by authoritarian regimes, which use a range of methods from informants to academic surveys, to obtain this information.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, horizontal flows of information are also essential to an authoritarian regime like China, but also perceived to be inherently hazardous.

Although horizontal flows of information underpin economic growth, the CCP believes that the flow of information among societal actors can also lead to the spread of collective action. Technologies such as mobile phones and instant messaging can be used to organize and mobilize collective action, and as important, technologies such as social media spread knowledge of collective behavior, inspiring others to join or to organize.

This tension inherent in horizontal information has generated a paradox in China, where the regime actively promotes and supports the development of technologies that bolster the horizontal flow of information, but at the same time, devotes substantial efforts to control the substance of information flowing via these technologies.

For example, China has invested a great deal in its Internet infrastructure, working to extend access to remote, rural areas. Because of these efforts, China has gone from less than 23 million Internet users in 2000 to nearly 650 million Internet users today, making China the country with the largest number of Internet users in the world, representing over 21 percent of

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among citizens.

3. For example Martin K. Dimitrov, "What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a 'Barometer of Public Opinion' in Communist Bulgaria," *East European Politics & Societies* 28 (May 2014): 271-295; Martin K. Dimitrov, "Internal Government Assessments of the Quality of Governance in China," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 50 (March 2014): 50-72.

the world's share of Internet users.<sup>4</sup> Telecom and Internet investments continue to this day and are seen as a way to bolster growth. In May 2015, Chinese premier Li Keqiang said: "speeding up the construction of information infrastructure will boost investment and support."<sup>5</sup>

At the same time as China is beefing up its Internet infrastructure, the regime is also increasing its control over the Internet. In January 2015, China's Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs and its executive arm, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) began disrupting VPN services used to circumvent China's website filter, the Great Firewall of China, that prevents individuals located in China from accessing certain foreign websites such as YouTube and Facebook. The same month, dozens of websites and WeChat accounts were shut down for producing unsanctioned information.<sup>6</sup> In May of 2015, CAC set limits on what outlets can produce "news" in an effort to control the production of information by individuals and non-governmental groups, and to limit the spread of this information by Internet news aggregators like Sohu.com and 163.com. These recent efforts come on top of censorship activities such as website blocking, keyword filtering, search filtering, and content filtering that have been de rigueur in China for years

4. See details at "Internet Users by Country (2014)," Internet Live Stats, last modified by July 1, 2014 based on data from International Telecommunication Union, United Nations Population Division, Internet & Mobile Association of India, and the World Bank, <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/>.

5. See "China Reveals Ambitious Broadband Plan," *BBC News*, 14 May 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32736199>.

6. See Cao Siqi, "Foreign VPN Service Unavailable in China" *Global Times*, 1 January 2015, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/903542.shtml> and "China Shuts 50 Websites and Social Media Accounts" *Reuters*, 13 January 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/13/us-china-internet-idUSKBN0KM1F320150113>.

To balance the need for horizontal information while mitigating its perceived dangers, the Chinese regime engages in censorship to prevent the spread of collective action and encourages government responsiveness to societal demands to prevent discontent from fomenting into real world action. Each of these strategies is discussed in turn below.

### Censorship to Prevent the Spread of Collective Action

Through a large-scale observational study of content filtering—the manual removal of Internet social media content after it has already been posted online—King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) find that censorship is aimed at removing all discussions of real-world events with collective action potential, while allowing for a great deal of criticism of the regime.<sup>7</sup> Through a randomized experiment of censorship on 100 social media sites including microblogging sites, blogs, and forums, King, Pan, and Roberts (2014) find that discussing real-world events with collective action potential *causes* censorship, regardless of whether discussions support or criticize the regime; in contrast, criticisms of the government unrelated to events with collective action potential do not cause censorship.<sup>8</sup>

Removing discussions of real-world events with collective action does not prevent these events from occurring in the first place, but it limits the growth potential of these events. Let us suppose there is a sizable environmental protest in northwest Beijing, and the protest is discussed on social media

7. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review* 107(May 2013): 326-343.

8. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. "Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation." *Science* 345 (August 22, 2014): 891.

for several hours before all mentions of the event are removed. Let us also suppose that there is a person living in eastern Beijing who is sympathetic to this cause, but who finds no evidence of this protest by the time he goes online because all discussions of this protest have already been removed. As a result, this person is unaware of the event, and cannot be inspired to join in and to organize similar types of activities. By removing all discussion of events, for many, it is as if the event never occurred, and collective action cannot spread without awareness. Censorship in the form of content filtering prevents the spread of collective behaviors.

However, while censorship may prevent the spread of collective action, it does not appear to be an effective strategy for preventing collective action from emerging in the first place. While in theory censorship tactics such as keyword filtering—flagging content containing certain terms for removal—would prevent content deemed to be inappropriate from appearing online; in practice, these ex-ante censorship methods are largely ineffective. Through randomized experimentation, King, Pan, and Roberts (2014) observe that two thirds of Chinese social media sites use keyword filtering to flag posts for review, but keyword review has virtually no effect on what content is removed from appearing online because human censors correct errors after keyword filtering techniques are applied.

### Responsiveness to Prevent the Emergence of Collective Action

Rather than censor, the government prevents the emergence of collective action through responsiveness. In recent years, there is growing evidence that officials in authoritarian regimes are responsive to citizens, and much of this research has been done in China. Through a survey experiment, Meng,

Pan, and Yang (N.d.) find that approximately half of provincial and city-level officials in China believe that suggestions from local residents should be seriously considered when making policy and expenditure decisions, even when these suggestions are expressed through the Internet rather than state institutions such as residential committees, people's congress representatives, or the local CCP organization.<sup>9</sup>

Measuring responsiveness more directly, Chen, Pan, and Xu (N.d.) conduct a randomized field experiment among 2,103 Chinese counties by submitting online requests for help in obtaining social welfare and measuring the government response.<sup>10</sup> Overall, one third of county governments responded to demands expressed online, but when a vague threat of small-scale collective action was appended to the request for help, local governments became considerably more responsive. The increased responsiveness to unrealized threats of collective action suggests that responsiveness is a way for the regime to prevent the emergence of protest. That responsiveness is a priority for the CCP regime is further substantiated

9. Tianguang Meng, Jennifer Pan, and Ping Yang. "Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (Forthcoming 2015).

10. Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (Forthcoming 2015).

by the existence of a strong social desirability bias to appear responsive to citizen demands. In Meng, Pan, and Yang's (2014) survey experiment, almost all official surveyed said they would be receptive to citizen demands in direct questioning, while only half responded in the affirmative through a list experiment. This suggests two important considerations—first, that responsiveness is deemed to be a priority, and second, that many officials only pay lip service to the task.

Responsiveness breaks down further in regions where there is antagonism between the state and citizens and, indeed, the CCP has identified antagonism as a main cause of collective action against the state. In regions with high levels of state-society antagonism, officials are much less responsive to demands residents express online, although responsiveness to demands expressed through in-person, formal channels remains unchanged.

These results show that while censorship efforts to prevent the spread of collective action have been largely successful, responsiveness efforts are more mixed. This is perhaps reflective of the general phenomenon that it is easier to mobilize in response to crisis than it is to vigilantly prevent crisis from appearing in the first place. When a crisis, such as collective action has already occurred, resources are

quickly mobilized to impose control, but when faced with amorphous and unrealized threats, mobilizing resources to continually engage in prevention is difficult. However, China's pursuit of growth and stability require information to continue to flow horizontally, and relying more intensively on repression and control when faced with the proliferation of information generated by new ICTs could thwart efforts to use these technologies to support growth, investment, and innovation.

New information technologies are a double-edge sword in China. Because the country aims to pursue both stability and economic growth, new information platforms are essential yet potentially dangerous. The tension between promoting and constraining new ICTs begs the questions of whether outcomes of the unconstrained information flow on the Internet and social media feared by the CCP regime are likely to transpire. For example, if there were no censorship, would there be more, and larger scale, collective action? Or would open debate and discussion provide a pressure valve for discontent? These and other questions require further research, but for now, China's delicate balancing act continues.

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## HASSANPOUR, CONTINUED

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the puzzle of spontaneous and fast growing contention. Decentralization, spontaneity, and lack of hierarchy at times set into motion revolutions, bank runs and religious reversals that, unlike what the logic of coordination predicts, benefit from limited information, are faster growing when the size of the group is larger, and are led from the periphery of the sociopolitical network, not the center. The cognizance of such processes advances our understanding of contentious politics in autocratic environments, particularly because much of informational transactions therein are interpersonal, local and clandestine.

High risk collective action is deemed to be a product of strong social ties and a hierarchical line of command. First note that all solutions to the collective action problem as a giant prisoner's dilemma emphasize elements that economize on *coordination*. Lichbach and Olson offer a solution based on selective incentives for participation, Tilly presents repertoires of action as unifying modes of contention, Schelling offers focal points as the unifying apparatus for coordination, Hardin takes common identity as a facilitator of coordination on a cause. Finally in the setup of *global games* accurate public information facilitates collective action.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, I argue that lack

3. Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (June 1987): 266–297; Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken Press, 1971); Thomas C. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978). See Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) for an argument for strong organization. For the definition of the standard global games see Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin, "Global Games: Theory and Applications," in Mathias Dewatripont et al., eds., *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Volume 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

of unification, accurate information, and centralized contention can set into motion contentious processes with dynamics different than well-rehearsed coordinated contentious politics. Neither of the two major models of collective action, Granovetter's (and Kuran's) threshold model, and Morris' definition of global games, import network structure in their formulation of collective action processes. In Kuran's formulation, everybody is visible to all. Such high levels of centrality are plausible towards the end of revolutionary processes, not at their beginnings, where my research question lies. Global games, too, assume a simplified information structure, in which stylized signals are either public, visible to all in the system, or private. There is no intermediate apparatus of information dissemination that could describe *local* networks of information propagation and contentious action. The dynamics of risk-taking based on the threshold models of collective action depend on the structure of underlying social network. The same is true of global games.

Note that many Middle Eastern capitals, the theaters of the 2011 popular confrontations, with dense local urban structure, fit well in the category of *small world networks*: they are comprised of interconnected dense neighborhoods with strong local features, a point that I will return to when I discuss the consequences of a total communication shutdown, and lack of public information. Furthermore, early studies of collective action in networks made clear that marginal risk takers are more likely to be the early

2003), a variation exists in Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin, "Social Value of Public Information," *American Economic Review* 92 (December 2002): 1521–1534. Public information and social action, rational ritual, is discussed in Michael Chwe, "Structure and Strategy in Collective Action," *American Journal of Sociology* 105 (July 1999): 128–156.

adopters of risky social behavior. These early adopters are less likely to be influenced by the risk-aversion of the majority of the population, and in turn are more likely to influence their small social circle. Now if these speculations on the nature of mobilization from the periphery are plausible, then there is a need for formulating contentious processes that do not originate from the centers of attention, but instead take hold at the margins of a social network and move towards the center stage. The need is pressing because in autocracies much of contention is hidden from the watchful state apparatus.<sup>4</sup>

Collecting empirics on decentralized and clandestine collective action is challenging, as they mostly happen before the process reaches levels that are visible to the public eye. New data rich environments, however, allow researchers to collect data that are inadvertently captured in communications leading to the ascendance of the movement. In the following, I discuss three classes of data sources: surveys, geographic data on conflict processes, and network experiments each can shed light on the dynamics of decentralized and clandestine collective action. I have put the predictions of the network models into the test using the same empirical strategies.

4. On risk taking and early adoption, see Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties." *The American Journal of Sociology* 78 (May 1973): 1360–1380, while discussing the importance of weak ties in engendering collective action, Granovetter mentions observations by Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2003) on the marginal location of early adopters of social innovations. For a discussion of public and hidden transcripts, see James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). Also negative coalitions Mark R. Beissinger, "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution." *American Political Science Review* 107 (August 2013): 574–592, common to many of spontaneous rebellions, shape in environments that are hostile to political organization. In the absence of clear leadership and ideology, cascades of collective action are more likely to originate from the periphery.

Surveys on contentious activity provide subjective information on the event, but there is a tension between the subject of the study, which is a dynamic event process, and methods for pinpointing a representative sample based on static socioeconomic parameters. Convenience and representative samples are easier to come by in the spatiotemporal proximity of the event itself. In the absence of survey data in conflict zones, Geographical Information System (GIS) analysis is another means for tracing the dynamics of conflict. Particularly, in urban environments, with the heavy presence of human recording, the contentious networks embedded within the spatial web of public squares, major and minor streets and dense neighborhoods are aptly susceptible to GIS methods. Real time spatiotemporal tracing reveals patterns of contention that are invisible to a local observer, or unavailable in a post hoc survey. A triangulation of social media reports in text, image, and video, as well as reports in online and news media outlets can help to pinpoint contention in space and time. Early examples of geographical analysis in the context of urban conflict can be found in Roger Gould's pioneering study of the Paris Commune.<sup>5</sup> Detailed geolocated data, often provided by handheld devices used by the parties in contention, leave traces of irregular rebellion in unprecedented formats, residues that facilitate novel modes of empirical analysis. I have applied GIS methods in the context of the

5. See Roger V. Gould, *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995). in conjunction with Gould's dynamic network models Roger V. Gould, "Collective Action and Network Structure." *American Sociological Review* 58 (April 1993): 182-196. He argued that remodeling of Paris by Haussmann meant the Paris Commune in 1871 engaged in mobilization efforts different from those of the 1848 urban rebellion. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) also implements an argument based on categorization of space and information.

civil conflict in Damascus in 2012; later I outline some of the results on the communication-conflict nexus. Finally, laboratory experiments of collective action are another venue for exploring the dynamics of risk taking in a controlled setting. Measuring risk propensity is a well rehearsed practice in behavioral economics; knowing the risk propensity of a subject leads to an opportunity to test the dynamics of collective action in a heterogeneous network. Once the risk takers, or early adopters of a social innovation, are identified, then one can arrange them in different network positions, have them engage in a collective game of risk-taking, an online lottery in our case, and observe the dynamics of risk-taking diffusing from the margins to the other parts of the network. The results shed light on the dynamics of mobilization from the margins, otherwise invisible to aggregate measuring mechanisms.

To test the predictions of a contagion based dynamics I turned to contentious processes in 2011. I noted above that decentralized mobilization interacts with information regimes in ways different from mobilization based on coordination. Hence, it was imperative to find cases in which the access to information had drastically changed in the course of the mobilization process, and to test the dynamics of recruitment and risk taking in time and space. During the Middle Eastern contentious processes post 2011, at least on two occasions countrywide blackouts in Egypt and Syria, in early 2011 and in late 2012, provided grounds for detecting risk taking dynamics that often work side by side with coordination based, centralized dynamics, but are masked in the presence of more visible contentious elements. A vacuum of public information could bring their significance to the fore. To further examine the role of instigators situated

in the peripheries of the social network, I also examine the findings with a number of controlled experiments of collective risk-taking.

In the months following the ill-fated Egyptian Revolution of January 2011, I ran a survey with a convenience sample of more than seven hundred Cairo residents on their protest participation and media usage behavior during the 18 days of the protests. I found that the vanguards, the early adopters of the contentious activity, those who had protested on the first day of the protests, January 25, 2011, had done so in substantially more geographically dispersed manner compared to the late adopters, and their levels of protest outside Tahrir was as high on the first day of protests, January 25, as they were on January 28, a day of blanket shutdown of all means of communication in Egypt. The protests, as a whole, were also the most dispersed on January 28; the rate of those who reported being in Tahrir, conditioned on participation, were the lowest among the 18 days of contentions, although the total number of those in Tahrir Square itself was unprecedented. In other words, the protests were the most dispersed during the day of blackouts. Unlike January 25, when the protest processions converged in Tahrir, on the 28th they flared in multiple corners of the city, despite repeated prior public calls for convergence to Tahrir. Later I sifted through more than seventy emails sent out January 25 by the April 6th Youth Movement, which played an important role in organizing the protests on the first day of the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. The April 6th Youth Movement, emerged as an opposition group in the labor protests of Mahalla El-Kubra in April 2008, and played an important role in organizing the protests on the first day of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in 2011.

## Hassanpour

Several of its leaders, including those who lead the movement on January 25, were eventually arrested and sentenced to prison. In particular, I traced the convergence and decentralization processes on the micro level. On the 25th, these emails were sent out from an operation room every hour (every 30 minutes in the afternoon), and contain an itemized list of protest movement reports around the city of Cairo and other major Egyptian cities. The emails were sent out to hundreds of April 6th activists. Tahrir, the eventual destination for protesters on the 25th, was not in the list of four distinct Cairo locations designated for congregation on that day. The emails start to report on the presence of protesters in Tahrir only in the early afternoon. There were no such convergence mechanisms in place on the 28th, the protests were effectively decentralized during the blackout.<sup>6</sup>

If mobilization in Cairo streets was solely based on coordination processes, then the complete absence of the means of communication that had proved crucial on the 25th, should have had a devastating effect on mobilization. Instead disrupting the opponents' means of communication brought about the exact opposite of what Mubarak's regime had planned. The blackout amplified face to face interpersonal and local dynamics, decentralized and leaderless protests became much harder to control than a sole colossal meeting in Tahrir. The Syrian case I detail below, provides further evidence on the contagious nature of decentralized contention.

Intended—and unintended—interruptions in communications in conflictual situations happen often,<sup>7</sup> therefore there are a number of cases where the very same *dispersion hypothesis*, decentralization of contention during a blackout, can be put into the test. In November 2012 another countrywide disruptions of communications happened in Syria in the midst of civil conflict in and around the city of Damascus and lasted for three days. I used a detailed dataset of daily violent conflict locations in Damascus during 2012 to study the dynamics of the conflict before and during the blackout. For doing so I divided the area under study (a spatial window of 14 by 18 miles) using a one-mile square grid that contained Damascus and its satellite neighborhoods. The grid division facilitated tracing the patterns of contagion in time. Again, unlike the predictions of the coordination logic, the geographical dispersion of conflict in Damascus was unprecedented during the blackout. Neither conflictual business as usual, extrapolated from the patterns of violence during the first 11 months of the year 2012, nor the pattern of government attacks on the rebels, extracted from the data which differentiates between rebel and state violence, can fully account for the decentralization of the conflict on November 30 and December 1. Controlling for a number of structural variables for each square mile, such as approximate levels of income, ethnic composition, population, temporal and spatial trends, and a lagged version of the dependent variable (the rates of violent conflict in each mile by mile cell per day) I find that unlike the civil conflict outside urban

areas,<sup>8</sup> altitude adversely influenced the rates of rebellion in urban areas, and as expected, the rates of violence increased with the population and total sum of street length in each square mile window. The most instructive finding is that contagion, defined as “conflict in [the] spatiotemporal neighborhood of previous conflict”, was effectively activated during the blackout. The spatiotemporal profile of the conflict depicts a process that is clustered *locally* and dispersed *globally*, particularly during the blackout. Interestingly enough, this topology is the main characteristic of *small world networks*, a network structure, in which I argue, a disruption of public signal encourages more contention, not less.

Finally, to further our understanding of the dynamics of collective risk-taking in regimes of limited information, I designed and implemented synchronous experiments of collective risk taking online, in which the risk takers were first identified through their decisions over lotteries of different risk levels, and then assigned to network positions based on the level of their risk aversion. I observed that assigning risk takers to peripheral network positions generated cascades of collective risk taking that were on par with a central assignment of instigators. Furthermore, and as important, compared to a baseline of random assignment in experimental networks, when the cascades of collective action or collective apathy happened, they were reached more quickly than central and random assignments on average. These results are significant, because social organizations, as well as campaigns of opinion reversal and political promotion are fixated on central and visible actors: they are easier to identify.

6. The effect (dispersion hypothesis) can not be solely explained by either police blockage or Friday prayers in mosques, Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption and Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s Quasi-Experiment.” *Political Communication* 31(January 2014): 1–24.

7. Philip N. Howard, Sheetal D. Agarwal, and Muzammil M. Hussain, “When Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of Social Media.” *The Communication Review* 14(September 2011): 216–232.

8. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* 97( February 2003): 75–90.

However, the dynamics of contention in the field and the laboratory I outlined above, show that mobilization from the margins possesses dynamics that are different than coordination from the center. Those who lead are not always the leaders.<sup>9</sup>

9. See Damon Centola, "The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experiment," *Science* 329(September 3, 2010): 1194–1197 for an experimental example Damon Centola and Michael W. Macy, "Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 113(November 2007): 702–734 outline complex contagion processes that underlie the dynamics. Sinan Aral and Dylan Walker, "Identifying Influential and Susceptible Members of Social Networks," *Science* 337(July 20, 2012): 337–341 discuss identifying influence in experimental networks, for a theoretical discussion of the influence maximization problem in social networks see David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Eva Tardos, "Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network," proceedings from the ninth ACM SIGKDD

To return to the question that motivated the inquiry: the presence or absence of information influences rates of collective action in ways that are contingent on the underlying structure of interpersonal connections. For example, removing the public signal in a global games model, increases the rates of collective action in *small world networks*, but not in *fully connected* ones. The distinction between coordinated organization from the center, and contagious contention from the margins helps to explain the extant contradicting reports on the relation international conference on Knowledge, Discovery, and Data mining, New York, 24 August 2003, 137–146. The experimental results and further discussion are included Navid Hassanpour, *Leading from the Periphery: The Network Dynamics of Decentralized Collective Action* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming 2016).

between communication technology and conflict.<sup>10</sup>

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10. See Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, "Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword? Cell Phones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq" *International Organization* 69(March 2015): 247–274, and Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, "Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa" *American Political Science Review* 107(May 2013): 207–224, the former argues that cellphone coverage decreased insurgent violence, while the latter finds the introduction of wireless communication to have increased rates of violent conflict. The underlying structure of rebellion network, and the levels of cooperation needed in each case are obviously different, hence the disparate influence of communication technology in the two cases.



(photo courtesy of mkhmarketing)

## LYNCH, CONTINUED

(continued from page 2)

as al-Jazeera, which had served as a virtual Arab public sphere as recently as early 2011, increasingly morphed into transparently partisan actors supporting the interests of their state patrons and local proxies.

Second, the media magnified the *fear and uncertainty* which inevitably accompany transitions, particularly when those transitions involve profound institutional disarray and potentially incipient anarchy. Where the media tended to support revolutionary enthusiasm by demonstrating success in the early Arab Spring, by the middle of 2011 it frightened viewers with terrifying accounts of violence and mayhem from Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The types of media which characterized the period of the uprisings (i.e., unreformed state media, weakly institutionalized private media, and intense social media) were particularly prone to exacerbating the fear of violence or political subjugation by publicizing worrisome information, ideas, and rumors, and by encouraging the self-segregation of sectors of the public into echo chambers where only such polarizing information tended to circulate. This media ecosystem tended to amplify and exacerbate the uncertainty associated with institutional change into existential fears.

Finally, where social media allowed the bridging of traditional political divides during mobilizational moments, after that moment of enthusiasm it offered the ideal conditions for intense *polarization*. Media outlets typically sought out a distinctive political niche and catered to that constituency to the exclusion of others. Islamists watched one set of television stations and Twitter feeds, while anti-Islamists consumed an entirely different set. Transnationally, al-Jazeera went from the primary source for news and political discourse across ideological lines to an outlet catering to Islamists and shunned by their enemies. Nationally, the media in transitional states like Egypt and Tunisia, as in failed states such as Syria, Libya and

Yemen, rapidly polarized as the moment of revolutionary enthusiasm gave way to hard political combat over the extent of reforms, the distribution of power, and the identity of the state. This self-segregation into ideological or sectarian clusters drove politics towards the extremes, undermined the common ground of politics, and intensified and accelerated conflicts and divisions.

### The Arab Media Ecosystem

Transnational, national, and social media interact with each other in intimate, intense ways, with a distinctive combination of media characterizing each national media ecosystem. These three types of media cannot be understood as discrete sources of information or opinion. Broadcast media relied heavily upon videos and images from social media, especially from war zones such as Syria and Libya, while social media users frequently retweeted and discussed the stories disseminated by broadcast and print media.

The Arab information environment differed from most other regions experiencing democratic transitions in three ways. By the late 2000s, most Arabs had hundreds of free-to-view satellite channels from which to choose, while internet access spread widely from initially low levels to near ubiquity in key urban centers. First, each individual Arab country was embedded within a transnational Arabic language media ecosystem of satellite television, pan-Arab newspapers and websites, and social media. Few of the transitions outside the Arab world have a comparable level of regular, intense transnational media involvement in national political spheres. Second, Arab national media sectors had a comparatively high degree of direct and indirect state control. Finally, the rapidly evolving social media introduced very new dynamics into the familiar democratic transitions of decades past.

These different media platforms formed a media ecology through which information

and ideas circulated through Arab politics, in a hyper-mediated environment in which states retained considerable structural power and in which all political actors saw the media as a potential weapon. During the period of relatively stable autocracy, this media ecosystem offered important opportunities to challenge state monopolies over information, expand the realm of political contention, and develop the foundations of a new public sphere. The potential for deeper change offered by the Arab uprisings dramatically raised the stakes for such public discourse at all levels: transnational, domestic, and social media.

### Transnational Broadcast Media

Transnational broadcast media, which had for a decade offered a platform for a region-wide public sphere, rapidly degenerated into an arena for regional power struggles and proxy wars, with al-Jazeera serving the interests of the Qatari regime and Saudi-owned media closely aligned with Riyadh's regional policies. Bahrain was one turning point, as Arab stations either did not cover or slanted their coverage of its popular uprising in sectarian terms to justify the Saudi-led intervention. Pan-Arab stations openly campaigned for chosen groups. Al-Jazeera came to be viewed as a publicity machine for Islamists such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia's Ennahda, while other Gulf-based stations peddled wild, sensational stories which fed anti-Islamist anger and suspicion. This partisan turn, along with the images of horrific violence and state collapse in Libya and Syria, likely contributed to the diminishing enthusiasm for popular uprisings. It also removed the possibility that transnational media could provide a neutral forum to help bridge the political divides between intensely contested national media.

### Domestic Media in Transitional States

A democratic transition from authoritarian rule should, in principle, entail the emergence of a more open national public sphere able to monitor domestic

politics, hold politicians to account, devote sustained attention to local issues, and become the site for national opinion formation. The early post-uprisings period in some Arab states did see the flourishing of a wide variety of new national media, from television to radio and newspapers. It did not last, however, due to the limited extent of institutional and legal reforms, the rapid polarization of politics, and resource constraints on new media initiatives.

It is worth briefly explaining why reforms to the media sector proved so difficult.<sup>3</sup> In the absence of settled rules of the game and intense polarization, all sides feared that these institutions could quickly come to be dominated by their political rivals. Where there is a broad political consensus, there may be the chance to establish independent, non-partisan institutional reforms. But where politics quickly becomes zero-sum and highly polarized, then every move towards institutional reform will be interpreted as a political purge aimed at institutional capture. Egypt's newly elected President Morsi, for instance, had every reason to seek fundamental change in the institutions at the heart of the old regime, from the Interior Ministry to state broadcasting, and most revolutionaries would agree that such change was essential. Every effort to actually do so, however, frightened political opponents who feared that Muslim Brothers would simply take over those institutions to impose their rule. A similar dynamic played out in Tunisia, where the attempt at reforming the media and the state led civil society and journalists to rally against what they viewed as an attempt by Ennahda to subordinate those institutions to an Islamist agenda.

The key transitional cases of Egypt and Tunisia had remarkably similar experiences with the media.<sup>4</sup> Most of Egypt's

3. Andrew K. Milton, "Bound But Not Gagged: Media Reform in Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Political Studies* 34(June 2001): 493-526.

4. Naomi Sakr, *Transformations in Egyptian*

independent media rallied to the side of the revolution in early 2011.<sup>5</sup> The sight of top generals being grilled on live TV by a revolution-sympathizing talk show host seemed like an early sign of the emergence of a public sphere in the classical sense. So did the robust, critical debate in the opinion pages of leading independent newspapers, which opened the debate to a wide range of new voices and relaxed the red lines constraining political criticism. Egyptian media outlets soon found themselves facing regulatory pressure, capture by powerful social groups, state intimidation, and attachment to local political trends. The state media sector remained largely intact.<sup>6</sup> Activists and protests were soon targeted by the military-controlled media, demonized as foreign-backed agents of destabilization and blamed for the country's ills. Though activists continued to find ways to creatively use new media, they were shouting into the abyss or preaching to a dwindling choir.

The Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the June 2012 Presidential shifted dynamics. Efforts to reform state institutions, including the media, now triggered intense

*Journalism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Edward Webb, *The Media in Tunisia and Egypt* (New York: Palgrave Pivots, 2014).

5. Ramy Aly, "Rebuilding Egyptian Media for a Democratic Future," *Arab Media and Society* 14 (Summer 2011); Mark A. Peterson, "Egypt's Media Ecology in a Time of Revolution," *Arab Media and Society* 14 (Summer 2011); Fatima el-Issawi and Bart Cammaerts, "Shifting Journalistic Rules in Democratic Transitions: Lessons from Egypt," *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism* OnlineFirst (April 15, 2015): 1-18; Anne Alexander and Miriyam Aoragh, "Egypt's Unfinished Revolution: The Role of the Media Revisited," *International Journal of Communication* 8 (2014): 890-915.

6. Jared Maslin, "Pro-regime journalists are shaping public opinion in Egypt," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 22 January 2015, [http://www.cjr.org/b-roll/egypt\\_sisi\\_mona\\_iraqi.php](http://www.cjr.org/b-roll/egypt_sisi_mona_iraqi.php); Rasha Abdulla, "Egypt's Media in the Midst of Revolution," *Carnegie Papers* (July 2014); Fahmy Howeydi, "Playing with the Media," *Al-Shorouk*, 20 August 2014 (Arabic); Mohammed Elmashed, "We Completely Agree: Egyptian Media in the Era of President el-Sisi," *Committee to Protect Journalists*, 28 April 28 2015, <https://cpj.org/2015/04/attacks-on-the-press-egyptian-media-in-the-era-of-president-el-sisi.php>; Amr Hamzawy, "Types of Arab Neo-Fascist Media," *Al-Masry al-Youm*, 19 July 2014 (Arabic).

fears of "Islamization." Constant reporting of economic and social breakdowns, along with widely circulating rumors of Islamist perfidy, fueled popular discontent and shaped the popular support for the July 2013 military coup. Following the coup, the regime formed an even tighter symbiosis with the media. Journalists and television hosts dropped any pretense of objectivity, competing with each other over who could most enthusiastically support the regime. Liberal politician Amr Hamzawy scathingly described this as a "neo-fascist" period for the Egyptian media.

Tunisia's pre-revolutionary media was far more rigidly controlled than Egypt's, but the experience proved remarkably similar. Serious efforts were made at media reform after the revolution: a new press code adopted in 2011; a new oversight body established in November 2012; robust protections for freedom of speech and the media included in the new Constitution, ratified in 2014. Nonetheless, national television and radio remained dominated by the old guard. Previously existing private television stations adapted quickly to the new market, with their owners often using them to promote their personal profile and advance their political agendas. Ennahda and its rivals each set up television stations to advance their agendas, leading, as in Egypt, to the fragmentation and self-segregation of the public into hostile, mutually incomprehensible camps. The media contributed to the near breakdown of Tunisia's transition in mid-2013 with sensational reporting on events like the assassination of opposition figure Chokri Belaid or allegations of Ennahda corruption and infiltration of state institutions. During the Tunisian Presidential campaign in the winter of 2014, a furious President Moncef Marzouki lashed out at the media as "sleeping remnants of the old party" and lambasted National TV as a "lying and corrupt media which doesn't have the right to speak in the name of Tunisians."<sup>7</sup>

7. Quoted in *Al-Balad*, November 3, 2014 (Arabic).

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### *Domestic Media in Non-Transitional and Failed States*

Arab regimes that did not experience transitions mostly proved able to use familiar media methods, from censorship to undermining opposition to mobilizing nationalist passions. In Morocco and Jordan, the regimes used both official and private outlets to mobilize support for the political order, market limited constitutional reforms, and raise fears of the bloody potential consequences of civic unrest. Regimes in the Gulf adopted especially draconian control against both the formal media sector and against individual online activists. Kuwait, which had long enjoyed one of the most open and contentious media spaces in the region, witnessed severe crackdowns after 2011, imprisoning multiple citizens for tweets criticizing the Emir and pressuring newspapers. Bahrain fiercely attacked independent media and oppositional online networks. These regimes typically found ways to manage the media to their benefit.

These mechanisms were exacerbated in countries where state institutions failed more dramatically and violent anarchy had become a reality rather than a concern. In Libya, for example, the proliferation of national and local television stations aligned with particular political factions contributed to polarization, fear, and insecurity.<sup>8</sup> The lack of a pre-existing media ecosystem, after decades of Qaddafi's autocratic rule, opened the door to highly partisan transnational media and social media to define the information space. Collapsing political institutions, the absence of reliable non-partisan media, and the very real violence magnified the impact of the information circulating through these media platforms.

8. Anja Wollenberg and Jason Pack. "Rebels with a Pen: Observations on the Newly Emergent Media Landscape in Libya," *Journal of North African Studies* 18 (February 2013): 191-210; Fatima el Issawi, "Transitional Libyan Media: Free at Last?" *Carnegie Papers* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).

### **Social Media**

Social media, which many had hoped would provide an antidote to the toxic legacy of official Arab media, could not escape – and often exacerbated – its pathologies during the transitions.<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt about the rapid growth of social media usage across the region, or of its broad political and cultural impact. As described above, however, social media should be understood as part of a broader media ecosystem rather than in isolation. Media and social media formed symbiotic relationships, with newspapers reporting on stories and publishing images appearing on blogs. In Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf, Twitter is the most important location of the public sphere, while Facebook plays a greater role in Egypt and much of North Africa. The importance of these social media platforms can in part be seen in the extreme efforts taken by regimes to control them, particularly with a wave of disproportionate punishments by Gulf states of satirical or critical tweets.

Social media is good at mobilizing transient coalitions around immediate, urgent protest issues, whether the demand to overthrow Hosni Mubarak or fury over police abuse in Ferguson, Missouri. It is less useful for the consolidation of long-term, strategic coalitions or the institutionalization of political movements. The allure of street battles and purist politics can prove far more attractive to mobilized youth, especially given the inevitable frustrations and inefficiencies of institutional democratic politics.

Two common features of socially mediated environments are particularly destructive in transitional situations. First, individuals embedded within informational clusters tend to be exposed disproportionately to confirming information, and when discordant information does appear it is usually only to be mocked or challenged.

9. Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media," *Journal of Democracy* 22 (July 2011): 35-48.

Debates within like-minded clusters tend to favor the more extreme voices over the voices of caution or moderation. This has very disturbing implications for socially, ethnically or politically divided countries, where social media homophilia may tend to exacerbate such cleavages and fuel the potential for violent conflict. Social media is very good at cultivating a sense of aggrieved identity among an in-group and mobilizing resentment and fury against out-groups. The enthusiastic online embrace of Egypt's military coup in the summer of 2013, the sectarianism which ran rampant through Gulf social media, and regional online support for violent jihadist factions in Syria show very powerfully how social media can empower illiberal forces.

Second, the accelerant and intensification effects of the extremely rapid spread of information and dissemination of visceral imagery can drive destructive, self-fulfilling prophecies of conflict. The Arab transitions were replete with the spread of such highly destructive rumors and falsehoods over social media, which undermined confidence in transitional orders. The mass media, both transnational and domestic, also generated enormous amounts of misinformation, partisan spin, and mobilizational content, which fed the social media mill.

### **The Media in Context**

The role of the media should of course not be viewed in isolation from the underlying political challenges. The pernicious effects of the Arab media took root in transitional environments characterized by institutional uncertainty, personal insecurity, and ideological or sectarian divisions. Such uncertainty, fear and anger created a fertile environment and eager audience for sensationalist media, which fanned rumors targeted at political adversaries, and fueled divisive and demonizing narratives. In particular, transitional moments in most Arab cases revealed profound disagreements about national identity and deep fears about the future. Long

delays and highly contested processes in the drafting of constitutions contributed to the intensity of these identity conflicts. Initial moments of unity consistently gave way to growing polarization around regional, ethnic, sectarian or ideological identities, and between Islamists and anti-Islamists. Populist, mobilizational media interacted with partisan, polarized social networks to drive discourse to the extremes and intensify divisions between groups.

The past two years have proven profoundly dispiriting to those who put faith in the

emergence of a new Arab public sphere. Regimes and old elites proved quite capable of adapting to the challenge and turning the new media environment to their advantage. The same media that helped to drive the diffusion of protest during the early Arab uprisings proved equally effective at driving resentment, fear, division and demobilization of exhausted publics. But despair is premature. The underlying transformations in the media environment that originally empowered the Arab uprisings have not disappeared. Nor have the deep grievances that originally sparked

the protest wave. When political conditions change, the media will likely once again accelerate and intensify episodic protests and political challenges to the brittle new authoritarian regimes in the region. If no lessons are learned from the previous few years, however, then the same destructive post-uprising path is likely to be repeated.

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(photo courtesy of Essam Sharaf/Flickr/Creative Commons)

## PETROVA, CONTINUED

(continued from page 4)

the Chinese blogosphere every 20 minutes to identify content that is deleted ex post. They find that Chinese censors were more likely to delete appeals for coordination and collective action than the content critical of the Communist Party of China. In a related study, King et al. (2014) performed a field experiment that confirms this finding. Using randomized blog postings in Chinese online social media they find that coordination messages indeed had a higher probability of being censored, as compared with information messages, which only contained critical information about the regime. Ananyev et al. (2015) present a formal model of online censorship with information and coordination aspects, arguing that regime stability and the costs of censorship determine the optimal censorship strategy. Empirically, they find that lower regime stability, measured by the yields on government bonds issued by different countries, increases governments' reliance on coordination censorship, such as denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, using daily data for 43 countries.<sup>4</sup>

### When Is Media Capture Most Likely?

The presence of media control, or media capture, depends on both "demand for capture", i.e. the incentives of politicians to control media, and "supply of capture," i.e. the willingness of the media outlets to change their content in exchange of favors. The absence of political competition and state ownership of media are important factors allowing governments to control media (Djankov et al., 2003), but other factors also play a role. The ability of media to earn independent revenues can successfully protect the media from capture by politicians or interest groups. For example,

4. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," *American Political Science Review* 107 (May 2013): 326-343; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, "Reverse-Engineering Censorship In China: Randomized Experimentation And Participant Observation" *Science* 345(August 22, 2014): 891; Maxim Ananyev, Maria Petrova, and Galina Zudenkova, "Content and Coordination Censorship in Authoritarian Regimes," (unpublished manuscript, 2015).

Baldasty (2002) suggests that the growth of advertising – or "commercialization of the news" – was one of the drivers of the development of independent press in the United States. Petrova (2011) empirically tests the claim that an increase in advertising helped newspapers in 19th century U.S. to become independent. More specifically, the paper shows that newspapers were more likely to enter the market as independents or more likely to switch their political affiliation to an independent affiliation in places with higher growth of advertising revenues. The effect holds if after instrumenting for advertising revenues using restrictions for outdoor advertising and handbill distribution. These results confirm that growth of advertising was an important driving force in the development of an independent press in 19th century United States. Similarly, Qin et al. (2014) suggest that commercialization of the news is an important factor affecting the content of newspapers in modern China. They find that newspapers, which are less directly controlled by the Communist Party and partially depend on commercial revenues, have a lower probability of reporting about low-level corruption. At the same time, more commercial newspapers are more likely to produce entertaining content such as articles about sports or celebrities.<sup>5</sup>

Several papers look at the determinants of media capture and media freedom in cross-country perspective. Egorov et al. (2009) show that higher oil revenues are associated with lower media freedom, and this effect is especially strong in nondemocratic countries. Their argument is that free media monitor bureaucratic behavior, but this monitoring is beneficial for autocrats

5. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer, "Who Owns the Media?" *Journal of Law and Economics* 46(October 2003): 341-82; Gerald Baldasty, *The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1992); Maria Petrova, "Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press," *American Political Science Review* 105(November 2011): 790-808; Bei Qin, Yanhui Wu, and David Strömberg, "Determinants of Media Capture in China," (unpublished manuscript, 2014).

only if oil rents are not too high, and bureaucrats are still important for economic growth. Petrova (2008) shows that income inequality leads to lower media freedom, as rich elites have incentives to manipulate public opinion to prevent redistribution. VonDoepp and Young (2013) show that media capture also depends on regime stability, since governments that are uncertain about staying in power have stronger incentives to control the media.<sup>6</sup>

### What Is the Effect of Media Capture?

Recent empirical work demonstrates that even controlled media can have a significant causal effect on people's behavior. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), for example, shows how media availability can promote violence. Specifically, he uses geographical variation in accessibility of the RTL radio in Rwanda, which openly called for violence against the Tutsi minority population at that time, and he finds that the radio was responsible for 10 percent of anti-Tutsi violence during 1994 genocide events. The paper also suggests that the impact of radio is multiplied by social interactions, which can explain geographic spillovers in violence.<sup>7</sup>

Adena et al. (2015) look at the impact of radio in Weimar Republic and in Nazi Germany, using variation in area topography and in radio content for identification. They find that radio had an important effect on Nazi party support. Specifically, before 1933, when Nazis had almost no access to radio, radio availability decreased vote shares of NSDAP. After Hitler became the Chancellor in January 1933, the availability of radio had a positive effect on different

6. Georgy Egorov, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin, "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory And Evidence From Panel Data," *American Political Science Review* 103 (November 2009): 645-668; Maria Petrova, "Inequality and Media Capture," *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (February 2008): 183-212; Peter VonDoepp and Daniel Young, "Assaults on the Fourth Estate: Explaining Media Harassment in Africa," *Journal of Politics*, 75 (January 2013): 36-51.

7. David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129 (November 2014), 1947-1994.

indicators of Nazi support, such as voting for NSDAP, joining the party in spring 1933, discrimination against Jews in 1933-1934, and more violent expressions of anti-Semitism in the late 1930s.

### Can an Independent Media Mitigate Media Capture?

A separate but related question is whether independent media can become important when other media are controlled. Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) examine the effect of an independent TV channel (NTV) on support for the pro-governmental *Unity* party in the 1999 Russian Parliamentary elections. In this election, there was one independent TV channel critical of *Unity* to which only a portion of the population had access, whereas the entire population had access to government-controlled TV channels that supported *Unity*. Using idiosyncratic geographical variation that exogenously determined access to NTV, the authors find that exposure to NTV increased combined vote share of the opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, while decreasing the vote share of *Unity* by 8.9 percentage points.

There is also evidence on the effect of cross-border exposure to independent television from Western Germany on the behavior of people in Eastern Germany, where the pro-Communist government controlled all the media inside the country.<sup>8</sup> They find that Eastern Germans with exposure to Western TV were more likely to support communism and less likely to apply for asylum, probably because they knew more about Western Germany and were less likely to idealize it. These results also suggest independent media is important when most other media outlets are controlled by the governments.

### Can Social Media Mitigate Media Capture?

Finally, in environments in which traditional media is controlled, social media

8. Jens Hainmueller and Holger Kern, "Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes," *Political Analysis* 17 (Autumn 2009): 377-99.

can play a role. For example, Enikolopov, Petrova, and Sonin (2015) provide evidence that publications in a Russian blog about corruption in state-controlled companies significantly affected the stock market performance of the targeted companies and their corporate practices. Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova (2015) show that higher penetration of the leading online social network in Russia had a positive effect on the incidence and the size of political protests in 2011-2012, possibly because of the reduced costs of collective action. To identify this effect, they exploit over-time variation in the origins of students who studied at St. Petersburg State University as an instrument for network penetration. Similarly, Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun (2015) demonstrate that in the aftermath of Arab Spring in Egypt, the content of social media predicted the size of next-day political protests.<sup>9</sup>

### What Are the Limits on the Powers of Media Capture?

Although the existing research suggests that media capture can have an important effect, the effects may be limited by several mechanisms. If readers or viewers know that media is captured, they can discount information coming from the biased sources. Bai et al. (2015) test this directly in a lab experiment by looking at how people update their beliefs about air pollution in China after receiving information from either government-controlled or independent sources. They found that people do not fully discount information coming from government media, and overall have problems with interpreting information from conflicting sources. On the other hand, Knight and Tribin (2015) use high-frequency ratings of different programs in Venezuela to show that

9. Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Konstantin Sonin, "Social Media and Corruption," (unpublished manuscript, 2015); Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova, "Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia," (unpublished manuscript, 2015); Daron Acemoglu, Tarek Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun, "The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt's Arab Spring," (unpublished manuscript, 2015).

viewers are likely to turn off propaganda messages in the form of *cadenas*, unexpected interruptions of TV programming by Hugo Chavez speeches. This response was stronger for viewers of opposition-leaning channels. Viewers were also more likely to switch to cable opposition channels, which were not required to show *cadenas*.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, there is evidence that propaganda may backfire if a propaganda message is too different from prior beliefs of the audience. Adena et al. (2015) show that impact of radio in Nazi Germany depended on citizens' predispositions. Although, on average, radio exposure increased denunciation of Jews and anti-Semitic violence, they find that in places in which population was historically tolerant to Jews, exposure to radio actually decreased denunciation of Jews and anti-Semitic violence, consistent with idea that propaganda can backfire.

### Conclusion

Empirical evidence shows that politicians are often able to control the media. There are several implications from the recent literature to understand the role of mass media in such environments. First, controlled media outlets have different content from independent media outlets, and governments in different countries use various methods for controlling the media. Second, even controlled media might still affect people's behavior. Third, independent and social media are especially important in environments where other media outlets are captured. Finally, there are limits to the propaganda power of controlled media.

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10. Jie Bai, Mikhail Golosov, Nancy Qian, and Yan Kai, "Understanding the Influence of Government Controlled Media: Evidence from Air Pollution in China," (unpublished manuscript, 2015); Brian Knight and Anna Tribin, "The Limits of Propaganda: Evidence from Chavez's Venezuela," (unpublished manuscript, 2015).

## SECTION NEWS

### 2015 Section Award Winners

#### Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy

Henry Thomson (University of Oxford) for his dissertation on "Food and Power: Authoritarian Regime Durability and Agricultural Policy." Thomson completed his PhD in Political Science at the University of Minnesota.

**Committee Members:** Leonid Peisakhin (New York University); Paula Valeria Munoz Chirinos (Universidad del Pacifico); and Arturas Rozenas (New York University).

#### Committee's Remarks on the Award

**Winner:** Henry Thomson's dissertation is an especially insightful and in-depth study of the dynamics of authoritarian survival. Thomson sets out to explain how authoritarian rulers manipulate agricultural policies and resultant food prices under the pressure of demands from urban residents and rural agricultural producers. Thomson demonstrates that dictators who are especially dependent on elite support are likely to tolerate higher food prices in order to appease large-scale agricultural producers. This argument challenges the common wisdom that dictators are especially beholden to urban interests. Forced to pander to wealthy rural interests by the nature of elite politics, some authoritarians are pushed onto a particular developmental trajectory, which eventually comes to shape democratic transition via feedback loops. In laying out his argument and supporting it with empirics, Thomson brings to bear an impressive knowledge of the theories of political development and masterfully deploys cross-national data as well as a fascinating case study of Imperial Germany under Bismarck. All in all, the author tackles an important and overlooked question with theoretical rigor, meticulous attention to detail, and stellar use of empirical methods, all along remaining keenly aware of the argument's limitations and pitfalls. These qualities make this dissertation especially worthy of the legacy of Juan Linz.

### Best Book Award

Kurt Weyland (University of Texas at Austin) for *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since 1848* (Cambridge University Press).

*Honorable Mentions:* Rachel Beatty Ridel (Northwestern University) for *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa* (Cambridge University Press) and Ben Ansell (University of Oxford) and David Samuels (University of Minnesota) for *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach* (Cambridge University Press).

**Committee Members:** Scott Mainwaring (University of Notre Dame); Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (University of Pittsburgh); and Anna Grzymala-Busse (University of Michigan).

#### Committee's Remarks on the Award

**Winner:** The committee selected Kurt Weyland's book, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*, as the winner of the 2015 prize for the best book in comparative democratization among the 35 books submitted. *Making Waves* covers a grand sweep of time and geography with an interesting original research question and argument. Weyland notes that early waves of regime contention in Europe (1848 and 1917-19) occurred more rapidly but with lower rates of success of achieving democracy than a later wave in South America (1979-90).

To explain this puzzle, he develops an organizational argument grounded in theories of bounded rationality. The earlier waves of contention occurred before political parties, labor unions, and other organizations that characterize modern mass democracy became well-entrenched. As a result, popular contention spread rapidly, but without leadership that took more informed decisions. In contrast, organizational leaders with more information and more seasoned judgments had the capacity to spur or

moderate popular contention in the third wave of democratization. Protest against authoritarian regimes spread more slowly, but it was more likely to succeed.

The committee recognized with Honorable Mention citations the excellent books by Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels, *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*, and Rachel Beatty Riedl, *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*.

### Best Article Award

Jordan Gans-Morse (Northwestern University), Sebastian Mazzuca (Universidad Nacional de San Martín and CIAS), and Simeon Nichter (University of California, San Diego) for their article "Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections" *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (April 2014): 415-432.

**Committee Members:** Lisa Blaydes (Stanford University); Nahomi Ichino (University of Michigan); and Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University).

#### Committee's Remarks on the Award

**Winner:** This article presents a unified theoretical framework to explain the mix of clientelistic strategies that political parties may employ in an election with the distribution of voters in two dimensions: how inclined they are to vote and whether they favor the party. The model generates predictions on who is bought in an election, and therefore, predictions on the optimal mix of four strategies in an election: vote buying, turnout buying, rewarding loyal voters, and double persuasion. It further explores how several factors in the political environment shapes the optimal mix of strategies. The article uses examples from around the world to illustrate the impact of institutional changes such as the introduction of compulsory voting, the secret ballot and characteristics of the electorate and party system such as political polarization. This study recasts our

understanding of vote-buying and related strategies in a broader context and generates a set of novel hypotheses that can be applied and tested in diverse settings around the world and across time.

#### **Best Field Work Award**

Barry Driscoll (University of Wisconsin - Madison) for his work on "The Perverse Effects of Political Competition: Building Capacity for Patronage in Ghana" and Colm Fox (Singapore Management University) for his work on "Appealing to the Masses."

*Honorable Mention:* Michael Broache (Columbia University) for his work on "Assessing the Impact of International Criminal Court Prosecutions During Ongoing Conflict."

**Committee Members:** Milli Lake (Arizona State University); Michael Weintraub (Binghamton) and Calvert Jones (University of Maryland).

#### **Committee's Remarks on the Award**

**Winners:** The selection committee for the Comparative Democratization Section's Best Fieldwork Award has enthusiastically selected Barry Driscoll and Colm Fox as co-recipients of the 2015 award.

Both recipients explored questions related to electoral mobilization at the subnational level: Driscoll in Ghana and Fox in Indonesia. Driscoll's dissertation, "The Perverse Effects of Political Competition: Building Capacity for Patronage in Ghana" found that Ghanaian party leaders offered club rewards to local activists for ensuring that constituents turned out to vote. Contrary to the findings of much of the recent scholarship on political competition, districts with greater electoral competition fostered patronage networks, whereas districts with less competition facilitated the more equitable distribution of public resources. Colm Fox's dissertation, "Appealing to the Masses" similarly examined the conditions under which electoral candidates mobilized

support in diverse subnational settings, interrogating the role of ethnic visual cues in Indonesian campaign materials. Among other fascinating insights, in analyzing over 15,000 election posters across rural Indonesia, Fox identified two categories of visual appeals on the basis of ethnicity: bonding and bridging cues. Candidates tended to display "bonding" cues when their own ethnic group comprised a majority in any district, while displaying "bridging" cues to appeal across ethnic lines when the support of other groups was needed to secure electoral victory.

Both Fox and Driscoll demonstrated incredible skill, creativity and methodological innovation in the research practices they employed in the field. Both spent years immersing themselves in their respective fieldsites, becoming proficient in local languages and dialects, and intimately acquainted with regional political culture. Both employed an impressive combination of methodological approaches in order to develop, substantiate, test and refine their arguments.

Over the course of his research in Ghana, Driscoll implemented a comprehensive survey of tax collection and public goods provision in 88% of Ghana's 170 local governments. He supplemented this work with exciting ethnographic and interview-based research with civil servants and market traders across the country, offering crucial new insights into the realities of tax collection and public goods provision in areas of weak state capacity. Fox, on the other hand, spent nearly two years collecting and photographing campaign materials in a convenience sample of nine district elections to create the largest dataset of election posters ever gathered. Additionally, he employed a rigorous analysis of election-related news coverage from 1997 to 2011 and months of immersive observational research in selected districts in order to deepen his understanding of the types of ethnic appeals made by candidates.

The committee is also delighted to extend an honorable mention to Michael Broache for his dissertation: "Assessing the Impact of International Criminal Court Prosecutions During Ongoing Conflict." Broache's research into combatant responses to ICC prosecutions in the Democratic Republic of Congo presented powerful military and rebel elites with hypothetical scenarios in order to assess their knowledge, behavior and decision-making processes on the battlefield. Broache conducted in-depth interviews in a highly volatile research environment, at times placing himself at considerable personal risk, in order to shed light on an important topic in comparative politics and international relations for which existing data is notoriously thin.

The committee extends heartfelt congratulations to each of the recipients of this year's award.

#### **Best Paper Award**

Kenneth Greene (University of Texas at Austin) for his paper on "Ousting Autocrats: The Political Economy of Hybrid Autocracy."

**Committee Members:** Christian Houle (Michigan State University); Michael Albertus (University of Chicago); and Ryan Kennedy (University of Houston).

#### **Committee's Remarks on the Award**

**Winner:** We are pleased to award the best paper prize in comparative democratization to Kenneth Greene's paper 'Ousting Autocrats: The Political Economy of Hybrid Autocracy.' Kenneth Greene develops an innovative argument according to which the capacity of incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes to retain power depends primarily on their ability to politicize public resources. He supports his argument using both quantitative and qualitative evidence. This paper has the potential to make a very valuable contribution to diverse subfields, such as the study of comparative

## Section News

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authoritarian regimes, of the incumbency advantage and of regime transitions.

### Call for Nominations: Section Awards at APSA Annual Meeting:

The Comparative Democratization Section will present five awards for scholarly work at the 2016 APSA annual meeting in Philadelphia: the Linz Prize for Best Dissertation, and the Best Book, Best Article, Best Field Work, and Best Paper prizes. Members are strongly encouraged to submit nominations (including, for several awards, self-nominations) to the appropriate committees listed below. Please also forward this information to colleagues and graduate students. We ask you to note the eligibility criteria, deadlines for submissions, and materials that must accompany nominations; direct any queries to the committee chairs.

### Juan Linz Prize for Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy

Given for the best dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy completed and accepted in the two calendar years immediately prior to the APSA Annual Meeting where the award will be presented (2014 or 2015 for the 2016 Annual Meeting). The prize can be awarded to analyses of individual country cases as long as they are clearly cast in a comparative perspective. A hard copy of the dissertation, accompanied by a letter of support from a member of the dissertation committee, should be sent to each member of the prize selection committee.

**Deadline: March 15, 2016**

#### Committee Chair:

Henry Thomson  
Nuffield College  
New Road  
Oxford, OX11NF, UK  
henry.thomson@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

#### Committee Members:

Mai Hassan  
Department of Political Science  
University of Michigan

1303 Granger Avenue, Apt #2  
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Christian von Soest  
Head of Research Program 2: Violence and Security  
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies  
GIGA Office Berlin  
Friedrichstrasse 206  
10969 Berlin, Germany  
christian.vonsoest@giga-hamburg.de

#### Best Article Award

Single-authored or co-authored articles focusing directly on the subject of democratization and published in 2015 are eligible. Nominations and self-nominations are encouraged. Copies of the article should be sent by email to each of the committee members.

**Deadline: March 15, 2016**

#### Committee Chairs:

Jordan Gans-Morse  
Department of Political Science  
Northwestern University  
Scott Hall #203  
601 University Place  
Evanston, IL 60208  
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Simeon Nichter  
Department of Political Science  
UC San Diego  
9500 Gilman Dr.  
La Jolla, CA 92093  
nichter@ucsd.edu

#### Best Book Award

Given for the best book in the field of

Comparative Democratization published in 2015 (authored, co-authored or edited). Copies of the nominated book should be sent to each committee member in time to arrive by March 15, 2016. Books received after this deadline cannot be considered.

**Deadline: March 15, 2016**

#### Committee Chair:

Kurt Weyland  
Department of Government  
University of Texas at Austin  
158 W. 21st St. A1800  
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#### Committee Members:

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Rachel Beatty Riedl  
Sciences Po bordeaux  
Les afriques dans le monde  
Institut d'Etudes politiques  
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Domaine Universitaire  
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#### Best Field Work Award

This prize rewards dissertation students who conduct especially innovative and difficult fieldwork. Scholars who are currently writing their dissertations or who complete their dissertations in 2015 are eligible. Candidates must submit two chapters of their dissertation and a letter of nomination from the chair of their dissertation committee describing the field work. The material submitted must describe the field work in detail and should provide one or two key insights from the evidence collected in the field. The chapters may be sent electronically or in hard copy directly to each committee member.

**Deadline: March 15, 2016****Committee Chair:**

Barry Driscoll  
Department of Political Science  
Grinnell College  
1210 Park St  
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Grinnell, IA 50112  
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**Committee Members:**

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mbroache@ut.edu

Colm Fox

Singapore Management University  
90 Stamford Road, Level 4, #04-052  
Singapore 178903  
colmfox@smu.edu.sg

**Best Paper Award**

Given to the best paper on Comparative Democratization presented at the previous year's APSA Convention. Papers can be nominated by panel chairs or discussants. Self-submissions are also encouraged.

**Deadline: March 15, 2016****Committee Chair:**

Kenneth F. Greene  
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**Committee Members:**

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Edmund Malesky

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Duke University

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**NEWS FROM MEMBERS**

**Michael Albertus**, assistant professor of political science, University of Chicago, published *Autocracy and Redistribution: the Politics of Land Reform* (Cambridge University Press, 2015). The book challenges traditional conceptions of land reform and offers a new theory and typology for understanding land reform policies under democracies and dictatorships.

Albertus also published "Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above" in *Latin American Research Review* (Vol. 50, No. 2); "The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics: Political Bias in Venezuela's Land Reform under Chavez" in the September 2015 *Comparative Political Studies*, and will publish "Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico" in the forthcoming *World Development*.

**Gerardo Berthin**, senior democracy and governance associate, Tetra Tech International Development, published "Democratic Governance and Corruption in Latin America" in *Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species?* (Taylor and Francis, 2015), edited by Richard Millett, Jennifer Holmes, and Orlando Perez. The chapter explores the persistence of both perceptions of corruption and corrupt practices and the effects on democratic governance.

**Archie Brown**, Emeritus Professor of Politics, Oxford University, and Emeritus Fellow, St. Anthony's College, was given the Distinguished Contributions to Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies Award for 2015 by the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. He also published "Questioning

the Mythology of the Strong Leader" in the August 2015 *Leadership*, in which he argues that contemporary political commentary attributes too much power to individual leaders, ignoring the impact of deliberative policy-making and enabling the myth of the "strong" leader in both autocracies and democracies.

**Lenka Bustikova**, assistant professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State University, published "Voting, Identity and Security Threats in Ukraine: Who Supports the Ukrainian 'Svoboda' Party?" available online July 26, 2015, in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. The article uses 2010 survey data to show that support for Svoboda was rooted not in ethnic hostility but in anxiety over perceived threats to the identity of the Ukrainian state.

**Melani Cammett**, professor of government, Harvard University, published *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, fourth edition (Westview Press, 2015) with Ishac Diwan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury. This edition includes two new introductory chapters as well as new discussion of oil economies, private sector growth, crony capitalism, and civil society.

Cammett also received awards for two books published in 2014: *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Cornell University Press, 2014) received the 2015 Giovanni Sartori Book Award from the APSA Section on Qualitative and Multi-Method Research and was an honorable mention for the 2015 Gregory Luebbert Book Award from the APSA Section on Comparative Politics, and *The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare* (Cornell University Press, 2014) received an honorable mention for the 2015 Outstanding Book Award of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action.

**Michael Coppedge**, professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, and

## Section News

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co-principal investigator, Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) Institute, has issued a call for papers for a fall 2106 conference at the University of Notre Dame to mark the release of the latest V-Dem data, which will be released on December 31, 2015. Topics can include anything that employs V-Dem data and is related to the nature, causes, or consequences of democracy or its components; or research on measurement methods. If you would like to be considered for an invitation to this conference, send an abstract and CV to Michael Coppedge at [coppedge.1@nd.edu](mailto:coppedge.1@nd.edu) by November 20, 2015. More information regarding the V-Dem project may be found at <http://www.v-dem.net>.

**Arolda Elbasani**, Visiting Fellow, European University Institute, published "Islam and Democracy at the Fringes of Europe: The Role of Useful Historical Legacies" in the June 2015 *Politics and Religion*. The article examines how Albanian Muslims contributed to democratization and European integration in post-Communist Albania. She also edited *The Revival of Islam in the Balkans: From Identity to Religiosity* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) with Olivier Roy. This edited volume uses a cross-country approach to examine the complex relationships between the post-communist Balkan states and Islam.

**Natalia Forrat**, doctoral candidate in sociology, Northwestern University, published "The Political Economy of Russian Higher Education: Why Does Putin Support Research Universities?" available online June 23, 2015, in *Post-Soviet Affairs*. The article explains that Russian government support for research universities reinforced the regime by dividing university communities, masking attacks on university autonomy, and containing anti-regime student activity.

**Vladimir Gel'man**, professor of political science and sociology, European University

in St. Petersburg, published *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015). The book explores the development of electoral authoritarianism in Russia. Gel'man also published "The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia," available online August 10, 2015, in *Post-Soviet Affairs*. The article examines the incentives responsible for Russia's poor record of post-Soviet economic reform and presents options for changing them.

**Maiah Jaskowski**, assistant professor of politics and international affairs, coauthored and coedited *American Crossings: Border Politics in the Western Hemisphere* with Arturo C. Sotomayor and Harold A. Trinkunas (Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). The book examines the complicated modern history of borders in the Western Hemisphere and their impact as geopolitical boundaries, key locations for internal security, spaces for international trade, and areas where national and community identities are defined.

**Debra Javeline**, associate professor of political science, University of Notre Dame, published "Expert Opinion on Extinction Risk and Climate Change Adaptation for Biodiversity," available July 15, 2015, in *Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene* with Jessica J. Hellmann, Jason S. Mclachlan, Dov F. Sax, Mark W. Schwartz, and Rodrigo Castro Cornejo. The article discusses the circumstances in which managed relocation of species threatened by climate change is a justifiable conservation tactic.

**Jeremy Kleidosty** is now a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland, where he will work on a research project entitled "Political Power in the Early Modern European and Islamic Worlds." He recently published a book entitled *The Concert of Civilizations: The Common Roots of Western and Islamic Constitutionalism* (Ashgate, 2015), in which he develops a definition

of constitutionalism through which cross-cultural comparisons are possible.

**Maria Koinova**, reader in international relations, Warwick University, published "Sustained vs. Episodic Mobilization Among Conflict-Generated Diasporas," available July 8, 2015, in *International Political Science Review*. The article explores differing mobilization patterns among conflict diaspora groups from the same region living in the same host country, suggesting that issues binding the diaspora, the host-state, and the home-state are crucial to the creation of sustained diaspora movements.

**David Kuehn**, research fellow, Heidelberg University, and **Aurel Croissant**, professor of political science, University of Heidelberg, have obtained funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft to conduct a three-year research project entitled "Dictator's Endgame: Theory and Empirical Analysis of Military Behavior in Authoritarian Regime Crises, 1946-2014." The project will begin October 2015 and will explore the conditions under which militaries defend, or defect from, authoritarian regimes under threat from popular mobilization and how different forms of defection can be explained.

**Carl LeVan**, assistant professor of international service, American University, published "When Talk Trumps Text: the Democratizing Effects of Deliberation During Constitution-Making, 1974-2011" with **Todd A. Eisenstadt**, professor of government, American University, and Tofigh Maboudi in the August 2015 *American Political Science Review*. The authors use data from 138 constitutions in 118 countries to explore the effects of constitution-making on democratization.

LeVan also edited *African State Governance: Subnational Politics and National Power* (July 2015) with Joseph Olayinka Fashagba and Edward R. McMahon. The book contains

chapters on Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa, with a strong focus on state-level legislative politics. Receive 30% off the list price by emailing [levan@american.edu](mailto:levan@american.edu) for a coupon from the publisher.

**Staffan I. Lindberg**, professor of political science, University of Gothenburg, was selected to the editorial board of the *American Journal of Political Science* and was recently appointed director of the V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The institute has been recognized as a university-wide research infrastructure by the Vice Chancellor of the University, making it a candidate for 7-year institutional grants by the Swedish Research Council. He is also co-author on a series of nine articles in the V-Dem Working Paper Series/SSRN V-Dem Journal. Lindberg published "From Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation in Africa, 1986–2012" with Carolien van Ham in the July 2015 *Government and Opposition*.

**Cyenne Loyle** is now assistant professor of political science, Indiana University, where she will be teaching courses on human rights and conflict studies.

**Stanislav Markus**, assistant professor of political science, University of Chicago, published *Property, Protection, and Predation: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge, 2015). The book advances understanding of this issue beyond state predation and commitment to property rights (or lack thereof), instead proposing a broader theory of agent predation and the firm-level alliances that allow property owners to protect themselves.

Markus will also publish "Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights: The Case of Ukraine's Orange Revolution," available online July 23, 2015, in *Studies in Comparative International Development*, in which he explores the unexpectedly negative relationship between democratization and property rights.

**Yonatan L. Morse**, assistant professor of teaching, Georgetown University, will publish "From Single-Party to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Institutional Origins of Competitiveness in Post-Cold War Africa" in the October 2015 *Comparative Politics*. The article highlights differences in party institutionalization and patterns of social incorporation as key aspects that help explain the competitiveness of elections.

**Alina Mungiu-Pippidi**, professor of democracy studies, Hertie School of Governance, published *The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption* (Cambridge University Press, 2015). The book examines the governance structures used to maintain integrity in the allocation of public resources while diminishing systemic corruption and explores how to influence governance to protect the rights of policy-makers and civil societies to defend those resources.

**Pippa Norris**, McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Government, Harvard University, and director, Electoral Integrity Project, published the second installment in her trilogy on electoral integrity, *Why Elections Fail* (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Using structural, international, and institutional accounts of elections which fail to meet international standards, Norris argues for the need to prevent political actors from manipulating electoral integrity while allocating sufficient resources and capacities for officials to manage elections effectively. She also co-edited the 2015 executive report, *Checkbook Elections: Political Finance in Comparative Perspective* with Andrea Abel van Es and **Lisa Fennis**, project coordinator, Electoral Integrity Project. The report, copublished by Global Integrity, the Sunlight Foundation, and the Electoral Integrity Project, can be found at [www.moneypoliticaltransparency.org/](http://www.moneypoliticaltransparency.org/).

**Olukunle Owolabi**, assistant professor of political science, Villanova University, published "Literacy and Democracy despite Slavery: Forced Settlement and Postcolonial Outcomes in the Developing World" in the October 2015 *Comparative Politics*. The article examines the impact of forced settlement on the developmental legacy of countries decolonized after 1945 finding that forced settlement colonialism resulted in significantly higher literacy rates and higher mean levels of postcolonial democracy than domination over indigenous populations.

**Ani Sarkissian** was recently promoted to associate professor of political science at Michigan State University. Her recently published book, *The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion* (Oxford University Press, 2015), explores the various forms of religious repression and their challenges to democratization, pluralism, and civil society development.

**Carsten Q. Schneider**, associate professor of political science, Central European University, and Kristin Makszin won the 2014 Socio-Economic Review Annual Prize for their article, "Forms of Welfare Capitalism and Education-Based Participatory Inequality," published in the March 2014 *Socio-Economic Review*. The article analyzes how institutional conditions shape the impact of differences in education on political participation in capitalist democracies.

**Mariela Szwarcberg**, assistant professor of political science, Reed College, published *Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina* (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Observing the consolidation of clientelism alongside democratic development, this book explains the perverse incentives for utilizing clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters in poor neighborhoods and the consolidation of political machines at the local level.

## Section News/New Research

**Jan Teorell**, professor of political science, Lund University, is currently a Fernand Braudel Fellow at the European University Institute in Italy for the 2015-2016 academic year. He recently published "Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-Level Analysis of Electoral Contestation" with **John Gerring**, professor of political science, Boston University, and Maxwell Palmer in the August 2015 *American Political Science Review* and "A Quality of Government Peace? Explaining the Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1985-2001" in the October 2015 *International Interactions*.

**Gunes Murat Tezcur** is now the Jalal Talabany Chair of Kurdish Political Studies at the University of Central Florida.

**Michael Wahman** is now an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri. He published "Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?" with Christian von Soest in the October 2015 *Democratization*. The article explains that although sanctions do not generally increase the level of democracy, they increase the instability of authoritarian rule which is associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change. Wahman's article "Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa" also became available online on July 23, 2015, in *Party Politics*.

**Brian Wampler**, professor of political science, Boise State University, published *Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking Institutions* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2015). The book examines the proliferation of democratic institutions within Belo Horizonte, Brazil and how those institutions have transformed the manner in which citizens, civil society organizations, and political parties work together to generate political and social change.

**Christian Welzel**, professor of political culture research, University Lueneburg, was awarded the 2014 Stein Rokkan Prize for his book *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). The book explores reasons for the recent expansion of universal freedoms and democracy while providing a well-reasoned theory of emancipation.

**Matthew Winters** is now an associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

**Jong-Sung You**, senior lecturer of political and social change, Australian National University, published "The Cheonan Incident and the Declining Freedom of Expression in South Korea" in the April 2015 *Asian Perspective*. Examining the controversy surrounding North Korean culpability for the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan warship, this article discusses South Korea's reliance on national security rhetoric and criminal defamation to suppress free speech. His earlier article with **Stephan Haggard**, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies, University of California-San Diego, "Freedom of Expression in South Korea," was published in the January 2015 *Journal of Contemporary Asia* and discusses the country's declining freedom of speech more broadly.

## NEW RESEARCH

### SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

#### *Journal of Democracy*

The October 2015 (Vol. 26, no. 4) *Journal of Democracy* features clusters of articles on "Authoritarianism Goes Global" and "After the Arab Spring," as well as individual articles on militarism in Latin America and non-Western democracies.

"The Rise of the World's Poorest Countries" by Steven Radelet  
*Widely believed to be hopelessly mired in*

*poverty, stagnation, and dictatorship, the developing world has in fact been making steady progress for over two decades in health, education, income, and conflict reduction, along with democracy.*

### Authoritarianism Goes Global (II)

I. "The Leninist Roots of Civil Society Repression" by Anne Applebaum  
*East European communists inherited the Bolshevik obsession with repressing any genuinely independent civil society groups.*

II. "Civil Society Under Assault" by Douglas Rutzen

*Once widely celebrated, civil society today is regarded as a threat by many governments, leading them to restrict its funding and activities.*

III. "The Kremlin's Information War" by Peter Pomerantsev

*The Kremlin is now bringing to the rest of the world the kind of propaganda and conspiracy theories it has been churning out at home.*

IV. "China's Foreign Propaganda Machine" by Anne-Marie Brady

*China is aggressively working to reshape its image, touting the "Chinese Dream" and its desire for a peaceful rise to power on the international stage.*

"Decentralizing for a Deeper, More Supple Democracy" by Jean-Paul Faguet, Ashley M. Fox, and Caroline Pöschl

*Can decentralization deepen democracy or is it doomed to weaken the state? If well designed, decentralization can have a positive impact on national unity, conflict mitigation, policy autonomy, service delivery, and social learning.*

### After the Arab Spring

I. "Caught in History's Crosswinds" by Michele Dunne

*We are still struggling to understand the mostly bitter harvest of the Arab Spring, but there are a few lessons that can be drawn.*

II. "People Still Want Democracy" by Michael Robbins

*Data from the Arab Barometer suggest that Arabs have not rejected democracy. In fact, they still by and large believe in it and want it.*

III. "How the Media Trashed the Transitions" by Marc Lynch

*The Arab experience shows that the same media that facilitate the toppling of dictators can make it harder to build democracy.*

IV. "Do Muslims Vote Islamic Now?" by Charles Kurzman and Didem Türkoglu

*Islamic political parties were not especially popular with voters in Muslim-majority countries before the Arab Spring. Has that changed?*

V. "The Islamist Compromise in Tunisia" by Kasper Ly Netterstrøm

*How did a potent Islamist movement come to accept a non-Islamist constitution? The answer lies in that movement's self-protective reflexes.*

VI. "Are Secular Parties the Answer?" by Mieczystaw P. Boduszyński, Kristin Fabbe, and Christopher Lamont

*A close look at secular parties in the Middle East today raises doubts about whether they are ready for prime time.*

"Exploring 'Non-Western Democracy'" by Richard Youngs

*Often called for but seldom defined with any precision, "non-Western democracy" could end up giving cover to authoritarianism, but also could allow potentially useful democratic innovations to be tried and tested.*

"A New Militarism in Latin America" by Rut Diamint

*Latin American countries are burdened with domestic security problems and institutional weaknesses that have led to a rising political role for the military forces. Are there serious dangers in this "turn toward the barracks"?*

The July 2015 (Vol. 26, no. 3) *Journal of*

*Democracy* features a cluster of articles on "Authoritarianism Goes Global," as well as individual case studies on Azerbaijan, Rwanda, Hungary, Nigeria, China, and authoritarian successor parties.

"Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame" by Gerald Knaus

*Europe's most significant intergovernmental organization for safeguarding human rights, the Council of Europe, has sold its soul to a dictator, and for a laughably low price. It's a tale as sad as it is shameful.*

"Rwanda: Progress or Powder Keg?" by Filip Reyntjens

*Rwanda under Paul Kagame has been hailed for its visionary leadership, economic progress, and reforms in education, health, and agriculture. Yet the regime's autocratic rule, human-rights abuses, persecution of the Hutu majority, and growing inequality point to an ominous future.*

"Hungary's U-Turn: Retreating from Democracy" by János Kornai

*The great achievements of Hungary's 1989–90 transition—including democracy, rule of law, market-oriented reform, and pluralism in intellectual life—are being dismantled as the world looks the other way.*

**Authoritarianism Goes Global**

I. "Countering Democratic Norms" by Alexander Cooley

*Favored by global conditions that lean their way, authoritarians have been busy over the last decade coming up with new and inventive ways to thwart the global advance of democracy and human rights.*

II. "Cyberspace Under Siege" by Ron Deibert

*Rosy assumptions once held that the Internet would inevitably undermine unfree regimes. A look around the world today, however, indicates that something very different and far more disturbing is going on.*

III. "Election Monitoring vs. Disinformation"

by Patrick Merloe

*Nonpartisan election monitoring has helped to foster democratization over the last thirty years, but now dictators are trying to sabotage it, often by spreading lies and confusion.*

"Nigeria's Hopeful Election" by Peter Lewis and Darren Kew

*In a surprising turn of events, opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari was able to outpoll incumbent Goodluck Jonathan—and the latter peacefully acknowledged his defeat.*

"The Medieval Roots of Democracy" by Jørgen Møller

*Europe in the Middle Ages was hardly democratic, but it did have law-based institutions that could and did stay the hands of kings, laying a crucial basis for future state-building and democracy-building alike.*

"Comment on Møller: The Importance of Equality" by Francis Fukuyama

*It is fine to acknowledge the importance of law-based rule to the eventual rise of modern democracy, but we must not overlook the even greater contribution of the idea of equality.*

"Structural Conditions and Democratization" by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme B. Robertson

*How are trends in global democratization likely to be shaped by the distribution of such key structural factors as income, ethnic or religious diversity, and the quality of the state?*

"Authoritarian Successor Parties" by James Loxton

*Why do significant numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders via free and fair elections, vote for political parties with deep roots in dictatorship, and how do such parties affect the consolidation of democracy?*

**Democratization**

The Volume 22, no. 6 (2015) issue of *Democratization* includes articles on democratic sanctions, cultural values, Belarus, Palestine, and subverting autocracy.

## New Research

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“Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?” by Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman

“The Relation between Cultural Values and Models of Democracy: A Cross-National Study” by Ammar Maleki and Frank Hendriks

“Who Owns ‘the Spring’ in Palestine? Rethinking Popular Consent and Resistance in the Context of the ‘Palestinian State’ and the ‘Arab Spring’” by Philip Leech

“The Election Trap: The Cycle of Post-Electoral Repression and Opposition Fragmentation in Lukashenko’s Belarus” by Konstantin Ash

“Strategic Silence as a Third Way: Political Parties and Transitional Justice” by Filipa Raimundo

“Rethinking Pathways to Democracy: Civil Society in Portugal and Spain, 1960s–2000s” by Tiago Fernandes

“Subverting Autocracy: Emancipative Mass Values in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes” by Margarita Zavadskaia and Christian Welzel

“Beyond the Arab Revolts: Conceptualizing Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa” by Anders C. Hårdig

The Volume 22, no. 5 (2015) issue of *Democratization* is a special issue on “Voting Rights in the Age of Globalization.”

“Beyond Citizenship and Residence? Exploring the Extension of Voting Rights in the Age of Globalization” by Daniele Caramani and Florian Grotz

“Morphing the Demos into the Right Shape. Normative Principles for Enfranchising Resident Aliens and Expatriate Citizens” by Rainer Bauböck

“The Enfranchisement of Citizens Abroad: Variations and Explanations” by Jean-Michel Lafleur

“The Enfranchisement of Resident Aliens: Variations and Explanations” by David C. Earnest

“Keeping Pandora’s (Ballot) Box Half-Shut: A Comparative Inquiry into the Institutional Limits of External Voting in EU Member States” by Derek S. Hutcheson and Jean-Thomas Arrighi

“Expatriates as Voters? The New Dynamics of External Voting in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Christof Hartmann

“Immigrant Enfranchisement in Latin America: From Strongmen to Universal Citizenship” by Cristina Escobar

### SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

*African Affairs*, Vol. 114, no. 456, July 2015

“Rejecting Rights: Vigilantism and Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa” by Nicholas Rush Smith

“Ethnicity, Intra-Elite Differentiation and Political Stability in Kenya” by Biniam E. Bedasso

“The Political Economy of Grand Corruption in Tanzania” by Hazel S. Gray

“The Political Economy of Property Tax in Africa: Explaining Reform Outcomes in Sierra Leone” by Samuel S. Jibao and Wilson Prichard

“After Restitution: Community, Litigation and Governance in South African Land Reform” by Christiaan Beyers and Derick Fay

“Briefing: Why Goodluck Jonathan Lost the Nigerian Presidential Election of 2015” by Olly Owen and Zainab Usman

*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 109, no. 3, August 2015

“International Interventions to Build Social Capital: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Sudan” by Alexandra Avdeenko and Michael J. Gilligan

“How Does Development Assistance Affect Collective Action Capacity? Results from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia” by James D. Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein

“Women’s Participation in Violent Political Organizations” by Jakana L. Thomas and Kanisha D. Bond

“Clan Governance and State Stability: The Relationship between Female Subordination and Political Order” by Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen

“War and Revenge: Explaining Conflict Initiation by Democracies” by Rachel M. Stein

“Demography and Democracy: A Global, District-level Analysis of Electoral Contestation” by John Gerring, Maxwell Palmer, Jan Teorell, and Dominic Zarecki

“When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing Effects of Deliberation during Constitution-Making, 1974–2011” by Todd A. Eisenstadt, A. Carl LeVan, and Tofiq Maboudi

“International Knowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China” by Haifeng Huang

*Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 12, October 2015

“A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy” by Svend-Erik Skaaning, John Gerring, and Henrikas Bartusevičius

“Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development” by Michael K. Miller

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 11, September 2015**

“Elections in the Arab World: Why Do Citizens Turn Out?” by Carolina de Miguel, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler

“Ethnic Parties and Public Spending: New Theory and Evidence From the Indian States” by Tariq Thachil and Emmanuel Teitelbaum

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 10, September 2015**

“How Economic Integration Affects Party Issue Emphases” by Dalston Ward, Jeong Hyun Kim, Matthew Graham, and Margit Tavits

“Executive Power and Media Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe” by Richard L. Bairett, Jr.

***Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 9, August 2015**

“Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying: Evidence From Latin America” by Joby Schaffer and Andy Baker

“Legitimacy Buying: The Dynamics of Clientelism in the Face of Legitimacy Challenges” by Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David W. Nickerson

“Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition” by Sara B. Hobolt and Catherine E. de Vries

“Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America” by Alisha C. Holland and Brian Palmer-Rubin

***Comparative Politics*, Vol. 48, no. 1, October 2015**

“Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Coalitions: Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions” by Mark

Beissinger, Amaney A. Jamal, and Kevin Mazur

“The Production of Electoral Intimidation: Economic and Political Incentives” by Isabela Mares and Boliang Zhu

“Literacy and Democracy despite Slavery: Forced Settlement and Postcolonial Outcomes in the Developing World” by Olukunle P. Owolabi

“Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania” by Catherine Boone and Lydia Nyeme

“From Single-Party to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: The Institutional Origins of Competitiveness in Post-Cold War Africa” by Yonatan Morse

***Comparative Politics*, Vol. 47, no. 4, July 2015**

“Multi-Level Elections and Party Fortunes: The Electoral Impact of Decentralization in Western Europe” by Bonnie M. Meguid

“Propaganda as Signaling” by Haifeng Huang

“Beyond the Secularism Trap: Religion, Political Institutions, and Democratic Commitments” by David T. Buckley

“Information, Elections, and Political Change” by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme B. Robertson

“The Communist Party’s Miracle? The Alchemy of Turning Post-Disaster Reconstruction into Great Leap Development” by Christian Sorace

***East European Politics*, Vol. 31, no. 3, 2015**

“State–Society Relations in Contemporary Russia: New Forms of Political and Social Contention” by Ammon Cheskin and Luke March

“Political Opposition in Russia: The Challenges of Mobilisation and the Political–Civil Society Nexus” by David White

“Women’s Human Rights in Russia: Outmoded Battlegrounds, or New Sites of Contentious Politics?” by Vikki Turbine

“The State, Civil Society and Social Rights in Contemporary Russia” by Eleanor Bindman

***East European Politics*, Vol. 31, no. 2, 2015**

“Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Test of Early Impact” by Nina Bandelj, Katelyn Finley, and Bogdan Radu

“Do Spoilers Make a Difference? Instrumental Manipulation of Political Parties in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime, the Case of Russia” by Grigorii V. Golosov

“Persistence and Decline of Political Parties: The Case of Estonia” by Tõnis Saarts

“Nationalisation of Regional Elections in Central and Eastern Europe” by Arjan H. Schakel

***International Political Science Review*, Vol. 36, no. 4, September 2015**

“Women’s Descriptive Representation in Developed and Developing Countries” by Daniel Stockemer

“Helping Hand or Heavy Hand? Foreign Aid, Regime Type and Domestic Unrest” by Daniel Yuichi Kono, Gabriella R. Montinola, and Nicholas Verbon

“The Rise of the Cosmopolitan Traditionalists: From the Arab Spring to a Global Countermovement?” by Adam K. Webb

## New Research

“Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalisation, and the Politics of Social Spending: Disentangling a Conditional Relationship” by Carsten Jensen and Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 53, no. 3, September 2015

“China’s Example for Meles’ Ethiopia: When Development ‘Models’ Land” by Elsie Fourie

“Unchanging Public Order Policing in Changing Times in East Africa” by Bruce Baker

“Between Party Capitalism and Market Reforms – Understanding Sector Differences in Rwanda” by Prithish Behuria

“Hands Off My Constitution: Constitutional Reform and the Workings of Democracy in Mali” by Susanna D. Wing

“The Battle for Zimbabwe in 2013: From Polarisation to Ambivalence” by Julia Gallagher

*Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 57, no. 3, Fall 2015

“States as Gender Equality Activists: The Evolution of Quota Laws in Latin America” by Jennifer M. Piscopo

“Distributive Politics in Developing Federal Democracies: Compensating Governors for Their Territorial Support” by Lucas I. González and Ignacio Mamone

“Assessing Freedom of Information in Latin America a Decade Later: Illuminating a Transparency Causal Mechanism” by Gregory Michener

“Electoral Realignment and Economic Change Among Brazil’s ‘New Middle Classes’” by Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos

*Middle East Journal*, Vol. 69, no 3, Summer 2015

“Egypt, Iran, and the Hizbullah Cell:

Using Sectarianism to “De-Arabize” and Regionalize Threats to National Interests” by Elizabeth Monier

“Censorship and the Islamic Republic: Two Modes of Regulatory Measures for Media in Iran” by Babak Rahimi

“Rabbi ‘Ovadia Yosef, the Shas Party, and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process” by Nissim Leon

*Middle East Policy*, Vol. 22, no. 3, Fall 2015

“Egypt’s Conspiracy Discourse: Liberals, Copts and Islamists” by Sherifa Zuhur and Marlyn Tadros

“China and the Uyghurs: The ‘Palestinization’ of Xinjiang?” by Michael Clarke

*Party Politics*, Vol. 21, no. 5, September 2015

“A Case of Valence Competition in Elections: Parties’ Emphasis on Corruption in Electoral Manifestos” by Luigi Curini and Paolo Martelli

“Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Voter Turnout” by Erik R Tillman

*Party Politics*, Vol. 21, no. 4, July 2015

“Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents’ Governing Strategies” by Marisa Kellam

“Party Institutionalization and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective” by Şebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi

“Left–Right Reversed: Parties and Ideology in Modern Turkey” by Abdullah Aydoğan and Jonathan B Slapin

“Interactive Party Effects on Electoral Performance: How Ethnic Minority Parties Aid the Populist right in Central and Eastern Europe” by Dan Koev

*World Politics*, Vol. 67, no. 4, October 2015

“Attribution And Accountability: Voting for Roads in Ghana” by Robin Harding

“Elections and Collective Action: Evidence from Changes in Traditional Institutions in Liberia” by Kate Baldwin and Eric Mvukiyeh

“Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin America” by Victor Menaldo and Daniel Yoo

**SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY**

**ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES**

*Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections.* By Michael H. Armacost. Columbia University Press, 2015. 289 pp.

*Bringing Race Back In: Black Politicians, Deracialization, and Voting Behavior in the Age of Obama.* By Christopher T. Stout. University of Virginia Press, 2015. 186 pp.

*Democracy’s Muse: How Thomas Jefferson Became an FDR Liberal, a Reagan Republican, and A Tea Party Fanatic, All While Being Dead.* By Andrew Burstein. University of Virginia Press, 2015. 256 pp.

*Democratic Humility: Reinhold Niebuhr, Neuroscience, and America’s Political Crisis.* By Christopher Beem. Lexington, 2015. 173 pp.

*Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism From the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism.* Edited by Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton. Cornell University Press, 2015. 299 pp.

*The European Union: Democratic Principles and Institutional Architectures in Times of Crisis.* Edited by Simona Piattoni. Oxford University Press, 2015. 298 pp.

*In Search of Democracy.* By Larry Diamond. Routledge, 2016. 469 pp.

*In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media.* By Diana C. Mutz. Princeton University Press, 2015. 263 pp.

*No Freedom Without Regulation: The Hidden Lesson of the Subprime Crisis.* By Joseph William Singer. Yale University Press, 2015. 215 pp.

*Party in the Street: The Antiwar Movement and the Democratic Party After 9/11.* By Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 313 pp.

*Practicing Democracy: Popular Politics in the United States From the Constitution to the Civil War.* Edited by Daniel Peart, and Adam I.P. Smith. University of Virginia Press, 2015. 296 pp.

*Running From Office: Why Young Americans Are Turned Off to Politics.* By Jennifer L. Lawless and Richard L. Fox. Oxford University Press, 2015. 211 pp.

*Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept.* By Dieter Grimm, translated by Belinda Cooper. Columbia University Press, 2015. 167 pp.

*Voters' Verdicts: Citizens, Campaigns, and Institutions in State Supreme Court Elections.* By Chris W. Bonneau and Damon M. Cann. University of Virginia Press, 2015. 163 pp.

*When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence.* By Genevieve Lester. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 239 pp.

#### AFRICA

*Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa.* By Robert A. Dowd. Oxford University Press, 2015. 224 pp.

*Democratic Contestation on the Margins: Regimes in Small African Countries.* Edited

by Claire Metelits and Stephanie Matti. Lexington Books, 2015. 173 pp.

*Oil, Democracy, and Development in Africa.* By John R. Heilbrunn. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 270 pp.

*Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Building.* By Harry Verhoeven. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 314 pp.

#### ASIA

*The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power.* By Thomas J. Christensen. W.W. Norton, 2015. 371 pp.

*China's Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance.* By Eva Pils. Routledge, 2015. 297 pp.

*Citizen Publications in China Before the Internet.* By Shao Jiang. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 268 pp.

*Pakistan's Enduring Challenges.* Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sarah J. Watson. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015. 310 pp.

*The Political Development of Modern Thailand.* Federico Ferrara. By Cambridge University Press, 2015. 328 pp.

*Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970–1979.* By Paul Y. Chang. Stanford University Press, 2015. 291 pp.

#### EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

*Nothing Is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia.* By Peter Pomerantsev. Public Affairs, 2014. 241 pp.

#### LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

*Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking*

*Institutions.* By Brian Wampler. University of Notre Dame Press, 2015. 297 pp.

*Barrio Rising: Urban Popular Politics and the Making of Modern Venezuela.* By Alejandro Velasco. University of California Press, 2015. 321 pp.

*Challenging Social Inequality: The Landless Rural Workers Movement and Agrarian Reform in Brazil.* Edited by Miguel Carter. Duke University Press, 2015. 494 pp.

*Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America: The Quiet Transformation.* By Ana Lorena De La O. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 178 pp.

*Enduring Reform: Progressive Activism and Private Sector Responses in Latin America's Democracies.* Edited by Jeffrey W. Rubin and Vivienne Bennett. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. 270 pp.

*Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape.* By Archibald R.M. Ritter and Ted A. Henken. First Forum Press, 2015. 373 pp.

*Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina.* By Mariela Szwarcberg. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 175 pp.

*Political Landscapes: Forests, Conservation, and Community in Mexico.* By Christopher R. Boyer. Duke University Press, 2015. 337 pp.

*Revolt of the Saints: Memory and Redemption in the Twilight of Brazilian Racial Democracy.* By John F. Collins. Duke University Press, 2015. 464 pp.

*Unearthing Conflict: Corporate Mining, Activism, and Expertise in Peru.* By Fabiana Li. Duke University Press, 2015. 265 pp.

#### MIDDLE EAST

*The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and*

## New Research

*Reform.* By Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. Oxford University Press, 2015. 324 pp.

*EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism.* By Vera Van Hüllen. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 242 pp.

*Gaining Freedoms: Claiming Space in Istanbul and Berlin.* By Berna Turam. Stanford University Press, 2015. 250 pp.

*Iron Cast of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa.* By Daniel P. Ritter. Oxford University Press, 2015. 273 pp.

*Islam and Politics in the Middle East: Explaining the Views of Ordinary Citizens.* By Mark Tessler. Indiana University Press, 2015. 245 pp.

*National Elections in Turkey: People, Politics, and the Party System.* By F. Michael Wuthrich. Syracuse University Press, 2015. 342 pp.

*Political Islam and Democracy in the Muslim World.* By Paul Kubicek. Lynne Rienner, 2015. 349 pp.

*Turkey's Difficult Journey to Democracy: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back.* By İltan Turan. Oxford University Press, 2015. 252 pp.

*Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion in*

*Morocco and the Arab World.* By Avi Max Spiegel. Princeton University Press, 2015. 246 pp.

### COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL

*The Anomie of the Earth: Philosophy, Politics, and Autonomy in Europe and the Americas.* Edited by Federico Luisetti, John Pickles, and Wilson Kaiser. Duke University, 2015. 260 pp.

*Decolonizing Democracy: Intersections of Philosophy and Postcolonial Theory.* By Ferit Güven. Lexington Books, 2015. 121 pp.

*Democratic Transitions: Conversations with World Leaders.* Edited by Sergio Bitar and Abraham F. Lowenthal. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. 467 pp.

*Enemies of Violence: Transnational Feminism, Postsocialism, and the Politics of Sex Trafficking.* By Jennifer Suchland. Duke University Press, 2015. 260 pp.

*Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy.* Edited by Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri. Oxford University Press, 2015. 284 pp.

*Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts.* By Samuel Issacharoff. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 298 pp.

*If God Were a Human Rights Activist.* By Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Stanford University Press, 2015. 130 pp.

*Managing Conflict in a World Adrift.* Edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. USIP Press, 2015. 629 pp.

*Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management.* By Anna Ohanian. Stanford University Press, 2015. 250 pp.

*The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions.* By Michael Walzer. Yale University Press, 2015. 172 pp.

*The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy.* By Richard Youngs. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. 212 pp.

*Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance.* Edited by Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 241 pp.

*The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas and How They Made the Modern World.* By Scott L. Montgomery and Daniel Chirot. Princeton University Press, 2015. 492 pp.

*The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators.* By Sarah Sunn Bush. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 272 pp.

*U.S. Foreign Policy on Transitional Justice.* By Annie R. Bird. Oxford University Press, 2015. 223 pp.

*Why Elections Fail.* By Pippa Norris. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 256 pp.

# APSA-CD

is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the V-Dem Institute and the International Forum.

## Executive Editor



**Staffan I. Lindberg** is professor of political science and director of the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; is one of four PIs for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem); Wallenberg Academy Fellow; selected member Young Academy of Sweden; and a Research Fellow in the QoG Institute. He is author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* and editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?*, and has also worked on women's representation, clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative relationships.

## Members



**Anna Lührmann** is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her doctoral thesis – completed in summer 2015 at Humboldt University (Berlin) – studies the causes and effects of United Nation's electoral assistance. She currently works on several research projects concerning electoral manipulation, regime legitimacy and the impact of democracy promotion.



**Kyle L. Marquardt** is a post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies identity politics and the politics of authoritarianism. His current project uses data from extensive field and survey research from Eurasia to examine the relationship between language and separatism. Other projects involve the use of list experiments to analyze support for authoritarian leaders and Bayesian latent variable analysis of the components of social identities.



**Kelly M. McMann** is an associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve University and the V-Dem project manager for subnational government. She currently is conducting research on how democracy develops within countries, studying contemporary cases in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union and historical cases in Europe. Her earlier research focused on corruption and activism and has been published in the books *Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia* and *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*.



**Eitan Tzelgov** is a senior post-doctoral fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. He studies legislative institutions and political parties. His dissertation, awarded the Carl Albert Award by the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association, examines the strategic use of parliamentary speeches by the legislative opposition.



**Yi-ting Wang** is assistant professor of political science, National Cheng Kung University (Taiwan) and affiliated researcher at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg. Her work primarily focuses on legislative institutions and politicians' accountability strategies with an emphasis on questions of conditions for democratic stability. Her dissertation addresses how and why legislative committees differ in their abilities to exert policy influence across democracies. Her current project explores the consequences of different legislative capacities to participate in law making and monitor the executive for the quality of democracies.



**Brigitte Zimmerman** is assistant professor of political science and Peter Thacher Grauer Fellow in public policy, UNC-Chapel Hill; affiliated researcher at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg; and V-Dem project manager for experiments. Her research agenda examines accountability institutions in consolidating democracies, with a geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa. In her dissertation, she analyzed the strategic responses of political officials to anti-corruption interventions, documenting patterns of corruption substitution through extensive fieldwork. Other current research addresses discrimination in petty corruption, incumbency advantage in diverse institutional contexts, the political economy of FDI and foreign aid, and the ethics of field research.

## Managing Editor



**Melissa Aten** is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.